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1Introduction 
Gábor Soós, Violetta Zentai
1. RATIONALE FOR MONITORING DEMOCRACY 
 AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Local democracy and the transformation of the local government system have often 
remained in the shadow of more appealing topics related to the larger political transfor-
mations in the post-socialist context. Councilors of local municipalities or municipal 
decision-making processes rarely capture the attention of researchers and analysts in 
contrast to, for example, the ideological struggles of ascending and descending politi-
cal parties or the power struggle between a prime minister’s oﬃce and line ministries. 
Yet, no one would deny that strengthening the pillars of local democracy is an essential 
aspect of the broader democracy-building endeavors in the societies concerned. This 
self-evident conception receives a closer scrutiny from those research and developmental 
organizations whose mission is to study and enhance democratic governance on the 
local level, which is often no less complicated than on the central level.
The Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), in partner-
ship with the Tocqueville Research Center (T–RC) in Budapest, has been conducting 
a multi-year project entitled ‘Indicators of Local Democratic Governance’ (hereafter: 
‘Indicators’). The project aims to help decision-makers and researchers assess and explain 
the state of local democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While there 
are numerous international research initiatives examining the condition of democracy 
on a national level, only a limited number of comparative inquiries have been launched 
at the subnational level. The ‘Indicators’ project is a modest but perhaps unique enter-
prise, having three broad aims: (a) the generation of original survey data and collection 
of other relevant statistical data; (b) regular reporting on the state of local democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe; and (c) the dissemination of results and standardized 
datasets to inform developmental and policy reform initiatives. 
Local government systems take a very diﬀerent shape in ‘old Western democracies’ 
depending on historical and political circumstances.1 European Union integration, 
despite having some important eﬀects on these systems, does not stipulate particular 
political and administrative structures for the national and subnational levels. On the 
contrary, it values diversity of traditions. Certain principles are spelled out, but those 
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do not stipulate systemic changes for the old or new member states. In CEE, SEE, and 
CIS countries, local government systems are in the making, replacing the old hierarchical 
territorial structures of the single party state (although in the latter group authoritarian 
structures are still prevalent). In some countries, mostly in the new EU member states, 
the reform or the radical rebuilding process (including constitutional and legal changes; 
elections, institutional, and public ﬁnance reforms; property restructuring) started more 
than a decade ago and has resulted in diﬀerent but more or less democratic governance 
systems. In several states of SEE and the CIS, local governments are in a transient state, 
often subject to progressive or nonprogressive changes, or simply stuck in national politi-
cal stalemates. They exist, but their autonomy is frequently formal and their mandates 
and governance structures are undecided or unstable. The study of the latter geographical 
group is equally as important as the former. The ﬁrst of the large, multi-year initiatives 
of the ‘Indicators’ project has a prime interest in countries that are beyond certain stages 
of democratization and modernization of their government systems. The study remains 
open to further geographical and conceptual expansion at a later stage.
The ‘Indicators’ initiative is working on the underlying assumption that building 
core institutions of democracy has a genuine value on its own, and it is also a precondi-
tion for eﬃcient policymaking at both the central and local levels. Practical experience 
from both the Western and post-socialist contexts, however, shows that, on the one 
hand, democracy is often not a guarantee to eﬃcient policymaking, and on the other, 
satisfactory policy performance is at times supported by political systems that are not 
democratic or are only partially so, or even worse. Nonetheless, as a holistic and nor-
mative concept, we propose that democratic political institutions are public goods in 
themselves, whereas their actual local conﬁgurations have diﬀerent potentials for eﬃcient 
policymaking to promote social and economic progress. 
The conceptual frame of the ‘Indicators’ initiative addresses those pillars of de-
mocracy that local governments build within their own bodies and processes, and also 
those that the social environment oﬀers. Local communities (in the most neutral sense 
of the term) do produce or cultivate institutions that help to build local democracy. 
Some elements of administrative and policy performance are included in the ‘Indica-
tors’ inquiry, but the main emphasis is elsewhere. Primarily, the initiative promotes 
a democracy-monitoring exercise to the beneﬁt of researchers, policymakers, and local 
administrators. It is expected that further research initiatives, whether aﬃliated with the 
‘Indicators’ project or not, could use the methodology and the data to seek correlations 
between democracy and policy performance in the case of particular local governments 
or whole governmental systems. 
Though local pillars of democracy provide the focus of its investigations, the ‘Indi-
cators’ initiative resonates with a recent conceptual shift that emphasizes governance in 
addition to, in combination with, or often instead of government.2 Governance embraces 
other social actors in decision-making and policy-implementing practices. Governance 
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highlights processes and outcomes instead of putting trust solely in institutional struc-
tures empowered to govern. By the same token, some balance between institutions and 
process-driven thinking is important to maintain. In this part of the world, the fear 
of bureaucratic and power-driven governance is prevalent and justiﬁed. But this fear 
should not make one blind to the value of democratically empowered institutions; that 
is, structures that are not like drawings in the sand. Ultimately, the ‘Indicators’ project 
investigates the potentials of local democratic governance in CEE as characterized by 
institutions as well as by actors, processes, and outcomes that go beyond the realms of 
local governments.
Despite the diﬀerences in the pace and scope of systemic changes, all countries in 
our inquiry are inﬂuenced by the dominant paradigm of decentralization.3 Decentrali-
zation has been accepted as an unavoidable direction of reforms, yet the connotations 
and policy impacts of the concept diﬀer. In addition to the devolution of power, the 
meanings of the term embrace democratization, reform of the policymaking process, 
and administrative and public ﬁnance reform. Sometimes decentralization represents 
a deliberate shift to enhance subnational layers of power and administration; in other 
instances it is a consequence of the shrinking or weakening state. As the most common 
trend in the region, decentralization signiﬁes the growing importance of local govern-
ments as they obtain larger mandates but not necessarily adequate ﬁnancial resources and 
democratic incentives. Decentralization undoubtedly creates possibilities for enhancing 
local democracy, but this is far from being a self-evident, causal relation.
Decentralization distinctively alters relations between levels of government. The 
‘Indicators’ project intends to address some of the issues of intergovernmental relations, 
but strictly from the perspective of the local level and not delving into the complexity 
of mid-tier levels of government. The project does cast light on how local democratic 
governance creates and relies on distinctive interfaces between national and subnational 
forces in a democracy. Most notably, local governance embraces political parties, is 
dependent on national civil service regulations, and is inﬂuenced by media property 
structures and general NGO regulations. Our inquiry intends to study the subtleties of 
these interfaces without subscribing deterministic or dependency theorems. 
It is often noted that even more developed government structures in the region are 
embedded in the frailty of political institutions, slowly-moving public administration 
reform, haphazard or frozen territorial restructuring, debated civil service reform, not 
to speak of battles over election reform and party systems. Nonetheless, there has been 
a general belief in a wide democratization process that reaches all corners of the post-
socialist world as well as other places in the post-cold-war international context. In 
the new millennium, this belief started to fade with the rise of populism in the CEE 
countries; the tensions that European integration have generated in the former ‘socialist 
block’; the uneven potentials for democratic change in the postwar western Balkans; 
the anti-democratic arrangements of consolidated presidential power in Russia; and, 
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the clearly authoritarian trend in many Central Asian countries, just to name a few 
experiences. The export of democracy has become more diﬃcult due to the growing 
discontent with the workings of international development organizations and the highly 
controversial proﬁle of the only superpower in the world.4 In the shadow of these larger 
concerns, the perplexities of newly established local government systems in CEE have 
also started to reveal themselves. 
The belief that power practices within and for smaller communities must be more 
democratic than those on the societal level (since they are closer to the public eye) 
has become challenged. Simpliﬁed accounts of local democracy-building have been 
undermined by instances of local power elites with great autonomy to privatize public 
assets being caught in improper deals, paralyzing in-ﬁghts in elected bodies, and lack 
of transparency in decision-making justiﬁed by democratic elections. Careful studies 
must examine the extent to which structural causes allow the misuse or abuse of power, 
in contrast to simply pointing ﬁngers at leaders with character faults. We believe that 
the ‘Indicators’ project will contribute to these studies and will create incentives to go 
further in democracy-building, rather than allowing it to slow down due to discontent 
or disappointments accumulated over a decade and a half.    
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, DATA AND OUTCOMES 
Democracy is a contested term. The ‘Indicators’ project draws on Beetham’s concep-
tualization of democracy, nowadays one of the most frequently used frameworks in 
democracy evaluations.5 Beetham argues that democracy implies decision-making about 
collectively binding rules and policies. A decision-making process is democratic to the 
degree that it is “subject to the control of all members of the collectivity considered 
as equals.”6 Therefore, the two key principles of democracy are popular control over 
decision-making (or at least decision-makers) and political equality. For the purpose of 
evaluation, democratic audits break down these two principles into four criteria.
 a) A guaranteed framework of equal rights. This includes access to justice and the rule 
of law, the basic civil and political rights. Citizens’ rights and their enforcement 
also provide limitations on government.
 b) Institutions of representative government. Free and fair elections are a basic in-
strument of democracy to promote popular control. Elections are democratic 
if they are meaningful, inclusive, fair, and uninﬂuenced by government power. 
The idea of meaningful and fair elections also includes competition amongst 
political forces, which have equal access to communication.
 c) Institutions of open and accountable government. A democratic government is 
transparent, and politically, legally, and ﬁnancially accountable to other bodies. 
The power of democratic government is limited by other formal institutions.
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 d) A civil or democratic society. Independent associations have the potential to en-
courage government responsiveness to public opinion and to increase equality 
among citizens. An organized society with a democratic political culture is a 
powerful instrument of democracy.
These four dimensions can be also adapted as a monitoring framework for local 
democracy. Nevertheless, they are not of equal importance in the analysis of local 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, and they must be adapted to the speciﬁc 
properties of local government systems. The ‘Indicators’ project devotes more attention 
to mapping the contribution of civil society to local democracy than, for example, to 
analyzing the problem of civil rights, which are better researched by other initiatives 
and show less variance in CEE.
The assessment of local democracy requires two additional dimensions. The ﬁrst 
comes from the local nature of the subject of analysis. A distinctive feature of local gov-
ernments is their autonomy, i.e., their freedom from the direct involvement of external 
forces. If local administrative units have no legal, political, and ﬁnancial autonomy, the 
term ‘local (self-) government’ loses its meaning. The degree of autonomy is a crucial 
element in the assessment of local democracy. Swedish audits of democracy point to 
the relevance of a second criterion in addition to the above. As the history of regime 
collapse in the 1930s demonstrates, a viable democracy requires a certain level of eﬀec-
tiveness. Consequently, policy performance is a crucial dimension of a local democracy 
assessment. In sum, local democracy is conceptualized as a local government that is 
autonomous, eﬀective, open, and representative, surrounded by a civil society in the 
framework of guaranteed political rights.
The ‘Indicators’ project collects two types of quantitative survey data: (1) data on 
the major actors in local democratic governance (2) comprehensive, longitudinal and 
cross-national data on local democratic governance. The Local Government Survey (LGS) 
collects comprehensive data on local governance such as objective information about 
the activities of local governments (especially concerning inclusive decision-making) 
and their social and political environment (parties, NGOs, and local media). In 2001 
administrative leaders of (in total) 2024, municipalities in Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and 
Romania were interviewed in the framework of LGS. The questionnaire was updated 
in 2002. The T–RC and its local partners completed a second round of data collection 
in all the municipalities in Estonia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia in 2003–2004. 
The data on local politicians is derived from the Local Representative Survey (LRS), 
which focuses on the activities, values, opinions, and demography of local councilors. 
In 2001 a pilot was conducted in Hungary to test both the questionnaire and the mail 
survey method. The mail surveys of LRS were conducted in Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria in 2002–2004. The currently available multi-country database 
includes the responses of approximately 5,000 local councilors and mayors from within 
the surveyed countries.7
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The initiative has resulted in two sets of country reports on the state of local demo-
cratic governance in seven countries. The ﬁrst volume, published in 2002, portrays 
Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Poland.8 The second volume, describing Bulgaria, 
Estonia, and Slovakia, will come out in 2005. Following this conceptual framework, 
the structure of the country reports is organized around six pillars or dimensions of 
local democratic governance. As those are not equally important in the political reality 
of Central and Eastern Europe, two dimensions (representation and civil society) are 
given more attention. The ﬁrst part of the country reports covers four components of 
local democracy (autonomy, eﬀectiveness, rights and the rule of law, and transparency 
and accountability). The conciseness of this discussion is explained by the availability 
of other publications (e.g., decentralization and eﬀectiveness are covered by other LGI 
initiatives and publications) and the focus of the original data gathered by the surveys 
of the project. The second part of the country reports highlights issues of representa-
tion (local elections and referenda, local parties and factions, local representatives, and 
responsiveness), and the third part addresses civil society components (local media, local 
civil society organizations, and citizens’ political culture). Country report writers used 
not only the actual survey data of the ‘Indicators’ project, but available statistical data 
and information derived from secondary analysis as well.
3. COMPARATIVE INQUIRIES
The conceptual framework and the survey data generated by the ‘Indicators’ initiative 
inspired LGI and T–RC to commission comparative analyses on various distinctive pil-
lars or dimensions of local democratic governance. Comparative inquiries were invited 
to explain country-speciﬁc correlations between diﬀerent variables of the research and 
to explore variances across the region. An open call for proposals was announced, to 
which numerous applicants responded, and the selected authors completed their analyses 
independently in 2003–2004. Authors were to embrace at least three countries from 
the pool and to use survey data in correspondence with their thematic choice and ini-
tial hypotheses. The topical and geographical interest of the proposed analyses turned 
out to be naturally diverse without any intervention. The current volume presents the 
seven best studies prepared in the framework of the ﬁrst comparative analytical phase 
of the ‘Indicators’ project. 
In chapter 1, Pawel Swianiewicz and Adam Mielczarek explore the roles of political 
parties in forming local democracies through observation of a complex set of variables. 
Their analysis partially proves the hypothesis that the role of political parties in local 
politics has gradually increased over the last twelve years. This increase has been faster 
in countries with more consolidated territorial systems (Poland, Bulgaria rather than 
Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and Slovakia). The size of the local government appears as a 
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very powerful variable explaining the importance of parties in local politics. The role 
of parties is more signiﬁcant in countries with proportional electoral systems than in 
countries with one-ward, majority local council elections. The analysis of survey data 
shows that popular beliefs of both politicians and experts overestimate the impact of the 
mayors’ nomination method on the role of parties in local politics. Political fragmen-
tation and the volatility of local councils is signiﬁcant in the countries observed, and 
may weaken the management capabilities of local governments. The party orientation 
(sympathy and membership) of local councilors and mayors is only loosely correlated 
with their political culture and policy preferences. Finally, the examination of the ideo-
logical landscape of local party factions upholds left-right cleavages, with variations in 
the meanings of left and right across countries. The authors suggest that cleavages are 
much more coherent than one might expect on the basis of popular beliefs concerning 
the chaotic character of the political scene in CEE countries, but it is also far from fully 
logical and consistent. 
In chapter 2, Zsolt Nyíri and Richard Vengroﬀ examine gender diﬀerences, par-
ticularly the so-called gender gap among local representatives in ﬁve countries: Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The authors assert that women are relatively 
well represented in local government in the region. Male and female locally elected 
oﬃcials in these countries share common educational backgrounds, a sense of opti-
mism regarding their respective municipalities, and belief in democracy as the best 
form of government. Although there are gender-related diﬀerences in commitment to 
core democratic values, these diﬀerences are relatively small. Female oﬃcials are more 
likely to be independent rather than formal members of political parties, indicating 
that their political bases and electoral support are built on personal networks as well 
as associational groups. This is further reinforced by ideological self-placement, which 
shows women generally to the left of their male counterparts and growth in this gap 
from generation to generation. The inquiry found that even among members of the 
same political party there is a small but persistent diﬀerence between male and female 
councilors, with women again tending to the left. Even when the analysis controls for 
a variety of other factors, such as education, postmaterialism, age, trust in government 
institutions, ideology, democratic values, organizational memberships, and country, 
gender remains a signiﬁcant but by no means the strongest predictor of political percep-
tions of the preferred role of government.
In chapter 3, Tania Gosselin illuminates the linkages between local media and the 
decisional performance and inclusive policy-making practices of local governments, 
respectively, in Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. The author’s ﬁrst set of hypoth-
eses articulates that localities endowed with more media outlets, where the ownership 
structure is more diverse, where the quality of coverage is higher and where more citizens 
consume local media, are expected to display better democratic performance. The mixed 
ﬁndings are explained by a potential threshold eﬀect: the number of media appears to 
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have an eﬀect on performance only above a certain threshold; in turn, once a local media 
system’s ownership structure is diverse enough, it may ‘take over’ the positive impact of 
the number of local outlets. The analysis also shows that the impact of the media features 
identiﬁed, notably the positive eﬀect of coverage quality on democratic performance, 
is quite robust. The second stage of the analysis explores three potential channels of 
media eﬀects on democratic performance. Accordingly, the presence and dynamism of 
civil society enhances the impact of media on democratic performance. The number 
of NGOs in the locality and citizens’ public interest-oriented activities also enhance 
the impact of media features on democratic performance. The chapter concludes that 
further research is required to better understand local media, to formulate more precise 
hypotheses about their eﬀects, and to interpret ﬁndings with greater accuracy.
 In chapter 4, Daniel Pop addresses the systematic relationship between municipal-
ity size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters in Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania. The author argues that the state of local democracy in these three countries 
seems to be rather weak in terms of system capacity to respond. A common ﬁnding for 
all three countries is that municipalities are highly dependent on central government 
transfers, and therefore there is not much incentive for citizens to participate. The general 
trend found for all three country-cases is that the smaller the municipality, the higher 
its expenditure rigidity. Larger municipalities are more likely to have higher rates both 
of citizen participation and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters. Participa-
tion becomes minimal only in very large units, but the three countries concerned do 
not have many of these large units. In conclusion, the success of citizens’ participation 
depends on the structure of the municipal system in these countries. By reducing the 
share of extremely small municipalities, in which the citizens’ eﬀectiveness is the low-
est, it would be possible to create opportunities to build a more vibrant and dynamic 
community life. The editors stress that these ﬁndings will be somewhat surprising but 
very instructive to those, in particular, who believe unconditionally in the democracy 
eﬀects of extreme decentralization.
In chapter 5, Georg Sootla and Kristina Grau seek quantitative evidence for the 
existence of diﬀerent models of local government in diﬀerent countries, using the examples 
of Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia. Even if the main variable accounting for diﬀerences 
among the countries is the legal frameworks, the authors ﬁnd considerable variation 
among local governments within one country, indicating that rather diﬀerent patterns 
of actual behavior and attitudes do exist in the same legal framework. The analysis un-
covers clear diﬀerences between Estonia and Latvia in institutional conﬁgurations, the 
distribution of authority, and patterns of behavior under diﬀerent legal contexts in those 
two countries. In Estonia the strong role of the executive and in Latvia the strong role of 
council is emphasized. Accordingly, consistent committee and cabinet systems produce 
internally more homogeneous local governance in comparison with the council-mayor 
system. In Hungary such diﬀerences are caused not only by political variables but also 
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by diﬀerences in the legal context at elections in both small and large communities. The 
authors formulate a question for further analysis: does this ﬂexibility of institutional and 
role conﬁgurations contribute to the eﬀectiveness of local democracy?
In chapter 6, Philip Franek examines the links between the concept of delegates 
and trustees, classifying local councilors and their declared representation of national 
vs. local interests.
The correlation was present in the case of all three countries observed (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, and Hungary). The author found that councilors who declared a preference 
for solving local problems rather than pursuing national goals voted more often accord-
ing to their own opinion (trustees), gave less special consideration to the party, had no 
aspiration for a future political career on the national level, and in the case of Hungary, 
did not have professional political training. At the same time, there was no correla-
tion between preference for national vs. local goals and political party membership. 
This result suggests that the dividing line between councilors who are oriented to local 
or national goals is more related to the concept of delegates or trustees than to party 
membership. The data for Bulgaria and Hungary show that party membership has an 
inﬂuence on the relation between the other variables. The comparative analysis tried to 
identify how delegates and trustees diﬀer in terms of civic engagement, embeddedness 
in the municipality, professional political training, and plans for the future, but no 
signiﬁcant links were captured.
In chapter 7, Cristina Nicolescu and Amelia Gorcea explore the factors inﬂuencing 
the approach that local representatives take towards their constituency by comparing 
Bulgaria, Estonia, and Poland. Besides considering the notion of social capital, the 
analysis relies on other variables, such as value orientations and socialization of coun-
cilors, and some context inﬂuences. As for social capital, the tested models have shown 
that institutional trust and generalized trust have diﬀerent explanatory impacts, sup-
porting those scholars who propose to approach the two concepts separately as they are 
of diﬀerent origins. The three country cases show diﬀerences in the determinants that 
have an impact on the relationship between the representatives and their constituents, 
even if the dependent variable shows the prevalence of the same approach of local 
representatives towards their constituency in all countries. The Estonian case shows 
unexpectedly that an overwhelming majority of local representatives relate to their 
constituency horizontally, whereas at the other end, the Polish representatives showed 
a highly balanced distribution of behavior. The authors suggest that the combination 
of factors that stimulate local representatives to act as citizen-oriented decision-makers 
is far from being exhaustively explained by their study. 
The selected comparative studies oﬀer some general lessons for scholars, critics, 
experts, and advocates of local democratic governance in post-socialist countries. 
The editors value, in particular, those ﬁndings that reveal the shortcomings of some 
mainstream scholarly beliefs. These beliefs often replicate popular accounts when making 
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strong statements on the nature of local governance systems (e.g., the role of political 
parties, the nature of ideological cleavages, and the impact of electoral systems) with 
little evidence or based on simpliﬁed analogies with national political systems. The study, 
which reveals that citizens’ interest and actual involvement in shaping the decisions of 
local governments are lowest in the extremely small municipalities (mainly due to their 
lack of ﬁnancial autonomy which, realistically, will remain the state of aﬀairs in this 
region for some time), also undermines some frequently voiced political convictions. 
The editors stress that these ﬁndings will be somewhat surprising but very instructive 
to those, in particular, who believe unconditionally in the ultimate democracy eﬀects 
of the maximum degree of decentralization.
The analyses published in this volume powerfully demonstrate that there are some 
aspects of local democratic governance that are poorly researched, and the ‘Indicators’ 
project provides much needed data for their study. The problem of gender and media are 
cases in point. Nonetheless, the authors of both the gender and the media topics argue 
that a more reﬁned inquiry and more ambitious data generation would be essential to 
produce subtle analyses of local governance structures in the region in their respective 
problem areas. This commonality stands in spite of the fact that the gender issue has 
had a relatively lower proﬁle than the media in recent broader democracy debates.
This volume sends a strong invitation to both researchers aﬃliated with the ‘Indi-
cators’ project and to any external collaborating parties to identify further measurable 
components of local democratic governance. These might explain, for example, the 
diﬀerent role models (delegates and trustees) and leadership styles of local representa-
tives that have a crucial impact on the quality of local democracy and of policymaking 
processes. The editors stress that, in addition to ﬁnding the missing variables of political 
culture, the ‘Indicators’ inquiry should also contemplate developing case studies in the 
countries already researched, that portray the subtleties of interplay between diﬀerent 
variables of the quantitative analysis. 
Finally, through the work of the authors in this volume we are shown not only the 
achievements of the ‘Indicators’ project, but also its lacunae. Topics of autonomy in 
the context of intergovernmental relations, the signiﬁcance of transparency, mainstream 
and experimental forms of inclusive policymaking, and the correlation of democracy 
performance and policy eﬀectiveness should be addressed in all areas where the project 
is generating knowledge: data gathering, analyses, and advocacy as well.
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4. BEYOND RESEARCH
Democracy-monitoring projects could and should have an impact beyond the wider 
research community. The ‘Indicators’ project has concentrated so far on gathering and 
anlyzing data indispensable for evaluating the performance of local democracies. In 
the next phase of the project, the sponsoring and implementing institutions will mo-
bilize interest on the part of various national and subnational actors who have some 
leverage to inspire the prime actors in local governance to reﬂect critically upon their 
practices. Along with other potential instruments, the survey data could also be used to 
rank the performance of local democracy within particular countries, thus stimulating 
some healthy competition among cities/municipalities. The monitoring methodology 
could, for example, be adopted as a collective exercise to be used by associations of local 
municipalities within a particular country. Individual municipal governments seeking 
accessible and aﬀordable self-evaluation methods could also apply the methodology for 
their own purposes. National governments could rely on it as a measure of the outcomes 
of major political and policy reform initiatives. International organizations could add 
their governance assessment outcomes to the results of the ‘Indicators’ project, to produce 
more comprehensive data. Finally, regular reports on the status of local democracy in any 
post-socialist country should be seen as a serious eﬀort to shed light on the fundamental 
issues of social and political transformation.
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Parties and Political Culture in Central 
and Eastern European Local Governments
Paweł Swianiewicz, Adam Mielczarek
ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses issues related to the presence and signiﬁcance of parties in 
the local politics of seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe. First, we look at 
how many councilors and mayors belong to parties or use party support in election 
campaigns, and then we consider the relative importance of party politics in the local 
decision-making process. As there is a great variation among the seven countries on 
this issue, we have tested the variation against some possible institutional factors: the 
nature of the electoral system (proportional or majoritarian), the position and method 
of appointment of mayors (strong mayoralty versus collective leadership), and the type 
of territorial organization (fragmented or consolidated systems). Our analysis conﬁrms 
that territorial organization and electoral systems have a signiﬁcant impact, but fails 
to ﬁnd convincing evidence on the impact of the mayor’s position. We also examine 
political fragmentation of local councils and ﬁnd that it is usually signiﬁcantly higher 
than in Western European countries.  
Another factor germane to our topic is the political culture of individual parties and 
its possible inﬂuence on the views of the local councilors. Our approach was to check 
the views of councilor-members of diﬀerent parties on certain topics: their self-location 
on the left-right political scale, market individualism, social individualism, egalitarian-
ism, elitism (paternalism), and their acceptance of the general direction of political 
transformation. We conclude that the most vital cleavage still seems to be the division 
between post-communists and groups rooted in the former democratic opposition. But 
the parties themselves are not homogeneous—councilors from the same party diﬀer 
signiﬁcantly in their views related to political culture, and this variation is not much 
lower than it is among all the councilors from various parties. 
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and Eastern European Local Governments
Paweł Swianiewicz, Adam Mielczarek
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of party politics in local governments in Central and Eastern Europe has not 
yet received the attention it deserves. An unspoken and rather naive assumption persists 
that party politics on a local level is not (and should not be) important. Facts and events 
that obviously contradict this assumption are treated as embarrassing distortions rather 
than as a natural part of the fabric of local politics.
But in classical theories of representative democracy, political parties are treated as an 
essential aspect of pluralist societies (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Dahl 1961). In his compara-
tive study of urban community power structures, Clark (1967) suggests that having a 
strong system of political parties increases the chances for pluralist, as opposed to elitist, 
local decision-making. And party politics is increasingly being seen as important at the 
local government level in various countries. Sundberg (1987) noted the politicization 
of municipal elections in Nordic countries, where the role of political parties in the 
nomination of local councilors increased consistently over time. His study shows that 
between the 1930s and 1990s the proportion of councilors in parties increased from 
less than half to over 90% (see table 1.1). 
Another example of highly politicized local government is found in the UK, where 
several studies have conﬁrmed the role of parties in making policy choices. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive was a study of Sharpe and Newton (1984), who argued that party 
color had an increasing importance on spending patterns during the 1960s and 1970s. 
They came to the conclusion that parties “are not mere transmission belts of majority 
interests or needs, but they have views of their own as to what policies they wish to pursue, 
and they only modify these views if  forced to do so because they have a close competitor” 
(p. 202). Several other studies have conﬁrmed these observations (e.g., Barnett et al. 
1990, Page et al. 1990, Hoggart 1984, Hoggart and Shrives 1991).  
The role of parties in local government has been somewhat weaker in southern 
Europe, although Balme (1989), for example, shows that political color has been an 
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important factor explaining policy choices in France. A study by Hoﬀman-Martinot 
(1998) shows that over 97% of Norwegian or Finnish mayors were members of political 
parties in the 1980s, while in France the proportion was considerably lower (below 85%). 
In Belgium, 90% of mayors belong to political parties (Steyvers 2003). In addition, it 
appears that cities with strong party organizations (SPO) diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their 
policy choices from local governments in which parties are weak (Miranda 1987).  
But a diminution of the role and social prestige of parties has become evident in 
several newer analyses. This process is seen as one element of the crisis of traditional 
representative democracy, and it concerns both the central and local political scenes 
(Franklin et al. 1992, Clark and Lipset 1991, Clark and Lipset 2001, Clark 2000, 
Gabriel et al. 2002). Denters (2002) shows that in the Netherlands, membership in 
parties dropped from around 10% of the adult population in the 1950s and 1960s to 
just over 2.5% in the 1990s. Local politics no doubt reﬂected this process as well. 
While the crisis of parties in Western local democracies is connected to an extent 
with the values and attitudes of postmodernism (as described by Back, 2003), the situ-
ation is quite diﬀerent in Central and Eastern Europe. The political arena is extremely 
unstable, where new parties are created and disappear every year, and many splits and 
mergers occur on a regular basis. One very simple but powerful indicator of the weak-
ness of political parties is the low party membership in this part of Europe (see table 
1.2). In all four CEE countries included in this table, party membership is lower than 
the mean, and in Poland it is the lowest among the 20 countries in the study. Some 
authors also claim that the traditional left-right dimension is increasingly irrelevant and 
that the diﬀerences between parties in Central and Eastern Europe are often diﬃcult to 
deﬁne. Last but not least, the reputation of political parties among the general public in 
Central and Eastern Europe is low—they are seen as pursuing selﬁsh goals rather than 
taking care of the public wealth.  
Table 1.1
Proportion of Councilors Elected from Party Lists in Nordic Countries [%]
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
1915 34 NA 38 NA
1925 57 NA 50 NA
1935 58 NA 62 NA
1945 63 62 66 70
1955 60 79 77 99
1965 58 89 85 98
1975 86 96 91 98
1985 90 98 95 99
Source: Based on Sundberg (1987).
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The picture is even more chaotic at the local level. Low membership rates make the 
role of political parties in local politics especially problematic. A study of local govern-
ments in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, conducted in the early 
1990s by the Local Democracy and Innovation Project (LDI), concluded that “party 
membership” was seen as one of the least important qualiﬁcations for local councilors 
(Baldersheim et al. 1996). This observation was conﬁrmed by a second wave of LDI 
projects conducted in 1997 in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.
In this chapter we attempt to map and analyze the role of political parties in local 
governments in an empirical, comparative setting of several countries of Central and 
Table 1.2
Party Members as a Percentage of Voters
Country Year Total membership base Membership/electorate ratio [%]
Austria 1999 1,031,052 17.66
Finland 1998 400,615 9.65
Norway 1997 242,022 7.31
Greece 1998 600,000 6.77
Belgium 1999 480,804 6.55
Switzerland 1997 293,000 6.38
Sweden 1998 365,588 5.54
Denmark 1998 205,382 5.14
Estonia 2002 14,400 4.90
Slovakia 2000 165,277 4.11
Italy 1998 1,974,040 4.05
Portugal 2000 346,504 3.99
Czech Republic 1999 319,800 3.94
Spain 2000 1,131,250 3.42
Ireland 1998 86,000 3.14
Germany 1999 1,780,173 2.93
Holland 2000 294,469 2.51
Hungary 1999 173,600 2.15
United Kingdom 1998 840,000 1.92
France 1999 615,219 1.57
Poland 2000 326,500 1.15
Mean 4.99
Source: Mair, van Biezen (2001) quoted after Walecki (2002), with the exception of Estonia which 
is based on Sikk (2003).
Note: Bold font indicates Central and East European countries. 
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Eastern Europe. The ﬁrst part of the analysis focuses on the changing role of political 
parties in Central and East European local governments, as well as the diﬀerences both 
between and within individual countries. The second part looks at diﬀerences in the 
political cultures of parties present in local governments, as measured by the values and 
opinions declared by the local politicians who are members of these parties. 
1.1 Approaching the Topic: Research Questions
The very wide range of questions asked in our research prohibits discussion of every 
single issue in depth. But rather than limit the scope of the analysis, we decided to 
take a broad approach. Since this topic has never been the subject of a comprehensive 
analysis, we feel it is more valuable to explore wide-ranging aspects of it, even if (due to 
space and data limitations) some of our conclusions must be regarded as temporary and 
needing conﬁrmation through more detailed analysis in the future. Four basic research 
questions, discussed below, provided the direction for our study.
1.1.1 What Is the Role of Political Parties in Local Politics?
In looking at this issue we want to discover, ﬁrst, if parties are present (i.e., do they have 
their councilors and mayors) and second, how inﬂuential they are (i.e., do they play a 
role in local decision-making).
The second question is asked in several ways. First, we use the “reputational” method 
derived from Hunter’s classic community power study (1953) to determine whether 
political parties are seen as important actors in local politics. Second, we ask councilors 
and mayors to what extent they consider the opinion of their party committees when 
they make important decisions. Third, we ask how important the parties are to councilors 
and mayors as a source of information on local policy issues. 
As mentioned earlier, party membership is at a low level in Central and Eastern 
Europe. We also know that parties are rather disliked by the general public and that the 
dominant ideology of local government reform has been anti-partisan. A typical slogan 
used by many reformers but also by local leaders is that “a hole in the bridge is not a 
political issue.” This supposes that the issues local governments deal with are politically 
neutral or “objective” and do not leave much space for partisan or ideological debate. 
The slogan itself is highly controversial. One could argue that while a “hole” may not 
be political, the question of who should ﬁx it, or how, can be easily connected to ideo-
logical value choices. Based on the results of a 1991 LDI project survey, Baldersheim 
et al. (1996) has noted that “not being a member of a political party” was among the 
most desirable characteristics of an “ideal local councilor.” A 1997 LDI survey showed 
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quite similar results. However, new parties are gradually establishing their place in the 
political system, and local government is an important ﬁeld for their activity. 
These observations lead us to hypothesize that:
 • The role of political parties in local politics is not very important (e.g., the mem-
bership rate among mayors and councilors is signiﬁcantly lower than in countries 
of the European Union), but has been gradually increasing during the last twelve 
years.
1.1.2 What Is the Variation in the Role of Political Parties 
  in Diﬀerent Municipalities?
The essence of local democracy is variation. What is true and important in one town 
can be irrelevant in another, and the same applies to the role of political parties. One 
can expect that the shape of local politics varies from one country to another, but also 
from one municipality to another within one country. The variation may be accounted 
for by a number of factors, loosely grouped as:  
 (i) country-speciﬁc factors, such as political culture, and
 (ii) the institutional features of the local government system. 
We have focussed on the latter group, and particularly on the factors mentioned at 
the beginning of this section. 
Parties, like other organized groups, are usually more numerous and more active in 
larger communities (Dahl and Tufte 1973, Clark 1967). Also, as noted in the introduc-
tory section, political parties are usually more signiﬁcant in the territorially consolidated 
countries of northern Europe than in southern Europe which is more geographically 
fragmented. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the rapid increase in the level of party 
membership of councilors in Nordic countries (see table 1.1) occurred at the same time 
as the territorial amalgamation reforms. 
These observations have led to our next two hypotheses: 
 • The increase in the role of parties in local politics is faster in countries with more 
consolidated territorial systems (Poland, and Bulgaria rather than Estonia, Latvia, 
Hungary, and Slovakia). 
 • The increase is also faster in big cities (in which party organizations often play a 
decisive role in local politics) than in small communities (where parties are often still 
nonexistent and most councilors as well as mayors are elected as independents).
Proportional representation forces the candidates to be organized in larger electoral 
lists, and such a system requires that the groups have recognizable labels that voters can 
vote for. For this reason our fourth hypothesis expects that:
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 • The role of parties is bigger in countries with proportional electoral systems than in 
countries with one-ward, majority local council elections. 
Comparative studies of the local government systems of CEE countries (Horváth 
2000, Kandeva 2001) indicate that most of the analyzed countries belong to the ﬁrst 
group (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania), while Slovakia represents the majority sys-
tem (although elections are organized in multi-councilor wards). Hungary and Poland 
are more complicated, as election is based on the majority principle in municipalities 
with a population below 10,000 in Hungary and below 20,000 in Poland. The larger 
Polish local governments have a proportional system, while in the larger cities of Hun-
gary the system is more complex and could be classiﬁed as mixed. This may strengthen 
the diﬀerence between small and large units, as we suggested earlier. However, the 
experience of EU countries suggests that a high intensity of partisan politics in local 
governments may also coincide with majoritarian electoral systems (e.g., local govern-
ments in the UK). 
The position of mayor is another important factor. There is a clear distinction 
between countries where the council elects the mayor (Estonia and Latvia) and those 
where a popular election by the general public occurs (all remaining countries). Poland 
is a particularly interesting case, as the system was changed in 2002, and an open goal 
of the electoral reform was to limit party inﬂuence on local governance. In the UK, 
the introduction of direct election of mayors resulted in non-partisan mayors in half 
of the communities that adopted this institutional arrangement (Elcock and Fenwick 
2003). Mayor Ken Livingstone in London is perhaps the best known example of this 
phenomenon.
However, empirical data from OECD countries are inconsistent on this question. 
Mouritzen and Svara (2002, 176, 184–190) note that in “strong-mayor” systems (parts 
of the USA, France, Italy, and Portugal), the role of local politician as a spokesperson 
for a party is usually perceived as much less important than it is in “committee-leader” 
or “collective-leader” systems1 (Sweden, Denmark, the UK, and the Netherlands). 
Countries with “council-manager” systems (parts of the USA, Finland, and Norway) are 
much more diversiﬁed, but on average they are closer to weak than strong with respect 
to the role of the spokesperson for a party. Although this observation is made on the 
basis of Chief Executive Oﬃcers’ (CEOs) opinions on the characteristics of an “ideal 
politician,” Mouritzen and Svara note that “the attitudes of CEOs do not determine 
the behaviour of elected oﬃcials, but they presumably contribute to the deﬁnition of 
norms of appropriate behavior that elected oﬃcials seek to meet” (185). On the other 
hand, Mouritzen and Svara discovered in the same research that in CEOs’ perceptions 
of the actual roles performed by mayors, partisan leadership was the most frequent in 
the committee-leader form, followed by the strong-mayor system, while it was weakest 
in countries with council-manager and collective forms of government (69–71). (It 
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is interesting that the council-manager form is perceived as the least partisan in both 
instances.)
Of all the CEE countries analyzed, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland before the 2002 
reform have the closest to a collective form of leadership (although in many respects the 
situation in Poland before 2002 was similar to the committee-leader form). Hungary, 
where the council plays a strong role and where  most executive functions are performed 
by  the CEO, is not far from the council-manager form, although the direct election of 
the mayor and a more than ceremonial role for him or her is a deviation from the ideal 
model. The situation in Bulgaria, Poland (after 2002), Slovakia, or Romania is more 
diﬃcult to classify. It is deﬁnitely close to the strong-mayor system, but a frequent lack 
of control of the majority of the council is an important diﬀerence from the description 
provided by Mouritzen and Svara. The same applies to limitations on the hiring or ﬁring 
of key persons in the administration, which are not too severe in Slovakia or Romania, 
but considerably limit the power of mayors in Poland (where approval is needed for the 
nomination of the city treasurer or city secretary) or in Bulgaria (where council appoints 
deputy mayors). Perhaps this form could be called “strong-mayor with a strong control 
by the council,” which is closer to “sharing leadership”—to use the label of Getimis 
and Grigoriadou (2003). 
Disregarding the conﬂicting conclusions which may be drawn from the Mouritzen 
and Svara study, and considering instead the frequently stated goals of executive power 
reforms in CEE local governments, a ﬁfth hypothesis emerges:
 • The role of parties in local politics is larger in countries with collective forms of 
leadership (Latvia, Estonia, Poland before 2002) than in countries closer to the 
strong-mayor system (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland after 2002), and even 
larger in Hungary where the system is closest to the council-manager form.  
1.1.3 How Fragmented and Volatile Is the Local Political Scene?
The political environment is an important condition shaping the capacity of local gov-
ernments to act eﬀectively. We can expect that a very fragmented local council as well 
as frequently changing governing coalitions will make implementation of long-term 
policies extremely diﬃcult. Mouritzen and Svara (2002) cite data according to which 
chief administrators see conﬂicts between political parties as one of the signiﬁcant factors 
having a negative eﬀect on their performance. Although party fragmentation is not the 
only factor inﬂuencing the intensity of conﬂicts between countries (e.g., the absence 
or presence of a consensual style of politics is also important), there is no doubt that 
conﬂicts within highly consolidated councils are less likely to occur. Our earlier study 
suggests that political fragmentation in local governments in Polish cities is much larger 
than in the cities of Western Europe (see  Swianiewicz and Klimska 2003, as well as 
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Gabriel et al. 2002). We expect that the same may be true in other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, so our next hypothesis states that:
 • Political fragmentation and volatility of local councils is signiﬁcant (more than is 
typical in West European cities) and may be potentially dangerous for the manage-
ment capabilities of local governments.
Another factor that may potentially inﬂuence the capacity to implement coherent 
long-term policies is the volatility of political parties in local elections. We expect that 
this is quite high in Central and Eastern Europe. This expectation is based on the general 
observation that rapid changes occur in the political arena of the analyzed countries.2 This 
high political volatility is well documented in Polish local governments (see Swianiewicz 
and Klimska 2003 for comparison of 1998 and 2002 local election results), but unfor-
tunately our data do not permit extending this analysis to other countries as well. 
1.1.4  Do Diﬀerent Parties Represent Distinct
  and Coherent Political Cultures? 
Are local parties signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other? Do local councilors who are 
members of or declare support for diﬀerent parties have distinct values and diﬀerent 
policy preferences? What are the typical features of the political culture of supporters 
and members of various parties? 
Earlier attempts to answer these questions have not produced a very clear picture. 
An analysis of the variation of political cultures of the supporters of diﬀerent parties in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, based on a 1991 survey, was rather 
inconclusive (Swianiewicz and Clark 1996). However, a few years later, an analysis of a 
Polish local government election in 1994 gave an unexpectedly coherent picture of the 
variation between local party members (Swianiewicz 1996).
In our analysis we distinguish between several dimensions of political culture:3
 • the left-right self-location of local politicians;
 • market individualism;
 • social individualism;
 • egalitarianism; and 
 • elitism (paternalism).
In addition to this set of general values local leaders believe in, we take into account 
three dimensions that are particularly important in Central and Eastern Europe at the 
present time:
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 • the level of “acceptance for general system changes” after 1990 (measured by ac-
ceptance of a democratic system and integration with the European Union);
 • “communist roots/path dependency” of party members; and
 • modernism (measured by education level and Internet use).
The general picture of the political arena in the analyzed countries is often somewhat 
chaotic. Frequent changes of party maps, unexpected changes in governing coalitions, 
and unclear ideological diﬀerences between the main political opponents on important 
policy issues are all typical elements of the picture in Central and Eastern Europe. These 
observations lead us to a further hypothesis that:
 • The party orientation (sympathy, membership) of local councilors and mayors is only 
loosely correlated with their political culture and policy preferences. Nevertheless, 
parties diﬀer from each other and our report will attempt to map these diﬀerences. 
Also, we propose that:
 • There is not a clear international pattern of diﬀerences between parties. Parties 
that  use similar labels (such as liberal, social-democrat, and in particular left- and 
right-wing) in diﬀerent countries are not necessarily similar to each other.
1.2 Sources of Data 
The Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project (ILDGP) survey, conducted 
in 2000–2003, has provided the most important source of data. The ILDGP project 
included an extensive survey of councilors and mayors (Local Representatives Survey—
LRS), and another of chief executive oﬃcers, from which we derive information on the 
political composition of local councils as well as the political position of mayors.
Some supplementary, comparative data have also been drawn from surveys in 1991 
and 1997 that were part of the Local Democracy and Innovation project (LDI).4
Most of the analysis is based on a survey of councilors and mayors conducted dur-
ing 2002 and 2003 in ﬁve countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
A survey of chief administrative oﬃcers conducted in 2000 and 2001 within the same 
project has made it possible to extend our data in some cases to Latvia and Romania. 
Historical analyses based on LDI surveys are limited to Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
Table 1.3 illustrates the sources of data and the sample size in individual surveys.
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2. ARE PARTIES PRESENT IN LOCAL POLITICS?
2.1  PARTY MEMBERSHIP
Despite the crisis of partisan politics discussed earlier, party membership of local coun-
cilors in several of the EU countries is quite high, and usually much higher than in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as table 1.4 shows.
Interestingly enough, the ranking in table 1.4 does not fully correspond with the 
ranking of party membership presented in table 1.2. In the UK, Ireland, and the Neth-
erlands, the proportion of voters that are members of political parties is relatively low, 
but their local councils are highly politicized. Territorial organization is a very impor-
tant factor, and we should note that the EU countries included in the table are mostly 
located in northern Europe, where they are usually more territorially consolidated. Ac-
cording to Loughlin (2001), the situation is slightly diﬀerent in the more fragmented 
parts of southern Europe. In France, political parties are virtually nonexistent in small 
localities, and the  national parties exert real control over local coalitions only in towns 
over 30,000. In both Italy and Greece, most councilors traditionally belong to parties, 
although the picture has begun to change recently in Italy.  
The diﬀerences found among European countries are conﬁrmed by data on the 
party membership of local mayors (see table 1.5). The level of partisanship is lowest in 
Central and Eastern Europe, while it is most often highest in countries traditionally 
associated with north European local government systems. 
Table 1.3
 Data Sources and Sample Size in Individual Surveys
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Latvia Poland Romania Slovakia
Survey of councilors—Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project (2002–2003)
N 956 983 982 NA 759 NA 890
Survey of mayors—Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project (2002–2003)
N 95 77 70 NA 38 NA 109
Survey of Chief Executive Officers—Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project (2000–2001)
N 189 291 646 241 579 557 413
Survey of mayors—Local Democracy and Innovation Project
1991
1997
NA
NA
NA
NA
206
NA
NA
NA
503
521
NA
NA
167
313
Survey of councilors—Local Democracy and Innovation Project (1991)
N NA NA 206 NA 395 NA 330
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The position of Bulgaria in the CEE ranking seems to conﬁrm the relationship 
between territorial fragmentation and the partisan character of local councils. Bulgaria 
has both the largest local governments and the highest proportion of party councilors. 
But Poland, which also has large local governments, does not conﬁrm this simple model. 
Similarly, Slovakia is not last in the ranking of party membership rates, even though it 
has the most fragmented territorial system. To analyze this relationship more carefully, 
we need to present more precise data about the relationship between councilors’ party 
aﬃliation and the size of local governments (table 1.6).  
As we expected, the party membership of councilors is much more frequent in big 
cities than in small, usually rural communities. The strongest correlation was found in 
Hungary, where fewer than one in ten councilors belong to a political party in munici-
palities of below 2,000 population, but almost nine in ten in cities over 50,000. The 
only exception is Bulgaria, where party membership is equally high in all size cohorts. 
Table 1.6 also shows that national averages may be misleading to a large extent. 
Analyzed variables are often highly dependent on the size of the local government, and 
size structure is diﬀerent in diﬀerent countries. For easier comparison, we calculate the 
“size-standardized mean”5 in this and the following tables (i.e., the value that would be 
found if distribution of local governments among size groups were identical in all ana-
lyzed countries). A comparison of party membership rates for councilors in Poland and 
Hungary provides a good illustration—the mean is similar in both countries, but when 
local governments of similar sizes are compared, the membership rate is signiﬁcantly 
higher in Hungary (and this diﬀerence is reﬂected in the size-standardized index). 
Table 1.4
Party Members as Percent of Total Local Government Councilors 
in EU and Central and Eastern European Countries
EU countries CEE countries
United Kingdom (1997) 90.4 Bulgaria (2002) 86.4
Ireland (1991) 90.4 Estonia (2002) 49.4
Germany (1997)* 90.0 Slovakia (2002) 44.9
Sweden (1998)** 94.6 Poland (2003) 34.9
Denmark (1997)** 96.7 Hungary (2002) 34.7
Finland (1996)** 93.2
Netherlands (1994)** 75.0
Note: * Municipalities over 10,000 population.
  ** Excluding small, local parties.
Source: EU countries—Loughlin (2001), CEE countries—ILDGP surveys.
26
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
According to the data in table 1.6, party councilors are the most common in Bulgaria 
and the least common in Poland. The situation in Hungary, Estonia, and Slovakia is 
similar, but in Hungary membership is deﬁnitely less frequent in small local govern-
ments, while in the larger ones it is even more common than in Slovakia and (to a lesser 
extent) in Estonia. 
We expected that in countries with indirect election of mayors, party membership 
among mayors would be higher than among councilors, while in countries with direct, 
popular elections there would be no diﬀerence, or even lower membership among mayors 
than among councilors (this might occur in countries with direct election of mayors 
and proportional elections to the council). Our data on mayors’ party aﬃliation are also 
presented in table 1.6 (this data includes two more countries—Romania and Latvia). 
The ﬁrst observation is that the relationship with size is identical to but not as strong 
as the case of councilors: membership increases with growing population size. Correlation 
coeﬃcients are highest in Hungary and Poland, but they are also statistically signiﬁcant 
in Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia. Only in Bulgaria and Romania (the two countries with 
the highest politicization of local governments) is there no relationship between the 
two variables. But how do diﬀerences between the membership rates of mayors and 
councilors ﬁt with our theoretical expectations? The summary of our hypothesis and 
its veriﬁcation is presented in table 1.7.
Table 1.5
Party Aﬃliation of City Mayors in European Countries
Country Size of the sample Percent of mayors 
who are members 
of political parties
Percent of mayors elected 
as representatives 
of political parties
Sweden 139 100 NA
Holland 256 99 NA
England 122 96 96
Germany 632 79 76
Switzerland 111 95 NA
Belgium 139 98 99
France 181 82 NA
Italy 253 79 89
Greece 138 82 NA
Czech Republic 78 78 86
Hungary 92 62 76
Poland 230 40 61
Source: 2003 survey of “European Mayors” international research project.
Note: Data concern local governments with over 10,000 residents. 
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We expect that direct election of mayors pushes down and indirect election pushes 
up party membership among mayors. Similarly, a proportional electoral system pushes 
up and a majoritarian system pushes down party membership among councilors.
Basically, our hypotheses have been conﬁrmed. The most telling case is Poland, where 
the ﬁrst of the analyzed surveys was conducted before 2002 and the second after 2002, 
when the direct election of mayors was introduced. After the reform the proportion 
of mayors that are party members dropped, and in big cities (with a proportional elec-
toral system for councils) it is lower nowadays than among councilors (the opposite was 
true before the 2002 reform). Indeed, we can ﬁnd numerous examples of successful mayoral 
candidates who run without the clear support of any party, or even against the will of the 
apparatus of their former party (Swianiewicz and Klimska 2003). A huge diﬀerence between 
membership rates among councilors in small (with majoritarian) and big (with a propor-
tional system) local governments in Hungary and Poland also conﬁrms our theory.  
But country speciﬁc factors matter too. If  institutional factors were solely valid, we 
would observe the highest party membership rate among Estonian, Latvian, and Polish 
(before 2002) mayors. In reality it was still relatively low in Poland and highest in 
Romania, with its direct elections of mayors. In addition, institutional factors cannot 
explain big diﬀerences between membership rates in small local governments in Hun-
gary and Slovakia.  
2.2 Party Support in Local Elections
Occasionally a candidate in a council or mayoral election is not a party member but is still 
closely connected with a political group, which recommends or supports him or her in the 
campaign. The lower part of table 1.6 conﬁrms that using a “party ﬂag” or party organi-
zational machinery in the campaign is much more frequent than formal membership. 
With councilors in Bulgaria and Hungary, the diﬀerence between the proportion 
of party members and those using partisan support in the election is not large. But in 
Poland, Estonia, and Slovakia it is quite signiﬁcant, especially in relatively small local 
governments. The support probably takes a diﬀerent form depending on the electoral 
system. In Estonia (with proportional elections) the candidates, not being formal mem-
bers, are included on oﬃcial party lists. In Poland and Slovakia (with a majoritarian 
system in small local governments), formally independent candidates receive ﬁnancial 
and organizational support from parties.  
With respect to mayors, the diﬀerence between formal membership and party sup-
port is greatest in Poland and Slovakia and least in Estonia. The diﬀerence is probably 
explained by the indirect election of mayors in the Baltic countries and the direct system 
in Poland and Slovakia. In direct elections there is more space for formally independent 
candidates to use organizational support from a political group. 
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2.3 Which Parties?
Having considered the extent of party aﬃliation in general, we would also like to know 
which parties are the most popular among local government politicians. We approached 
this question in two ways: by determining which group has the largest proportion of 
councilors and mayors, and by establishing the net sympathy of councilors and mayors 
for individual parties. For this, respondents were asked to deﬁne their attitude towards 
major parties on a seven-point scale, with net sympathy being the diﬀerence between 
the percentage of those who selected six or seven and those who selected one or two. 
The results are presented in ﬁgures 1.1 and 1.2, and include all parties having more 
than ﬁfteen members among the councilor-respondents.6 Only ﬁve parties have mem-
bers constituting more than 10% of each sample of councilors. Two are Bulgarian—the 
socialist BSP (at 29% the clear leader in our classiﬁcation) and the UDF. Next is the 
Polish SLD (Alliance of the Democratic Left) at 18.7% followed by the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (14.7%) and the Estonian People’s Union (12.3%). It is worth stressing 
that three of those ﬁve parties have roots in the previous system (the Bulgarian, Hun-
garian, and Polish socialists/social-democrats). Only one of them (the UDF) is related 
to the anti-communist opposition.  
But high membership does not imply general sympathy towards the party. For 
example, almost 20% of councilors in Poland belong to the post-communist, social-
democratic party (the SLD), but it is one of the most disliked parties by other local 
politicians. On the net sympathy7  measure it scored –31%; only the Estonian Pro Patria 
Union has a worse score. Another of the “top ﬁve”—the Estonian People’s Union—has 
only a marginally positive net sympathy (+3%). The only instance of high party mem-
bership co-existing with a high average level of sympathy among councilors is that of 
the Hungarian socialists. Both Bulgarian parties with a high level of membership among 
councilors (the post-communist BSP and the UDF with roots in the democratic op-
position) scored  negatively in net sympathy among the councilors in our sample. The 
BSP enjoys a very modest positive net sympathy among Bulgarian mayors, but this is 
not true for the UDF.  
It is important to note that political parties are rather disliked in most of the analyzed 
countries. The net sympathy is positive in only four of 25 cases (the socialist and MDF 
parties in Hungary and the People’s Union and Res Publica in Estonia). In Poland, 
Slovakia, and to a large extent Bulgaria, all parties are generally disliked.   
Our sample of mayors8 (ﬁgure 1.2) includes two more countries and many more 
parties with a signiﬁcant membership rate. The absolute leader is the Romanian Social 
Democratic Party, which counts almost half of Romania’s mayors among its members. 
This is followed by the Bulgarian socialists (BSP) at 29.6%, the Bulgarian UDF at 22.2%, 
and the Estonian People’s Union at 20.6%. One more Estonian (Center) party and two 
Polish (the SLD and PSL) parties have more than 15% membership of all mayors in 
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their respective country’s sample. Among this group, only the Estonian People’s Union 
and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) enjoy a net sympathy9 of all mayors. But the 
remaining “big parties” of local mayors—the Estonian Center Party as well as the  Bul-
garian UDF, Polish PSL and SLD—are rather disliked (the negative value of the index 
is the most signiﬁcant in the last case).   
Figure 1.1
Party Membership and Net Sympathy of Councilors toward Political Parties (2002–2003)
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Figure 1.2
Party Membership and Net Sympathy of Mayors toward Political Parties (2000–2002)
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2.4 Historical Evolution
We noted earlier that we should expect a gradual growth in the role of political parties 
in local governments. Can we ﬁnd empirical conﬁrmation of this expectation? 
The answer is not straightforward. There is deﬁnitely a growing (although still low) 
party membership among Polish local politicians. The 1990 elections were organized 
just as the political transformation in Poland was beginning, and they could be described 
as “non-party” elections. In 1990 the old (post-communist) parties were mostly com-
promised and the new ones had not yet had enough time to develop. Local elections 
were dominated by Civic Committees (Komitety Obywatelskie) rooted in the Solidarity 
movement. Kowalczyk (1991) oﬀers data showing that the Civic Committees won over 
40% of all seats in local councils. Political parties were able to win (either independ-
ently or in coalitions) only about 8% of seats, and independent candidates won almost 
40%. The low share of party councilors winning elections may be related to the fact 
that only 23% of councilors elected in 1990 had ever served as councilors before the 
1990 political turn-over (“Radni pierwszej kadencji” 1994). Most of the remaining 77% 
came from the opposition movement, which had not yet started to organize political 
parties at that time. 
The 1994 Polish local elections could be characterized as “hidden” partisan. The 
politicization of the election was a very clear trend in the large cities. In most cities with 
a proportional system, the majority of the seats in local councils was divided between 
three blocks: the SLD (post-communist social-democrats, often in coalition with the 
PSL), the Democratic Union (at that moment the strongest of the parties to emerge 
from the Solidarity movement) and coalitions of smaller rightist parties. This situation 
gave room for a variety of local coalitions. The relative balance between the blocks was 
one reason for the very long and diﬃcult process of electing executive bodies (e.g., in 
Warsaw it took almost three months to elect the mayor). About 30% of candidates 
country-wide, but 60% in medium and big cities, were nominated by political parties 
(Halamska 2001).
But this does not mean that party labels were highly visible during the 1994 elec-
tion campaign. Especially in small towns, candidates tried to avoid admitting to any 
political orientation. Responding to the popular disappointment with party politics, 
candidates most frequently used a strategy that assumed the “ideal” candidate did not 
belong to any party and represented no one except the community as a whole. Only 
such a candidate could be accepted by a considerable part of electorate as “our man” 
(i.e., not belonging to “them”—in this case the political elite). An anecdote from one 
of the medium-size cities illustrates this well.  Two interviewed candidates unwillingly 
admitted they were members of the political party but immediately stressed that this 
membership had absolutely nothing to do with their electoral program or with what 
they planned to do as councilors (Swianiewicz 1996). Even in large cities, it was often 
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diﬃcult to ﬁnd any trace of party activity. Because of the proportional electoral system, 
candidates obviously needed to organize in groups, but they tried to avoid any party labels 
and used local names instead. In most cases a well-informed voter could easily recognize 
which party was hidden behind the name of a particular “local committee,” but candidates 
still considered it safer to avoid having the party name spelled out. The election campaign 
in Kraków provides a good example of this cautiousness: the major parties used com-
mittee names that communicate as little as possible, such as Your City, Self-governing 
Kraków, Alliance for Kraków, etc. (Swianiewicz 1996). 
The 1998 local elections were more clearly dominated by national political parties. 
This time they used their own names, at least in the big cities. Although we do not have 
any precise statistics, we know that the majority of seats in the councils were divided 
between the post-communist SLD and a coalition of rightist post-Solidarity parties called 
the AWS (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność—Electoral Action Solidarity), with the centrist 
Union of Freedom (UW) sometimes playing an important role in the big cities and the 
agrarian PSL in the smaller municipalities. As in the previous elections, independent 
candidates—at least, those who did not formally expose their party aﬃliation during 
the election campaign—played an important role in smaller municipalities, but in big 
cities the domination of the major political parties was very clear. Data provided by 
Halamska (2001) shows that in the whole country the AWS won 14% of council seats, 
the SLD 11%, the PSL (in coalition with two other small parties) 6%, and the UW 
1.5%, although it remained very important in major cities. In 2003 almost two-thirds 
of councilors were still not members of any political party. 
Similar changes occurred with the political aﬃliations of mayors. An unprecedented 
turnover of mayors took place in 1990. Almost none of the former communist execu-
tives in cities over 40,000 and only about 15% in smaller local governments kept their 
positions after the ﬁrst democratic elections (Swianiewicz 1996). Almost 60% of new 
mayors came from the Solidarity Civic Committees (Baldersheim et al. 1996). A ma-
jority of Polish mayors interviewed in 1991 declared they were not members of any 
political party (Bartkowski 1996), and a large proportion had no clear party preference. 
In 1991, when asked for whom they would vote in a parliamentary election, over 30% 
answered they did not know! In 1997, 73% of mayors (and over 65% of mayors in 
municipalities with a population over 20,000) still declared they were not members of 
any political party. According to the 2000 IDLG survey, the proportion of non-partisan 
mayors dropped to 54%, but in 2003 (after the reform introducing direct election of 
mayors) it increased again to 63%.
The growth in partisan aﬃliation among local councilors and executive mayors in 
Poland during the 1990s may seem to be a natural evolution of local politics in times 
of transition and the building of a new party system. However, it is interesting that this 
phenomenon is not as strong in some other Central and Eastern European countries. 
In Slovakia there is a very clear diﬀerence between trends in council and mayoral elec-
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tions. The percentage of Slovak deputies who ran as independents (i.e., neither members 
of parties nor recommended by any party) dropped from as much as 16% in 1990 to 
9% in 1998 (Bernatova et al. 2001). A parallel situation is not observed among mayors 
in direct elections in Slovakia, where LDI project data suggest that the proportion of 
mayors who are members of political parties has remained relatively stable. Also, if 
we disregard those councilors who are recommended by political parties but are not 
members, the membership rate dropped after 1990 and has remained relatively stable 
during the last two elections. 
In Hungary, also, the partisan aﬃliation ratio of mayors dropped after the extension 
of the direct election system to all local governments in 1994, while for councilors it 
remains at a relatively stable level. To be more precise: the ratio of independent councilors 
seems to slowly increase in small local governments (with a simple majority electoral system), 
while there is a slight opposite tendency in larger cities. This is illustrated by table 1.8.
Summing up, an increase in party involvement of local politicians is neither obvious 
nor common for all countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A summary of available 
survey data on the recent situation is presented in table 1.9.10
3. HOW INFLUENTIAL ARE THE PARTIES?
We know the extent to which parties are present in local governments, but how inﬂuential 
are they? Do they play a major role in crucial decisions? Do councilors take into account 
their party’s perspective when voting on important issues? We attempt to answer these 
questions using the classic “reputational” method in which we ask councilors about their 
perception of the role of various actors in local decision-making. Tables 1.10 and 1.11 
illustrate their opinions on the inﬂuence of parties on important decisions.
A comparison at the level of countries shows the inﬂuence of parties is deﬁnitely 
strongest in Bulgaria, followed by Poland  (the two countries with the most territorially 
consolidated systems). Bulgaria is the only country in which more respondents think 
that parties are very inﬂuential than those who think parties’ inﬂuence is very low (22% 
and 14%, respectively). The opposite is true in Poland, but the diﬀerence is not very 
large (16% think parties are very inﬂuential and 29% think their inﬂuence is very low). 
In the remaining three countries the number of those who believe parties’ inﬂuence is 
very low is several times larger than those who think the opposite.  
Party inﬂuence is signiﬁcantly correlated with the size of local government, and this 
relationship has been found in all the analyzed countries. 
We get similar results when we compare the perceived inﬂuence of parties with 
the inﬂuence of other actors. Councilors were asked to assess the importance of each 
of ﬁfteen groups. In Bulgaria parties ranked fourth in inﬂuence, but in Slovakia they 
placed second-last in the ranking. 
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Table 1.8
 Proportion of Independent Mayors and Councilors in Hungary [%]
Mayors Councilors
Total Simple majority system 
(local governments 
below 10,000 residents)
Mixed system 
(local governments 
above 10,000 residents)
1990 80 NA NA NA
1994 84 69 81 9
1998 85 74 86 9
2002 85 73 87 6
Source: Az önkormányzatok döntéshozói, 1990–2002 (2003), Budapest: Hungarian Statistical Oﬃce.
Table 1.9
Changes in Party Membership Rates—Councilors and Mayors [%]
1991 1997 2000–01 2002–03
Mayors
 • Hungary
 • Poland
 • Slovakia
26
—
48
—
27
40
18
46
48
23
37
48
Councilors
 • Hungary
 • Poland
 • Slovakia
34
8
67
—
—
40
—
—
—
34
35
45
Source: 1991, 1997—LDI Project, 2000–2003—ILDGP surveys.
If our comparison across countries is limited to local governments of a similar size, 
the results are slightly diﬀerent. Bulgaria remains the country with the strongest inﬂu-
ence of parties, conﬁrming the opinion that Bulgarian local governments are the most 
politicized. But it is more complicated to identify the countries where parties are seen 
as the least inﬂuential. If we consider small local governments (below 2,000 citizens), 
the least inﬂuence is found in Hungary and then in Slovakia. In both of these countries 
the local election system is based on the majoritarian principle, and this may contribute 
to the noticeable diﬀerence from Estonia, which has a proportional electoral system 
(although the results in Poland, where councils in small municipalities are also elected on 
this basis, do not quite ﬁt with this explanation). If we consider big local governments 
(with populations above 10,000), the inﬂuence of parties is lowest in Estonia, followed 
by Slovakia, i.e., two countries with diﬀerent electoral systems.
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We also expected that the inﬂuence of parties might be larger in countries with a 
collective form of leadership where the mayor is nominated by council (Estonia) than 
in countries with direct, popular elections (the remaining four countries in tables 1.9 
and 1.10). However, such a relationship is not supported by our data. 
Finally, we expected that the inﬂuence of political parties has grown gradually during 
the last decade, together with clariﬁcation and stabilization of the new political map. 
We may only partially verify this opinion thanks to LDI surveys conducted in Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia in 1991 and 1997. Since mayors responded to the LDI surveys 
and councilors were included in our newer data sets, the data are not fully comparable. 
We need to be careful in drawing conclusions; nevertheless, our hypothesis seems to be 
conﬁrmed to a large extent. 
The change is clearer in Hungary, where parties’ inﬂuence ranked 14th in 1991 
but 11th in 2002, and in Poland with a ranking of 15th in 1991 and 1997, but 10th in 
2003. The former case mainly applies in bigger towns, and the latter predominantly in 
smaller municipalities where parties have gradually come to play a role in local decision-
making. In Slovakia the increase of party inﬂuence is less visible (a ranking of fourteen 
in all three surveys), but it may be noted in medium-size and big cities as well (a ranking 
of eight in cities over 50,000 in 1997, but six in 2002). 
The perceived importance of parties relative to other actors in decision-making is 
not the only way we can learn about their inﬂuence. Respondents—councilors and 
mayors—were also asked whose opinion they usually take into consideration when 
making important decisions. They were asked to assess the impact of eight diﬀerent 
groups, of which parties were one.
The results are summarized in table 1.12. As we might expect, Bulgaria conﬁrms 
its opinion of having the most partisan local government system. But in the remaining 
countries respondents (perhaps with the exception of Slovak mayors) declare consid-
eration of parties’ opinions more often than one might expect, judging on the basis of 
the answers on the relative inﬂuence of parties on local decision-making. The largest 
diﬀerence is in Estonia, where the  perceived inﬂuence of parties is relatively modest, 
but most of the respondents admit to serious consideration of parties’ opinions when 
making important decisions. This diﬀerence, which is especially big in small munici-
palities, could be related to the proportional system of elections (while in Hungarian 
or Slovak villages of identical size, elections are based on the majoritarian principle). If 
the chances of a councilor in the next election depend to a large extent on his or her 
position on a party list, then considering party opinion while making crucial decisions 
is a highly advisable strategy. A comparison of the answers of Estonian, Slovak, and 
Hungarian mayors also suggests that consideration of parties’ opinion is more frequent 
if mayors are nominated by the council (as in Estonia) than when they are elected 
directly by all citizens (as in Hungary and Slovakia). Bulgaria does not quite ﬁt with 
these conclusions, but as Bulgarian local governments are much more politicized than 
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those of other countries, a large part of the diﬀerence may lie in political culture, not 
in institutional factors. 
The observation on the impact of the formal position of mayor on the consideration 
of parties’ opinions is quite similar to the observation made by Mouritzen and Svara 
(2001, 71) about Western Europe and America: “Relatively few mayors emphasize the 
promotion of the party program and the interests of the party members... one out of ﬁve is 
characterized as a strong partisan leader.” Mouritzen and Svara notice a close relationship 
with the form of government. They classiﬁed 70% of mayors in council-manager systems 
(which in our research is relatively close to the Hungarian system) as “weak partisan 
leaders,” but only 38% in strong-mayor systems (close to the situation in Slovakia or 
to a lesser extent in Bulgaria) and 29% in committee-leader systems (characteristic in 
Estonia). On the basis of Mouritzen and Svara’s theory we might expect that mayors 
would consider party opinions most often in Estonia, followed by Bulgaria and Slo-
vakia, and least often in Hungary. With the exception of Bulgaria (the country most 
dominated by partisan politics), the variation between the remaining countries largely 
ﬁts with our theoretical expectations. 
  As we might expect, consideration of parties’ opinions is more signiﬁcant in bigger 
local governments.
Finally, councilors and mayors were asked where they seek information. They were 
asked to assess the importance of ten diﬀerent sources, political parties being one. A 
summary of their answers is provided in table 1.13. 
The conclusions from table 1.13 are similar to those we have already discussed, and 
may be summarized as follows:
 • Parties are usually not seen as an important source of information for local 
politicians. They are closer to the bottom than to the top rank of the various 
sources considered;
 • Bulgaria is the clearest exception to this rule, and even more so in the in case 
of councilors than mayors. Perhaps an institutional factor does play a role here: 
Bulgarian mayors are directly elected while the council electoral system is pro-
portional, which strengthens the party links of elected representatives;
 • Poland is at the other extreme. While it is not rare to consider parties’ opinions, 
Polish local politicians indicate parties as a source of information considerably 
less often than their colleagues in other countries. This is especially visible when 
local governments from the same size cohort are compared;
 • The importance of parties as a source of information grows with the size of lo-
cal governments. Having a population above 50,000 or sometimes even above 
10,000 makes a big diﬀerence. With Hungarian, Estonian, and Slovak councilors 
this is particularly obvious.
The same question was asked in a 1997 mayors’ survey in Poland and Slovakia. In 
Slovakia  the diﬀerence between 1997 and 2002 is very slight. In Poland, however, the 
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role of parties as a source of important information has signiﬁcantly decreased. Most 
likely this shift is associated with a change in the way mayors are nominated (by the 
council before 2002 and in popular elections since then).
4.  THE ROLE OF PARTIES IN LOCAL POLITICS: A SUMMARY MODEL 
How we can summarize the inﬂuence of parties on local political life in Central and 
Eastern Europe? First, we have created an index of party importance based on a weighted 
sum of the following indicators:11
 • Party membership rate of councilors
 • Party membership rate of mayors
 • Party support for councilors in the last election campaign
 • Party support for mayors in the last election campaign
 • Perceived inﬂuence of parties on local decision-making 
 • Parties as a source of information for local councilors.
(Due to missing data for Poland, the question on consideration of parties’ opinion 
while making important decisions was excluded from the index.)
Table 1.14 presents the results of the calculations. The highest signiﬁcance of politi-
cal parties is in Bulgaria, while in the remaining four countries it is much lower. In all 
countries it is signiﬁcantly correlated with the size of local government—i.e., the index 
grows with the size of municipalities. 
Although the correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level in each of the countries, 
it is weakest in Bulgaria and highest in Hungary. In Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia the 
relationship is relatively ﬂat (i.e., there is growth in party signiﬁcance with increasing 
size, but the change is relatively slow), while in Poland and especially in Hungary it is 
very steep. 
The signiﬁcance of parties is lowest in small Hungarian municipalities (below 2,000 
citizens), a few times lower than in Estonian or Slovak local governments of comparable 
size according to the index. In the next size cohort (2,000–10,000) the index for Hungary 
is still lower than for Estonia or Slovakia, but in the two remaining groups (over 10,000 
citizens) it is far higher in Hungary, and only marginally lower than in Bulgaria. 
The size-standardized index allows a comparison of the signiﬁcance of political parties 
regardless of diﬀerences in the size structure of the samples in individual countries. On 
average it is the lowest in Poland, somewhat higher in Hungary, and by far the highest in 
Bulgaria. This means that the highest value of a “normal index” mean cannot be  reduced 
to just the territorial consolidation of the Bulgarian local government system. 
How we can explain the variation? To answer this question and to test our initial 
hypothesis we constructed a regression model in which “party signiﬁcance index” is 
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a dependent variable. Independent variables in the model might be clustered in two 
groups:
 • National political culture—represented by dummy variables for each of the 
countries;
 • Institutional factors represented by:
  — Population size of the local government (territorial consolidation);
  — Method of mayors’ nomination (by the council in Estonia and by popular 
elections in the remaining four countries);
  — Method of council election (proportional in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungarian12 
governments with over 10,000, and Polish over 20,000 population, and 
majoritarian in Slovakia and smaller Hungarian and Polish municipalities).
The weakness of the model (at least in relationship to our data) is the fact that the 
manner of mayors’ nomination diﬀers from popular elections in one country only (Es-
tonia). Therefore, we cannot statistically distinguish the impact of “Estonian culture” 
from the impact of the method of nomination of mayors. 
The results from the testing of our model are brieﬂy presented in table 1.15. First of 
all, the model proved to be highly statistically signiﬁcant, i.e., the selected independent 
variables explain much of the variation in party signiﬁcance. 
If controlled for other variables, the most signiﬁcant are the method of council elec-
tion and the size of local government. As expected, in big cities and in councils elected 
by the proportionality principle the importance of parties is higher. 
Interestingly, Slovak political culture seems to favor party inﬂuence. In spite of 
Slovakia’s  majoritarian electoral system, party inﬂuence is relatively high. Bulgarian 
culture also has the eﬀect of increasing the importance of parties, but in this case the 
inﬂuence is lower, since the high scores for Bulgaria may be partially explained by its 
Table 1.14
Index of Party Signiﬁcance in Local Politics
Bulgaria Poland Hungary Estonia Slovakia
Mean value 73.6 47.6 33.9 50.8 49.5
Size-standardized mean 70.9 43.3 44,5 53,0 48,9
Correlation of the index 
with population size
*** *** **** *** ***
Note: 0—means no signiﬁcance, 100—a very large signiﬁcance of parties in local politics.
Note: * means correlation signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level, *** signiﬁcant at 0.001 level, and 
**** signiﬁcant at 0.0001 level. 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the ILDGP survey of councilors and mayors (2002–2003).
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proportional electoral system and high level of territorial consolidation. In both Poland 
and Hungary the political culture seems to weaken party signiﬁcance.  
But curiously, the index shows a low correlation with net sympathy towards political 
parties, as discussed earlier in this chapter. In Slovakia, where party inﬂuence is relatively 
strong, parties are rather disliked. In Poland, where party importance is very low, they 
are also disliked. On the other hand, in Hungary parties enjoy a larger net sympathy.  
The impact of the method of nomination of mayors, which was not very strong 
but nonetheless signiﬁcant, works in an opposite direction to what was expected. But 
as mentioned above, we are not able to say to what extent this is due to the factor in-
vestigated and to what extent it is related to the “Estonia factor.”
Our problem with determining whether the method of mayors’ election has an im-
pact on local government politicization may be partially solved by analysis of the Chief 
Executive Oﬃcers’ surveys conducted in seven countries in 2000–2001. Our data do 
not allow the computing of a similar index of party signiﬁcance, but we may check the 
impact of the same set of independent variables on mayors’ party membership rates (see 
right column of table 1.15). In this survey data we have more cases where mayors are 
nominated by a council: Estonia, Latvia, and Poland (where the survey was conducted 
before the 2002 reform which changed the method of Polish mayors’ election). As a 
Table 1.15
Factors Inﬂuencing Parties’ Role in Local Politics—Regression Model Results
Party significance index Mayors’ party membership
R 0.5860 0.5890
R square 0.3430 0.3440
Significance of the model 0.0000 0.0000
Independent variables:
 Proportional elections
 Size of local governments
 Direct election of mayor
 Bulgaria
 Estonia
 Hungary
 Poland
 Slovakia
 Romania
 Latvia
+ + +
+ + +
+
+ +
NA
–
–
+ + +
NA
NA
+ + +
+
+ +
+ + +
– – –
+
+ + +
+ + +
– – –
Notes: + means positive and – negative relationships. Number of pluses or minuses refers to signiﬁcance 
of the variable. + + + means signiﬁcance on 0.001 level, + + signiﬁcance on 0.01 level, and + signi-
ﬁcance on 0.05 level. Independent variables are ordered from the most to the least signiﬁcant. 
Source: Own calculations based on ILDGP surveys.
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result, we can distinguish the impact of the mayors’ election factor from the impact of 
the country variable.  
But we found that the method of mayors’ nomination remained insigniﬁcant when 
controlled for other independent variables. Other results are not very much diﬀerent 
than what has already been presented in the party signiﬁcance index. Proportionality in 
elections is conﬁrmed as an important factor. This result may look surprising since it is 
not directly related to mayors’ party membership. But in countries where the mayor is 
elected by the council, the method of council election is deﬁnitely very important—a 
more partisan council elected in a proportional system is more likely to nominate a par-
tisan mayor. The council election system may also have an indirect impact in countries 
in which the mayor is directly elected by all voters. Even in this case, a mayor needs to 
cooperate with the council. We should remember that the position of directly elected 
mayors in CEE countries is usually relatively weak. For example, they have to rely on 
council approval in appointing important staﬀ members. However, party mayors have 
a better chance of success in cooperation with highly partisan councils elected in a pro-
portional system. In countries with majoritarian electoral systems, councils are more 
likely non-partisan and they may cooperate more easily with an independent mayor. 
There are also country-speciﬁc variables that remain important. Estonia, Romania, 
Slovakia, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria are more likely to have partisan mayors. In 
Latvia and Hungary, independent mayors are more likely to be elected, assuming that 
the impact of other (institutional) factors is eliminated. There is an interesting diﬀer-
ence between the impact of the “Poland” variable in both regression models. “Poland” 
had a modestly negative impact on the 2003 party signiﬁcance index, while the impact 
of the same variable on the 2000 mayors’ partisanship analysis was modestly negative. 
The change of sign might be related to the 2002 reform of Polish mayoralty election 
methods (although, as mentioned earlier, this variable’s high signiﬁcance has not been 
conﬁrmed).  
Do our results shed light on whether there are parties that govern in Central and East 
European local politics? The proper answer is—it depends where and when. We have 
been able to identify countries in which there is a tendency for strong party inﬂuence 
(Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania). But institutional factors also play a role—especially 
the territorial fragmentation of the local government system and the method of council 
election.
5. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION WITHIN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
In addition to the question of whether councilors are party members or politically 
independent, the number and size of the various factions in a local council are impor-
tant issues for the management of local governments. Is there one group with a clearly 
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dominant position that can easily implement its policies, or are there several small groups 
that necessitate stable or ad hoc coalitions for each decision that is made? To measure 
levels of political fragmentation we use an index called the Rae-Taylor fragmentation 
index. The formula for this index is:
FRA = 1 – ∑s(i)2, 
 where  FRA is a fragmentation index for the council, and s(i) is a share of mandates 
possessed by the faction.  
One can ﬁnd two versions of this index (see Gabriel et al. 2002): the “electoral 
fragmentation index,” which reﬂects fragmentation of votes in the election, and the 
“parliamentary/council fragmentation index,” which takes into account the division of 
seats among party groups. The former better reﬂects the variation in citizens’ political 
options. But we will concentrate on the latter, as it illustrates the environment for day- 
to-day local government management.
The index diﬀers from 0 to 1, where 0 means a situation in which all seats in the 
council belong to the same political group (or all voters voted for one party, if we take the 
“electoral” version of an index), while 1 means that each councilor is independent and 
there are no factions in the council (or every councilor belongs to diﬀerent political party).
Table 1.16 illustrates the fragmentation of local councils in seven CEE countries. 
The analyzed countries may be divided into those with a high or low fragmentation 
index. The overall fragmentation was by far the highest in Hungary with an average 
score above 0.9, then in Poland (0.818), and in Latvia (0.809). In the group with a low 
fragmentation index we ﬁnd Romania (0.727), Slovakia (0.731), Bulgaria (0.744), and 
Estonia (0.747).  But if we take into account diﬀerences in the size of local governments, 
the lowest score is for Slovakia.
We expected that fragmentation would be lower in the big cities, where parties play 
a more important role and there are fewer independent councilors who do not belong 
to any faction. The last row in table 1.16 shows that this is deﬁnitely the case in Hun-
gary, to a slightly lesser extent in Poland, and much less in Slovakia. In the remaining 
countries the correlation is insigniﬁcant (Bulgaria, Romania, and Latvia) or even points 
weakly in the opposite direction (Estonia). 
The data on a fragmentation index is static and cannot show changes over time. 
But as the party system in Central and Eastern Europe is far from stable, we can expect 
that fragmentation within the council changes signiﬁcantly during the term of the 
council. Some groups and coalitions break down after the election and new factions are 
formed, which increases the level of fragmentation. The opposite can also happen, but 
our observations suggest this is much less frequent. We cannot verify this in a systematic 
way, but the hypothesis can be partially conﬁrmed by data from Poland. The index of 
fragmentation calculated in 1998 for all Polish cities above 100,000 citizens was 0.614 
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(Swianiewicz and Klimska 2003). The same index, calculated for the same group of cities 
two years later (still in the same term) was 0.680, i.e., it was considerably higher. 
Polish data also suggest that the level of fragmentation has increased in the current 
term compared to the situation after the previous elections. At the end of 2002, the mean 
score for cities over 100,000 was 0.670, while after 1998 it was only 0.614 (Swianiewicz 
and Klimska 2003). Other observations tend to conﬁrm this. For example, in the 1998 
elections 54 committees or factions won seats in 42 big cities, while in 2002 the number 
increased to 98. The other indicator of increasing fragmentation in Polish cities is the 
diminishing number of councils in which one party received an absolute majority of 
votes. Of 42 cities over 100,000 citizens, 22 had a clear majority in the council after 
the 1998 elections; after the 2002 elections this number decreased to 11 (Swianiewicz 
and Klimska 2003). Interestingly enough, the increase in fragmentation was usually 
the highest in cities with a high electoral turnout. A well-known observation of Lipset 
(1981)—that a high level of voter activity is often correlated with a demand for political 
change—might oﬀer an explanation. Unfortunately, we cannot compare this data with 
changes in other CEE countries and in smaller local governments.
How does the level of fragmentation in CEE countries compare with the situation 
in EU countries? We can analyze this only in an indirect way. A study published in 
2002 includes fragmentation indices for big cities in eight EU countries (Vetter 2002). 
But those indices were calculated for electoral data, not on the basis of information on 
the distribution of seats in the council. An electoral fragmentation index will always be 
higher than parliamentary fragmentation, so direct comparison with our scores in table 
1.15 is impossible. But in 2002 an electoral fragmentation index was calculated for the 
20 largest Polish cities (Swianiewicz and Klimska 2003). The score ranged from 0.669 
in Gdynia and 0.760 in Sosnowiec to 0.873 in Krakow and 0.878 in Szczecin. With the 
exception of Gdynia, the scores were much higher than those for cities of a similar size 
in the EU. Of all the cities analyzed by Vetter, only Helsinki (0.82) and some Dutch 
Table 1.16
Council Fragmentation Index  (2000–2001)
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Latvia Poland Romania Slovakia
Mean 0.744 0.747 0.967 0.809 0.818 0.727 0.731
Size-standardized mean 0.730 0.770 0.918 0.798 0.830 0.731 0.693
Correlation between 
fragmentation and size 
of local government
* (–)**** (–)*** (–)*
Note: * means correlation signiﬁcant at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level, *** signiﬁcant at 0.001 level, and 
**** signiﬁcant at 0.0001 level. Blank spaces mean insigniﬁcant correlations. (–) means negative 
sign of the correlation coeﬃcient.
Source: Own calculations based on ILDGP survey of CEOs (2000–2001).
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cities (e.g., Amsterdam) showed values similar to those in Poland. But the fragmenta-
tion of votes in cities in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the UK, France, and Germany was 
much lower. For example, in the six biggest English cities the score ranges from 0.60 in 
Manchester to 0.65 in Liverpool. It is also very low in several French cities—0.569 in 
Tours, 0.572 in Nantes, and 0.584 in Bordeaux (Hoﬀman-Martinot 2002). 
From our data we know that the parliamentary fragmentation index in Polish cities 
over 100,000 citizens is usually lower than in other big cities of Central and Eastern 
Europe (except in Slovakia). Indirectly, therefore, we may conclude that the level of po-
litical fragmentation in CEE cities is much higher than in most of the EU countries.
It appears that weakness in the party system in CEE countries leads to consider-
able fragmentation of local councils and can potentially produce complications in local 
management. Another potential complication is that the mayor does not always have a 
majority in the council—the opposite of the situation resulting from recent reforms in 
southern Europe. This may lead, and actually often does lead, to serious management 
problems when a mayor faces a majority opposition on council. Recalling the connection 
between low stability and high fragmentation of political parties in CEE countries, we 
can expect  numerous cases in which eﬀective decision-making may be diﬃcult. Only 
seven mayors in the 42 Polish cities with a population over 100,000 have the clear support 
of the majority of councilors. In most of the remaining cases the mayor needs to rely on 
more or less stable coalitions. In ﬁve cities the situation is even more complicated—the 
majority in the council is held by a group that is deﬁnitely in opposition to the mayor 
(Swianiewicz and Klimska 2003). Similar problems are reported in other countries. 
Sometimes they concern major cities such as the Romanian capital, Bucharest, or the 
Albanian capital, Tirana. But this issue goes beyond the scope of our analysis here.
6. COUNCILORS’ PARTY AFFILIATIONS AND POLITICAL CULTURE
We turn now to party membership and its meaning. How do the party programs diﬀer 
from each other? Are the programs really internalized by local party members who are 
municipal councilors? Are the parties groups of people believing in similar values and 
trying to achieve common goals? Or are they pragmatic groups of friends and colleagues 
whose reasons for coming together are not strongly related to ideological choices? 
6.1 Setting the Context
The political party system in Central and Eastern Europe, as stated earlier, is far from 
stable. Of course, the situation diﬀers from one country to another, but the general 
observation remains true throughout the whole region.
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The most volatile is perhaps the party system in Poland. The rise and decline of AWS 
(initially a loose coalition of post-Solidarity groups and then a single political party), 
which won the 1997 parliamentary election only to almost completely disappear after 
the 2001 election, is the best but not the only example. UW (Freedom Union)—a party 
which until recently seemed to be a stable element of the Polish transition—has almost 
disappeared from the political scene since 2001. Among six major parties represented 
in the present Parliament, only two (the PSL and the SLD) were present in the previ-
ous term as well. These rapid changes are obviously reﬂected in local governments (see 
Swianiewicz and Klimska 2003). 
Slovakia is not much more stable. Former Prime Minister Mečiar’s HZDS, the Christian-
Democratic KDH, the leftist SDL, or the Hungarian minority SMK have been active 
and signiﬁcant for over ten years. But recently the strong position of some new parties 
such as the ANO or the SMER (the latter having the highest support of voters accord-
ing to some polls from the summer of 2003) has contributed to a generally unstable 
picture. In both Poland and Slovakia the system does not seem to be moving towards 
greater consolidation, and this observation is connected, above all, to the right wing of 
a political scene that has a strong tendency towards instability and fragmentation. 
In Bulgaria in 2001 the explosion of support for a newly created party of the former 
Tsar Symeon (National Movement) has totally demolished the relatively stable political 
scene.
Hungary and Estonia seem to be the most stable. It is interesting that three of the 
four parties identiﬁed by Swianiewicz and Clark (1996) as the most frequently repre-
sented in local councils in 1991 are still among the strongest political groups in 2002. 
(The fourth, currently among the strongest, is the post-communist MSzP, which was 
also the sixth largest among the councilors in 1991). But this does not mean that the 
picture has remained unchanged for over ten years. Apart from the growth of support 
for MSzP, we also witnessed a radical consolidation of the center-right. In 1994 there 
were four center-right parties in the Hungarian Parliament, each having between 7% 
and 12% support, while in 2002 the scene was clearly dominated by one group—the 
FIDESZ—with over 40% support (Fowler 2003). On the other hand the Christian 
Democratic KDNP, which was relatively strong ten years ago, completely disintegrated 
and disappeared from the political scene (C. Nikolenyi 2003). 
For a long time Estonia might have been seen as the most stable among the countries 
that are the focus of our analysis. The list of  “strongest parties” has been quite stable, 
and volatility indices have been clearly below CEE averages (Sikk 2003). However, the 
appearance of a strong new party—“Res Publica”—in the 2003 parliamentary elections 
seems to undermine the prior relative persistence of the party system (Sikk 2003). It 
should be added, however, that “Res Publica” had existed for a long time; during the 
1990s it had connections to other political parties (Pro Patria and the Reform Party), and 
2003 was just its ﬁrst strong appearance as an independent player in the election game. 
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The older roots of “Res Publica” did not prevent it from basing its election campaign 
on anti-establishment rhetoric. 
While these observations concern central level politics, much less is known about 
the parties in local governments. Table 1.17 lists the parties that are included in our 
analysis. Membership of these parties in internationals, indicated in the right column, 
should help us in establishing the parties’ ideological proﬁle, which we will later compare 
to the councilors’ values as declared in the IDLG survey. 
Looking ﬁrst at the age of the councilors, we ﬁnd that the average varies from 45 
to 51 years. Those who are party members are usually a bit older than the independent 
councilors.  Post-communist parties (the BSP in Bulgaria, the MSzP in Hungary, and 
the SDL in Slovakia) usually have older than average members. The youngest parties 
are those that evolved from the youth opposition movement like FIDESZ in Hungary 
and the recently established Res Publica in Estonia. (In FIDESZ, the average  member-
councilor is over ten years younger than his or her colleagues in other parties.) 
The share of female councilors varies from below 20% in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Poland to slightly over 30% in Estonia. But there are more women among independent 
than among party councilors. In Poland the share of female councilors is more or less 
even across parties, unlike Hungary, where FIDESZ and MDF have a very low rate of 
women councilors (only 6% and 8%, respectively). Other highly masculinized parties 
are the Bulgarian BANU and MRF parties and the Estonian Pro Patria (with only one 
woman among 33 councilors!). 
The proportion of councilors with a university degree is lowest in Slovakia (38%) 
and highest in Bulgaria (79%).  This variation can probably be explained by the extent 
of territorial fragmentation, as councilors in big municipalities are often more educated 
than those in small, rural villages. In Hungary and Poland party councilors usually have 
a higher level of education than the independents. But the opposite is true in Bulgaria, 
and in Slovakia or Estonia there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship. Not surpris-
ingly, a low level of education can be found in agrarian political groups and those of 
the national minorities.
Before turning to the subject of political culture, we will look at the characteristics 
of councilors who are members or supporters of individual political parties. Table 1.17 
presents a summary of the demographic variation of supporters of the main parties in 
the analyzed countries. 
The picture changes when we look at respondents who are sympathetic toward but 
not members of various political parties. Diﬀerent demographic variables are signiﬁcant 
in diﬀerent countries. In Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary, support for parties is related 
to age—particular parties are supported by older or younger councilors and there are 
only a few for which this variable is not important. Hungary is also the only country 
in which gender is relevant: the Socialists (MSzP) and Liberals (SzDSz) are supported 
more often by women than by men. 
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Table 1.17
Political Parties Selected for Analysis
Name Number of respondents Membership in party internationals 
Bulgaria
 • BSP (post-communist)
 • UDF
 • MRF (Turkish minority)
 • People’s Union
 • BANU (agrarian)
277
262
74
50
21
Socialist
Christian-Democrat, Democratic Union
Hungary
 • MSzP (post-communist)
 • FIDESZ
 • SzDSz
 •  MDF
144
55
43
26
Socialist
Christian-Democrat, Democratic Union
Liberal
Christian-Democrat, Democratic Union
Slovakia
 • KDH
 • HZDS
 • SDL
 • SMK (Hungarian minority)
 • SDK
 •  SMER
82
82
50
48
28
16
Christian-Democrat, Democratic Union
Socialist
Liberal
Estonia
 • People’s Union
 • Center Party
 • Res Publica
 • Reform Party
 • Pro Patria
 • Moderates
121
96
71
59
34
33
Liberal
Christian-Democrat, Democratic Union
Socialist
Poland
 • SLD (post-communist)
 • PSL (agrarian)
 • PiS
 • PO
142
49
19
16
Socialist
Source: Membership in party internationals: Lewis (2003).
In Poland and Slovakia age is not related to the sympathy of councilors towards 
parties, though the mean age of councilor-members of the various parties diﬀers. In 
Slovakia cleavages are related to size of local government and to education—there are 
parties supported by educated and urban councilors and others supported by rural and 
uneducated respondents. 
Poland is the most complex case. Only two of the important parties (the PSL and 
the PO) have councilor-supporters with a clearly deﬁned demographic proﬁle.  
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Two further questions are of interest here: (1) to what extent are members of political 
parties rooted in the communist system, and (2) what is the level of their modernization. 
The communist roots factor is measured by the number of members of political 
parties before 1990, the number holding an oﬃcial position in a political party before 
1990, and the number of councilors before 1990. To analyze the variation between 
parties, we relate the communist roots factor to a national average. If the value is lower 
than 1, the role of communist roots among party members is lower than the average 
in the country; if it is higher than 1, then the members of that party have more com-
munist roots.13 
Membership in parties before 1990 is most frequently reported by members of 
“post-communist”groups, although this relationship is much weaker in the Polish SLD 
than in the Bulgarian BSP, Hungarian MSzP, or Slovak SD. Over 70% of BSP or MSzP 
members stated that they had belonged to “old” parties before 1990. Many members of 
former parties are also found in agrarian groups—the Polish PSL and Bulgarian BANU. 
One should remember that both agrarian parties existed before 1990 as satellites of 
communist, but formally independent parties.  
The extent of communist roots is fairly uniform in Estonia. This may reﬂect the 
diﬀerence between the communist system in the Soviet Union and in satellite countries 
(especially in ones like Poland or Hungary) where some amount of democratic opposition 
could exist and party membership was slightly less of a sine qua non for holding public 
oﬃce. In all countries except Estonia, left-wing means more rooted in the communist 
system (see table 1.22). 
Finally, we characterize political parties through the “modernism” of local coun-
cilors. The modernism index is measured by three variables: education, e-mail use, and 
Internet use.14 
Estonian councilors are the most frequent users of e-mail and the Internet. In Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovakia usage of e-mail and the Internet is more frequent among party 
members than independent councilors, but in Bulgaria or Estonia no such relationship 
could be found (see table 1.19).
Computer usage is usually strongly correlated with level of education, although the 
SMK party in Slovakia is an exception, having a relatively low level of education but a 
high ratio of e-mail usage. In general, however, parties having less educated councilors 
lag behind even more in the use of e-mail. This relationship is clear both in countries 
where Internet use by councilors is not common (e.g., Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovakia), 
and in Estonia, where as many as 58% councilors’ declare they have access to the Internet 
(although 45% of members of  the Moderate Party and 47% of those in the People’s 
Union report using it). In the Polish PSL 10% of members use the Internet while the 
national average is over 30%; in the Slovak HZDS the ﬁgure is 13% compared to the 
Slovak average of 32%; and in the Bulgarian MRF 13% and the BANU 17% compared 
to an average for Bulgarian councilors of 28%.
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Table 1.18
Correlations between Demographic Characteristics of Councilors, 
Party Membership, and Sympathy towards Political Parties
Age 
in 2003
Level of 
education
Population
 size
Gender
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Bulgaria BSP old old high small
Turkish minority (MRF) young young low low small small male
BANU low
PU male
UDF young high big big
Estonia Center Party old old low
Moderates young low low small
People’s Union old old low low small small
Res Publica young young big
Pro Patria young male
Reform Party young young high high big male male
Hungary MSzP old old high big big female
SzDSz old high big female
MDF old big male
FIDESZ young young low high small big male
Poland SLD
PSL low low small small
PO young high high big big
PiS young
Slovakia SDL NA old NA NA NA
HZDS low low small small
SMER old low small small
SMK–MKP high high big big
SDK–SDKU young young high high big big
KDH high high big big
Note: Only correlations signiﬁcant at a 0.05 level are taken into account in the table. In this and the 
following tables parties within countries are presented in order from left- to right-wing on the 
political spectrum (measured by the self-assessment of councilors who are party members).
Source: ILDGP survey of councilors (2002–2003).
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Table 1.19
Communist Roots and Modernism of Party Members: 
Deviation from the National Mean 
Communist roots index (CRI) Modernism index (MI)
Bulgaria—national mean 18.00% 52.00%
 BSP 2.35 0.96
 Turkish minority (MRF) 0.29 0.70
 BANU 0.88 0.74
 Peoples Union 0.33 0.87
 UDF 0.18 1.15
Estonia—national mean 5.00% 71.00%
 Center Party, United People Party 1.00 0.95
 Moderates 0.76 0.92
 Peoples Union 0.98 0.89
 Res Publica 1.06 1.14
 Pro Patria 1.10 1.24
 Reform Party 1.06 1.28
Hungary—national mean 16.00% 67.00%
 MSzP 2.63 0.93
 SzDSz 0.58 1.12
 MDF 0.24 0.92
 FIDESZ 0.15 1.15
Poland—national mean 11.00% 62.00%
 SLD–UP 2.05 1.04
 PSL 1.61 0.59
 PO 0.19 1.29
 PiS 0.48 1.13
Slovakia—national mean 8.00% 51.00%
 SDL 4.08 0.87
 HZDS 0.71 0.76
 SMER 1.04 1.37
 SMK–MKP 0.17 1.08
 SDK–SDKU 0.56 1.48
 KDH 0.10 1.03
Note: For individual parties—a score of 1 means equal to the national average, while scores below 1 
mean values lower than the national average.
Source: Own calculations based on ILDGP survey of councilors (2002–2003).
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Members of post-communist parties are usually less “modernized” than the national 
average, but the Polish SLD is an exception to this rule. In general, right-wing coun-
cilors score higher on the scale of modernism in Slovakia, Estonia, and Bulgaria, while 
in Hungary and Poland there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship. 
6.2  Self-identification on the Left-Right Axis
An analysis of councilors’ ideology should begin with their own stated location on the 
left-right political spectrum. Whether or not these terms adequately characterize the 
present political arena in Central and Eastern Europe cannot be discussed at length here, 
but it should be noted that quite often the  meaning of “left-wing” and “right-wing” in 
CEE countries is diﬀerent from the traditional interpretation based on the 19th century 
experience of European parliamentary systems. In this region of Europe, the terms left 
and right arise from a diﬀerent context and diﬀerent political debates. 
For this reason we do not treat the terms as archetypical conglomerates of values, but 
as terms from the history of political ideas—terms that are learnt by people in the same 
way as other abstract terms and deﬁnitions. In Central and Eastern Europe the learning 
of these terms took place in a very concrete historical context, and their meaning was 
often the subject of political battles involving media and political groups.
In most of the analyzed countries, the terms left and right are used to distinguish 
between two main blocks: (1) post-communist, and (2) groups arising from the demo-
cratic opposition active during the communist period. Data from Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia clearly support this observation. In all of these countries there 
is also a signiﬁcant correlation between membership in political parties before 1990 
and present left-wing self-location. Members of post-communist groups (the BSP in 
Bulgaria, MSzP in Hungary, SLD in Poland, and SDL in Slovakia) are those who most 
often declare themselves as leftist, and this identiﬁcation is much stronger than in any 
other party. It is a paradox that members of small parties who use “socialist” or “social-
democratic” labels in their names, and whose program is often much more radical than 
that of post-communist groups, usually declare themselves centrist rather than leftist. 
The Bulgarian data provide a good example: in the case of Bulgarian Social Democracy, 
twelve of fourteen respondents declare themselves as centrist, not left, and nine out of 
ten in the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party declare themselves to be centrist. In the 
Polish Unia Pracy (Labour Union) the number is three out of four.
We are not claiming that post-communist parties are not leftist (the ideological 
content of individual parties will be discussed later), but we want to point out what the 
popular meaning of the term actually entails.
But the use of leftist rhetoric by post-communist parties is not a “historical neces-
sity.” In Estonia, the term leftist has been strongly linked to communism and Soviet 
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dictatorship. Consequently, the party established by former members of the communist 
“nomenclatura” in Estonia is called the “Center Party” (Raun 1997; Kuczynski 2003) 
and councilors who are members of that party declare themselves as centrist. Ironically, 
in spite of the name of the party they are more leftist than other councilors in Estonia. 
The unwillingness to use the term “left” in Estonia is a very clear diﬀerence between 
Estonia and the other analyzed countries. In the remaining four countries the percent-
age of leftist councilors varies from 19% to 30%, but in Estonia it is only 5% (see table 
1.20)! As we will demonstrate, this verbal resistance to the label of “leftist” is often but 
not always correlated with more liberal economic programs. 
There is a strong correlation between self-location and membership in a particular 
party. The general rule is that most councilors prefer not to choose the extreme val-
ues on our scale (with the exception of Bulgaria). The tendency towards self-location 
in the center is most visible in Estonia and is clearly related to the negative attitude 
towards the term “left.” As we can see in table 1.20, the proportion of Estonian 
respondents choosing rightist aﬃliation is not signiﬁcantly higher than in other countries. 
Although the mean value is the highest (most “rightist”) in Estonia, the highest number 
of respondents clearly declaring their rightist location is found in Bulgaria. The center 
location is also a very frequent choice in Poland. We tend to relate this phenomenon 
to the deep crisis recently experienced for various reasons by leading leftist and rightist 
political parties in Poland. 
As for leftist values, Hungary is the country with the highest number of councilors 
declaring such values. As we will show later, the Hungarian left wing presents the most 
coherent set of values. Hungary is the only country in which more respondents declare 
left- than right-wing political aﬃliation. 
Table 1.20 also indicates that centrist aﬃliation is most often chosen by non-party 
members. This indirectly supports our claim that self-location on the left or right wing of 
politics is less an expression of opinions on social or economic issues, and more a declara-
tion of support for one or another of the dominant political groups. If we are right, a 
declaration of being in the center may simply mean unwillingness to choose between the 
main political parties. We assume that this logic lies behind the choices of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria (74% of those in the Movement for Rights and Freedom choose 
the center option), or of members of the populist protest party Samoobrona in Poland 
(all four members in our sample declare themselves as centrist). For various reasons, 
members of these groups want to show that they are far from both the post-communist 
left and their main opponents, the rightist parties. Several small parties also follow this 
rule. In Estonia such a relationship is not evident, but it is easy to understand why—if 
all major political parties locate themselves in the center, then demonstrating independ-
ence through a speciﬁc location on the left-right political axis makes little sense.
The relationship between party membership and left-right self-location is very clear 
in Bulgaria. As  previously observed, it is a country with a very high level of party mem-
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Table 1.20
Councilors’ Self-location on the Left-Right Political Spectrum (7-Point Scale)
Own views left or right Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Mean value 4.11 4.62 3.73 4.05 4.18
Left (1–2) 27.0 5.2 29.6 19.7 19.1
Center (3–5)
 • among party members
 • among non-party members
41.0
36.7
68.9
68.0
65.9
70.1
50.6
34.5
58.7
59.9
46.0
67.3
52.9
41.7
62.2
Right (6–7) 32.0 26.8 19.8 20.4 28 .0
Source: ILDGP survey of councilors (2002–2003).
bership among councilors (about 86%). At the same time, the proportion of centrist 
declarations is lowest there. One might expect that participation in the party system 
forces councilors to clearly locate themselves on one or another side of the barricade. 
The same factor (party membership rate) leads to a clearer left or right self-location of 
councilors in big cities, while in small communities the centrist option is chosen much 
more often. For these respondents “center” probably means “neither left nor right.”
6.3 Party Membership, Political Culture, and 
 Traditional Left-Right Values
The Local Government Survey provides an enormous amount of empirical material al-
lowing for an analysis of councilors’ values related to various social and economic issues. 
To limit the scope of our analysis we concentrate on a few indices. The most important 
questions we hope to answer are related to left-right cleavages as characterized earlier. 
We try to address the following issues: 
 1. To what extent does self-location on the political spectrum reﬂect traditional 
distinctions between leftist and rightist values?
 2. To what extent do declarations of left-right self-location overlap with post-com-
munist or anti-communist cleavages?
We have already shown that there is a clear link between left-right self-location and 
the communist roots of councilors. In the following section we will try to ascertain the 
attitude of the parties towards the present political system. 
We will compare members’ left-right self-location with certain values that are present 
in traditional ideological debates involving the left and right wings of the political 
spectrum. These are:
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 • Market individualism (MI). After Clark and Swianiewicz (1996, 144) indi-
vidualism (as opposed to collectivism) is deﬁned here as support for political 
conditions that maximize the ability of all citizens to realize their private wishes... 
Market individualism involves support for minimal government intervention in 
private economic transactions. The index of MI is calculated as the sum of the 
answers to three questions illustrating the attitude towards public ownership 
in the economy. 
 • Social individualism (SI), according to the deﬁnition of Clark and Swianiewicz, 
is related to the freedom to attain more subjective, qualitative goals in the non-eco-
nomic arena… social individualism emphasizes freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
religion and the liberty to make personal lifestyle choices (144). In our analysis SI is 
an index based on three variables related to: (1) special protection of minorities, 
(2) acceptance of freedom of speech on controversial issues, and (3) tolerance 
towards extremist groups. The ﬁrst of the three variables may raise some doubts, 
since it is non-correlated (and in some countries even negatively correlated) with 
the remaining two. But we suggest that it reﬂects a well-known controversy 
related to the idea of “freedom for the enemies of freedom.” Nevertheless, all 
three variables comprising the index are clearly related to universal values that 
can be easily considered social individualism. It is more diﬃcult to relate this 
index to left-right cleavages than it is for market individualism or egalitarian-
ism. On the one hand, Lipset (1981) provides arguments that “protection of 
minorities” is more often a feature of leftist parties, and members of minor-
ity groups vote often for left-wing parties. Also, some extreme rightist groups 
sometimes advocate censorship in controversial issues. On the other hand, in 
the CEE context of the last half-century, censorship and lack of social tolerance 
have been ascribed instead to left-wing politicians.   
 • Egalitarianism (E) is deﬁned after Clark and Swianiewicz (1996, 144) as a sup-
port for the use of government to equalize social, economic and political outcomes 
among all citizens... Egalitarians favor extensive government regulation of market 
transactions and extensive social service spending. The index of E is obtained from 
the sum of answers on two questions related to the distribution of personal 
income and the redistributive role of the state. 
 • (non)Paternalism/Populism (P). Paternalism involves support for the insti-
tutionalization of mediating structures between citizens and the executors of 
political decisions (Clark and Swianiewicz 1996, 144). Populism, the opposite, is 
understood as directly and decisively referring to the voters’ will in any decision-
making. The P index is calculated as the sum of support for the following 
opinions: (1) decisions should be based on the opinions of experts, (2) the wide 
participation of citizens in decision-making leads to unnecessary conﬂicts and 
loss of time, and (3) in the case of conﬂict between the opinion of a councilor 
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and of the majority of voters, the respondent would use his or her own judg-
ment and would not follow the opinion of voters. The latter variable is clearly 
related to one of the classic dilemmas in the theory of representative democracy 
(see, for example, Pitkin 1972). This dilemma may be summarized brieﬂy as 
mandate doctrine (the representative must do what his/ her principal would do, and 
must act as if the principal himself/herself were acting-- Pitkin 1972, 144) versus 
independence doctrine (the representative as a free agent, a trustee, an expert who is 
best left alone to do his/her work—Pitkin 1972, 147). This is another dimension, 
along with social individualism, that is more diﬃcult to relate to the traditional 
left-right dimension. But one may expect that left-wing parties would represent 
paternalist values more often than their right-wing colleagues, at least in the 
Central and East European context.
Also, in case there are contradictions between councilors’ abstract verbal declarations 
and their attitudes towards the practical issues they happen to be confronted with, we analyze 
the extent to which their market individualism translates into practical opinions on:
 • The contracting out of services for which local governments are responsible. 
We are also interested in the attitude of local party members towards the general di-
rection of  political changes during the last decade. Therefore, we created an index of: 
 • Acceptance for the new political system. This index describes approval for the 
general direction of changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Citizens of Central 
and Eastern Europe have experienced a long period of governments with a very 
low level of political legitimacy. But in the democratic system, general accept-
ance of the direction of the most important changes is a very important factor 
inﬂuencing the performance of the political system. We try to measure this 
level of acceptance through three indicators: (1) acceptance of the democratic 
system, (2) a comparison of the performance of present local governments with 
communist local administrations, and (3) approval for European integration. 
Most of the variables were measured on a seven-point scale and the rest were con-
verted to the same scale. We recoded some of them in such a way that a positive value 
will always mean more liberal choices (i.e., market or social individualist, non-egalitarian, 
and non-paternalist) and higher acceptance for political transformation, while negative 
values mean support for state intervention, paternalism, and lack of support for general 
changes in CEE. We may also expect that high values in the indices will coincide with a 
right-wing location and lower values with a left-wing orientation. However, as explained 
above, in the case of social individualism and paternalism/populism this relationship 
is less obvious than it is for market individualism, contracting out, egalitarianism, or 
system acceptance.  
58
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
Table 1.21 presents a summary of the results. Taking into account popular opinion 
on the incoherent character of ideological diﬀerences between parties, the scores for 
market individualism are surprisingly consistent with left-right self-location. At the level 
of countries, Hungarian councilors declare themselves to be the most leftist and they are 
also the least market individualist. Estonians, who are closest to the right wing of the 
political spectrum, are second in market individualism (after Bulgarian councilors). 
Table 1.22 shows that the correlation between the two indices is statistically sig-
niﬁcant in all ﬁve countries, with the highest occurring in Bulgaria and Slovakia. Only 
in Hungary (where it is the weakest) is it not signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. In Hungary 
we also ﬁnd the only examples where councilors from the party declaring a radical 
right-wing orientation are leftist in their market orientation (FIDESZ), and also the 
opposite—councilors from the SzDSz party, located left-of-center, are radical market 
individualists (in the Hungarian context). Post-communist parties (the BSP, SLD, and 
SDL parties) that are the furthest left in their countries also have below-average scores 
on market individualism. The only exception comes again from Hungary—where post-
communist MSzP councilors declare themselves to be radically left, but their score on 
market individualism is just above the national average.  
But on the issue of the contracting out of local services—a practical test of readi-
ness to implement market values—the picture is less coherent. Bulgarian councilors 
who declare the most radical market-individualist values are the most sceptical about 
contracting out. Estonians, who in their self-assessment are by far the most distant from 
the left wing, are just after Bulgarian councilors in opposing market solutions in urban 
services. The opposite is true of Hungarian local politicians, who support privatization 
of urban services even though they are sceptical of market values in general and declare 
themselves to be leftist more often than respondents from the other countries. 
The variation is just slightly more coherent when we consider individual countries 
separately. In Bulgaria, Estonia, and Poland the correlation between left-right self-lo-
cation and support for contracting out is statistically signiﬁcant. But this relationship 
exists in neither Hungary nor Slovakia. In Hungary, councilors from the rather leftist 
SzDSz are the strongest supporters of the privatization of urban services, while rightist 
councilors in the MDF are the most frequent opponents. The leftist MSzP is above the 
average national score of this index, and also above the score of the most right-wing 
of the analyzed parties, FIDESZ. In Slovakia, although the two parties with the most 
declared supporters of contracting out are the rightist SDK and KDH parties, the third 
in the rank is the post-communist and leftist SDL. 
An anti-market attitude does not seem to be most typical for post-communist groups. 
In Slovakia the most anti-liberal in economic terms is the Slovak SDL, but the HZDS 
is not much diﬀerent. In Poland, the agrarian PSL is more radically anti-market than 
the post-communist SLD. In Hungary, MSzP support for market solutions is clearly 
above the national average, while rightist FIDESZ is closer to the opposite extreme. The 
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Table 1.21
Values of Councilors and their Membership in Political Parties
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Bulgaria national mean 4.11 4.69 3.75 3.34 4.59 4.15 5.60
BSP –2.18 –0.73 –0.28 –0.09 –0.71 –0.06 –0.87
Turkish minority (MRF) 0.04 0.21 –0.13 –0.07 –0.25 –0.12 0.48
BANU 0.56 0.26 –0.20 –0.36 –0.45 0.19 0.05
People’s Union 1.27 0.64 0.03 +0.03 0.57 0.17 0.71
UDF 1.97 0.68 0.28 +0.11 0.77 0.14 0.86
Estonia national mean 4.62 4.62 3.89 3.81 3.98 4.17 5.13
Center Party –0.54 –0.47 –0.45 –0.37 –0.12 0.13 –0.11
Moderates –0.45 –0.38 0.52 +0.25 –0.50 0.01 0.36
People’s Union –0.41 –0.21 –0.16 –0.05 –0.45 0.01 –0.41
Res Publica 0.35 0.36 0.13 0.15 0.14 –0.04 0.32
Pro Patria 0.97 0.93 0.59 0.34 0.35 –0.20 1.19
Reform Party 1.15 0.31 0.27 0.12 0.90 –0.11 0.72
Hungary national mean 3.73 4.11 4.55 4.05 3.75 3.54 5.67
MSzP –2.00 0.05 0.13 –0.13 0.02 0.05 0.46
SzDSz –0.47 0.75 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.67
MDF 1.46 0.22 –0.10 0.10 0.33 –0.15 0.34
FIDESZ 2.22 –0.07 0.03 0.23 0.41 –0.07 0.13
Poland national mean 4.05 4.47 4.16 3.77 4.34 3.83 5.36
SLD-UP –1.52 –0.21 –0.07 –0.03 –0.02 0.01 0.33
PSL –0.35 –0.61 –0.38 –0.41 –0.69 0.39 –0.43
PO 1.28 1.09 1.54 0.56 1.38 –0.65 0.46
PiS 2.17 1.58 0.58 0.32 0.27 –0.17 0.91
Slovakia national mean 4.18 4.47 4.30 3.60 3.68 4.49 5.35
SDL –2.57 –1.12 0.09 –0.04 –0.11 0.03 –0.40
HZDS –0.80 –0.53 –0.12 –0.07 –0.45 –0.27 –0.47
SMER –0.68 0.20 –0.17 0.07 0.07 0.02 –0.32
SMK–MKP 0.97 0.24 0.06 0.13 –0.25 –0.12 0.55
SDK–SD KU 1.55 0.70 0.30 0.16 1.62 0.07 0.79
KDH 2.07 0.62 0.28 –0.12 0.35 0.18 0.94
Note: National means represent the absolute values of an index, while values for individual parties 
represent a variation from national means. 
Source: Own calculations based on the ILDGP survey (2002–2003).
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post-communist BSP in Bulgaria is also the most anti-market party within the analyzed 
countries. In Estonia, too, the most left-wing group is also the most strongly opposed 
to market solutions, but in this country none of the analyzed parties is clearly rooted 
in the previous political system, as noted earlier.15
 We expected that issues related to social individualism may be more diﬃcult to 
connect to the categories of left and right wing, and the data in table 1.22 conﬁrm 
this expectation. The correlation is quite strong in Hungary, weak in Bulgaria, and 
not signiﬁcant in any of the remaining countries. If there is any relationship, it is that 
right-wing councilors are more social individualist than leftist ones. Councilors’ scores 
on the social individualism scale are highest in Hungary and lowest in Bulgaria. It is 
also worth stressing that all four post-communist parties are below the national average 
on this scale. 
The least egalitarian are the Polish and Bulgarian councilors, while the most egali-
tarian are the Slovak and Hungarian. This means that on a national level egalitarianism 
is not related to left-right self-location. The only country where the position on both 
scales is similar is Hungary. But Estonian councilors that are the most right-wing, for 
example, are in the middle range of the scores on egalitarianism.  
If we look at each country individually, we ﬁnd that the picture changes. There is 
a very strong correlation between declared left-right orientation and egalitarianism in 
Bulgaria and Estonia, and only a slightly weaker one in Slovakia and Hungary. Poland 
is the only  analyzed country where such correlations are found. There is an even closer 
relationship between declared egalitarianism and market individualism (correlations are 
signiﬁcant on a level of 0.001 in all ﬁve countries). Post-communist parties are the most 
Table 1.22
 Correlations between Left-Right Self-location and Indices of Political Culture
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Market individualism + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Contracting out + + + + + + + +
Social individualism + + +
(non)Egalitarianism + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Populism + + – + +
System acceptance + + + + + + + – – + + + +
Modernism + + ++ + + +
Communist roots – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Note: “+” or “–” refers to the sign of correlation coeﬃcients, while the number refers to statistical sig-
niﬁcance (0.05, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001). A blank space means insigniﬁcant correlation. “+” means 
that the scores of an index are higher for right-wing councilors.
Source: Own calculations based on the ILDGP survey of councilors (2002–2003).
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egalitarian in their countries. This is very clear in Bulgaria and Slovakia. In Poland, the 
SLD follows the agrarian PSL in this respect, but the scores of both parties are higher 
than the national average. Hungary is a special case. The MSzP score on the egalitarian-
ism index is the lowest of the parties analyzed, but all parties have positive scores (i.e., 
above the national average). This suggests that the remaining councilors  (independent 
or belonging to small parties of marginal importance on the national level) are much 
more egalitarian than those from the four “establishment” parties. A similar phenom-
enon shows up in the analysis of Hungarian scores on market individualism and the 
acceptance of system changes (discussed below).  
Slovakia is the highest on the populism scale, while Hungary and Poland are at 
the other extreme (paternalism). This dimension is only loosely connected to left-wing 
self-location. In Poland and to a much lesser extent in Bulgaria and Estonia, rightist 
councilors are also more populist. In Hungary the correlation goes in the opposite direc-
tion, although it is weak. Inter-party diﬀerences are the strongest in Poland, where the 
agrarian PSL is the most populist, while the liberal PO is at the other extreme. On the 
populism index, the PO also has the lowest score among all 25 parties analyzed. 
Finally, we attempt to measure the level of general acceptance for the direction of 
political and economic transformation (the last column of table 1.21). The index may 
help us to see whether there is a real consensus on the general direction of system evolu-
tion and to identify parties whose attitude diﬀers from that general consensus. 
In general, our data suggest that the support for changes is quite high. In each of the 
countries the average score is above ﬁve on a one-to-seven scale. The consensus is broadest 
in Hungary—the  mean value of the index is the highest, and the standard deviation of 
answers is very low. Also, the standard deviation of answers within individual parties is 
low, which means that there is a high homogeneity of opinions within parties.
 The second country with a high level of consensus (low standard deviation of an-
swers) is Estonia. At the same time, Estonia is the country with the lowest mean value 
on the system acceptance index. This is related to a very low level of acceptance for Eu-
ropean integration (the average opinion is just above neutral and the value for the most 
enthusiastic party on this issue—Pro Patria—is below six on the one-to-seven scale). 
The situation in the remaining countries seems to generate more potential conﬂicts. 
In these countries the standard deviation of answers is much higher—from 1.82 in 
Bulgaria to almost 1.95 in Poland and Slovakia. In Bulgaria, the post-communist BSP 
questions the direction of changes the most often. BSP members question the view that 
present local governments work better than the former communist administration, but 
they are also sceptical on other issues.  
In Poland both the post-communist SLD and groups rooted in the former demo-
cratic opposition accept the most important system changes. But this consensus is not 
shared by the agrarian PSL nor by members of small, “other” parties (which are not 
presented in our summary tables). In the latter case the index has a negative value, i.e., 
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more councilors have a negative than positive attitude towards the direction of system 
changes. This means that in Poland, more clearly than in other analyzed countries, we 
can identify the opposition, which is reﬂected in the party system (although not in the 
mainstream parties) and which questions the general direction of changes in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
Hungary is another country in which a post-communist party (MSzP) accepts the 
main directions of political transformation. As in Poland, Hungarian councilors who 
are either independent or belong to small “other” parties are much more critical in their 
evaluation of system changes than local politicians from the main “establishment parties.” 
(But as mentioned above, the general acceptance of systemic changes in Hungary is much 
higher than in Poland, and consequently this anti-system opposition has a less radical 
character—the average score for “others” and “independents” is just above neutral.)
In Slovakia the index of system acceptance and measures of homogenity have even 
lower values. But political cleavages take a diﬀerent shape. The speciﬁcity of Slovakia is 
due to the presence of a very strong party (HZDS) which questions, to a large extent, 
the general direction of changes. Another party with a clearly critical attitude is the 
post-communist SDL. In diﬀerent ways, in both Poland (PSL) and Slovakia (HZDS 
and SDL) the anti-system opposition is clearly reﬂected by the party system.
Generally speaking, the index of system acceptance has the highest values in parties 
rooted in the former democratic opposition or in currently governing parties such as 
the post-communist parties in Hungary and Poland. Being in power and not in op-
position, it is much easier for them to accept system changes. In parties having roots in 
the former system the acceptance is much lower, especially if those parties are now in 
opposition (e.g., the BSP in Bulgaria or the SDL in Slovakia). 
In such circumstances, the shape of the relationship between left-right self-location 
and general acceptance of systemic changes should not be surprising. As we can see in 
table 1.22, there is much stronger support for changes among right-wing councilors 
in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia. But there is no such relationship in Poland, and an 
opposite correlation in Hungary.
6.4 Typology of Parties’ Political Culture
The typology of parties (viewed through the declarations of their councilor-members) 
is based on the indices discussed above, using Ward’s hierarchical cluster analysis. To 
minimize the impact of country speciﬁc factors, we took into account each party’s 
variation from the national average (e.g., how much lower or higher from the national 
average the index of market individualism for a given party is).
Before we discuss in detail the results of the typology, we should make one important 
methodological observation. Ward’s cluster analysis method (as any other formal typology 
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method) produces classes that are relatively homogenous (i.e., diﬀerences within group 
members are lower than between groups), but that does not mean that all the charac-
teristics of a group mean are always true for every group member. Analysis of intra- and 
inter-group standard deviations suggests that the results of our typology reﬂect very well 
the diﬀerences in left-right self-location, in communist roots of party members, and to a 
slightly lesser extent in market individualism. But it is less ideal from the point of view 
of variation in the indices of populism, social individualism, and modernism.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the results of the typology, while ﬁgure 1.4 summarizes the 
identiﬁed groups’ main characteristics. By applying Ward’s hierarchical method, we 
distinguish ﬁve types of political party whose main characteristics are presented in Figure 
1.4. The most internally homogenous are groups V and I, while groups IV and III are 
more heterogeneous. However, in the latter case intra-group diﬀerences are obviously 
substantially lower than the average variation among the analyzed parties.
Type I includes four parties of the post-communist left (the Hungarian MSzP, the 
Polish SLD, the Slovak SDL, and the Bulgarian BSP). All of the parties classiﬁed within 
this cluster are members of the European socialist international (see table 1.16). Their 
most pronounced features are the strong leftist identiﬁcation and communist roots of 
a large proportion of their councilors. They are also usually market collectivist (i.e., 
opposing market or individualist solutions) and egalitarian. Regarding other charac-
teristics, the position of this cluster is less clear. As presented in ﬁgure 1.3, this type, in 
fact, consists of two sub-groups: the Hungarian MSzP and Polish SLD are very similar 
to each other, while their taxonomic distance from the SDL and BSP is considerably 
higher. The ﬁrst sub-group might be called “reformed post-communist”—characterized 
by high system acceptance, a high level of modernism, and a more ambivalent attitude 
towards market individualism than the other sub-group. Again, it is important to stress 
that both of these parties currently hold power at the central government level.
The second sub-group (BSP and SDL) might be called “unreformed post-commu-
nist” and is characterized by a low level of acceptance for system changes, a low level of 
modernism of their councilors, and radical anti-market values. 
Type II, which we call “anti-modernist left” (since it is characterized by the lowest 
modernism index, the lowest index of social individualism, and low acceptance of po-
litical transformation) consists of three Estonian parties (the Center Party, the People’s 
Union, and the Moderates), two Slovak (HZDS and SMER), and one Polish (the agrarian 
PSL). An additional characteristic of this group is its strong egalitarianism and low level 
of acceptance for market solutions. This group could be also called “eurosceptics.” Three 
of the six parties belonging to this group have been classiﬁed by Taggort and Szczerbiak 
(2003) as “soft eurosceptics” (the Estonian Center Party, the Slovak HZDS, and the 
Polish PSL). One could easily add the Slovak SMER to the same group. Two remaining 
parties—the Estonian People’s Union and the Moderates—come from a country in which 
identiﬁed scepticism towards EU integration is the highest in general. We have already 
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Figure 1.3
Typology of Political Parties' Political Culture (Ward’s Hierarchical Method)
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mentioned the anti-system opposition in the Polish and Slovak party arenas, and most 
of these parties (apart from the small ones, which are not a subject of speciﬁc analysis 
here) ﬁt Type II. With the exception of the Center Party, they are parties of councilors 
with lower education levels from small towns and rural villages (see table 1.17 above). 
Last but not least, these are parties which are usually the least internally homogenous, 
as we will show in the next section.
Type III consists of what appears at ﬁrst glance to be a strange conglomerate of 
two Bulgarian parties that use anti-establishment rhetoric (the agrarian BANU and 
the MRF, a party of the Turkish minority), along with the Estonian Res Publica and 
the liberal Hungarian SzDSz (which belongs to the liberal international). This group is 
relatively heterogeneous—in political culture the two Bulgarian parties are very close 
to each other, while Res Publica and SzDSz are slightly diﬀerent. Internal variation is 
especially visible in social individualism and modernism issues (Res Publica and SzDSz 
are more modernist and more in support of social individualism than the two remaining 
parties of this group). The group is quite homogenous on other scales in the analysis. 
It is somewhat market individualist and has weak communist roots, but on most of the 
issues the group mean is close to the average for the whole set of analyzed parties.    
The remaining two types include parties whose members locate themselves clearly 
on the right wing of the political spectrum. 
Type IV may be called “liberal right” and consists of two Polish parties (the PO 
and PiS), two Estonian (Pro Patria and the Reform Party), and one Slovak (the SDK). 
This group is the closest to liberal: as observed in table 1.17, two out of ﬁve parties (the 
Slovak SDK and the Estonian Reform Party) belong to the liberal international, and 
the Polish PO is also very close to this ideology (since it was established only recently, 
it does not yet belong to any international). Councilors of parties belonging to this 
group present values that are the most consistently rightist in the traditional meaning 
of this term, and their self-location is consistently right although not extreme. They 
declare the highest support for market solutions, measured both by abstract questions 
concerning market individualism and a more practical question about the contracting 
out of local services. They are the most strongly anti-egalitarian and their level of system 
acceptance is also the highest. They are the least populist, the most modernist and the 
most social individualist.   
Type V includes two Bulgarian parties (the UDF and the Peoples’ Union), two 
Hungarian (the MDF and FIDESZ), and two Slovak (the SMK and KDH), and may be 
called “traditionalist right.” This group might be also called Christian-Democratic, since 
four out of ﬁve parties belonging to this class are members of the Christian-Democratic 
international (the Bulgarian UDF, the Hungarian FIDESZ and MDF, and the Slovak 
KDH). It is the most homogenous of the identiﬁed classes. As presented in ﬁgure 1.4, 
respondents from this cluster are the most right-wing in their self-location and were the 
least involved with politics under the communist period. But the values they declare are 
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not necessarily very close to the traditional meaning of the term “right-wing politics.” 
They support market individualism and are non-egalitarian, but not as strongly as the 
parties in Type IV (and in the latter case even less than Type III). However, it would 
not be fair to say that their right-wing orientation is only ideological. The mean score 
on most scales is substantially diﬀerent from Types I and II (which are the closest to the 
extreme left of the scale), but not as diﬀerent as one might expect on the basis of their 
own self-location and their non-communist past. 
The typology shows that the political map of parties in Central and Eastern Europe 
is not one of chaos without any order. The opinions of councilors that are members of 
parties of similar character show many similarities across countries. The amount of order 
is actually surprising, given the turbulent political scenes observed in these countries. It 
reconﬁrms the observation that organizational changes (the emergence of new parties, 
splits and internal conﬂicts) are not necessarily the result of variation in ideological 
choices. They might also be the result of personal conﬂicts or the low organizational 
skills of party leaders. Nevertheless, the internal homogeneity of individual parties is 
relatively low as we will see in the next section. 
 
6.5 Political Concurrence within Parties
It is assumed that the presence of parties helps to create order in political debate. In 
democratic theory parties articulate more or less coherent programs on behalf of voters 
and—if they successfully pass the electoral test—try to implement them. How close 
is this normative statement to the actual situation in Central and Eastern European 
local governments? How coherent are the opinions of local councilors from the same 
party?
We try to answer these questions by using a standard deviation of answers as well 
as an “index of party homogeneity”16 that takes into consideration the variation of all 
nine indices analyzed previously. In general, the variation of opinions is greatest in Bul-
garia and Slovakia, and least in Estonia. The homogeneity index for individual parties 
is presented in table 1.23.
Usually the index values are below 1, which means that the variation of opinions 
within parties is lower than general among all councilors in the country. The Estonian 
People’s Union is the only exception to this rule. Other very heterogeneous parties are 
the Estonian Center Party and the Moderates, the Hungarian SzDSz, the Polish PSL, 
and the Slovak HZDS. 
At the other extreme, the most homogeneous parties are the Bulgarian UDF and 
Peoples’ Union, the Estonian Reform Party, the Polish PO and PiS, the Hungarian 
FIDESZ, and the Slovak KDH. It can be easily seen here that the opinions of right-
wing councilors are usually more homogeneous than those of their colleagues from 
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Table 1.23
Party Homogeneity Index for Individual Parties
Bulgaria 
 BSP 0.91
 Turkish minority (MRF) 0.87
 BANU 0.92
 Peoples’ Union 0.84
 UDF 0.78
Estonia 
 Center Party 0.97
 Moderates 0.95
 People’s Union 1.01
 Res Publica 0.90
 Pro Patria 0.88
 Reform Party 0.84
Hungary
 MSzP 0.86
 SzDSz 0.94
 MDF 0.89
 FIDESZ 0.83
Poland 
 SLD–UP 0.91
 PSL 0.96
 PO 0.82
 PiS 0.82
Slovakia
 SDL 0.88
 HZDS 0.95
 SMER 0.88
 SMK–MKP 0.86
 SDK–SD KU 0.86
 KDH 0.82
Note: If an index is lower than 1, the variation within the party is lower than in the whole national 
sample, i.e., the lower the index, the more homogeneous the party. 
Source: Own calculations based on the LGDP survey of councilors (2002–2003).
68
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
left-wing parties. Indeed, the correlation between the two indices is 0.58 (statistically 
signiﬁcant on a 0.01 level). This is deﬁnitely a surprising ﬁnding.17 In Poland (but not 
only in Poland, as the same applies to the Slovak right, for example) rightist parties 
are famous for being undisciplined. The high number of disputes in these parties and 
the consequent splits and mergers make the right side of the political scene extremely 
unstable and chaotic. Their inability to act together is well known. Nevertheless, our 
research shows that members of these groups are similar to each other, and their opinions 
on important policy issues are more uniform than in other parties! 
Even more surprising, the high homogeneity is sustained when we treat all councilors 
belonging to various Polish “center-right” parties as one group. The right-wing councilors’ 
homogenity is usually higher than in post-communist groups, which have a reputation 
of being relatively uniform and disciplined. But in our opinion this observation is not 
necessarily in contradiction with the famous tradition of quarrels and turbulences in 
right-wing groups. Parties that have been created on the basis of the former democratic 
opposition have been based (at least historically) on common values and ideological 
choices. If they are not able to utilize this capital to build a stable political organization, 
the reason lies in their lack of practical skills and sometimes their inability to seek a 
consensus, but not in the lack of common ideological ground. On the other hand, our 
results conﬁrm a claim that leftist groups (especially post-communist parties) are often 
glued by common interest, not by common ideas. Our analysis also conﬁrms an obser-
vation of Szczerbiak (2003) that the splits and instability of Polish right-wing groups 
are related more to low institutional skills than to ideological inconsistency. 
High homogeneity is typical for most of the parties classiﬁed by us in clusters IV 
and V.  On the other hand, the most heterogeneous are the parties in Type II. These 
are groups that are afraid of the changes initiated by the 1990 political turn-over, and 
probably these fears provide the main glue for their organizations (rather than a com-
mon, coherent, positive program). These parties’ electorates often recruit from groups 
with a lower education, so the theoretical coherence of party programs has only limited 
importance for their voters.
 In contrast to what Clark and Swianiewicz suggested in their analysis based on the 
1991 data, party homogeneity is not a strong factor inﬂuencing their stability. There are 
several examples of groups among the parties analyzed in this chapter whose members 
have very diverse opinions on many issues, but which are still very stable. 
But for most Central and East European parties the index is only slightly lower than 
1. There is only one party (the UDF in Bulgaria) for which the index of homogeneity 
is lower than 0.80.18  
69
P A R T I E S  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  C U L T U R E
7. CONCLUSIONS
 
We now refer back to the various hypotheses presented at the beginning of this chapter, 
and determine whether or not they have been conﬁrmed by the analysis.
 • The role of political parties in local politics is not very important but has been gradu-
ally increasing during the last twelve years.
First of all, the role of political parties is diversiﬁed—it diﬀers among countries as 
well as between big and small municipalities. But the idea that it has been gradually 
increasing has only partially been conﬁrmed. The trend of increasing partisanship in local 
elections and local politics has certainly been observed in Poland, but data from Hungary 
and Slovakia are much less conclusive. Unfortunately, we do not have time-serious data 
for other countries. Thus, the ﬁrst hypothesis has been only partially conﬁrmed and its 
validity does not seem to be universal in all CEE countries. 
 • The increase in the role of parties in local politics is faster in countries with more 
consolidated territorial systems (Poland and Bulgaria rather than Estonia, Latvia, 
Hungary and Slovakia).
Yes, territorial consolidation deﬁnitely contributed to high scores in Bulgaria, while 
a high level of territorial fragmentation in Hungary led to low scores on the party 
importance index. But the role of parties depends also on “country-speciﬁc” variables, 
and in Poland, for example, it is much lower than one might expect on the basis of its 
territorial organization. 
 • The increase is also faster in big cities (in which party organizations often play a 
decisive role in local politics) than in small communities (where parties are often still 
nonexistent and most councilors as well as mayors are elected as independents).
Yes, the size of the local government proved to be a very powerful variable explaining 
the importance of parties in local politics. The correlation is stronger in some countries 
(e.g., Hungary) and weaker in others (e.g., Bulgaria), but it seems to be universal across 
the whole CEE region. The comparison of national means with “size-standardized means” 
is a very convincing illustration of this relationship. 
 • The role of parties is bigger in countries with proportional electoral systems than in 
countries with one-ward, majority local council elections. 
Yes, deﬁnitely it is. In fact, proportional versus majoritarian electoral systems proved 
to be the most powerful explanatory variable in some of the regression analyses.
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 • The role of parties in local politics is larger in countries with collective forms of 
leadership (Latvia, Estonia, and Poland before 2002) than in countries closer to the 
strong-mayor system (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland after 2002) and 
even larger in Hungary where the  system is closest to the council-manager form.
We failed to ﬁnd evidence to support this; on the other hand, neither did we ﬁnd evi-
dence that the opposite relationship (as suggested in some of Mouritzen and Svara’s results) 
might be true. It seems that the popular beliefs of both politicians and experts overestimate 
the impact of the mayors’ nomination method on the role of parties in local politics.
 • Political fragmentation and volatility of local councils is signiﬁcant and may be 
potentially dangerous for the management capabilities of local governments.
Yes, this proposition has deﬁnitely been conﬁrmed. Data on volatility are only 
partial and mostly limited to Poland, but political fragmentation is clearly higher than 
in most EU cities, and cases of management problems, which might be related to this 
fragmentation, are often reported.
 • The party orientation (sympathy, membership) of local councilors and mayors is only 
loosely correlated with their political culture and policy preferences. Nevertheless, 
parties diﬀer from each other and our report will attempt to map these diﬀerences. 
The question of the strength of the relationship between individual party member-
ship and opinions on various policy issues is probably the most diﬃcult to answer in 
a deﬁnite way. We do not have fully comparable data from countries in other regions, 
but we suggest that there is usually low homogeneity in the analyzed parties of Central 
and Eastern Europe. In one of the parties (the People’s Union in Estonia) the varia-
tion in opinion within the party was even higher than in the whole national sample of 
councilors. In some others such as the Slovak HZDS, the Polish PSL, and the Estonian 
Center Party and the Moderates, it is just a little bit lower. In other parties the internal 
variation is lower, but nevertheless very high. However, as we noted earlier, one cannot 
make predictions about the stability of the party system simply on the basis of their 
internal homogeneity. Sometimes parties that are not homogenous on policy issues (such 
as most of the post-communist parties) are much more stable than more homogeneous 
rightist groups.
 Finally, we have noticed that diﬀerences between parties in Estonia and to a some-
what lesser extent in Hungary are lower than in other countries. Summing up, it would 
not be fair to say that party membership of councilors or mayors is only loosely related 
to their political culture. But at the same time, low homogeneity of party members’ 
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opinions on crucial issues leaves us unable to call the present party system clearly and 
fully coherent. 
  There is not a clear international pattern of diﬀerences between parties. Parties 
that use similar labels (such as liberal, social-democrat, and in particular left- and 
right-wing) in diﬀerent countries are not necessarily similar to each other.  
The most vital cleavage still seems to be a division between post-communists and 
those that are rooted in democratic opposition groups. Except for Estonia, this line is 
to a large extent identical with the division between politicians who declare their ori-
entation to be right-wing or left-wing. This distinction is largely reﬂected in ideological 
choices on such issues as market individualism or egalitarianism (i.e., values that are 
important dimensions of the traditional left-right cleavages). But there are important 
exceptions to this general rule. For example, left-right location is not signiﬁcantly cor-
related with market individualism in Hungary or with egalitarianism in Poland. At the 
same time, “leftist” or “rightist” orientations are much more weakly reﬂected in more 
concrete policy choices. In the case of willingness to contract out local services (which 
may be interpreted as a practical test for market individualism) the correlation with the 
left-right dimension is problematic in most of the analyzed countries. In Hungary, “left” 
and “right” parties have similar opinions on the economy, but economic liberalism is 
characteristic for councilor-members of SzDSz, which is close to the center. 
At the same time, applying a formal classiﬁcation method brought more or less 
coherent results. We were able to group the analyzed parties into ﬁve clusters that dif-
fer in political culture and in the biographies of their members-councilors. Moreover, 
it has been possible to identify parties of a similar type in various countries (one group 
consisting of post-communist parties, and another of parties identifying themselves 
with Christian-Democracy). On the other hand, the ﬁnal result of classiﬁcation is not 
always coherent. Some groups that are “forced” by the formal clustering method look a 
bit artiﬁcial and are quite heterogeneous—e.g., Hungarian liberals from FIDESZ being 
in the same group as the Bulgarian agrarian BANU or a party of the Turkish minority 
in Bulgaria. 
It should be added that the picture arising from such a typology of parties is more like 
the traditional picture of left-right cleavages. Unlike what Clark suggests in his modern 
theories of New Political Culture or New Fiscal Populism (Clark and Fergusson 1983, 
Clark and Hoﬀmann-Martinot 1998) parties which are “leftist” on market issues are 
also “leftist” on social issues. To conclude, the picture of cleavages is much more coher-
ent than one might expect on the basis of popular beliefs in the chaotic character of the 
political scene in CEE countries, but it is also far from fully logical and explicable.
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NOTES
1 Classiﬁcation of local executive management systems refers to Mouritzen and Svara (2002) typology.
2 We return to this issue at the beginning of section on parties’ local political culture.
3 More precise deﬁnitions of individual dimensions are included in relevant section of this paper.
4 Local Democracy and Innovation project has been funded by the Norwegian Research Council for 
Applied Social Sciences and coordinated by prof. Harald Baldersheim (see Baldersheim et al. 1996, 
Baldersheim et al. 2003).
5 To calculate “size-standardized mean” we take into account size distribution which is averaged for 
all analyzed countries. For the size cohorts that are empty in our samples (e.g., we have no local 
governments below 1,000 residents in Bulgaria or in Poland), we use an extrapolation of the trend 
from the existing size cohorts. 
6 There are 25 such parties in the ﬁve analyzed countries. The same list of parties is analyzed in the 
following section where we discuss the variation in political culture. 
7 The surveys do not provide data on sympathy towards two of the analyzed parties: the SDL in 
Slovakia and the People’s Union in Bulgaria.
8 Party membership of mayors is known from the survey of Chief Executive Oﬃcers (see section 1.3). 
9 We do not have data on mayors’ sympathy towards Romanian parties.
10 Survey data for Hungary slightly diﬀer from actual data concerning the whole population (presented 
in table 1.7). But these diﬀerences are small and—generally speaking—conﬁrm the accuracy of our 
information gathered through surveys. 
11 The applied method of index calculation perhaps requires a methodological footnote. The index is 
calculated on the basis of mean values for each indicator taken into account. To get a size-standardized 
index, the means have been calculated individually for seven size cohorts of local governments (below 
1,000 residents; 1–2,000; 2–5,000; 5–10,000; 10–50,000; 50–100,000; over 100,000). Missing 
values (for example, there are no local governments below 1,000 residents in Bulgaria) have been 
handled in the way described in footnote 6. To avoid a strong domination of membership and 
support in elections in the index, the weight of the ﬁrst four variables is 0.5, while for the last two 
variables the weight is 1. The index is presented on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means the lack of 
any presence of parties while 100 means the domination of parties in local political life.
12 Strictly speaking, the electoral system in larger Hungarian cities is not purely proportional and 
might be described as “mixed.” But in our model we group it together with Bulgaria or Estonia, to 
distinguish the situation in the local governments from typical majority systems that exist in Slovakia 
or in small Hungarian and Polish local governments.
13 Communist roots index (CRI) is calculated as: com(partymean)/com(countrymean) and  
com =  
crcomm + crcomoﬀ + croldrep
3
 Crcomm—membership of political parties before 1990. 
 Crcomoﬀ—party oﬃcers before 1990. 
 Croldrep—councilors before 1990.
73
P A R T I E S  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  C U L T U R E
14 The index of modernism is calculated in the same way as the index of communist roots. A 100% 
value for the national average (as presented in table 1.17) would mean that all councilors use e-mail, 
use Internet, and have a university degree.
15 At least, these are the verbal declarations of all party members. Some other analyses—for example, 
Raun 1997, Kuczynski 2003—suggest that the Center Party was created by the former communist 
party establishment. But this ﬁnding is not conﬁrmed by our data. Is this perhaps not a concern of 
present local councilors? Or do they just not want to admit their communist past?
16 Such an index has been suggested by Swianiewicz and Clark  (1996). It consists of the mean standard 
deviation for the party divided by the standard deviation for the national sample.  
17 We claim this ﬁnding is surprising in the Central and East European context, since it goes against 
the popular stereotype of a uniform left together with fragmented and incoherent right-wing parties. 
However, we should mention that the phenomenon of increasing diversiﬁcation of left-wing parties 
has been observed in Western democracies. Lipset (2001) indicates that following changes in the 
social structure in modern societies, left parties now seek to appeal more to the growing middle 
strata than to industrial workers, and the “New Left” is looking for more market solutions. Lipset 
concludes that the Social Democratic and Labour parties are now socially and ideologically pluralistic 
(p.252).
18 Our intuition tells that if indices are so close to 1, parties’ homogeneity should be assessed as rather 
low. But perhaps it is typical for most parties, even those in more stabilized democratic systems such 
as in Western Europe. Unfortunately, we do not have fully comparative data, but we applied the same 
method to a few questions related to values similar to those we have discussed here, which were asked 
to mayors in the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) Project in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
index of parties’ homogenity was between 0.57 and 0.93 for ﬁve French parties, and between 0.80 
and 0.99 for three Norwegian parties. This very imperfect check conﬁrms our suggestion that there 
are larger variations of opinion within CEE party members than typically in Western Europe. 
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in Central and Eastern Europe
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ABSTRACT
This chapter presents a comparative study of gender diﬀerences in the attitudes and 
beliefs of local representatives in ﬁve transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe: 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.1 Looking at the special characteristics 
of women representatives is important since women are, or are close to being, a critical 
mass of local oﬃcials in all ﬁve countries (21–32%). The research is based on surveys 
of about 1,000 locally elected oﬃcials in each of the ﬁve countries. Our ﬁndings for 
locally elected oﬃcials are consistent with ﬁndings for the general population and with 
trends in the gender gap worldwide. We ﬁnd gender diﬀerences in perceptions of the very 
nature of the role of the state, and this is consistent from country to country. Women 
see a greater role for the state in the economy and in the provision of help and support 
to citizens. Diﬀerences at the local level are especially important because it is here that 
many of the issues having a direct impact on the lives of women are addressed on a daily 
basis. The existing gap seems to be growing, as we see clear generational (age cohort) 
diﬀerences consistent with growth in the gap over time. This is further reinforced by 
the data on ideological self-identiﬁcation, which shows women generally to the left of 
their male counterparts and growth in this gap from generation to generation. However, 
support for democracy and democratic values is quite consistent across gender.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A recent survey of local legislatures (LRS 2002–2003) was sent out to thousands of local 
representatives in ﬁve countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Bulgaria, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. While the survey had many objectives, including 
gathering information about the activities, values, opinions, and demographics of locally 
elected oﬃcials, these data also provided an opportunity to examine important diﬀer-
ences in the attitudes, preferences, and perceptions of male and female representatives. 
The data have allowed us to place in comparative perspective the gender diﬀerences, and 
particularly the so-called gender gap, among local representatives in these ﬁve countries. 
We can see to what extent these data are consistent with ﬁndings on the gender gap 
at other levels. Moreover, the survey allows us to make interesting comparisons across 
countries in the CEE region.
Our ﬁndings on this issue are unique and potentially quite important. There is a lack 
of available research identifying in what ways female and male locally elected oﬃcials 
actually diﬀer and how those diﬀerences aﬀect their policy choices. The idea that more 
equitable gender representation is good for democratic development and will result in 
more diverse policymaking at the local level is based on the assumption that there are 
gender-related diﬀerences in the values, goals, priorities, and perceptions of representa-
tives. In addition, since the research focuses on local councilors instead of national or 
state representatives, it will add to our understanding of the nature and potential beneﬁts 
of decentralization. These data also provide the opportunity to examine the nature of the 
“gender gap” among locally elected elites compared to the gap found within the general 
population of the ﬁve countries included in the study. Finally, the research investigates 
the local situation in a relatively new wave of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe 
and adds to our understanding of democratic transitions. 
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1.1 Decentralization and Gender Representation
In recent decades “decentralization” has become increasingly popular as a means of 
addressing major diﬃculties associated with the management of complex functions in 
public administration, increasing the responsiveness of government, promoting greater 
participation, and improving the quality of governance. Even traditionally highly cen-
tralized unitary states such as France have made signiﬁcant moves in this direction 
(Loughlin and Mazey 1995; Page 1991; Downs 1998; also see DeVries 2000 regarding 
support for decentralization in Europe). Worldwide, both developing and transitional 
countries have been under intense international pressure from the donor community 
to decentralize authority as part of the democratization process. Understandably, many 
post-socialist countries have welcomed decentralization as a way of breaking down the 
over-centralized socialist state as part of their democratic transitions.
All ﬁve countries in our study have already established local self-governments with 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. According to Tamás M. Horváth (2000), only Poland 
and Hungary can be described as following a “coherent model of transition” of local 
governments. For these two countries, the structure of local governments was established 
early and elections at the local level were held at the time of the ﬁrst parliamentary 
elections. In CEE countries, however, it was more common that their institution of 
local democracy developed gradually. The structures, functions, and ﬁnancing of local 
governments were the result of ongoing political disputes in which “temporary political 
and legal techniques were adopted” (Horváth 2000). Nevertheless, the end product is 
similar in all ﬁve cases in the sense that local government rests on the foundation of 
democratically elected local bodies. Moreover, all the countries included in this study 
consider the European Charter of Local Self-Government of the European Union as a 
model in establishing pluralistic and democratic local governance. Local governments 
also add a great deal of vitality to the political systems of each country. While the precise 
structures and functions of local governments often diﬀer from one country to another 
in important ways, we believe enough similarities still exist to allow for meaningful 
comparison. 
The importance of the impact of local level governance on people’s lives is increasing, 
and this raises several gender-related questions. To what extent do gender-related issues 
become part of the local agenda? How well are women represented in elected councils 
and legislatures at this level? In what ways do men and women diﬀer in their views of 
democracy and government? The number of women representatives, presumably with 
their own values, unique views on public policy issues, and diﬀerent backgrounds, may 
have a critical impact on a broad range of policy issues in the future. Assuming that 
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between male and female locally elected oﬃcials, bet-
ter gender representation may result in decision-making bodies that are more likely to 
represent the real values of the public (Thielemann and Stewart 1996). 
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In addition to the critical areas of policy they address, locally elected bodies may 
provide attractive opportunities and easier access for women. These legislatures oﬀer seats 
that are often less competitive, require less costly campaigns and are less likely to require 
relocation away from familial demands, all conditions which have traditionally inhibited 
women’s involvement in electoral politics (Lovenduski 1986). In addition, they may serve 
as an important recruiting ground for women candidates for higher-level oﬃces. 
For example, a recent study by Susan J. Carroll found evidence of a signiﬁcant 
“gender gap” between the ideological orientations and attitudes on policy issues of rep-
resentatives in the United States. Carroll’s work conﬁrmed earlier ﬁndings that women 
representatives are more likely to hold liberal opinions on issues and are less likely to 
call themselves conservatives—regardless of their party aﬃliation (Carroll 2002). 
At the state level, Carey, Niemi, and Powel found important diﬀerences between 
men and women legislators in the following areas:
 • Level of political ambition
 • Level of professionalization—the degree to which men were more ambitious, 
experienced, and able to mobilize greater resources
 • Legislative activities
 • Policy positions
 • Ideology.
Carey, Niemi, and Powel note that “women state legislators are diﬀerent from their 
male counterparts in important ways” (Thomas and Wilcox 1998, 87). Not only do they 
diﬀer, but this diﬀerence matters in the sense that it will aﬀect their politics (Thomas 
1994). As the number of women elected to public oﬃce grows, it is becoming more 
and more important to explore these gender-based diﬀerences.  Moreover, earlier studies 
neglected gender diﬀerences at the local or regional levels of politics. 
1.2 Small Differences That Matter
Inglehart and Norris (2003) note that there exists “a modest but consistent” gender gap 
between many aspects of policy-related values and beliefs such as the political activism 
of male and female citizens of postindustrial, industrial, and agrarian societies. Loven-
duski and Norris (2003) conclude in their study of the British Parliament that the entry 
of more women into the legislature will probably not generate radical revolution but 
will end “politics as usual.” Others, such as Phillips, also conﬁrm that the diﬀerences 
between men’s and women’s experience of politics originates in rather small diﬀerences 
and do not suggest that men and women are “essentially” diﬀerent. Instead, “a fairly 
small diﬀerence in experience can become a large diﬀerence in self-image and social 
perception” (Phillips 1998). 
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These seemingly small diﬀerences, therefore, can be very important. Anne Phillips 
identiﬁes some arguments why better gender representation and eventually gender parity 
is essential in a democracy (Phillips 1998):
 • Justice: it is unfair for men to monopolize political representation. Distorted 
representation is the result of intentional or structural discrimination against 
women representatives;
 • Women’s interest: from the point of view of political realism, there is no public 
interest. Instead, there are several diﬀerent interests within the public. Women’s 
interests are one of the many interests, and they are inadequately addressed in 
a political system dominated by men; 
 • Revitalization of democracy: increasing the number of women representatives is 
not only a pictorial or quota-related goal. Feminists think that gender representa-
tion matters because what female representatives do is diﬀerent from their male 
counterparts. Consequently, increasing the number of women representatives 
enhances democracy and democratic institutions. 
While much research has already been carried out on male to female ratios in elected 
bodies, it is rare to investigate what actual diﬀerence it makes to have better gender 
equity. In other words, how are male and female representatives diﬀerent2 and what is 
the policy impact of those diﬀerences? 
1.3 Gender Representation in Post-socialist Countries
The ﬁve countries included in this study, and post-socialist countries in general, now 
tend to share a similar experience with many developed western democracies. They 
generally have relatively low levels of women represented in legislative oﬃces when 
compared to women’s share of the total population. This is especially surprising with 
regard to formerly socialist countries, since these countries tended to have higher levels 
of descriptive representation in their “socialist” past than they do in their democratic 
present. Increasing the number of women in governmental bodies was part of the socialist 
rhetoric of emancipating women from a double oppression: ﬁrst, because of their class 
and, second, due to their gender. Paradoxically, the relatively high level of descriptive 
representation was only possible due to the fact that elections were not free. Thus, 
the Socialist Party could inﬂuence nominations and votes according to its ideological 
directives. During the last socialist elections in Hungary in 1985 women won 27% of 
the parliamentary seats (compared to only 8% in the most recent national election) 
and 21% of the positions in local governments. It is important to note, however, that 
descriptive representation was not accompanied by substantive representation, and for 
women as well as “for most people political participation meant passive attendance at 
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meetings and demonstrations to support the party” (Rueschemeyer 1994). Eva Fodor 
notes that even the 30% quota set by the Hungarian Politburo for female participation 
in political positions was a sign of limiting women’s advancement under socialism to 
a maximum of less than one-third of all the leadership positions (Fodor 2002; see also 
Moser 2003).
After the collapse of communism, the absolute number of female politicians 
signiﬁcantly dropped. In Hungary, for example, women occupied only 7.3% of the 
parliamentary seats after the ﬁrst democratic elections in 1990. However, more than 
double that (16%) were elected at the local level. There has been a slight increase in 
female representatives since the ﬁrst elections, and the gap between the local and central 
ratios remains in favor of the local level (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Vengroﬀ, Nyiri 
and Fugiero 2003).
The countries selected for inclusion in this study represent a great variety of CEE 
transitional democracies. Four of the ﬁve countries are new members of the European 
Union (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovakia), but Bulgaria has yet to join. Bulgaria 
is also representative of the Balkan region with its distinct historical and economic 
perspectives. But the most important feature of these countries is a unifying one, as they 
are all transforming their post-communist political systems into modern democratic 
systems of governance with a substantial amount of decision-making granted to the 
local level. Freedom House describes the “freedom status” of all ﬁve countries as free.3 
Four of the countries are ranked similarly in political rights and civil liberties, with only 
Bulgaria scoring a little less favorably on both indices (see table 2.1 below).
As far as women’s representation and gender equality are concerned, the countries 
are rather similar. With the exception of Bulgaria, all the countries in this study score 
relatively high on the Human Development Index and the Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI)—see ﬁgure 2.1. The Gender-related Development scale is a composite 
index measuring average achievement in the three basic dimensions captured in the 
Table 2.1
Freedom House Rankings (1999–2000) 
Political rights Civil liberties Freedom status
Bulgaria 2 3 Free
Estonia 1 2 Free
Hungary 1 2 Free
Poland 1 2 Free
Slovakia 1 2 Free
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org.
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Human Development Index of the United Nation’s Human Development Report 
(UNDP 2001): a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living for 
women. Only Bulgaria is among the countries considered to be at the “medium” level 
of development on this index. The countries in our study tend to be in one cluster as 
Slovakia ranks 34th, Hungary 35th, Poland 36th, and Bulgaria 53rd out of 146 countries 
(data on Estonia are missing).
As the countries in this study tend to rank high on gender-related development, 
they score somewhat similarly on the more political aspects of gender empowerment. 
The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) goes beyond basic dimensions of human 
development and takes into account the degree to which women participate in politics 
and the economy. GEM is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three 
important dimensions of empowerment: women’s economic participation and decision-
making roles, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic 
resources. Looking at the countries in our sample, Estonia is ranked the highest at 25th, 
Slovakia 27th, Poland 32nd, and Hungary 41st out of 64 countries. Unfortunately, GEM 
values are missing for Bulgaria. 
As noted above, CEE countries have a history of women’s participation in the political 
arena, and all the countries in our sample granted voting rights to women before 1945. 
Figure 2.1
Comparison of Rankings on Gender-related Development 
and the Gender Empowerment Measure4
Source: United Nations Development Program, 2001.
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Moreover, women could be legally elected to political oﬃce since that time. Women 
are fairly well represented at the ministerial level in our sample countries, ranging from 
14% to 36% of the workforce. But in the politically more prestigious parliaments 
women’s representation lags behind, ranging from a low of 8% of parliamentary seats 
held by women in Hungary to 18% in Estonia. Even the best performer in our group 
of countries has fewer women MPs than the leading countries in women’s representa-
tion such as Norway (36.4%) and Sweden (42.7%). This is not particularly unusual, 
however, as many of the more aﬄuent and established Western democracies also have 
relatively few women in their parliaments (e.g., France with 10.9%, the United States 
with 14%, and Italy with 11.1%). Table 2.2 below provides some basic indicators and 
milestones of women’s political rights and representation in the ﬁve countries.
Finally, lower earnings of women than men—a phenomenon not unknown in more 
established democracies—can also be observed in our sample of countries. Women’s 
income ranges from 57% to 65% of the earned male income among the general popu-
lation. Figure 2.2 displays the ratio of estimated earned income for males and females 
among the general population in four of the ﬁve countries of our study during the 
period 1994–1999. While earning disparities are a stable feature of all democracies, we 
must note that both male and female representatives make less money in CEE than in 
Western Europe, which makes the earning gap more painful for women since the base 
is lower to begin with.
In summary, based on general measures of gender equity, the ﬁve countries of our 
study are situated in a more or less uniform cluster. Based on the general population 
measures, we also expect them to behave relatively similarly with regard to the gender 
gap in local political elites, as they have shared a “common history” since World War 
II as well as a current political agenda to prepare them to conform with EU practices 
and policies. 
Table 2.2
Political Rights and Representation of Women in Five CEE Countries (2001)
The year women 
received the right 
to vote
The year women 
received the 
right to stand 
for election
Percent of women 
in government 
at the ministerial 
level
Parliamentary seats 
held by women in 
the lower or single 
house (as percent 
of the total)
Bulgaria 1944 1944 19 11
Estonia 1918 1918 14 18
Hungary 1918 1918 36 8
Poland 1918 1918 19 13
Slovakia 1920 1920 19 14
Source: United Nations Development Program, 2001.
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2. DATA SOURCES
The statistical analysis on gender diﬀerences is carried out on data5 gathered during 2002 
and 2003 as part of a project initiated by the Open Society Institute in Budapest. The 
survey instrument was distributed among local representatives in ﬁve countries to collect 
information about the activities, values, opinions, and demography of local political 
elites. The targeted respondents were locally elected representatives such as mayors and 
municipal councilors. The survey design included items in the following six areas: 
 1. The perception of local government performance
 2. An evaluation of the relationship between local government and citizenry
 3. Trust and power relations within the political elite
 4. Party and NGO membership
 5. Respect for and commitment to basic democratic values
 6. Demographic characteristics such as age and education.
The countries in this study (Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary) 
provide a good cross-section of Central and Eastern European countries, and all of them 
have a functioning system of democratically elected local representatives. Although the 
samples were not stratiﬁed by gender, between 21% and 32% of the interviewees in 
each country are women.
Figure 2.2
The Ratio of Estimated Female to Male Earned Income (2001)
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Source: United Nations Developement Program, 2001.
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3. THE COMMON GROUND: EDUCATION, AGE, AND OPTIMISM
3.1 Age
While the focus of this chapter is on gender diﬀerences, men and women elected as 
local oﬃcials also have many things in common. For example, the median age for both 
male and female local representatives is 49 and 47, respectively. Although this diﬀerence 
is statistically signiﬁcant, it bears little substantive relevance as both sexes tend to be 
from the same generation; that is, they were born before the 1960s and grew up under 
the communist regime. 
3.2 Education
The diﬀerences are also minimal in terms of education.6 Local representatives are generally 
well educated.  More than half of the representatives have had some college or university 
training, including 57% of  male and 59% of female representatives. Those having 
completed only primary school or fewer than eight years of elementary school comprise 
less than 2% of each group. Of those whose schooling ended at the secondary level, 
men are more likely (15.6% versus 9% for women) to have attended trade schools and 
to have some type of vocational degree, and women are more likely to have attended 
traditional high schools (30.9% compared to 25.5% of males). 
Figure 2.3
Gender and Education among Local Representatives (2002–2003)
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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We found no signiﬁcant gender-related diﬀerence in the ability to speak a foreign 
language(s). Slightly fewer  than half of all respondents (48% of men and 46% of women) 
reported that they are able to take part in a conversation in a foreign language. As we can 
see from ﬁgure 2.4 below, there exist some diﬀerences between countries in this regard 
(Slovakia scoring highest, as expected from its recent history), but the gender-related 
diﬀerences within the countries are negligible.
3.3 Optimism
Are women in general more optimistic than men about the future of their municipality? 
To determine this we created an optimism index based on the diﬀerence between the 
respondent’s estimation of how things will be going in the local community ﬁve years 
from now and their satisfaction with the municipality at the time of the interview.7 When 
we look at their predictions about life in their respective local communities ﬁve years 
from now (see ﬁgure 2.5), regardless of gender interviewees tend to be slightly optimistic, 
with an average of 4.5 on a one-to-seven scale (one meaning that the future will be much 
worse and seven meaning the future will be much better).  Representatives tend to give 
slightly weaker responses—but still without a signiﬁcant gender gap—to the question 
of how satisﬁed they are with the current situation in their own municipality. They tend 
to evaluate their local government at the middle point of a seven-point scale. 
The scale on the optimism index ranges from –6 to +6; the higher the score, the 
more optimistic the local representatives are (see ﬁgure 2.6). In all ﬁve countries there 
is some limited optimism about the future of their municipality. We can safely say that 
Figure 2.4
Representatives Speaking a Foreign Language, by Gender [%]
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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most local leaders do not expect things to worsen and do predict some improvement in 
the next ﬁve years. By far the least optimistic about change in the future are the Slovak 
representatives, especially women. Gender diﬀerences within the countries are quite 
small, on average well below one full point in all ﬁve countries. In other words, both 
female and male representatives can be described as being slightly and equally optimistic 
about the future of their municipality; on the other hand, they are closer to the middle, 
i.e., slightly less satisﬁed, with the current situation.
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Satisfaction with Municipality 5 Years from now
Figure 2.5
General Optimism about the Future of the Municipality
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Figure 2.6
Country and Gender Diﬀerences on the Optimism Index (2002–2003)
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4. AREAS OF DIFFERENCE: WORK AND COMPENSATION
4.1 Time Spent Working as a Local Councilor
The traditional view that women need to spend more time at home and that this detracts 
from their active time commitment to politics seems to be true in CEE countries (see 
ﬁgures 2.7 and 2.8 below). Women report devoting fewer hours in an average week 
to their activities as councilors than their male counterparts do. Furthermore, women 
representatives tend to work fewer oﬃce hours than do their male colleagues. But these 
ﬁgures may be deceptive as women tend to conduct more of their business in less for-
mal contact situations. There is very little cross-country variation in this regard and the 
modal category is in the 5–10 hours-a-week range for all ﬁve countries.              
4.2 Levels of Compensation
Finally, we must address the issue of  representatives’ compensation. As can be seen in 
ﬁgure 2.9 below, there is a statistically signiﬁcant gender gap here. Female representatives 
report their personal income is about the same as the average income in their munici-
pality, four on a seven-point scale. Male representatives report slightly higher incomes 
than the average citizen—4.5 on the same scale.
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Figure 2.7
Hours Local Representatives Spend on their Activities by Gender8 (2002–2003)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
93
T H E  G E N D E R  G A P
Figure 2.8
Provision of Oﬃce Hours for Constituents,9 by Gender (2002–2003)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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The above ﬁnding is not surprising if we take into account that women in general 
make less money than do men in the region. But this does not mean that female rep-
resentatives work less, because their employment status tends to be remarkably similar 
to that of men. That is, around 68–70% of both male and female local representatives 
are employed full time in one capacity or another. Hungarian male representatives seem 
to have the highest income when compared to average income (4.73 on a seven-point 
scale), while the only Estonian representatives who report that their income is below 
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Male Female
Average on
7-point scale
Figure 2.9
Personal Income Relative to the Community, by Gender10 (2002–2003)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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average (3.63) for their municipalities are the females (see ﬁgure 2.10 below). Detailed 
data on compensation are presented in tables 2.3a and 2.3b below.
5. CIVIC INVOLVEMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
 AMONG LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES
While the respondents in this study have already demonstrated their political activism 
by being elected to political oﬃce, we also examine whether the gender gap applies 
to other forms of political activism and non-traditional participation such as political 
protests and demonstrations. We also consider in what ways local political elites in 
Central and Eastern Europe behave diﬀerently from the general population in their 
respective countries. 
Table 2.3a
    Personal Income Comparison 
Gender Country Mean N Standard deviation
Male Bulgaria 4.23 716 1.480
Estonia 4.56 621 1.511
Hungary 4.73 702 1.223
Poland 4.53 581 1.669
Slovakia 4.55 647 1.366
Total 4.52 3,267 1.458
Female Bulgaria 4.05 194 1.311
Estonia 3.63 286 1.581
Hungary 4.27 221 1.397
Poland 4.45 153 1.666
Slovakia 4.07 230 1.498
Total 4.04 1,084 1.518
Total Bulgaria 4.19 910 1.447
Estonia 4.27 907 1.593
Hungary 4.62 923 1.281
Poland 4.51 734 1.667
Slovakia 4.43 877 1.418
Total 4.40 4,351 1.487
Note: N=4,351
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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Table 2.3b
    Personal  Income Comparison (ANOVA)
Income comparison by gender Sum of 
squares
df Mean
squares
F Sig.
Between combined groups 183.059 1 183.059 84.364 0.000
Within groups 9,436.700 4,349 2.170
Total 9,619.759 4,350
Note: N=4,351
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Gender has traditionally been examined as a factor that aﬀects political participation 
including electoral turnout, party membership, and political protest among the general 
population. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that there are three major dimensions 
of political activism: 
 • Traditional political activism such as party or union memberships and voting
 • Civic activism that goes beyond the conventional forms of political participation 
such as membership in voluntary organizations and associations 
 • Protest activism such as participation in demonstrations, boycotts, or petitioning. 
They found “a modest but consistent” gender gap in political activism with women 
being less active than men among the general population of postindustrial, industrial, 
and agrarian countries.
Figure 2.10
Personal Income Relative to Community by Country (2002–2003)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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Inglehart and Norris classify the countries of Central and Eastern Europe included in 
this study as industrial societies with newer democracies. All ﬁve of our sample countries 
are included in the 1990 World Values Study and in most cases in subsequent surveys. 
These studies provide some baseline data on the general population. These surveys 
provide us with an opportunity to contrast local elites with the general population, in 
addition to highlighting gender diﬀerences among local representatives.
5.1 Civic Involvement
Almond and Verba (1963), and Putnam (1994) point out that membership in volun-
tary associations is an important measure of civic culture. Civic-mindedness and social 
capital are connected to the quality and success of democratic institutions because they 
facilitate cooperation by increasing trust among the members of a particular group and 
by enhancing communication. Because of the increased role of the local elite in Central 
and Eastern Europe in building and maintaining democratic institutions, we have paid 
special attention to their level of civic activism.
We measure civic activism by membership in civic organizations such as associa-
tions, foundations, or trade unions, in which a representative has had a position of trust. 
(This is because the questionnaire only asked about membership in civic organizations 
in which the respondent occupied a position of trust such as being a board member 
or an oﬃcial.) We then contrast the level of associational activism between male and 
female local oﬃcials. 
A quick glance at table 2.4 reveals that at the national level membership in civic 
organizations seems to be negatively correlated with party membership. That is, countries 
with higher levels of party membership among local representatives tend to rank lower 
Table 2.4
Local Representatives Occupying a Position 
of Trust in Civic Organizations [%] (2002)
Country NGO Position of trust
Male Female Total Gender gap
Hungary 53.2 50.5 52.6 –2.7
Poland 43.0 43.0 43.0 0.0
Estonia 34.4 32.1 33.6 –2.3
Slovakia 27.8 23.3 26.7 –4.5
Bulgaria 20.7 21.9 20.9 1.2
Note: N=3,993
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03. 
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in civic organization membership. While 86% of the local representatives were party 
members in Bulgaria, only 21% of them held a position of trust in a civic organization. 
Meanwhile, only 35% of the Hungarian representatives were party members, but 52% 
percent were in a position of trust in a civic organization. 
The gender gap is quite small, but female representatives are less likely to be in a 
position of trust in an NGO than are their male counterparts in Estonia, Hungary, and 
Slovakia. There is no diﬀerence in Poland, and in Bulgaria women are more involved 
by a very slim margin.  However, the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant, even 
when we control for age cohort. Also, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between party 
and civic organizational membership at the individual level; that is, party members are 
not more or less likely to be members of civic organizations.
We further analyzed civic activism by contrasting the number of civic organiza-
tions to which men and women belong (table 2.4). Except for Slovakia, female local 
representatives belong to fewer civic organizations than do their male counterparts. 
This diﬀerence, similar to leadership diﬀerences in associational groups, fails to reach 
statistical signiﬁcance.
When we compare the civic activism of local representatives to that of the general 
population in their respective countries (as reported by Inglehart and Norris) we ﬁnd, as 
expected, that local elites greatly exceed their respective country averages in organizational 
activism. Citizens in industrial societies tend to belong to fewer than one civic organiza-
tion (on average 0.71 for women and 0.86 for men). Among local representatives in our 
sample, the mean number of civic organizations in which they hold a position of trust 
(a more restrictive measure than simple memberships) ranges from 1.37 for Estonian 
women to 1.69 among Hungarian women. Men who are local oﬃce holders tend to 
belong to more civic organizations, the range being from 1.48 civic organizations per 
representative in Estonia to 1.82 in Poland.
Although we found no statistically signiﬁcant gender gap in terms of membership 
in civic organizations, the numbers are in the expected direction.  Among leaders, as is 
the case with the general population, women seem to be slightly less likely to be active 
in civic organizations in most of the countries in our study. This has clear implications 
for democracy, to the extent that these measures are considered proxies for social capital 
(see tables 2.5 and 2.6).
5.2 Participation in Protest Demonstrations
Finally, the least conventional form of political participation measured in the survey is 
political protests and demonstrations. Our ﬁndings show that female local representatives 
were less likely than are their male counterparts to have participated in demonstrations 
during the previous year in all ﬁve countries considered. Hungary showed the largest 
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diﬀerence: more than twice as many of the male representatives (16%) report that they 
participated in a protest or demonstration during the previous year, compared to only 
7% of the female representatives. 
While the gender gap between representatives remains, local representatives of both 
genders are less likely to use this form of political activism than is the general population. 
Given the nature of our sample population (local representatives are already members 
of the political elite and tend to work inside the system), these results are not surpris-
ing. In addition, the local political elite has access to and may prefer other avenues for 
expressing their views than this non-traditional form of political participation. Even so, 
political protest is not unknown as a form of participation among them. 
Table 2.5
Mean Number of Civic Organizations in which 
Local Representatives Occupy a Position of Trust (2002)
Country  Mean number of civic organizations
 Male Female Gender gap
Bulgaria  1.67 1.47 –0.20
Estonia  1.48 1.37 –0.11
Slovakia  1.53 1.62 0.09
Poland  1.82 1.62 –0.20
Hungary  1.80 1.69 –0.11
Note: N=2,112
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Table 2.6
Membership in Civic Organizations in the General Population 
of Postindustrial and Industrial Societies (2003)
Type of society Gender Memberships in civic organizations (mean no.)
Postindustrial Female 1.46
Male 1.50
Difference –0.04
Industrial Female 0.71
Male 0.86
Difference –0.15
Source: Inglehart and Norris, 2003.
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Our ﬁndings for local representatives in Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, and 
Slovakia reinforce the “modest but consistent” gender gap in political activism that oth-
ers have found among the general population. Even in those cases where the diﬀerences 
are not statistically signiﬁcant, the direction of the relationship is such that female local 
elites seem to be less engaged in the major forms of political activism. The fact that these 
women are already elected political representatives does not fully overcome the gender 
gap. Local representatives in general, and male local representatives in particular, are 
more likely to be members of a party and hold a position of trust in civic organizations 
than is the case in the general population. However, local representatives in general 
are less likely to participate in protests and demonstrations in all of the ﬁve countries 
included in our analysis.
Table 2.7
Local Representatives Participating in Protest Demonstrations 
during the Previous Year [%] (2002)
Participation (percent of representatives)
Country Male Female Total Gender gap
Hungary* 15.9 7.1 13.8 –8.9
Bulgaria 12.7 9.9 12.1 –2.8
Poland 10.4 9.6 10.2 –0.8
Slovakia 5.8 3.4 5.2 –2.4
Estonia 4.8 3.2 4.3 –1.6
Note: p < 0.001, N = 4,274
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Table 2.8
Percentage of Population in Postindustrial 
and Industrial Societies Who Have Done at Least One Protest Act 
Type of society  Gender Protested at least once [%]
Postindustrial  Female    62.3
 Male    65.5
 Difference   –3.3
Postindustrial  Female    29.7
 Male    34.4
 Difference    –4.7
Source: Inglehart and Norris, 2003.
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5.3 Party Membership
Party membership is a traditional way for citizens to express their political views and 
their support in a rather active form. Tamás Horváth cautions us in advance that as 
parties are new to the political systems of CEE countries, independent candidates have 
better access to elected bodies on the local level than they do nationally (Horváth 2000, 
39–40). We ﬁnd his remarks generally hold true for the countries in our study.  Except 
for Bulgaria and Estonia, the majority of local representatives in our sample countries 
are not members of any party. When the gender of the representative is taken into ac-
count, four out of the ﬁve countries exhibit statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between 
men and women in terms of party memberships. With Estonia as the only exception, 
female local representatives are less likely to be party members than are male.  Hungary 
provides the most dramatic example of a signiﬁcant gender gap. Hungarian female 
representatives are less than half as likely as males (19% compared to 39%) to belong 
to a party. Clearly these data are consistent with the ﬁndings of the World Values Sur-
vey about the gender gap in party membership among ordinary citizens. It should be 
noted that party membership among Bulgarian local elites exceeds that of any of our 
other countries. This may help deﬁne the attitudinal diﬀerences between our Bulgarian 
respondents and those in the other four countries.
The size of the municipality also seems to aﬀect party membership in some coun-
tries, so we need to examine the possibility that there are diﬀerences in the chances 
of women being elected to councils based on city size. In Hungary and Slovakia, we 
ﬁnd that smaller municipalities are more likely to elect female representatives than are 
larger municipalities. Almost 73% of the female representatives in Hungary are elected 
in villages (p<0.000) and in Slovakia a slightly higher number (75%) are elected in 
villages rather than cities (p=0.056). In both of these countries, representatives in smaller 
municipalities are also less likely to be members of any party. It is in these two countries 
that the gender gap in party membership is greatest. Thus, in these two countries the 
gender gap in party membership may be, at least in part, a function of where women 
are elected rather than choice. However, we did not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant gender 
diﬀerences in representation based on size of municipality in Poland, Bulgaria, or Estonia. 
The gaps in these countries are therefore the result of other factors. 
Overall, “independents” (nonpartisans) seem to dominate local elites in four of the 
ﬁve countries considered here. Female local elites are, as expected, by a wide margin 
more likely to engage in this traditional form of political participation than are women 
in the general population. While among the general population party membership 
ranges from a low of 1% in Estonia to a high of 8% in Bulgaria, among local female 
representatives party membership is, as expected, much higher. 
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Table 2.9
Party Membership among Local Representatives by Country [%] (2002)
Country Members of a party
Male Female Total Gender gap
Bulgaria 87 83 86 –4
Estonia** 49 58 52 9
Slovakia** 48 35 44 –13
Poland** 38 27 36 –11
Hungary*** 39 19 35 –20
Note: * p< 0.01, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001(based on chi-square); N=4,358
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.  
Table 2.10
Party Membership among the General Population by Country [%] (2003)
Country      Party members
Bulgaria 8.0
Estonia 1.0
Slovakia 5.0
Poland 2.0
Hungary 2.0
Source: Letki, 2003.
5.4 Political Ideology and Party Membership
We have already established that local representatives are more likely to be party members 
than the general population of their respective countries. But we were also interested 
in knowing whether there is a diﬀerence in ideological self-placement among party 
members and non-members. We used our pooled data set of all ﬁve countries to test 
this hypothesis. Our one-way ANOVA test detected signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the 
ideological orientations of party members and non-members. Independents tend to be 
more to the center-right than party members who are more to the center on a seven-
point scale, with four being the middle point. (see ﬁgure 2.11 and table 2.11)
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Figure 2.11
Left-Right Self-placement and Party Membership (2003)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
When we control for gender, we see that it still holds true but that the gender 
gap among party members seems to be wider than among non-members. The average 
female party-member leans left of the center while male representatives who are also 
party members lean slightly to the right. The gender gap between female and male 
representatives is larger among party members than non-members as parties seem to 
polarize along gender lines (see ﬁgure 2.12, tables 2.12 and 2.13).
Based on our previous analysis, we can safely conclude that party members and inde-
pendent local representatives diﬀer in their ideological orientations in the ﬁve countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Independents of both genders lean more towards the 
right than do party members.
We also found that there is a signiﬁcant ideological gender gap between party mem-
bers, with women being more to the left than men. Our pooled data set which includes 
all ﬁve countries conﬁrms that in comparison to men, women lean more to the left. The 
Table 2.11
Party Membership and Mean Ideology Score
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
Non-member 1649 4.23 1.758 0.043
Party member 2486 4.07 1.833 0.037
Total 4135 4.13 1.805 0.028
Note: F=8.39, p<0.05, N=4,135
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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gender gap between male and female representatives is also more pronounced among 
party members than non-members. 
We expanded our analysis of party membership further by checking whether there 
is a gender gap in political ideology after we control for party membership. The sample 
sizes were too small to run statistical tests for all the parties within each country. There-
fore, we picked the most “popular” party in each country. After identifying these (i.e., 
those with the most local representatives in our sample) among local representatives 
39
40
41
42
43
Non-member Party member
Male Female
M
ea
n 
ow
n 
vi
ew
s (
le
ft 
or
 ri
gh
t)
Figure 2.12
Left-Right Self-placement and Party Membership by Gender (2003)
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.  
Table 2.12
Party Membership and Ideology by Gender
Own views left or right
Party membership Gender Mean N Standard deviation
Non-member
 
Male 4.24 1,253 1.783
Female 4.18 369 1.676
Total 4.23 1,622 1.759
Party member
 
Male 4.11 1,859 1.829
Female 3.94 600 1.833
Total 4.07 2,459 1.831
Total Male 4.16 3,112 1.812
Female 4.03 969 1.778
Total 4.13 4,081 1.804
Note: F=7.638, p<0.006, N=4,081
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.  
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in all ﬁve countries, we used a one-way ANOVA analysis to test for the gender gap in 
that party. In four of the ﬁve countries the major parties do not show a statistically 
signiﬁcant ideological gender gap, Bulgaria being the exception. In Bulgaria, female lo-
cal representatives who are also members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party tend to place 
themselves more to the left than do male representatives of the same party. However, 
in all the other cases the direction was similar, although by margins too small to reach 
statistical signiﬁcance. This is especially interesting because the major parties used for our 
analysis represent a wide spectrum of ideologies ranging from the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSzP) to Slovakia’s Christian Democratic Movement (KDH).  
Table 2.13
Left-Right Self-placement among Party Members
 N Mean Standard deviation Standard error
Male 1,859 4.11 1.829 0.042
Female 600 3.94 1.833 0.075
Total 2,459 4.07 1.831 0.037
Note: F=4,029, p=0.045, N=2,459
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Table 2.14
Country Comparison of Ideological Diﬀerences within Major Parties by Gender 
Mean scores on left-right self-placement (1=left, 7=right) 
Country Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Party Bulgarian
Socialist Party
Center Party Hungarian 
Socialist Party 
(MSzP)
Democratic 
Left Alliance 
(SLD)
Christian 
Democratic 
Movement 
(KDH)
Male 2.00 4.18 1.81 2.52 6.28
Female 1.70 4.09 1.42 2.17 6.15
F 3.82* 0.11 2.99 1.29 0.25
* p<0.05 n = 276 n = 84 n = 138 n = 128 n = 69
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
105
T H E  G E N D E R  G A P
6. COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES
At the most fundamental level we must ask whether there are gender diﬀerences among 
locally elected oﬃcials in terms of their commitment to core democratic values and 
tolerance. We selected ﬁve items from the survey of local elected oﬃcials to test this: 
(1) democracy is the best form of government for my country, (2) political tolerance 
of freedom of speech (even extreme views), (3) belief that broad participation produces 
better policy outcomes, (4) freedom of the press, and (5) minority rights.  On four out 
of the ﬁve items, special rights for minorities being the exception,11 respondents generally 
leaned to the more democratic side of the seven-point scale. For example, the view that 
democracy is the best form of government received positive average scores ranging from 
a low of 5.12 (Slovakia) to a high of 6.12 (Hungary), with Bulgaria (5.86), Estonia 
(5.67), and Poland (5.26) in between.  
For our purposes the critical issue here is whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences 
between female and male local oﬃcials on these issues. The answer is a qualiﬁed no. 
Only in Estonia are the scores signiﬁcantly diﬀerent by gender, with males leaning more 
toward the democratic end of the scale (5.78) compared to women (5.43). When we 
look at the pooled data, women and men do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on their belief in 
democracy as the best form of government  (the mean scores for women and men being 
5.68 and 5.72, respectively). The same holds true for the issue of minority rights, with 
the gender diﬀerence in the means on this item diﬀering by only one one-hundredth 
of a point on the seven-point scale.
The remaining three items show signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences, with women favoring 
more positive democratic values on only one of the three items, political participation. 
Female local representatives (4.76) are more likely than their male counterparts (4.48) 
to believe that broad participation produces decisions more consistent with the needs of 
the citizens (F=17.29, p<0.001). The tendency is the same in all ﬁve countries, but it is 
statistically signiﬁcant only in Estonia when we disaggregate by country. Thus, although 
women are more likely to view participation positively, they diﬀer only slightly in this 
regard from male oﬃcials.
On the critical issue of political tolerance, women are less likely to accept the right 
of extremist groups to present their opinions in an open forum. This relationship holds 
statistically for the pooled data as well as in four of the ﬁve countries (Estonia being 
the exception). The same holds true for freedom of the press (the right to report both 
bad and good events from their communities). Women in general are less committed 
to the right of the press to report problems that might have a negative impact on the 
community. This relationship is consistent across countries although statistically sig-
niﬁcant in only two of the ﬁve. It should also be noted that in spite of the diﬀerences, 
both men and women, regardless of country, tend to lean to the “freedom of the press” 
side of the scale.
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In sum, although there are diﬀerences in commitment to democratic values based 
on gender, these diﬀerences tend to be small. Furthermore, elected oﬃcials, regardless 
of gender or country, seem to be relatively more committed to democratic values as 
measured by our indices.
7. GENDER DIFFERENCES ON ECONOMIC ISSUES 
In their book, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World, 
Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that both voting behavior and public opinion dem-
onstrate that there is a signiﬁcant gender gap in countries all around the world. This 
gender gap is especially notable in the area of left-right self-placement, but in policy 
terms manifests itself in perspectives on the role of government. Historically, the gender 
gap was one in which males were more likely to be to the left of women on the key is-
sue of the role of the state in the economy. However, there has been a major change in 
this gap over time, with women now taking a more “statist” or social democratic view 
of the role of government and men tending more toward the right-wing, neo-liberal 
perspective. In fact, of some 70 countries for which Inglehart and Norris present data 
(2003), 64 show a gender gap where men are to the right of their female compatriots. 
There is also a voting gap to complement the opinion diﬀerences, with women being 
more likely to support parties of the left than men. Changes in this gap have been at-
tributed to a variety of social, cultural, economic, and institutional changes, including 
the rise of “postmaterialism.”
Cross-national data indicate that these phenomena are prevalent in the transitional 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the more advanced industrial 
democracies, and in this section we examine the data for our ﬁve selected transitional 
countries. But the individuals studied here, rather than being drawn from a mass sample, 
are selected from a survey of political elites—the locally elected oﬃcials at the county 
and municipal levels.  
We hope to see whether the attitudinal and ideological gaps noted at the mass level 
persist among locally elected elites. If gender-related diﬀerences in citizen attitudes are 
to eventually be manifested in policy, we would expect to see basic diﬀerences at the 
elite level as well. It is also important to note the direction of change. While this is not 
directly possible because we are dealing with cross-sectional data, we can infer change 
by comparing age cohorts. This is particularly important because we can identify major 
periods of transition, especially for those who grew up in the post-World-War-II period 
when the Cold War dominated. Alternatively, those socialized in the later period of the 
Cold War and during the transition to democracy may have diﬀerent expectations and 
attitudes.
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7.1 Views on the Role of the State
Women oﬃcials, like typical women citizens cross-nationally, are generally friendlier to 
state (i.e., public) involvement in the economy and the ownership and management of 
property than are men. In all ﬁve countries women oﬃcials are signiﬁcantly more likely 
to favor increasing public ownership of business while men tend to be more favorable to 
the private sector. Poland stands out in this because both male and female oﬃcials are 
much more favorable to the private sector than is the case in the other four countries, 
although the gender gap is still in the expected direction and statistically signiﬁcant. In 
three of the other four countries (Hungary being the exception) the mean scores tend 
to be slightly more favorable to the private sector side (four or lower). In Hungary the 
mean for women falls slightly on the public sector side of the scale while for men it 
leans toward the private. In a related fashion, women are more likely to suggest that 
the government should take greater responsibility for the well-being of the citizenry as 
opposed to the people taking more responsibility for themselves. It should be noted that 
this diﬀerence is in the expected direction in four of the ﬁve countries and statistically 
signiﬁcant in Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia, but not in Poland. In Bulgaria there are 
essentially no diﬀerences between men and women on this issue (see ﬁgure 2.13 and 
table 2.15).
In all ﬁve countries the private sector is seen as considerably more eﬃcient than 
the public. In four of the ﬁve, Poland being the exception, men are signiﬁcantly more 
likely than are women to see the private sector as the more eﬃcient sector. In a related 
question on the relative preferred size of the public and private sectors, women in 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Figure 2.13
Preference for Private or Government Ownership by Country and Gender12
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Estonia and Poland are signiﬁcantly less favorable to the public sector than are men (the 
tendency is consistent with our other ﬁndings in the remaining three countries). Only 
in Hungary do the scores indicate a preference for the public sector to grow (scores of 
three on the seven-point scale). In all other countries the tendency is toward a balance 
between the two. It is interesting to note that in four of the ﬁve countries (Bulgaria 
being the exception) male oﬃcials are more likely than their female counterparts to 
spend more time consulting with and explaining policy to their fellow citizens who 
represent the business sector.
Ideological self-placement is considered to be an important indicator of the policy 
positions taken by individuals.  Even though we ﬁnd considerable spread in each country 
regarding self-placement on the left-right scale, women are to the left of men in all ﬁve 
countries. However, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences only in Estonia 
and to a lesser extent in Hungary. The central tendency for both groups in Estonia is 
a bit right-of-center, while Hungary is left-of-center. In the remaining three countries 
men are slightly more to the right than are women, but both tendencies are very slightly 
right-of-center. The median and the mode are both the midpoint of the scale in four 
of the countries and the median is ﬁve in Estonia (the mode still being four) (see ﬁgure 
2.14 and table 2.16).
Following the lead of Inglehart and Norris (2003) we have constructed a “role of 
government scale” composed of the same items they employed and using the same 
100-point scale. In all ﬁve countries the gap between males and females is in the expected 
direction and in four of the ﬁve the relationship is statistically signiﬁcant (Bulgaria is 
once again the exception). All ﬁve of these countries appear in the rankings of the gender 
gaps for the general public presented by Inglehart and Norris for national population 
samples. Interestingly, the gender gaps, although in the same direction, are greater for 
our samples of local elites than is the case for the population as a whole in each of the 
countries. This is consistent with expectations that the elites will have a clearer view of 
their ideological positions than will be apparent among the general population.
Table 2.15
Mean Scores of Preference for Private or Government Ownership
by Country and Gender
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Male 2.89 3.42 3.69 1.86 3.64
Female 3.30 4.07 4.58 1.93 4.20
F 6.47* 29.3*** 41.70*** 15.40*** 10.30***
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; N=4,413
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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As already noted, these data are cross-sectional in nature so it is diﬃcult to determine 
trends in attitudinal change or changes in the size and nature of the gender gap. An 
indirect way of inferring change involves the comparison of age cohorts on these issues. 
For this purpose we compare those born between 1945 and 1959 with those born after 
1960. The basic rationale for this division is that those born in the earlier period would 
have experienced the bulk of their socialization, job training, and a considerable part 
of their work experience under communist rule during the period of the Cold War. By 
contrast, the latter group (those born in 1960 or later) would have entered the work 
force during the period in which major upheavals and regime transformation were 
in progress in the late 1980s and for the youngest, after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
during the democratic transition and economic liberalization period that followed. In all 
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Figure 2.14
Personal Beliefs on Relative Eﬃciency of Private and Public Sectors,13 
by Country and Gender
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Table 2.16
Private vs. Public Sector Eﬃciency by Country and Gender
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Male 5.21 5.02 5.32 5.20 4.65
Female 4.78 4.45 4.42 5.04 4.30
F 8.60** 23.70*** 54.90*** 0.90 5.00**
Note: Higher = private sector more eﬃcient; N=4,264
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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ﬁve countries we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in key attitudes between these age cohorts 
(see ﬁgure 2.15 and table 2.17).
We have computed a gender gap measure for both our role of government measure 
and the ideology self-placement measure. We then compare the diﬀerences in this gap 
between the age cohorts identiﬁed above to see if we can infer that the gap has grown, 
decreased, or essentially remained the same. As can be seen in ﬁgure 2.16 and table 2.17, 
in Poland, Slovakia, and Estonia the gap grew quite dramatically, while in Bulgaria and 
Hungary it remained essentially unchanged (statistically). In Poland this results from 
a combination of men staying about the same but women moving dramatically to the 
left (toward government ownership and responsibility as opposed to increasing the role 
of the private sector). In Estonia, both males and females moved in their views toward 
an increasing role for the private sector, but males did so at a more rapid rate, thereby 
Table 2.17
Role of Government Score by Country and Gender
(Norris and Inglehart measure)
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Male 66.55 59.95 57.85 57.68 55.30
Female 63.89 52.99 49.80 51.91 48.40
F & p< 2.10 NS 25.50*** 25.70*** 8.70** 11.00***
n = 932 939 919 727 875
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03. 
Figure 2.15
Role of Government Score by Country and Gender
Source: Norris and Inglehart, 2003.
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increasing the gender gap in the latest generation. In Slovakia generational change saw 
males move to the right toward an increasing role for the private sector, while women 
have moved in the opposite direction, toward a position of greater support for the role-
for-government position. 
Diﬀerent processes seem to have been at play where the gap remained stable. In 
Hungary, both men and women show a generational movement toward preference for 
an increasing role for the government while the gap between the two remained stable. 
In Bulgaria both genders moved to the right towards a position supportive of an increas-
ing role for the private sector and at about the same rate. Hence the gap between them 
stayed virtually unchanged. In sum, in terms of general overall change, in two of the 
countries, Estonia and Bulgaria, both males and females moved to the right, in Poland 
and Slovakia males moved to the right and females to the left, and in Hungary both 
groups moved to the left on this issue (see ﬁgure 2.16 and table 2.18).
Figure 2.16
Within Cohort Gender Gap in Role of Government 
by Cohort and Country
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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Table 2.18
Within Cohort Gender Gap—Role of Government II 
(Norris and Inglehart measure)
Age cohort Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Born 1945–59 5.13 5.94 7.56 5.10 5.80
Born 1960– 4.93 8.20 7.03 12.3 9.24
n = 706 755 676 539 557
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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To complement this analysis we also looked at the gender gap in ideological self-
placement across generations. In this instance the gap grew quite markedly in all ﬁve 
countries between generations. Hungary shows the greatest change, followed by Bulgaria 
and Estonia. In Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia we see generational change as movement 
toward the right in self-placement, but movement among males is more rapid than it is 
among women. Hungary and Estonia show generational change from a common posi-
tion in the older cohort toward the right among males and to the left among females in 
the younger cohort. The within-cohort gender gap is in the direction expected in all ﬁve 
countries, but should be interpreted conservatively because the magnitude of the diﬀer-
ences remains quite modest. The critical inference we can draw from these data is that 
the gender gap in ideological self-placement is “alive and well” among local government 
oﬃcials in Eastern Europe (see ﬁgure 2.17, table 2.19, ﬁgure 2.18, and table 2.20).
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Figure 2.17
Left-Right Self-placement by Country and Gender
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Table 2.19
Within Cohort Gender Gap: Left-Right Self-placement by Country
Age cohort Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Born 1945–59 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.10
Born 1960– 0.47 0.42 0.81 0.22 0.27
n = 706 755 676 539 557
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
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Table 2.20
Left-Right Self-placement by Country and Gender
Own views left or right
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Male 4.14 4.68 3.79 4.04 4.23
Female 4.03 4.46 3.53 4.03 4.10
F 0.40  4.80* 3.2 (.07) 0.00 0.70
n = 930 790 907 696 858
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
Figure 2.18
Within Cohort Gender Gap: Self-placement on Left-Right Scale by Country
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03.
8. IS THE GENDER GAP REAL?
One critical issue for examination is whether gender per se has an impact on the gap in 
policy views regarding the role of government. Recall that our key dependent variable 
is the role-of-government measure which replicates the Inglehart and Norris measure. 
In fact, we have included the same two ten-point survey items they use: (a) “Private 
ownership of business and industry should be increased (value 10)—Government own-
ership of business and industry should be increased (value 1)” and; (b) The government 
should take more responsibility to insure that everyone is provided for (value 1)—People 
should take more responsibilities to provide for themselves (value 10).” One of these 
two items was recoded so they would have the same directionality in the values.  The 
scale composed in an additive fashion from these two measures was then converted to a 
100-point scale to “ease interpretation” and be directly comparable with Inglehart and 
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Norris. The Inglehart and Norris scale was applied by them to data from national sam-
ples of individuals in 70 diﬀerent countries between 1990 and 2001. The gaps between 
male and female interviewees show women to the left (towards the “more government 
involvement” side of the scale) in 65 of these countries. Interestingly, our analysis of local 
oﬃcials closely mirrors the diﬀerences found at the mass level for each of the countries, 
but the point diﬀerences are one to three points higher (on the 100-point scale).    
A key question is whether the impact of gender is sustained when we control for a 
variety of other factors. In order to further examine this possibility we have pooled our 
data sets for the ﬁve Central and Eastern European countries included in the survey 
of local oﬃcials. We have already noted that the male-female gender gap is statistically 
signiﬁcant for four of the ﬁve countries (Bulgaria being the lone exception). In our 
pooled data set we ﬁrst look at the “role of government” measure to determine if it re-
mains aﬀected by gender among local government oﬃcials in all ﬁve countries. Using an 
ANOVA we in fact ﬁnd that the relationship is highly signiﬁcant (F=65.1, p<0.001).  
Our next strategy is to move beyond the bivariate relationship to a multivariate 
analysis. We employ an OLS regression to see if the impact of gender remains important 
after we control for a variety of other factors. The independent variables are handled 
in four groups: (1) social background factors (age, education, and gender), (2) cultural 
values (trust in institutions, postmaterialism, and left-right ideology), (3) democratic 
values (democracy as the best system, political tolerance, minority rights, participation, 
and media independence), and (4) a series of country dummy variables to sort out 
country-speciﬁc eﬀects.  
Education is diﬃcult to compare because of the lack of exact equivalencies across 
nations. However, we are dealing with elected local government oﬃcials, about half of 
whom have had at least some form of post secondary higher education. Hence we use 
this break point for its comparative validity. The dummy variable we created is for some 
higher education (1) or no post-secondary education (0). We also grouped individuals by 
age to get a post-Cold-War and a pre-Cold-War generation (arbitrarily deﬁned as those 
born before and after 1960) and created a binary variable for age cohort. We also tested 
the model with actual age as a variable. The “trust in government” variable is a combined 
measure of responses to a series of questions on the trust in various government institu-
tions (executive, legislature, parties, police, justice system, etc.). The postmaterialism 
scale is Inglehart’s standard four-point scale used cross-nationally in the World Values 
and related surveys. We also ran these regressions with dummy variables for each of the 
countries to further sort out possible country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
In table 2.21 we test ﬁve models to explain “the role of government” index. In Model 
One (not shown in the table) we examine the impact of gender alone. It remains quite 
signiﬁcant as a factor in our pooled data set. In Model Two we add in social background 
characteristics. Age, higher education, and gender are all statistically signiﬁcant in this 
model. In Model Three we add in the cultural and democratic values dimensions. 
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As can be seen in this model all three cultural values, trust in institutions, postmaterial-
ism, and left-right self-placement are statistically signiﬁcant contributors. Among the 
democratic values items, democracy as the best system, support for minority rights, 
and media independence are statistically signiﬁcant but neither political tolerance nor 
the value placed on popular participation ﬁgure in the equation. Gender and higher 
education remain signiﬁcant but the age variable drops out in Model Three.  
In Model Four we add in the organizational membership variables, party member-
ship, and membership in an NGO in which they hold a position of responsibility. The 
other variables that are statistically signiﬁcant in Model Three remain so, but the two 
additional variables are signiﬁcant, and the explained variance increased a bit. It is worth 
noting that when we ran this same regression for each country sample individually, 
the organizational membership variables are both signiﬁcant only in Bulgaria. Party 
membership but not NGO position is signiﬁcant in Hungary.
In Model Five we include the same sets of variables but add in dummy variables 
for country to sort out any country-speciﬁc eﬀects. Interestingly, we see signiﬁcant 
country eﬀects for Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. However, we can explain 
the same variance by including only Bulgaria. When any other countries are included 
with Bulgaria, the combination does not increase the explanatory power of our models. 
Bulgaria appears to be somewhat diﬀerent than the other four countries in the views of 
local oﬃcials on the role of government. In Model Five we see that all of our background 
factors, including age, all of the cultural values variables, the same three democratic 
values, and the four country dummy variables are signiﬁcant.  However, the organiza-
tional membership variables drop out of the equation (in terms of signiﬁcance).   
These models conﬁrm the ongoing impact of gender on overall perspectives on the 
role of government in the economy.  When we examine the standardized betas we see that 
the more educated, the more right-wing ideologically, the more postmaterialist, and the 
greater the level of trust in government institutions, the greater the support for a strong 
private sector role or less government involvement in the economy and responsibility for 
the well-being of the country’s citizens. The democratic values items show that greater 
support for democracy as a system and for a free press are associated with support for 
more government involvement in the economy, and greater commitment to minority 
rights is associated with a preference for less government involvement. The impact of 
gender is consistent with earlier ﬁndings. Women are more likely to support a larger 
government role and collective responsibility for individual welfare than are men, who 
seem to prefer the private sector and more individual responsibility.  Age cohort did not 
have a signiﬁcant impact in the pooled data set, but age (as a continuous variable) did. 
It has a very limited impact (approaching statistical signiﬁcance) with the young being 
only slightly more likely to support a stronger role for government.  
When we entered in the country dummy variables, all were statistically signiﬁcant, 
and they had some impact on the dependent variable (as measured by the standardized 
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betas). They did not aﬀect the signiﬁcance or impact of the other variables. Bulgaria 
stands out in this respect as being somehow diﬀerent than the other four. While the 
signs for the betas for the other four countries are negative (more supportive of greater 
government involvement), the sign for Bulgaria is positive. That is, Bulgarian local of-
ﬁcials diﬀer from their colleagues in the other countries in being much stronger in their 
support for privatization and a greater role for the private sector. What is consistent across 
all of these models, however, is the impact of gender. Therefore, our overall conclusion 
is that the gap associated with gender does indeed have its origins there rather than in 
other characteristics, and is of some importance (see table 2.21).
9. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we examined gender diﬀerences, particularly the so-called gender gap 
among local representatives in ﬁve countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), e.g., 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.  Diﬀerences at this level are especially 
important because it is in the locales that many of the issues that directly impact on the 
lives of women are addressed on a daily basis. Our ﬁndings, based on a large sample of 
local councilors in these countries, are consistent with those for the general population 
and with trends in the gender gap worldwide.  
Women are relatively well represented in local government in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Male and female locally elected oﬃcials in these countries share common edu-
cational backgrounds, a sense of optimism regarding their respective municipalities, and 
belief in democracy as the best form of government. Although there are gender-related 
diﬀerences in commitment to core democratic values, these diﬀerences are relatively 
small. Both men and women tend to place themselves on the more democratic side of 
the scale.
We also examined gender diﬀerences in variables related to social capital such as civic 
organizational memberships and activism. Here too, we ﬁnd a small but consistent gap, 
with males holding more organizational memberships and active roles. They are also 
more willing and likely to participate in nontraditional forms of political participation 
such as demonstrations. Women oﬃcials are more likely to be independents rather than 
formally enrolled members of political parties. In other words, their political bases and 
electoral support are built on personal networks as well as associational groups.
We ﬁnd that perceptions of the very nature of the role of the state come into play. 
The gender gap is consistent from country to country. Women see a greater role for the 
state in the economy and in the provision of help and support to citizens. They are also 
less convinced of the advantages of the private sector than are males occupying similar 
roles and functions. The existing gap seems to be growing as we see clear generational 
(age cohort) diﬀerences consistent with growth in the gap over time. This is further 
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Table 2.21
OLS Regression Models with the Role of Government Dependent
Model 2 Model 3
Gender+social background Gender+social+cultural values
B Beta Sig. B Beta Sig.
Gender –6.640 –0.128 *** –5.250 –0.099 ***
 Social Background
 Higher Education 10.480 0.230 *** 8.310 0.181 ***
 Age –0.160 –0.073 *** –0.031 –0.014
CULTURAL VALUES
 Trust in Institutions 0.117 0.036 *
 Postmaterialism 4.060 0.107 ***
 Left-Right Ideology 3.080 0.248 ***
DEMOCRATIC VALUES
 Democracy is the Best Govt. 2.510 0.185 ***
 Minority Rights 0.762 0.074 ***
 Political Tolerance 0.024 0.002
 Media Independence –0.516 –0.050 ***
 Public Participation 0.130 0.011
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP
 Party Member
 NGO Member (Officer)
COUNTRY 
 Estonia
 Hungary
 Poland
 Slovakia
Constant 68.200 *** 26.900 ***
R² 0.070 0.217
Adjusted R² 0.069 0.215
reinforced by ideological self-placement which shows women generally to the left of 
their male counterparts and growth in the gap from generation to generation. In this 
context we ﬁnd that even among members of the same political party there is a small 
but persistent diﬀerence between male and female partisans, with women again tend-
ing to the left.
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Model 4 Model 5
Gender+social+values
+org. membership
G+S+V+org.+country
B Beta Sig. B Beta Sig.
Gender –5.051 –0.095 *** –4.719 –0.089 ***
 Social Background
 Higher Education 8.210 0.178 *** 6.818 0.148 ***
 Age –0.015 –0.007 –0.042 –0.019
CULTURAL VALUES
 Trust in Institutions 0.129 0.040 ** 0.179 0.056 ***
 Postmaterialism 4.211 0.111 *** 3.690 0.098 ***
 Left-Right Ideology 3.122 0.252 *** 3.059 0.247 ***
DEMOCRATIC VALUES
 Democracy is the Best Govt. 2.595 0.191 *** 2.627 0.194 ***
 Minority Rights 0.800 0.078 *** 0.885 0.086 ***
 Political Tolerance –0.006 –0.001 –0.170 –0.016
 Media Independence –0.523 –0.051 *** –0.640 –0.062 ***
 Public Participation –0.088 0.008 –0.288 –0.025
ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP
 Party Member 2.287 0.05 *** 0.698 0.015
 NGO Member (Officer) –2.257 –0.048 ** –1.010 –0.021
COUNTRY 
 Estonia –7.585 –0.118 ***
 Hungary –9.228 –0.168 ***
 Poland –6.946 –0.120 ***
 Slovakia –6.911 –0.129 ***
Constant 24.600 *** 35.000 ***
R² 0.226 0.243
Adjusted R² 0.223 0.239
Source: Own calculations based on data from the LRS of the ILDGP, 2002–03. 
    
Even when we control for a variety of other factors such as education, postmaterial-
ism, age, trust in government institutions, ideology, democratic values, organizational 
memberships, and country (in our multiple regression), gender remains a signiﬁcant 
but by no means the strongest predictor of political perceptions of the preferred role of 
government. 
119
T H E  G E N D E R  G A P
 Although we have no direct evidence of actual policy diﬀerences or the impact of 
these gender diﬀerences on local and municipal councils, several hypotheses do emerge 
from this analysis. Women are or are close to a critical mass of local oﬃcials in all ﬁve 
countries (ranging from 21%–32% of elected councilors). First, since their views on the 
role of the state show some diﬀerences from those of their male counterparts, we expect 
some local policy diﬀerences to emerge, with women taking a more social democratic 
perspective and men leaning toward a more neo-liberal approach to social welfare issues. 
Second, since women constitute a critical mass on many local councils, we expect that 
there will be a rise in consideration of gender-related issues such as maternal health, 
state-supported day care, and spousal abuse and violence. We hypothesize these will 
become important subjects of local legislation and policy. Third, the election of many 
women to local oﬃce provides a vital training ground for future leaders at higher levels. 
Thus, we see the possibility of a longer-term inﬂuence of the local gender gap on national 
representation and policy. 
NOTES
1 Funding for our research was graciously provided by the Tocqueville Research Center Foundation, 
under its program in Comparative Local Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
2 See Rule 1987; Welch and Studlar 1986; Bullock and MacManus 1991; Studlar and McAllister 
1991; Studlar and Welch 1991; Chapman 1993; Caul, 1997; Maille 1990; Matland and Studlar 
1996; Reynolds and Reilly et al. 1997; and Vengroﬀ, Nyiri, and Fugiero 2003.
3 Political Rights and Civil Liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the 
highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. Source http://www.freedomhouse.org.
4 Lower scores mean higher ranks.
5 These data are currently housed at the Tocqueville Research Center in Budapest.
6 Even though they are signiﬁcant at the 0.000 level, using Chi Square test of signiﬁcance.
7 The two questions used for comparison are: “Generally speaking, how satisﬁed are you with the way 
things are going in the municipality where you are a representative of the local government?” and 
“In your estimation, how will things be going in your local community ﬁve years from now?” 
(1=much worse, 4=about the same, and 7=much better).
8 Respondents were asked: “Roughly how many hours in an average week do you usually devote to your 
activities as a councilor?” (p<0.000 using Chi-Square).
9 “How often do you [plan to] hold oﬃce hours for residents?” (p<0.000 using Chi-Square).
10 “Comparing your own personal income with others in your municipality, is it higher or lower than 
the average income in your municipality?” (p>0.000 using ANOVA).
11 It is possible to interpret this item in diﬀerent ways because one pole is equal rights for everyone.
12 Higher score means preference for public sector.
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13 “Some people would agree, and some would disagree with the following statements about the political 
and administrative system. Please indicate the extent to which you personally agree or disagree with 
them on our seven-point scale. 1 means that you completely disagree with the statement; 7 means you 
agree completely with the statement; and if your views fall somewhere in between, then choose one of
the numbers in between: In general the private sector is more eﬃcient than the public sector.”
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The Inﬂuence of Local Media 
on Local Government Performance, 
and Why It Matters
Tania Gosselin
ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the impact of local media on local government decision-making 
(smoothness and eﬃciency) and on democratic performance (inclusiveness). Four as-
pects of local media systems are considered: the number of media outlets present in the 
locality, the diversity of the ownership structure, the extent to which media cover local 
political aﬀairs, and the size of their audience. Findings show that coverage quality, the 
number of outlets, and the diversity of the ownership structure are positively associated 
with democratic performance. Such media features, however, have virtually no impact 
on how quickly and smoothly local authorities reach decisions. 
We also examine the hypothesis that the impact of the media on democratic perform-
ance may be enhanced by certain characteristics of the local civil society. In Hungary 
and Romania, the coverage quality and the number of local media outlets were found 
to exercise a greater inﬂuence on the performance of local governments in localities 
having more civic organizations and where citizens were more involved in public life. 
Further investigations of potential mechanisms of media inﬂuence on performance 
reveals that beliefs of chief administrative oﬃcers and councilors regarding the inﬂuence 
of local media outlets do not translate into greater or lesser impact of media features 
on democratic performance.
The analysis shows that local media do have an impact on the democratic, inclusive 
character of local authorities’ decision-making practices and allows us to quantify this 
impact. While the available measures do not permit deﬁnite conclusions about the 
mechanisms through which these inﬂuences operate, initial ﬁndings lend some support 
to the theory that a livelier civil society contributes to the impact of political informa-
tion disseminated by the media.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
People often observe that the media have an inﬂuence on the well-being of democracy, 
and Dawisha writes: “It can be generally assumed that the greater the independence 
and pluralism of the media ..., the greater will be the level of civic trust and civic in-
volvement” (1996, 54). This connection is also assumed to operate at the local level, 
but there has been no attempt to validate this assumption, as the absence of literature 
demonstrates. It has become almost a truism to say that the plurality and independence 
of local media are important and have a positive eﬀect on the performance of democratic 
local government. 
If it is true that politically well-informed citizens contribute to the well-being of 
democracy, then such eﬀects should be assessed. This chapter seeks to establish empiri-
cally whether and how local media enhance the quality of local governance. Relying 
on survey data gathered within the framework of the Indicators of Local Democratic 
Governance Project (ILDGP), we focus our analysis on the decisional and democratic 
aspects of local government performance in more than 2,000 municipalities of Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, and Romania. We assess the links between certain characteristics of the 
local media (number of outlets, ownership structure, the extent of coverage of public 
aﬀairs, and audience size) and the capacity of local governments to make decisions in 
a timely and eﬀective manner (decisional performance) that includes citizens in the 
decision-making process (democratic performance).
Following some introductory remarks about the local media landscape in the four 
countries included in the research, the chapter provides an overview of theories but-
tressing the assumption that media and local government performance may be linked. 
This is followed by an outline of the hypotheses to be tested with respect to how media 
presence, ownership structure, quality content, and penetration have an impact on per-
formance. We then describe the data and method of analysis, followed by our ﬁndings. 
The conclusion presents our interpretation of the results, suggests new hypotheses, and 
points towards further areas of exploration for increasing our understanding of media 
eﬀects on local government performance.  
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2. THE LOCAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE: TAKING STOCK 
 
The 1990s witnessed deep economic, social, and political reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and this included local government systems. The national media attracted a 
signiﬁcant amount of attention during this process and was assumed to have a major 
impact on public opinion, although scant attention was given to local media and their 
role in the development and strengthening of local democracy. Scholars and observ-
ers of the national outlets identiﬁed a variety of issues, including privatization (of the 
press and of broadcast media); changes or the lack thereof in the values and attitudes of 
journalists trained and socialized during the socialist era; and, perhaps most frequently, 
politicization of the media (as accounts of the “media war” that raged in Hungary until 
1996 well illustrate).
The main obstacles to media plurality and independence have been mapped out 
by a number of authors, including those focusing on post-communist media (e.g., 
Bajomi-Lazar 1999, 2001, 2002; Galik 1996; Giorgi 1995; Goban-Klasz 1994; Gross 
1996; Jakubowicz 1996; Kovats and Whiting 1995; O’Neil 1997; Splichal 1995; Sükösd 
1997–98). They have examined factors such as monopoly situations, government control, 
the grip of commercial interests, the legal framework, and, though less often mentioned, 
weak political party competition. Speciﬁc information on local media is much harder 
to obtain; scandals about local media rarely make headlines. But recent reports about 
the increasing concentration of ownership and political manipulation of local outlets 
in certain regions (see Preoteasa 2003 and SAR 2003 for examples from Romania) have 
raised concerns that a signiﬁcant number of people may not have access to adequate 
information about local public aﬀairs. These developments further underscore the gap 
in our knowledge about the state of local media in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
2.1 Citizens’ Attention to Local Media
The local media in each country are organized somewhat diﬀerently. In Hungary and 
Poland, for example, local print media are structured to a large extent to reﬂect territorial 
divisions.1 Regional newspapers in Poland are distributed in at least one voivodship, 
the largest territorial subunit of the country. Similarly, Hungarian regional papers are 
distributed within counties. Other subnational papers in Hungary cover events in towns 
or villages. In Poland, two levels of local media exist as a reﬂection of the three-tier 
territorial organization: “local” papers cover less than a voivodship but at least one powiat 
(the second largest territorial entity), and the “sublocal” media encompasses all other local 
publications, i.e., municipal, town, or parish papers. Foreign ownership predominates 
in both countries’ regional markets, while domestic owners are present at the local 
level. A signiﬁcant proportion of the local press is published by local governments in 
the two countries. 
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The ILGDP survey provides information about  the presence of local media systems, 
their coverage of local public aﬀairs, ownership, and audience size. Chief administrative 
oﬃcers of over 2,000 municipalities in Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania were 
asked, among other questions, how many media outlets cover public aﬀairs “from time 
to time” in their municipalities (from zero to eight or more). Table 3.1 shows that a 
large number of localities possess no media outlets.2 Of the 29,460,752 inhabitants 
living in the self-government units included in the survey, almost 8% have no access to 
information about local public aﬀairs. At the other end of the spectrum, nearly 40% of 
the population lives in media-rich environments, i.e., with access to six or more outlets. 
The number of media covering local public aﬀairs varies signiﬁcantly from one country 
to the next. Only 2% of localities in Poland and 3% in Latvia have no such outlets. 
In Hungary and Romania, on the other hand,  45% and 51% of the localities do not 
count any local media.
The Chief Administrative Oﬃcer (CAO) respondents were also asked to provide 
details about the owner(s) of local outlets, the extent to which the local media provide 
coverage on local public aﬀairs and how many citizens they reach. Diﬀerences between 
localities and countries are observed with respect to these attributes as well. (See appendix 
I for the distributions by country.)
National surveys are another source of information on the extent to which people 
attend to local media. According to the Public Opinion Barometer surveys3 carried 
out in Romania between 1995 and 1997, the proportion of Romanians who read local 
dailies hovered around 20% for those who read a local newspaper the day before and 
Table 3.1
Localities per Number of Media Outlets [%] (2001)
Media outlets Pooled data set Latvia Hungary Poland Romania
0 30 3 45 2 51
1 17 18 30 8 12
2 16 34 14 13 13
3 12 21 5 21 7
4 8 11 3 15 6
5 9 8 2 20 7
6 3 3 1 6 1
7 2 1 0 6 1
8 and more 4 2 1 10 2
N= 2023 N=241 N=646 N=579 N=557
Note: Percentage ﬁgures may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Unweighted data.
Source: Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
128
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
up to 36% for those who read one in the previous seven days. In Hungary, more than 
30% of respondents who participated in a recent survey reported reading a regional 
daily every day or several times a week. Fewer than 15% said they listen to local radio 
or watch local television channels equally frequently.4 
The 1999 Polish General Social Survey showed that almost 54% of the 1,143 
respondents read a regional newspaper at least once a week, while 27% stated they never 
read such newspapers (the data reveal little diﬀerence between readership of regional 
and national papers). A little more than 51% of respondents read national papers at 
least once a week, while nearly 32% claimed never to read them.5
Finally, according to a survey conducted in Latvia in 2000, of nearly 1,000 
respondents who were asked which newspaper they read most often and consider as 
their main source of information, almost 15% identiﬁed local and regional publications. 
When asked about their newspaper consumption, 23% said they regularly read a regional 
or local paper in Latvian, and 9% a regional or local paper in Russian. Only 6% reported 
listening to local radio programs.6 While these numbers come from observations at a 
single point in time (except in the case of Romania) and provide more information about 
print than broadcast outlets, they show that consumption of local media in Poland, 
Hungary, Romania, and Latvia is far from negligible.
2.2 Links between Media, Citizens,
 and Local Government Performance
The belief that the media make a diﬀerence to the quality of democracy is not new. 
Alexis de Tocqueville underlined the connection between civil society and media in his 
famous Democracy in America. To secure cooperation, individuals have to be persuaded 
that they serve their private interests by “voluntarily uniting [their] eﬀorts to those 
of all the others. That cannot be done habitually and conveniently without the help 
of a newspaper. Only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time before 
a thousand readers. ... So hardly any democratic association can carry on without a 
newspaper” (1990, 112–113). 
The need for communication channels between citizens also arises from the 
complexity of modern policymaking. Citizens require good information and access to 
discussion about the merits of policies, particularly since it is impossible for any one 
individual to pay attention to how a city is run all the time or to possess all the necessary 
knowledge to evaluate representatives’ every decision (Page 1996, 2). Nowadays, the 
mass media (notably television) have become the prime source of political information 
(Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993), enabling citizens to identify and articulate 
their interests, to voice them at election time, and to participate in public life in general. 
Factual political information “assists individuals in their civic actions, helps explain 
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group diﬀerences in political access, and serves as a collective good, strengthening the 
likelihood that the polity functions both responsively and responsibly” (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, xi). Except in very small communities, where interpersonal communication 
provides nearly all strata of local society with access to information about local aﬀairs, 
the development of meaningful democracy (rather than just a more or less liberal oligarchy) 
at the local level clearly requires substantial and diverse media coverage of local politics.
In classical liberal theory, this requirement was fulﬁlled by the existence of a 
marketplace of ideas ensuring that citizens are exposed to diverse information and 
points of view. Even if individual outlets were biased, competition would allow media 
consumers to weed out true information from the false. From the early to mid-20th 
century onward, this idea of the press as the cornerstone of representative democracy 
—the “fourth estate”—gave way to calls for a more deﬁned, substantial role for the 
media. In the modern media context, competition was found either to be unrealized 
or to privilege proﬁt-making over other goals such as achieving political and other 
freedoms. These changes gave rise to the notion of social responsibility of the media, 
media ethics, and the development of journalists’ professional roles such as that of “watch 
dog” (see McQuail 2000, 146ﬀ. for a detailed account of these developments). In this 
role, journalists and the media in general act as a check on authorities’ power, ready to 
expose wrongdoings (Kocher 1986; Weaver 1996).7 Thus, media “publicity provides 
an eﬀective external control over the competence, responsiveness and accountability of 
public oﬃcials” (Swoboda 1995). 
Reasons to suppose that the media have an eﬀect on local government performance 
are not only based in normative theories and journalists’ discourse about their profes-
sional role. They are also rooted in two strands of research about media eﬀects. The ﬁrst 
leans toward cognitive psychology and examines how media consumption or exposure 
aﬀects people’s knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. Studies belonging to this group have 
been preoccupied with how people (and which people, in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics) learn and retain political information distilled by the media. Delli Carpini 
and Keeter’s seminal book about the determinants of political knowledge in America is 
a good example. Literature focusing on electoral campaigns has also contributed to this 
stream, notably the agenda-setting theory and its extension, priming. Agenda-setting 
holds that the media are able to inﬂuence what issues people think about. Priming takes 
place when the media inﬂuence the importance that people assign to diﬀerent issues or 
considerations when making a choice (Iyengar 1991). A number of studies speciﬁcally 
concerned with the impact of local media have addressed the relationship between media 
consumption and community ties (Neuwirth, Salmon, and Neﬀ 1989), and between 
local media use and participation in local public aﬀairs (McLeod et al. 1999; McLeod, 
Scheufele, and Moy 1999).
A second stream of research concentrates on media eﬀects at the aggregate rather 
than the individual level. Recent studies have examined the association between access 
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to media as well as media freedom on the one hand and good governance8 on the other 
(Norris 2001). Links between the media ownership structure (public or private) and 
national indicators of education, health, and freedom are another focus of interest 
(Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer 2001). Studies in this group address media 
eﬀects from a wide range of perspectives, including links between various local media 
characteristics such as competition, ownership, and content (Lacy 1989; Bernstein and 
Lacy 1992; Lacy, Coulson, and St. Cyr 1999). Media features have also been linked 
with aspects of the local environment such as diversity of public opinion or ethnic 
heterogeneity (Lasorsa 1991; Johnson and Wanta 1993; Hindman, Littleﬁeld, Preston, 
and Neumann 1999).9 None of these studies provides an applicable framework of 
analysis for examining the relationship between media and decisional or democratic 
performance of local governments. However, they do provide a useful theoretical and 
empirical background against which to set it. 
Another related strand of research, mostly qualitative but not exclusively so, has 
been concerned with the impact of media on public policy and on policy-makers. Do 
media have a direct impact on governmental decisions and the opinions of the decision-
makers, or does public opinion ﬁrst mediate this inﬂuence?10 The question is relevant to 
the concerns of this chapter. Media eﬀects on local government procedures or policies 
can occur when citizens learn the information they need to hold their representatives 
accountable, to engage actively in local public life, and so on. The media can also aﬀect 
local representatives directly and, consequently, their performance as those who make 
the decisions and establish the rules for how those decisions are arrived at. “Media 
attention to an issue aﬀects legislators’ attention, partly because members [of Congress] 
follow mass media like other people, and partly because media aﬀect their constituents,” 
notes Kingdon (1995, 58). In their study, Lomax Cook et al. (1983) found that media 
reports about fraud in public programs had an impact on policymakers’ opinions and 
on policy mostly because of the “active relationship” that developed between journalists 
and policymakers, rather than as a result of pressure from public opinion. 
These last remarks highlight the complex nature of media eﬀects. The aggregate 
nature of the available survey data does not allow for a full account of the mechanisms 
underlying local media inﬂuence on the performance of local governments in Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, and Romania. Nonetheless, the analysis will generate useful insights on 
how local media work in the region, and what inﬂuence they have on (some of ) the 
nuts and bolts of local democracy. 
3. HYPOTHESES
Before we present our hypotheses linking media features with local government perform-
ance, a few words about the meaning and measures of local government performance 
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used in this chapter are in order. When information is “suﬃciently full, accurate, and 
well interpreted, then citizens can decide what policies they want in an informed way, 
consistent with their basic values and interests” (Page 1996, 2). Here, we assume that 
citizens prefer a local government that runs smoothly, as opposed to one frequently 
bogged down by delays, lack of quorum, and other similar impediments. Also, a central 
tenet of democratic theory is that governments do what citizens want them to do. While 
we do not have suﬃcient information to evaluate citizens’ preferences with respect to 
local public matters, we assume it is more likely that the interests of citizens will be 
reﬂected in decisions taken by the local assembly when they are more involved in the 
decision-making process. The construction of the performance indices, described in 
section 3.2, reﬂects these assumptions.    
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of local media with respect to two aspects 
of local government performance: decisional, that is, the capacity of local authorities 
to make decisions in a timely and eﬀective manner; and democratic, deﬁned as local 
authorities’ ability to favor the input of citizens and various elements of local civil society 
in the decision-making process. The indicators used to construct the two measures partly 
follow the model set in the State of Local Democracy (2002), whose contributions describe 
the main ﬁndings of the ILDGP survey data.11 The indices of decisional and democratic 
performance take into account only elements that were included in the survey. It is useful 
to keep in mind that, while attempting to design “universal” measures, surveys involve 
a selection of questions and indicators that leaves other, potentially relevant dimensions 
of performance unexplored. 
 
3.1 Media Presence
Evidence abounds that the media have an impact on the way politics are run. To give 
one famous example, the Watergate aﬀair and Nixon’s resignation as a consequence of 
it are considered to have happened because of media reports (Protess et al. 1991, 3–5). 
Focusing on the individual level, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 149) show that reading 
newspapers is associated with a higher level of knowledge about local politics in the 
United States. Reading local newspapers also has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on 
citizens’ participation as voters and in contacting public oﬃcials (McLeod, Scheufele, and 
Moy 1999). This last point about the potential mobilizing role of the media leads us to 
expect a more palpable impact of media on democratic than on decisional performance. 
This applies not only to media presence, but to other media characteristics as well.12
 • Hypothesis 1: Local governments in localities endowed with media outlets will display 
better performance than others—especially democratic performance.
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3.2 Diversity of Ownership Structure
Much has been written about the impact of media owners and ownership on media 
content, yielding sometimes compelling yet inconclusive accounts (e.g., Badgikian 1992; 
see also Page 1996 for a review). Similarly, the eﬀects of competition have been explored 
in a number of studies. Most ﬁnd that competition has little or no eﬀect on newspapers’ 
content, but Rarrick and Hartman (1966, in Entman 1989, 93) found competition to 
be associated with more local-oriented news. 
Franklin’s (1988) investigation showed that the content of newspapers published 
and distributed by English local authorities free of charge to each household was colored 
by the perspective of the party in power in the local assembly.13 Assuming that local 
politicians wish to be re-elected, it is not implausible to imagine that local governments 
that have control over the media will ensure that the content is not overly critical of 
their activities, if not blatantly biased in their favor (see Popescu and Tóka 2002 for a 
description of such an occurrence in Hungary’s public television during the 1994 general 
election campaign). Consequently, media presence in itself may not be suﬃcient to 
ensure an impact on performance. What matters could well be who owns the outlet(s), 
and thus whether local authorities are in a position to insulate themselves and their 
activities from the media’s critical scrutiny.14 
 • Hypothesis 2. Local government performance (notably democratic) is expected to 
improve when the media ownership structure is diverse; that is, when not only 
government-controlled but also privately-owned, NGO-run, etc., outlets are avail-
able. 
3.3 Quality of Content 
Deﬁning the quality of media content in quantitative terms is not an easy task.15 While 
the general distinction between information and entertainment is useful, such a measure 
can only be guided by content analysis. Given the unavailability of content analysis data, 
and regardless of the mechanism potentially at work between media and performance, 
it is plausible to suppose that whether local media report about local public aﬀairs, and 
to what extent, does matter for performance. Equally plausibly, reports about local 
politics can be regarded as quality media content—generally deﬁned as content of “social 
or political signiﬁcance… [that] is implicitly intended to help citizens in their role as 
democratic decision-makers” (Zaller 1999). 
 • Hypothesis 3: Greater quality coverage by local media is more likely to be associated 
with higher local government performance scores (particularly democratic perform-
ance scores). 
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3.4 Extent of Media Penetration 
In line with the hypotheses presented so far, greater penetration of local media outlets 
among the population is also expected to bolster the performance of local authorities. 
 • Hypothesis 4: The greater the reach of local media among citizens, the better the 
performance of local governments, especially its democratic aspect. 
“If extensive political information is available somewhere in the system, not 
everyone has to pay attention to it all the time,” writes Page (1996, 7). Because some 
people—“opinion leaders”—will pay more attention to local political news, some of 
this information will reach others in the community via face-to-face interaction with 
family, friends, and co-workers (Sniderman, Tetlock, and Brady 1991). The theory of the 
two-step ﬂow of communication (Ansolebehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993, 132) provides 
grounds to expect that media presence, rather than penetration, could be playing a more 
central role in inﬂuencing both types of performance (as long as a minimal threshold 
of penetration is achieved by local outlets). If, however, the media should play a direct 
mobilizing role, the impact of a greater number of people exposed to local outlets should 
be felt, particularly on democratic performance.16  
   
3.5 Other Factors Explaining Performance 
The goal of the hypotheses presented so far has been to quantify the impact of media 
features on the decisional and democratic aspects of local governments’ performance. 
But obviously the media are not the only element inﬂuencing performance. Therefore, 
to test for the robustness of ﬁndings related to the hypotheses above, a number of other 
factors with the potential to bear on performance are considered. 
 • Unemployment:
  In communities harder hit by unemployment, we expect people to be less engaged 
in participatory activities, and thus to observe a moderately lower democratic per-
formance (moderate because the index of democratic performance also includes 
elements such as the number of public hearings held. Attendance, rather than 
the number of hearings, is likely to be aﬀected by unemployment). Economic 
adversity is also likely to generate obstacles for the local assembly in reaching 
decisions, due to the compromises and trade-oﬀs involved when resources are 
limited (we posit here that unemployment reﬂects the general ﬁnancial state of 
the community). 
 • NGOs, Political Parties and Citizens’ Initiatives: 
  The presence of more parties is expected to decrease decisional performance; 
when more voices are heard, agreement and decisions are likely to be harder and 
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slower to reach. The presence of NGOs is anticipated to have a similar eﬀect, 
albeit to a lesser degree since they are not necessarily directly involved in deci-
sion-making. On the other hand, NGO presence should enhance democratic 
performance. Indeed, where more NGOs can contribute to bringing citizens 
together and better identifying and articulating their interests, it is more likely 
that citizens will want to make their voices heard. Also, local authorities will 
have more opportunities to engage in consultation and seek the contribution 
of citizens before taking major decisions. The role of political parties in this 
respect is not clear cut: considering that more parties implies the presence of 
more groups with diverse interests in local society, we would expect this to reﬂect 
positively on democratic performance. However, more political parties could 
also monopolize the decision-making process to the detriment of other local 
actors.Expectations with respect to the impact of citizens’ initiatives (petitions, 
requests for meetings with local authorities, demonstrations, and challenges of 
local government decisions in court) are similar to those related to the presence of 
civic organizations. The active engagement of citizens in local public life should 
reﬂect positively on democratic performance. However, it could also slow down 
decision-making by adding to the chorus of voices involved in the process. 
 • Level of Education of Local Government Staﬀ Members:
  The survey queried chief administrative oﬃcers about the number of local 
government staﬀ members having completed higher education. More staﬀ with 
higher education is expected to impact positively on performance.
 • Community Homogeneity:
  When people are similar in many respects such as socio-demographic characteris-
tics, income, beliefs, etc., representation is less problematic. There should be less 
dissent among local representatives and citizens as how to allocate the available 
resources. Greater homogeneity is therefore expected to be connected with greater 
decisional eﬃciency. The survey data provide information about a number of 
local cleavages: income, religious beliefs, political views, areas within the locality, 
urban/rural diﬀerences, ethnic origin, and long-time residents vs. newcomers. The 
questions were formulated to obtain information about tensions caused by the 
divides rather than about the “objective” divides themselves. While this formula-
tion may render the measure less precise in certain cases (e.g., ethnic cleavages), 
in others it may prove useful in highlighting more salient cleavages. 
We would expect more and stronger cleavages to be linked with poorer decisional 
performance. Conversely, it is plausible that more diversity would bring more frequent 
opportunities to draw citizens into the decision-making process. However, the positive 
impact of cleavages on democratic performance might not be felt should these divides 
have been translated into NGOs or political parties.
135
L O C A L  M E D I A
Obviously, a larger number of factors would be required to explain performance 
more fully.17 However, the goal of this analysis is not to explain all the observed variance 
in performance, but to provide an evaluation of the part played by the media in it.
3.6 Interactions between Media Features and Other Factors
Due to the complex nature of media eﬀects, the hypotheses below include the poten-
tial for interaction eﬀects—that is, the possibility that the characteristics of media act 
together with other variables to yield an eﬀect that can neither be attributed entirely to 
media nor to the other variables alone. 
 • Perception of Local Oﬃcials about Media Inﬂuence:
  As mentioned in the previous section, media can have an impact on perform-
ance for a variety of reasons: via citizens’ knowledge of public aﬀairs, by alerting 
public opinion about wrongdoing, or directly on the policymakers themselves. 
The survey data allow only for limited testing of the possible channels of media 
eﬀects. One possibility consists in using chief administrative oﬃcers’ (CAOs) 
evaluation of local media inﬂuence on decisions taken by the local assembly. 
Should CAOs’ stance about media inﬂuence be indicative of policymakers’ per-
ception and attention to local outlets, we expect a stronger positive relationship 
between performance and media in municipalities where CAOs believe that 
media signiﬁcantly inﬂuence local decisions.   
 • Hypothesis 5a: Localities where chief administrative oﬃcers consider local media to 
be a more potent inﬂuence on local authorities’ decisions will witness a larger impact 
of media characteristics on performance.  
The Local Representative Survey (LRS), also part of the Indicators of Local Gov-
ernment Project, provides another opportunity to test the idea that media inﬂuence is 
potentially channeled through the perception of members of local authorities. Coun-
cilors’ views of the media might be crucial in shaping media inﬂuence, even more so 
than the perception of CAOs. If the media matter for performance, they will matter 
more, other things being equal, in places where local representatives hold the view 
that the media are “powerful” at agenda-setting and help them to better take the pulse 
of the citizenry. Kanervo and Kanervo (1989, 310) found that policymakers tend to 
assign signiﬁcant inﬂuence of media over their consumers, thus “sometimes even using 
[newspaper] articles as a direct measure of public opinion.” Therefore, hypothesis 5b is 
similar to what has been posited about CAOs’ perception of media inﬂuence. 
 • Hypothesis 5b: The impact of media is accentuated where councilors perceive the 
media to be powerful in setting the citizens’ agenda and providing them with in-
formation about citizens’ views and opinions.
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Because the Local Representatives Survey (LRS) conducted in 2002 in Hungary and 
Poland was administered after the local elections, data from the ﬁrst LRS conducted in 
Hungary in 2001 is used to test hypothesis 5b. 
 • Civil Society and Citizens’ Participation: 
  Delli Carpini and Keeter found that partisan individuals are more likely to learn 
facts with a partisan color, and that contact by political parties and citizens’ 
knowledge about politics go up together. As they put it, parties and NGOs 
provide “fertile ground for improving the information environment” (1996, 
282). Consequently, investigating for potential interactions between media and 
the presence of local organizations could tell us more about how local media 
inﬂuence operates, and in which context. Hypotheses involving the interac-
tions between media and political/civil society speciﬁcally concern democratic 
performance, notably due to the already mentioned “push” phenomenon (see 
note 9). The ﬁrst hypothesis predicts that the impact of media will be greater in 
places where there are more NGOs to diﬀuse information and mobilize citizens 
more eﬀectively. Similarly, we expect that municipalities that are the theater of 
citizens’ active engagement in public life will also see a greater inﬂuence of local 
media. 
  
 • Hypothesis 6. The media features will have a greater impact on democratic perform-
ance in localities where more civic organizations are present.
 • Hypothesis 7. The media features will have a greater impact on democratic perform-
ance in localities where local citizens have engaged in demonstrating, petitioning, 
contacting local oﬃcials, or challenging local government  decisions.  
To summarize, we expect the number of media, the quality of their coverage of local 
public aﬀairs and their audience reach to “push up” performance, especially democratic 
performance. The same should be true with greater diversity in the media ownership 
structure. A denser civic network, generally gauged by the presence of NGOs and politi-
cal parties as well as by citizens’ initiatives, is likely to have diﬀerent eﬀects, depending 
on the type of performance considered. If our general hypotheses are supported, more 
associations, parties, and initiatives should go hand in hand with greater democratic 
performance, but lower decisional performance. The eﬀects of unemployment are ex-
pected to be negative. The diversity of interests represented in localities, measured by the 
degree of tensions rooted in income, religious, geographic, and other diﬀerences among 
inhabitants, should lead to lower decisional performance. Lastly, it is posited that the link 
between media and performance might be stronger where chief administrative oﬃcers 
and councilors estimate that the media exert greater inﬂuence on local authorities and 
in making public aﬀairs topics salient to the community. Similarly, opportunities for 
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discussion and dissemination of political information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 5) 
oﬀered by local clubs, civic associations, and various NGOs could amplify the impact 
of the media on democratic performance.
4. DATA AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The analysis below relies on survey data collected within the framework of the Indica-
tors of Local Democratic Governance Project (ILDGP) in the spring of 2001. Unless 
indicated otherwise, the data come from the Local Government Survey (LGS), one 
component of the ILDGP. Localities in the four countries covered in the ﬁrst wave of 
the LGS are included in the present study. The ﬁrst step consists in verifying whether 
there is a diﬀerence between localities endowed with media and those that have none 
with respect to decisional and democratic performance. A ﬁrst set of regression equations, 
controlling for population size and the country in which the localities are situated, estimates 
the impact of basic media presence (none versus at least one outlet), and also of the quantity 
available in town (none to eight or more) on both types of performance. Then two linear 
regression equations estimate the combined impact of the four local media characteristics 
we are interested in on decisional and democratic performance. 
A third set of equations assesses the relative impact of these media features together 
with that of other factors likely to aﬀect local government performance: the presence 
of political parties and civic organizations, citizens’ active participation in public life 
(measured by a dummy variable indicating whether at least one initiative was undertaken 
in the locality), unemployment, local government capacity (measured by the number of 
local government staﬀ members with higher education), as well as community hetero-
geneity. Finally, another set of equations explores interaction eﬀects, i.e., the potentially 
greater eﬀect of media features in local environments characterized by denser civic and 
political networks and more active citizens. The paragraphs below brieﬂy describe the 
operationalization of the variables used to test the hypotheses presented in the previous 
section. A detailed description of the variables can be found in appendix II.
The privileged unit of observation is the locality. Except where interaction eﬀects 
are concerned, the analyses are based on the pooled data set—that is, all the localities 
from the four countries together. Dummy variables control for the country in which 
municipalities are located. They capture country-level variations not accounted for by 
the factors considered in the models. Hungary is used as the reference category. Popu-
lation size is also controlled for by using the natural logarithm (indicated by “log”) of 
the population size of each locality. In all regression analyses, the data is weighted to 
adjust for the overrepresentation of bigger localities in the sample, thus assigning equal 
weight to all municipalities. Frequency distributions (shown in table 3.1 and in all but 
one table in appendix I) are not weighted.
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Space constraints and the limited information available about the particularities 
of local media systems in each country (aside from the characteristics assessed by the 
ILDGP survey data) restrict the range of country-related hypotheses that that we can 
draw and test. However, remarks about diﬀerent country patterns are made in the 
Findings section.  
4.1 Media Variables
The variable measuring the number of local media covering local public aﬀairs “from 
time to time” ranges from zero to eight. When CAOs where asked to qualify the extent 
to which outlets cover public aﬀairs, how many citizens they reach, etc., they were re-
quested to provide information about the ﬁrst ﬁve outlets. Consequently, the number of 
media was adjusted to account for a maximum of ﬁve outlets in the analyses involving 
other media characteristics. 
The response categories of the question pertaining to media ownership were the 
following: the local government or a company owned by the local government; another 
government (regional or national) or a company owned by this government; a local public 
institution; a political party; an NGO(s); a business enterprise(s); a private citizen(s) or 
“other owner.” Chief administrative oﬃcers had the option of indicating that they did 
not know who sponsored an outlet. The variable is coded from 1 to 5, given that diversity 
cannot exceed the number of outlets for which ownership information is available.
As already mentioned, quality is not a concept that easily translates into quantitative 
terms. Concepts such as fairness, lack of bias, good faith, and credibility are obviously 
relevant (McQuail 1992, 211–2). 
Since neither content analysis-based measures nor information pertaining to the 
number of journalists employed, editorial budget, or circulation numbers are available 
for all outlets, quality is measured by the presence/absence of four elements from local 
media outlets’ regular coverage: (1) reports about decisions of the local assembly; (2) 
reports about proposals debated in the assembly; (3) reports about arguments and coun-
terarguments discussed at the local assembly; and (4) interviews with local government 
leaders or councilors. Absence of coverage is coded “0,” and “1” reﬂects the presence of 
these quality elements in outlets’ coverage. The scores for the four elements were added 
and divided by the total number of outlets in each municipality.
Audience size is computed using chief administrative oﬃcers’ estimates of the 
number of citizens reached by each media outlet, on a scale ranging from 0 (“less than 
one person out of 10”) to 10 (“almost everyone”). The estimates were added and then 
divided by the number of outlets (up to ﬁve) to obtain an average penetration score. 
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(Appendix I presents the distribution of media systems’ features for the pooled data set 
as well as for localities grouped by countries.) 
4.2 Performance Indices
The decisional index was constructed using CAOs’ answers to survey questions on the 
number of occurrences of lack of quorum, the frequency of postponed decisions, budget 
promptness (acceptance of the budget before the legal deadline), as well as the number 
of extraordinary sessions held in 2000. The results were added to obtain a score for each 
municipality. A higher score denotes a better decisional performance.18 
The democratic index measures whether local authorities discussed budgetary plans 
with local civic associations, whether they held a public forum about the budget and 
published a draft of the document before it was passed. It also includes an indicator 
of the number of local associations that participated in the decision-making process 
during the year via membership in a municipal committee or as experts consulted by 
the local authorities. The last indicator included is the number of public hearings held 
in 2000.19 Again the measures were summed up. Like the decisional performance index, 
the democratic index is positive: the higher the score, the better the performance. 
Both indices are constructed so that each municipality is compared with other 
localities in the same country. This step was taken to compensate for the inevitable fact 
that the indices “perform” diﬀerently in each country. For example, a Polish regulation 
states that the failure to respect the legal deadline to pass the yearly municipal budget 
should result in the intervention and passing of the budget by a supervisory board. This 
rule provides a strong incentive to complete the budget on time; accordingly, virtually 
all municipalities in Poland met the budget deadline in 2000. In Latvia, where such an 
incentive is absent, approximately 30% of municipalities did not meet the legal deadline 
that same year. Does this mean that Polish cities are doing better than Latvian ones? 
The indices do not allow such general conclusions. All we can say is that according to 
the selected indicator—budget promptness in this case—Polish localities perform bet-
ter than their Latvian counterparts. It may well be that according to another indicator 
not included in the survey, the reverse situation would be true. To control as much as 
possible for such inevitable disparities, the indicators were centered around their mean, 
using the mean of each country’s samples before they were added up. Consequently, a 
Polish city that failed to pass the budget on time was assigned a very low score compared 
to other, “timely” cities in the country. Latvian towns that did not manage to meet the 
deadline also received a lower score than the Latvian localities that met it, but not as 
low because the average of that indicator in Latvia is lower than in Poland. 
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5. FINDINGS
5.1 Media Presence
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was a simple one: that cities endowed with media achieve greater 
performance than those without local outlets, when the data is controlled for size of 
locality and the country in which they are situated. Coeﬃcients in table 3.2 show that 
the number of local media is not signiﬁcantly associated with the measure of decisional 
eﬃciency of local authorities. It turns out that local media presence is signiﬁcantly as-
sociated with greater democratic performance. However, this impact is signiﬁcantly felt 
only as the number of outlets increases. 
The fact that the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant supports our ﬁrst hypothesis 
in the case of democratic performance. The signiﬁcance pattern holds everywhere,20 
except in Romania where media presence is also weakest (more than half of Romanian 
localities have no local outlets).
5.2 Diversity of Ownership, Quality of Content,
 and Penetration of Media
Next, we want to know if aspects of the local media other than the number of outlets 
are associated with greater decisional and democratic performance. Thus we focus on 
localities where at least one media outlet is available. According to hypothesis 2, the 
presence of diﬀerent types of local media sponsors should enhance performance, notably 
democratic performance.21 Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict that greater coverage quality 
and penetration of outlets would also positively inﬂuence performance, again more on 
the democratic than the decisional side. Along with these characteristics of media, the 
Table 3.2
 Impact of Media Presence on Decisional and Democratic Performance 
Local media presence 
(none versus at least 1 outlet)
Number of media 
(0 to 8 or more outlets)
Decisional performance 0.014 
(adj. R2: -0.001)
0.028 
(adj. R2: 0.00)
Democratic performance 0.041 
(adj. R2: 0.027)
0.102** 
(adj. R2: 0.031)
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; N=2,022; population size and country controlled for.
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
141
L O C A L  M E D I A
number of outlets was retained in the equation (recoded to account for a maximum 
of ﬁve, the highest number of outlets for which information is available regarding 
ownership, quality, and audience size). 
The results partly conﬁrm our expectations. Coverage quality and a diverse owner-
ship structure of local media are positively associated with democratic performance. 
Decisional performance fails to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by any of the four features of 
media. These results demonstrate that democratic performance responds to the shape 
of the local media scene. The four characteristics of local media systems taken together, 
along with population size and country dummies, explain slightly over 5% of the total 
variance observed in democratic performance. Among the four media features, coverage 
quality plays the largest role in inﬂuencing democratic performance: whether the media 
cover local government aﬀairs or not is what matters most. More media outlets with 
diverse ownership also spells good news for democratic performance. (see table 3.3)
Conducting the same analysis for each country separately is informative. The positive 
link between coverage quality and decisional performance already described emerges in 
all four countries.22 The case of ownership diversity and number of media is particular 
to each country: obviously, the two are related to some degree (a partial correlation 
controlling for population size in the pooled data set yields a coeﬃcient of 0.39). In fact, 
diversity of ownership structure plays a major role in Poland, while in Hungary and Latvia 
it is the number of media in town that makes a diﬀerence,23 with diversity not being 
signiﬁcant. Table A3.2 in appendix I clearly displays the fact that Polish municipalities 
enjoy a much higher rate of diversity than their counterparts in other countries. It could 
well be that a certain diversity threshold has to be reached before it can play a major role 
and relegate to backstage the impact of the number of available media outlets. In other 
words, a certain degree of competition, not reached except in Poland, could be required 
before the eﬀects of a diverse ownership structure on performance can be registered. 
This hypothesis cannot be tested until more municipalities displaying greater media 
competition, from a larger range of countries, can be included in a sample. 
Interestingly, Romania is the only country where neither diversity nor the number 
of media are associated with democratic performance. As mentioned above, it is the 
country where local media outlets are least present, where they are consumed on average 
by fewer people, and show less propensity to cover local public aﬀairs.24 This could 
explain why media features make little diﬀerence for performance.
Table 3.3 also shows that when only media factors are considered (with controls for 
country), bigger localities generally experience greater democratic performance. This is 
not surprising, given that the sheer presence of more citizens provides more opportunities 
for their inclusion in the decision-making process, as well as (plausibly) greater grass-
roots pressure for such opportunities to be made available by local authorities. On the 
other hand, in the case of decisional performance, greater size of locality is associated 
(but not signiﬁcantly) with less eﬃciency. 
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5.3 Other Factors Explaining Local Government Performance
Testing the strength of the variables already observed requires the consideration of other 
factors potentially accounting for local government performance. Table 3.4 includes the 
presence of local civic organizations and political parties in the locality; unemployment, 
as a measure of how the community is doing economically; the percentage of local 
government staﬀ members with higher education, which controls for the institutional 
capacity of local authorities; and, lastly, community heterogeneity or cleavages palpable 
enough to cause a certain degree of tension among local inhabitants ( 1 indicating “low” 
and 7 “high” tension). 
As expected, the presence of a larger number of civic organizations in the municipality 
is linked to the more democratic character of decision-making. Whether citizens had 
engaged in public life25 was signiﬁcantly related to both types of performance. The 
relationship goes in the anticipated direction and is stronger where democratic practices 
are concerned: localities that witnessed citizens taking initiatives such as signing a 
petition, demonstrating, or demanding to meet their local representatives boast a higher 
democratic performance. However, those localities also experienced fewer delays and 
postponements, and thus a higher decisional performance. The relative rarity of citizens’ 
initiatives (more than half of localities witnessed no initiative at all and the number 
of localities where more than one single initiative took place is very small) calls for a 
cautious interpretation of these ﬁndings.  
Table 3.3
The Impact of Media Features on Decisional and Democratic Performance 
Decisional performance Democratic performance
Population size (log) –0.041 0.094*
Number of media 0.024 0.058
Diversity 0.008 0.111**
Quality –0.034 0.155**
Penetration 0.066 –0.048
Poland 0.028 –0.158**
Romania 0.044 0.003
Latvia 0.009 –0.095*
Adj. R2: 0.00 Adj. R2: 0.053
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; N=1,119
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
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As anticipated, more staﬀ members with higher education working for local au-
thorities yielded a signiﬁcantly better democratic performance. But this did not bear 
signiﬁcantly upon decisional performance. The latter ﬁnding may be explained by the 
fact that staﬀ members have little, if any, opportunity to aﬀect such things as quorum, 
budget promptness, or the number of extraordinary sessions held in a locality. Elected 
representatives are in large part responsible for decisional performance as measured in 
this study. Staﬀ members, on the other hand, are more likely to impact on the inclusive 
character of decision-making through direct and regular contacts with community 
members and local civic groups. 
Contrary to expectations, a more politicized environment did not correspond 
to less eﬃciency in the decision-making process.26 The high number of independent 
councilors, notably in Hungary and in Poland, the frequent occurrence of candidates with 
multiple party labels, as well as the likelihood of consensus rule in local governments, 
especially small ones, could help explain why party politics does not appear to matter 
for performance in a direct way. 
Table 3.4
The Impact of Media Features, Civic Organizations, Political Parties, 
Citizens’ Initiatives, Unemployment, Education of Local Government Staﬀ,
 and Population Cleavages on Performance
Decisional performance Democratic performance
Population size (log) –0.091 –0.031
Number of media –0.007 0.028
Diversity 0.010 0.105**
Quality –0.026 0.161**
Penetration 0.080* –0.043
Number of NGOs 0.034 0.122**
Number of political parties 0.031 0.004
Citizens’ initiatives (dummy) 0.071* 0.092**
Unemployment 0.043 0.063
Staff education –0.026 0.100**
Community heterogeneity 0.146** 0.021
Poland 0.076 –0.070**
Romania 0.075 0.021
Latvia 0.048 –0.114
Adj. R2: 0.026 Adj. R2: 0.078
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; N=1,061
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
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Another result not in line with expectations is that communities divided along a 
higher number of cleavages witness a signiﬁcantly smoother decision-making process. 
It may be that tensions and the heightened awareness of potential disputes that is likely 
to accompany them impose constraints that ultimately prove beneﬁcial to decisional 
performance. Where the balance between interests is more delicate, it may be that local 
authorities cannot aﬀord to be bogged down by procedural delays and obstacles, or that 
diﬀerently-minded participants will act as checks upon each other. We not only initially 
posited that cleavages, as a measure of the diversity of preferences among citizens, would 
diminish eﬃciency but also that they would create an opportunity to boost democratic 
performance. However, the number and depth of social, economic, and other local 
fault lines as gauged by survey data do not have a visible impact on local governments’ 
participatory practices.27 It could be that, as speculated earlier, the divergent interests 
rooted in local cleavages are channeled through civil society.
The unemployment coeﬃcients fail to achieve signiﬁcance in both equations. 
Furthermore, their positive sign is not coherent with the initial hypothesis that the two 
types of performance should be hampered by a higher unemployment rate. It could be 
that unemployment ﬁgures given by CAOs do not constitute an adequate proxy for 
the general ﬁnancial state of the community. In addition, we cannot be entirely sure 
that economic adversity has the usually assumed negative impact on participation28 at 
the local level. For example, walking to the councilor’s oﬃce in a small town typically 
takes less time than visiting a parliamentary representative, whose oﬃce is likely to 
be located in the county’s largest city. A preliminary investigation of aggregate voting 
behavior at the local level in Hungary shows that poorer localities experience higher 
turnout than wealthier cities (Gosselin 2003a). A potential reason for this ﬁnding could 
be the not negligible welfare beneﬁts handed out by local governments in a number of 
CEE countries. 
The adjusted R-squared values of the full model remain relatively modest, indicat-
ing that factors other than those tested here are responsible for most of the variation in 
performance observed between localities (2.6% of the observed variation is accounted 
for in the case of decisional performance, almost 8% in the case of democratic perform-
ance). More interesting for our present purposes is that the two features of media systems 
highlighted in table 3.3—coverage quality and diversity of the ownership structure—re-
tain a signiﬁcant and positive relationship with democratic performance even when we 
control for alternative explanations. Moreover, the strength of the relationships between 
these media characteristics and democratic performance remains largely unaﬀected by 
the inclusion of additional factors in the equation.
Lastly, the coeﬃcient of penetration of local outlets is signiﬁcant for decisional 
performance once other factors are taken into consideration. In the absence of 
other elements that could point to a pattern, the interpretation of this result is not 
straightforward. In any case, the impact of the variable is limited since penetration 
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coeﬃcients were not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst, media-features-only, equation (table 3.3). It 
could be that a measure of penetration based on CAOs’ estimates does not adequately 
reﬂect real audience size. Of the four media characteristics asked about in the LGS, 
audience is probably the most diﬃcult for CAOs to assess with accuracy (more diﬃcult 
than the number of outlets or the nature of their coverage).29 
Separate country analyses conﬁrm the importance of coverage quality’s impact on 
democratic performance, statistically signiﬁcant in all settings.30 Diversity of ownership 
structure again plays a major role only in Poland. This time, the coeﬃcient for the 
number of media achieves signiﬁcance in Latvia (where p<0.1) but not in Hungary. 
This weakens the case for speculation about the prime role of the number of available 
media outlets until ownership structure in the local media market becomes suﬃciently 
competitive, without dismissing it entirely until the hypothesis can be tested in a larger 
number of settings. 
5.4 Investigating Mechanisms of Media Influence 
 on Democratic Performance
As highlighted in the theoretical discussion in section 2, media eﬀects are complex and 
diﬃcult to circumscribe. Two hypotheses presented in section 3 proposed to explore the 
possibility that linkages between local media and democratic performance run through 
the perceptions of media held by local oﬃcials and elected representatives, and/or through 
the characteristics of local civil society. The analyses of interaction eﬀects performed 
below assess whether the impact of media on democratic performance of local authori-
ties diﬀers depending on characteristics of the local civil society, or depending on local 
oﬃcials’ perceptions. Once the impact of media features is controlled for, a positive 
interaction term would suggest that the inﬂuence of the selected local media attribute 
on democratic performance is greater in localities where (for example) we ﬁnd more 
civic associations. The analyses of interaction eﬀects focus on democratic performance, 
because only this aspect of local government performance turned out to be signiﬁcantly 
linked to local media features in a manner ﬁtting theoretical considerations.  
5.4.1 Interactions between Media and Local Civil Society 
All four media systems’ characteristics are combined separately with indicators of the pres-
ence and dynamism of local civil society to detect potential interaction eﬀects: ﬁrst with 
the number of civic associations, then with citizens’ initiatives (measured by a dummy 
variable). Earlier we hypothesized that the presence of local civic organizations provides 
favorable ground for the diﬀusion of political information. In addition, if information 
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goes hand in hand with mobilization, we also expect a stronger link between media 
and performance where the local citizenry has proved more active. The analyses for the 
two types of interactions (one with NGO presence, the other with citizens’ initiatives) 
are conducted separately to avoid multiple collinearity problems; indeed, should many 
variables behave in a very similar way, it would become impossible to distinguish their 
respective impact. 
The method used here follows the one suggested by Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) to 
capture interaction eﬀects in multivariate regressions. First, the two predicting vari-
ables assumed to interact with one another are centered around their mean (a constant 
equivalent to the variable average is subtracted from each locality’s score). The product 
of the two mean-centered variables constitutes a distinct, third variable. The democratic 
performance index is then regressed onto the two mean-centered variables, as well as 
the product term. A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the product term variable indicates that 
the “moderating” factor (the number of civic associations or local citizens’ initiatives) 
inﬂuences the impact of media features on democratic performance. 
The ﬁrst set of analyses of interaction eﬀects takes the number of local civic 
organizations as a moderating factor. Namely, the impact of media characteristics on 
democratic performance is expected to vary according to the number of NGOs present 
in town. A pooled data set analysis (including all municipalities in the four countries) 
shows a positive and signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between the number of associations31 
and coverage quality, as well as between NGO presence and the number of local media 
(up to ﬁve outlets).
Separate country analyses reveal that the interaction between NGO presence32 and 
coverage quality plays a statistically signiﬁcant role in Romania. The second interaction 
eﬀect, involving NGO presence and the number of media outlets, is signiﬁcant in 
Romania as well as in Hungary. NGO presence did not combine with either diversity 
of media systems’ ownership structure nor audience size to produce a diﬀerential impact 
on democratic performance.
Citizens’ initiatives are the second aspect of local environment allowed to interact 
with the four media characteristics. Due to the skewed nature of the distribution of 
citizens’ initiatives (more than 50% of localities did not witness any type of action in 
2000), the variable was transformed into a dummy (coded “1” for cities where at least one 
type of action was used, and “0” where none took place). Avowedly crude, this measure 
of citizens’ involvement in local public aﬀairs nonetheless interplays with the coverage 
quality of local media to yield better democratic performance where inhabitants engaged 
at least once in petitioning, requesting meetings with local oﬃcials, demonstrating, 
or challenging a local government decision. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term 
is signiﬁcant for the pooled data set. At the country level, Hungary’s and Romania’s 
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level. Citizens’ initiatives also signiﬁcantly and 
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positively moderate the relationship between the number of media outlets and democratic 
performance in Hungary, but not in the pooled data set or in any other country.
Figure 3.1 below illustrates graphically how NGO presence aﬀects the impact of 
the number of local media outlets on democratic performance in Hungary. The ﬁgure 
shows that the eﬀect of the number of available outlets on democratic performance 
depends on the presence of civic associations, yielding a better performance score where 
both elements are present in higher numbers. When the number of NGOs in town is 
“low” (one standard deviation below average), the slope of democratic performance on 
the number of media outlets diﬀers from when NGO presence stands at average (i.e., 
approximately ﬁve organizations) or one standard deviation above average (approximately 
ten organizations). If there were no interaction eﬀect, the three lines in the graph would 
be parallel. This is clearly not the case in ﬁgure 3.1.
It appears that aspects of the local environment, namely NGO presence and citizens’ 
activities in the public sphere, generally matter more for media eﬀects in Hungary and 
Romania. Media presence is less frequent in Hungarian and particularly in Romanian 
localities, and local outlets available in the latter provide comparatively limited coverage 
of local politics (see appendix I, table A3.3). It could be that outlets present in envi-
ronments where media are not such a common feature, as well as those with markedly 
more political content (but not necessarily involving party labels), resonate more within 
civil society even if the latter is not overly developed (at least not by the yardstick of 
number of associations, which is lower in Romania than in the three other countries). 
Altogether, the analysis of interaction eﬀects provides us with as many insights as it 
raises new, intriguing questions.
Figure 3.1
Regression Lines Predicting Democratic Performance from the Number 
of Local Media Outlets in Hungary
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5.4.2 Interactions between Media and Local Oﬃcials’ Attitudes about Media
In the LGS, chief administrative oﬃcers were asked to estimate on a scale of 1 to 7 the 
inﬂuence of local media on decisions taken by the council. When added to the four 
media features in a regression equation, the coeﬃcient of this “media inﬂuence” variable 
turns out to be signiﬁcant when democratic performance is the dependent variable 
(data not shown; the impact is similar to that of coverage quality in strength and the 
R-squared is boosted to 0.069 when the variable is added to the equation presented in 
table 3.3).  However, product terms of media features and CAOs’ perceived inﬂuence 
of local media are not signiﬁcantly related to the performance index. This suggests that 
perceptions about the media’s inﬂuence do not amplify the eﬀect of media in localities 
where CAOs estimate that this inﬂuence is greater. The ﬁnding that CAOs’ perceptions 
of media inﬂuence are directly linked with performance seems to indicate that these 
perceptions might not have much to do with the reality of the local media systems, at 
least not in the way that this reality (deﬁned by our four media features) is captured 
by the survey data.33 As mentioned before, CAOs’ opinion on the matter of media 
inﬂuence provides an approximate and arguably not the best measure of local oﬃcials’ 
perceptions about media. 
Another tool is available to test the idea that perceptions of people within local 
authorities make a diﬀerence. The 2001 Local Representative Survey (LRS), the second 
component of the ILDGP project, was conducted in a number of localities in Hungary. 
A total of 255 localities count respondents from both the LGS and LRS, making it 
possible to merge information pertaining to the same year and same administrations. 
The LRS was conducted by mail; between one and eighteen councilors completed ques-
tionnaires in the overlapping municipalities (with an average of six respondents per 
locality). In the bulk of localities (60%), between three and eight respondents returned 
the survey questionnaire. Councilors’ evaluation of the inﬂuence of media on agenda 
setting (the capacity of local media content to inﬂuence what citizens think about), on 
the extent to which local media inﬂuence local authorities’ decisions, as well as their 
own opinions about local government issues, are averaged to obtain one score for each 
type of perception per locality.34 The results vary between 1, standing for “little inﬂuence,” 
to 7, indicating “great inﬂuence.” (On the agenda-setting scale, 1 stood for “no inﬂu-
ence.”) This investigation did not unearth a systematic pattern of interactions between 
media system features and councilors’ beliefs.35 However, we must keep in mind that the 
exploration for potential interactions between three of the four media characteristics, on 
the one hand, and beliefs of councilors, on the other, involved only 120 to 130 localities out 
of the initial 255 (due to the more limited information available about the ownership, 
coverage, and audience aspects of media systems), and that all were located in one country, 
Hungary.36 In spite of these caveats, the LRS 2001 and LGS 2001 data sets do not lend 
credence to the thesis that media impact on local government performance is channeled 
through the beliefs of councilors and administrators about the inﬂuence of local media. 
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6. CONCLUSION
This chapter explored the linkages between local media and the performance of local 
governments in Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. Two aspects of performance 
were considered: decisional performance, i.e., how eﬃciently local government oﬃcials 
and representatives arrive at decisions, and democratic performance, i.e., how open to 
citizens’ input the rules and practices of decision-making are. 
The ILDGP surveys generated original data pertaining to local government opera-
tions, local media, political parties, and civil society in a large number of localities in 
Central and Eastern European countries. The survey data shed light on various aspects 
of local media scenes: the number of outlets available on the local market; whether local 
governments or commercial interests are behind local media; how much local outlets 
report about local public aﬀairs, notably local government issues; and the extent to 
which citizens attend to local media.  
Statistical analysis was used to put to the test the hypothesis that these four attributes 
of local media enhance the performance of local authorities where they are present, 
especially democratic performance. The analysis mainly concerns a pooled data set 
including more than 2,000 municipalities from the four countries considered in this 
chapter, but also addresses country diﬀerences. Hypotheses and ﬁndings are summarized 
in the two sections below.
 • The direct impact of media characteristics on performance:
  Hypotheses 1 to 4 respectively submit that localities endowed with more media 
outlets, where the ownership structure of those outlets is more diverse (as op-
posed to only local-government controlled, for example), where the quality of 
coverage is higher, and where more citizens consume local media, are expected 
to display better performance, notably better democratic performance. The 
ﬁrst stage of the analysis shows that better coverage quality (measured by the 
extent to which local outlets cover local public aﬀairs), greater availability of 
media outlets and greater diversity in the ownership structure are linked with 
higher democratic performance scores, but register no impact on decisional 
performance. The average reach of local outlets was associated with neither 
of the two performance measures. A closer look at country patterns revealed 
that coverage quality has a positive and signiﬁcant impact in all settings. On 
the other hand, the positive impact of diversity of ownership structure on the 
democratic aspect of local authorities’ performance emerges only in Poland. In 
Hungary and Latvia, it is rather the number of media outlets that accounts for 
higher democratic performance, while neither the size of local media scenes 
nor ownership diversity matter for democratic performance in Romania. These 
mixed ﬁndings could be explained by a potential threshold eﬀect. The number of 
media appears to have an eﬀect on performance only above a certain threshold; 
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in turn, once a local media system’s ownership structure is diverse enough, it may 
“take over” the positive impact of the number of local outlets. The ownership 
structure of local media is not equally diverse in the four countries considered 
in this research. Polish localities often count many outlets, owned or control-
led by diﬀerent actors. There are also much fewer local media in Hungary and 
Romania. In further research, localities from a larger number of countries need 
to be examined to test a threshold hypothesis and fully disentangle eﬀects due 
to country settings and those attributed to media features.  
   A second multivariate analysis showed that the impact of media features 
previously identiﬁed, notably the positive eﬀect of coverage quality on demo-
cratic performance, is quite robust. The strength of the coeﬃcients remains 
largely unaltered once we have controlled for local political and civic activities 
(number of political parties and of NGOs, and citizens’ activities connected to 
public aﬀairs), the communities’ characteristics such as size, unemployment, and 
community heterogeneity, as well as the level of education of local government 
staﬀ. In a few words, these ﬁndings support Hypothesis 3 in all the country 
settings examined in this chapter. Hypothesis 1 is conﬁrmed only in Latvia and 
Hungary (to a lesser extent in the latter country), while Hypothesis 2 holds up 
in Poland. The data does yield support for Hypothesis 4. 
 • Channeling media inﬂuence—interactions between media features and the local 
environment: 
  The linkages between media and government performance run through a number 
of potential channels. Media can inﬂuence performance because citizens with 
access to more abundant and better information about local public aﬀairs are 
more likely to hold their representatives accountable. Those citizens are also more 
likely to better articulate their interests and concerns, and to voice them when 
issues relevant to their daily lives, from welfare and primary school education to 
garbage collection, are at stake. Media can also carry weight through the percep-
tions of local administrators and councilors; where the latter consider media as 
potent agenda-setters and shapers of local public opinion, local authorities might 
be more wary of ineﬃcient practices, lack of transparency, delays, etc., which 
could be publicized in the local media. The second stage of the analysis set out 
to explore three potential channels of media eﬀects on democratic performance 
(decisional performance was not considered in this part of the analysis since 
media features did not exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant link with this aspect of 
performance). 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b posited that the impact of the four media features would be 
stronger where chief administrative oﬃcers (CAOs) and local councilors believe that 
local media successfully inﬂuence local authorities’ decisions, and that they are potent 
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agenda-setters and shapers of local public opinion. Councilors and CAOs’ opinions in 
these respects did not signiﬁcantly modify the impact of media characteristics; however, 
CAOs’ perceptions proved to be directly and positively linked with democratic perform-
ance. Thus Hypotheses 5a and 5b do not receive support. The fact that CAOs’ opinions 
register a direct and positive impact on democratic performance could indicate, rather, 
that the perception measure is not exactly what we intend it to be: it may have less to 
do with the actual characteristics of local media than with those of the local oﬃcials 
themselves. 
Next, the study investigated how the presence and dynamism of civil society aﬀect 
the impact of media on democratic performance. Hypotheses 6 and 7 stated respec-
tively that the number of NGOs in town and citizens’ public issues-oriented activities 
(requesting meetings with local authorities’ representatives, taking part in petitions or 
demonstrations, or challenging a local government decision in front of courts) should en-
hance the impact of media features on democratic performance. Findings partly support 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 in Hungary and Romania. In both cases, a stronger NGO presence 
was associated with a greater impact of media attributes (of coverage quality in Romania; 
of the number of outlets in Hungary and Romania) on democratic performance. The 
enhancing eﬀect of citizens’ active involvement is similar but weaker (citizens’ initiatives 
corresponded with a stronger impact of coverage quality in Romania and Hungary; it 
was also linked to larger eﬀects of the number of outlets, but only in Hungary).
Overall, the media features examined in this study account for over 5% of variation 
observed in democratic performance between localities. This is not negligible, given that 
media eﬀects are by nature diﬃcult to circumscribe and thus to quantify. The diﬃculties 
of the endeavour are increased by the paucity of available information about local media 
in general, which received scant attention in transition studies compared to their national 
counterparts. These ﬁndings tell us that media do matter for how local governments run 
municipal public aﬀairs. This is not a trivial conclusion, since assumptions about the 
positive inﬂuence of plurality and independence of the media on local democracy have 
so far had more currency than quantitative assessments of the inﬂuence of local media 
on local authorities’ practices. Still, the results of this research cannot tell the whole 
story of how local media matter for local government performance.
Focusing on the locality as the unit of observation, for which the available survey 
data is well suited, has increased explanatory leverage with regard to the impact of 
media features. However, the diﬀerences between media systems, as well as between 
local government systems at the country level, compounded by the lack of information 
about local media, pose a thought-provoking challenge. More information and further 
research is required to better understand local media, formulate more precise hypotheses 
about their eﬀects, and interpret ﬁndings with greater accuracy. This chapter sought 
to identify direct (and indirect, through interactions) linear eﬀects of media systems’ 
characteristics on local government performance. Other, non-linear models have yet to 
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be tested. As hypothesized in the case of diversity of ownership structure, an inﬂuence 
might be detectable only after a certain threshold is reached. Media may also aﬀect 
performance following a more complex pattern of combinations between media features 
and characteristics of local environments than has been examined in these pages. Our 
study only begins the investigation of this so far neglected topic. 
NOTES
1 See Bajomi-Lazar (2001) and Chorawski (2001). I am unaware of similar accounts about Romanian 
and Latvian local media. 
2 Throughout this chapter the term “local media” is used for the sake of convenience but all survey 
questions refer to media outlets which provide information about local public aﬀairs. 
3 Survey data available from the Open Society Foundation–Romania at http://www.osf.ro/ro/bop/
cercetare.html.
4 Central European University Post-Election Survey 2002 (1,200 respondents), funded by the CEU 
Foundation.
5 Available at http://www.iss.uw.edu.pl/osrodki/obs/pgss/en/index.html. The machine readable data ﬁle 
1992–1999 of the Polish General Social Surveys is produced and distributed by the Institute for Social 
Studies, University of Warsaw (2002). Investigators are Bogdan Cichomski (principal investigator), 
Tomasz Jerzyński, and Marcin Zielinski.
6 The survey was conducted in the framework of the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences’ project “Towards 
a Civic Society;” the data is available at http://www.bszi.lv.
7 This idea of journalism’s function in society also emerges in studies of the public’s expectations of what 
the media should do (see Protess et al. [1991, 14] for an American survey).
8 In a nutshell, less corruption, greater administrative eﬃciency, higher political stability, and a more 
eﬀective rule of law.
9 The large majority of empirical studies of local media pertain to the American context, where detailed 
information about local media markets and a number of content analyses are available.
10 See Cook Lomax et al. (1983) for an empirical approach, and Protess et al. (1991) for a qualitative 
take on the issue.
11 The two other types of performance outlined in the book, responsiveness and implementation, were 
left out for reasons of space constraints, data availability, as well as the need to focus on the most 
comparable aspects of local governance procedures across countries.
12 It is quite possible that local authorities achieve higher democratic performance scores as a result of 
their own behavior (a “pull” phenomenon), and as a consequence of local inhabitants’ and civic groups’ 
demands (“push”) to be included in the policy-making process. A “push” eﬀect is less likely in the case 
of indicators measuring decisional performance. For example, instances of lack of quorum (used as 
an indicator of decisional performance) are related to councilors’ and mayors’ behavior rather than 
citizens’ inﬂuence. This is why, in addition to the purported mobilization role of the media, democratic 
performance should be more responsive than its decisional counterpart to the presence of media, as 
well as to other media features. 
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13 For diﬀerent reasons on why local media coverage is generally favorable to local authorities, see Paletz, 
Reichert, and McIntyre (1971). 
14 As Popescu and Tóka’s (2002) investigation revealed, the expected positive impact for incumbents does 
not automatically materialize. They found that when the government overtly used public television 
as a tool for political propaganda during the 1994 electoral campaign, it actually had the reverse 
impact on people’s voting choice—greater exposure to public television was associated with voting 
for the challenger, thus showing that mobilization can take place when media outlets are used in an 
outrageously self-serving manner by the government in power.
15 Most attempts to assess quality in a quantiﬁable manner have made use of content analysis. For example, 
the proportion of local content in a news report or a newspaper has been used as a measure of quality 
by students of local media. Others have used indicators such as the number of own news-gathering 
staﬀ (McQuail 1992, 268), the size of editorial budget, or the workload of journalists, deﬁned as the 
number or articles or news pieces produced per day (Riﬀe and Shaw 1990; Lacy and Fico 1990). In 
the case of newspapers with relatively large circulation, a rule of thumb has been to rely on a ratio of 
editorial staﬀ/circulation (Turner 1995).
16 However, this measure of penetration does not reveal whether the same or diﬀerent people are reached 
by a locality’s outlets. Here the average audience of all outlets present in one locality has been selected 
as the measure of penetration. 
17 Notably, more detailed measures of ﬁnancial capacities and autonomy. These elements can only be 
controlled for adequately in the framework of country comparisons rather than in a study privileging 
the locality as its prime unit of observation.
18 The indices are not meant as scales or as “objective” measures of performance; what constitutes 
performance here is solely deﬁned by the available data. The indicators used to build the indices do 
not necessarily correlate with one another. 
19 The question about discussion of budget plans with journalists was not retained because it is not 
independent of the presence of media in the locality. A measure of the number of local referenda was 
also not included because the question was not asked in Latvia. 
20 In Hungary and Poland, signiﬁcance levels are below 0.01. In Poland, the relationship is weaker, 
signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level. 
21 The coeﬃcient of a variable measuring whether or not the media scene was entirely controlled by the 
local government was not signiﬁcant when included in the equation instead of the ownership diversity 
variable. 
22 The signiﬁcance level of the coverage quality’s coeﬃcients in Latvia and Romania are 0.07 and 0.06 
respectively.
23 In Hungary, the signiﬁcance level of the number of media outlets variable is 0.01; in Latvia, 0.05.
24 However, we need to keep in mind the results of the Public Opinion Barometer surveys cited in 
section 1.1, according to which readership of Romanian local papers is far from negligible (at least 
between 1995 and 1997, when the surveys were carried out; the author could not ﬁnd more recent 
data pertaining to local media audience). 
25 Localities were separated into two categories: those that witnessed no such initiatives (a little more 
than half of the sample) and those where at least one activity took place. 
26 The coeﬃcient for the number of factions included in the ruling coalition of the local assembly was 
not signiﬁcant when included with or used instead of the number of parties.  
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27 Equations including each type of cleavage separately did not yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. 
28 One of the reasons frequently given to explain lower civic involvement is lack of resources (Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozmann 1995).
29  Unlike the question about ownership, the one about audience size did not include the “Don’t know” 
option as an answer. 
30 In Hungary, Poland, and Romania, p<0.01. In Latvia, p=0.07.
31 The number of organizations ranges from none (35% of localities) to 98 or more. In analyses involving 
interaction terms, the variable was recoded so that localities with ten local associations or more are 
part of one category. Approximately 85% of localities count between zero and nine NGOs.
32 In Hungary, Poland, and Romania, the variable accounting for the number of local organizations has 
been recoded so that approximately 15% of localities with the largest NGO presence are grouped 
into one category (in Romania, the scale runs from zero to ten; in Hungary, from zero to ﬁfteen; in 
Poland, from zero to twenty). In Latvia, no recoding was used as the distribution of NGO presence 
covered a narrower range, with 35 as the maximum number of associations reported. 
33 CAOs’ perception of media inﬂuence and the number of media are only moderately correlated. This 
could indicate that the perception of media inﬂuence of CAOs actually taps into something other 
than the media reality of the locality. It could be that CAOs have a poor idea of media inﬂuence; 
alternatively, the measure could be more indicative of the “open-mindedness” of respondents; yet 
again, it could also measure the eagerness of respondents to paint their locality in a “democratic” light. 
34 No weight is applied to the analyses pertaining to the merged LGS and LRS data sets.
35 Only two signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects emerge. The ﬁrst is between the mean penetration of outlets 
and councilors’ belief that local media are successful at inﬂuencing what citizens discuss and are 
concerned with when it comes to matters of local public life. It indicates that when such a belief is 
stronger, the slope of mean penetration on performance decreases. The second interaction occurs when 
councilors perceive that the inﬂuence of local outlets on local government decisions is larger. Then, 
the impact of the number of media on performance is enhanced. This second ﬁnding is more in line 
with expectations than the ﬁrst one.
36 Repeating the operation with other beliefs of councilors related to media, namely their trust in reports 
about local government issues, to what extent they believe that local media should serve as watchdogs 
for the community, or whether councilors think that citizens attempt to inﬂuence local government 
by alerting the media, did not yield signiﬁcant results.
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APPENDIX I
Overview of Local Media Characteristics 
and Local Government Performance Indices
The appendix provides a brief overview of the local media landscape in the four coun-
tries included in the study. The main characteristics of local media systems explored are 
their size (number of local media), the quality of their content, sponsorship (diversity 
of ownership), and their estimated reach (penetration) among local citizens. Since those 
four elements are interconnected to a certain degree, a table highlighting correlations 
between size, quality, sponsorship, and penetration is also included below. We have de-
scribed the feature involving the number of available local outlets in the ﬁrst section of 
the chapter (see table 3.1). The tables below display the distribution of the three other 
media features in the LGS sample. 
 The last section of the appendix describes how the local government performance 
indices “perform,” not only in the pooled data set but in each country. For more details 
on how the variables are constructed, see Appendix II. 
 • Ownership Structure
  Local Government Survey (LGS) data show that in over 40% of localities, local 
governments own at least one local media outlet. Private citizens and business 
enterprises are also present in over 30% of local media scenes. Other types of 
owner are less present in the local media; none of those included among the 
answer options (NGOs, local institutions, other governments, or political par-
ties) can be found in more than 11% of all localities included in the sample. 
Political parties own outlets in hardly a handful of localities, mostly located in 
Poland (5.8%).* By law, political parties are not allowed to control broadcast 
media in Latvia (CIT 2001). 
   In Hungary and Latvia, local governments are strong sponsors of the media, 
with at least one outlet in 78% and 63% of localities where there are local media. 
By contrast, only 10% of localities count local government-owned media in 
Romania. Poland stands somewhere in between, with local government media 
present in 27% of localities. The proportion of private media, owned either 
by enterprises or private citizens, hovers between 40% (Hungary) and 65% 
(Poland). Polish localities display the most diverse range of owners, notably with 
* This does not mean that political parties do not publish local papers. For example, competition is 
particularly ﬁerce in some districts of Budapest where major parties provide readers/voters with small 
newspapers after the model of the local government paper. 
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a signiﬁcant presence of public institutions (18%) and “other owners” (15%) 
as sponsors of media outlets.
 • Coverage Quality
  The distribution for the Coverage Quality Index is displayed in table A3.3 for 
both the pooled data set and by country. The index is composed of four indica-
tors: reports about local assembly’s decisions; reports about proposals debated 
in the assembly; reports about arguments and counter-arguments discussed at 
local assemblies; and interviews with local government leaders or councilors. 
 • Audience Size
  Audience size, or the penetration score of media outlets for each city is calculated 
using the mean of CAOs’ estimates of the audience reached by each outlet, 
ranging on a scale from zero (“less than one person out of ten”) to ten (“almost 
everyone”). For the sake of clarity, table A3.4 shows localities divided into ﬁve 
categories ranging from “very low” to “very high” penetration scores.
 • Correlations between Media Systems’ Features
  The coeﬃcients given below are indicators of the strength of the relationship 
between pairs of variables, while controlled for population size. The analysis 
is weighted to adjust for the over-sampling of bigger localities. Note that the 
number of cases pertaining to each correlation is given in the boxes below the 
standardized beta coeﬃcients (table A3.5).
 • Performance Indices
  The measures of decisional and democratic performance constructed for the 
purpose of this chapter are not signiﬁcantly correlated. Thus, one does not 
materialize at the expenses of the other (a common assumption in studies of 
local governance). However, democratic performance is moderately correlated 
to locality size (logged population size) (r=0.165). For the pooled data set and 
for each country, the distributions of both types of performance have been 
divided into ﬁve categories. Although the categories are roughly of equal size 
within countries, there are observable diﬀerences between countries’ distribu-
tions, thus allowing a comparison of how the indices “perform” in the diﬀerent 
settings considered in this study (tables A3.6 and A3.7).
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Table A3.5
 Partial Correlations between Elements of Local Media Systems
Size (up to five outlets) Coverage quality Ownership diversity
Coverage quality –0.059**
(1,282)
Ownership diversity 0.318** 
(1,148)
–0.067*
(1,130)
Penetration 0.005
(1,286)
0.077**
(1,267)
–0.029
(1,129)
Note: * p<0.05;  ** p<0.01; standardized coeﬃcients; the number of cases is indicated in parenthesis. 
Population size (logged) and countries controlled for. Weighted data.
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
Table A3.3
 Coverage Quality Measures of Local Media Outlets’ Coverage 
Coverage Quality
(5th quintile=highest quality)
Pooled data
(% localities)
Hungary
(% localities)
Latvia
(% localities)
Poland
(% localities)
Romania
(% localities)
1st quintile 20 13 11 9 29
2nd quintile 20 20 22 23 7
3rd quintile 16 11 17 24 4
4th quintile 23 31 31 23 2
5th quintile 21 26 19 21 5
N=1,398 N=349 N=229 N=561 N=259
Note: Percentage ﬁgures may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Unweighted data.
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
Table A3.4
 Localities per Average Size of Media Audience 
Average audience
(out of ten citizens)
Pooled Data
(% localities)
Hungary
(% localities)
Latvia
(% localities)
Poland 
(% localities)
Romania
(% localities)
Very low (0 to 2.99) 20 6 11 33 20
Low (3 to 4.99) 28 16 18 38 31
Average (5 to 6.99) 27 27 40 21 31
High (7 to 8.99) 15 27 21 6 14
Very high (9 to 10) 10 25 11 2 6
N=1,399 N=348 N=233 N=563 N=255
Note: Percentages ﬁgures may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Unweighted data.
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
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Table A3.6
Localities per Decisional Performance 
Decisional performance
(highest quintile=best performance)
Pooled data
(% localities)
Hungary
(% localities)
Latvia
(% localities)
Poland
(% localities)
Romania
(% localities)
1st quintile 20 26 26 16 15
2nd quintile 20 16 17 23 21
3rd quintile 21 19 14 12 33
4th quintile 20 12 13 38 13
5th quintile 20 27 30 11 18
N= 2023 N=646 N=241 N=579 N=557
Note: Percentage ﬁgures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.Unweighted data.
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
Table A3.7
Localities per Democratic Performance 
Decisional performance
(highest quintile=best erformance)
Pooled data
(% localities)
Hungary
(% localities)
Latvia
(% localities)
Poland
(% localities)
Romania
(% localities)
1st quintile 20 27 22 19 13
2nd quintile 20 17 20 18 24
3rd quintile 20 21 16 19 23
4th quintile 20 15 21 20 25
5th quintile 20 21 20 25 15
N= 2023 N=646 N=241 N=579 N=557
Note: Percentage ﬁgures may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Unweighted data. 
Source: Own calculations based on the Local Government Survey of the ILDGP, 2001.
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APPENDIX II
Description of Variables and Performance Indices
The variables used in this chapter are listed and described below. Names of variables 
referring to the Local Government and Local Representative Surveys’ codebooks are in 
parentheses and italicized.  
Performance Indices
 • Decisional Performance Index. The index is composed of four indicators: budget 
promptness (computed using the month and year of adoption of the 2000 
budget), lack of quorum [decis03], frequency of postponed decisions [decis04], 
and number of extraordinary sessions [decis02]. Extraordinary sessions are re-
coded into eight categories: the numbers of extraordinary sessions from 0 to 6 
make up the ﬁrst seven categories, and “7 or more sessions” form the last one. 
The ordering is reversed so that a higher score reﬂects a lower number of sessions, 
and thus greater eﬃciency in decision-making. Budget promptness is coded is 
a similar fashion—lack of promptness receives a score of 1 while localities that 
managed to respect the legal deadline for passing the budget are coded 2.
   To capture a maximum of within-country variance in performance, the 
index is calculated diﬀerently depending on the country where the municipality 
is located. As explained in the chapter, the laws regulating the functioning of 
local governments diﬀer and a direct comparison of Latvian cities with Polish 
ones with respect to budget promptness would tell us more about the legal 
framework than about performance itself. Therefore, the mean and standard 
deviation of the four components of the index were calculated on the basis of 
country samples. Missing values were replaced with country-sample means. 
Z-scores (the variable value minus the sample mean, divided by the standard 
deviation) are then computed for each of the four variables. The Z-scores of the 
four components are summed up in a Decisional Performance Index. 
 • Democratic Performance Index. The index is composed of ﬁve indicators: the 
number of public hearings and forums held [info03], whether there was a public 
forum about the draft budget [decis06b], whether the draft budget was published 
[decis06c], whether the local authorities discussed the draft budget with local 
civic organizations [decis06a], and how many such organizations, if any, were 
included in the preparations of local governments’ decisions [civil01a].
The number of public hearings and forums was recoded into eight categories (zero, 
one, two, three and four, ﬁve to seven, eight to ten, eleven or more). The initial response 
options did not include “no forums were held.” Following the contributors to the ﬁrst 
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volume using the LGS data set (e.g., Kálmán and Soós 2002; Pop 2002, in The State 
of Local Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe), missing values were treated as an 
indication of a lack of hearings held in 2000. 
Variables for the public forum about the budget and draft budget publication were 
recoded so that better performance translates into a higher score (1=“no,” 2=“yes”). The 
two last indicators (discussions of draft budget with civic associations and number of 
associations included in decision preparations) imply the presence of civic associations 
in the municipality. To evaluate the democratic performance of localities with respect 
to their inclusion in decision preparations meaningfully, localities that count civic as-
sociations but do not include them in those preparations were assigned a score of 0. 
Localities without associations were given a score of 1. Localities where such organiza-
tions are present and included in the decision-making process received a score of 2. 
The variable indicating whether local authorities discussed the draft budget with civic 
organizations was coded in a similar fashion. Missing values (in cases of localities where 
civic organizations were reported) of the two indicators were replaced by the mean of 
only those cities in the sample endowed with associations. 
As for decisional performance, the means as well as the standard deviations used 
to calculate the Z-scores of the ﬁve indicators are calculated on the basis of country 
samples. Similarly, Z-score are added to yield a positive democratic performance index, 
i.e., a higher value indicates better performance.  
Media System Variables
 • Number of Media [media1]. Coded from 0 to “8 or more” for the ﬁrst analysis 
(described in table 3.2),  recoded from 0 to 5 in subsequent analyses. 
 • Coverage Quality Index [media7a to media7e, media8a to media8e, media9a to 
media9e, media10a to media10e]. Initial variables were recoded 0=“no” and 
1=“yes” to indicate whether the outlet includes the four indicators of quality 
coverage (reports about the local assembly’s decisions; reports about proposals 
debated in the assembly; reports about arguments and counterarguments 
discussed at local assemblies; and lastly, interviews with local government 
leaders or councilors) in its regular coverage. Mean scores for each of the four 
indicators were computed for all outlets. The new variables were standardized 
(i.e., “z-scored,” a process that centers the variable’s distribution around 0) and 
then added up to obtain a measure of quality in each locality. Cases that had 
missing values for two or more of the four indicators (and localities with no 
media outlets) were not included in the index (625 cases were excluded). 
 • Diversity of Ownership Structure [media13a, media13b, media13c, media13d, 
media13e]. The numbers of diﬀerent types of ownership present in a locality 
were added up. Cases for which no information (either missing or “don’t know”) 
about ownership was available, as well as localities without media outlets, were 
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not included. However, to maximize the number of cases that could be included 
in the analysis, localities for which no ownership information was available 
but where only one outlet was reported received a score of 1 (752 cases were 
excluded.)
 • Audience [media11a, media11b, media11c, media11d, media11e]. The origi-
nal variables are coded in such a way that the coding scheme does not fully 
distinguish between the absence of outlet or a score of 0 (i.e., no audience). 
To illustrate this point: in a number of localities with one or two outlets, the 
penetration score assigned to (non existent) third, fourth, and ﬁfth outlets was 
“0” instead of an indication of missing outlets. To correct for this as much as 
possible, I recoded as missing all outlets that were not reported when asked for 
the total number of local media (media1a, up to ﬁve). For example, were three 
outlets reported, the fourth and ﬁfth columns were treated as missing instead of 
“0” so as not to underestimate the audience of local media. The audience scores 
of all outlets in town were meaned. Localities without outlets or for which no 
audience information was available were left out and treated as missing (624 
cases were excluded). 
Local Civil Society Variables 
 • Number of NGOs [civil07]. The number of civic organizations in the locality.
 • Number of Political Parties [parties]. The number of political parties active in 
the locality. 
 • Citizens’ Initiatives [actio01a] (demonstrations), [actio02a] (petitions), [actio03a] 
(requests for meetings), [actio04a] (challenges to local government decisions in 
court). The localities that witnessed no initiatives were coded 0; those where at 
least one of the four activities took place were coded 1.
Other Variables 
 • Unemployment [unemp]. The percentage of unemployed people in the locality.
 • Community Heterogeneity [socio04a] (diﬀerences in income), [socio04b] (dif-
ferences in religious beliefs), [socio04f] (diﬀerent parts of the municipality), 
[socio04c] (diﬀerences in political views), [socio04e] (diﬀerences of ethnicity), 
[socio04g] (diﬀerences between newcomers and long-established inhabitants). 
Chief administrative oﬃcers’ evaluation of the degree of tension caused by 
these various divides in the locality—rated from 1 for “low tension” to 7 for 
“high tension.” Community heterogeneity is measured by taking the mean of 
the tension score of all cleavages. 
 • Staﬀ Level of Education [staﬀedu]. The percentage of local government staﬀ with 
higher education. 
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Local Oﬃcials’ and Representatives’ Perception of Media Inﬂuence 
 • Chief Administrative Oﬃcers’ Perception of Local Media Inﬂuence on Local Authori-
ties’ Decisions [decis08e].
 • CAOs’ Perception * Number of Media Outlets. The product of the two variables 
(both variables were centered on their mean by subtracting the mean from the 
two variables’ scores before they were multiplied). 
 • CAOs’ Perception * Quality Coverage. The product of the two variables (both 
variables were centered on their mean by subtracting the mean from the two 
variables’ scores before they were multiplied). 
 • CAOs’ Perception * Ownership Diversity. The product of the two variables (both 
variables were centered on their mean by subtracting the mean from the two 
variables’ scores before they were multiplied). 
 • CAOs’ Perception * Penetration. The product of the two variables (both variables 
were centered on their mean by subtracting the mean from the two variables’ 
scores before they were multiplied). 
From the 2001 Hungary Local Representative Survey (LRS)
 The observational unit of the LRS is the councilor, not the locality. Between one and 
18 councilors returned the questionnaire in a number of Hungarian localities. The
media-related responses of councilors from the same town were averaged to yield one 
measure for each type of perception per locality. The data were then merged with the 
LGS data and localities common to both data ﬁles were retained (255 localities). 
 • Councilors’ Perception of Local Media Capacity to Inﬂuence: 
  – Local Authorities’ Decisions [q21d]. Coded between 1 (little inﬂuence) to 
7 (great inﬂuence). 
  – Agenda-setting [q34] (capacity to inﬂuence what citizens think about concern-
ing local government issues). Coded 1 (no inﬂuence) to 7 (great inﬂuence).
  – Own Opinion about Local Government Issues [q40j]. Coded 1 (little inﬂu-
ence) to 7 (great inﬂuence).
 • Councilors’ Perception of Media Inﬂuence on Local Government Decisions * Number 
of Media Outlets (up to ﬁve). The product of the two variables (both variables 
were centered on their mean by subtracting the mean from the two variables’ 
scores before they were multiplied). 
 • Councilors’ Perception of Media Inﬂuence on Agenda-Setting * Number of Media 
Outlets (up to ﬁve). The product of the two variables (both variables were centered 
on their mean by subtracting the mean from the two variables’ scores before 
they were multiplied). 
 The three variables measuring councilors’ perceptions were mean-centered, then 
multiplied ﬁrst with the number of media outlets and second with the coverage 
quality index score, for a total of twelve product terms. 
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ABSTRACT
The relationship between the size of municipalities and the ability of citizens to inﬂu-
ence local matters is the focus of this chapter. Our study looks at Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania using data from the Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project 
(ILDGP), a joint project of the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative 
(LGI) and the Tocqueville Research Center (T-RC). The data reﬂect attitudes expressed by 
local public oﬃcials. In each of the three countries, the study shows less eﬀective citizen 
involvement in very small municipalities and greater eﬀectiveness in larger centers. This 
ﬁnding indicates that the high level of municipal fragmentation that is speciﬁc to the 
three countries tends to have a negative impact on the overall quality of local democ-
racy. The evidence that system capacity is negatively related to the size of municipalities 
further supports this ﬁnding. It appears that smaller municipalities are unable to fulﬁll 
their potential to provide incentives for local participation, without which we cannot 
consider these countries to have eﬀective local democracies.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
As the title suggests, this chapter deals with the relationship between municipality size 
and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters in the case of three countries 
(Hungary, Poland, and Romania). We consider the eﬀective engagement of citizens to 
be a dimension of the quality of local democracy, and when examining this issue we will 
need to look at the level and types of citizen participation as well as the system’s capacity 
to provide incentives for such participation. Depending on the relationship between the 
size of municipalities and citizens’ eﬀectiveness, we could gain a better understanding 
of the implications of municipal structure for the quality of local democracy. 
The starting point is Dahl’s claim that “participation in very large units becomes 
minimal and in very small units it becomes trivial” (1971, 960). This suggests that, on 
the one hand, the participation of citizens is inhibited within very large municipalities, 
while on the other hand it is even less eﬀective in very small ones. If this claim is valid 
in the three countries under study, it would imply that citizens’ eﬀectiveness varies 
according to the population size of municipalities—low in very small municipalities 
and improved in larger ones. Since very large municipalities in the three countries are 
extremely low in number and are mainly capital cities, we will not attempt to evaluate 
the level of participation in very large units.
Our analysis is comparative, being conducted in three countries, and the hypothesis 
to be tested is of special relevance to the three countries for at least two reasons. First, it 
relates to the ongoing debate on the relationship between citizens’ ability to inﬂuence 
local matters and the quality of local democracy. Second, the average size of municipali-
ties in all three countries under study is small compared to other democratic countries 
such as Great Britain and Ireland, where the average population of municipalities is 
120,000 and 103,000, respectively (Larsen 2002, 317). By comparison, in Hungary the 
average size of municipalities is 3,229 inhabitants, in Poland 15,561, and in Romania 
8,044 (Soós and Tóka 2002, 413). According to Larsen’s comparative data, Poland would 
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qualify as having medium-size municipalities on average, while those in Hungary and 
Romania would be small.
To determine if the relationship between municipality size and citizens’ eﬀective-
ness holds for the three countries under study, we will evaluate the relationship between 
the direct eﬀects that municipality size has on citizen eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local 
decision-making, and also investigate the system capacity of municipalities to create 
incentives for citizens to participate.
Path analysis will be used to evaluate the relationships among the variables. The 
main reason for this choice is that there are signiﬁcant levels of multi-colinearity among 
our variables. This technique is useful because in addition to addressing the possible 
relationship between the size of municipalities and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing 
local policy matters, it is also sensitive to the indirect eﬀects of municipality size.
The paper is organized in seven sections. Following this brief introduction to the 
topic of our study, we present a short review of the literature dealing with the relation-
ship between municipality size and the quality of local democracy. Next, the main data 
sources used in the analysis are presented. The fourth section describes the variables, 
and the ﬁfth deals with the analysis of individual country cases. The last two sections 
present a comparative analysis as well as the ﬁndings and conclusions. 
2. RESEARCH ON THE SIZE OF POLITICAL UNITS
In the early literature on the size of political units summarized by Almond and Verba 
(1963, 231–236), the authors found no consistent relationship between the size of 
municipalities and “subjective political competence.”1 In reanalyzing their data, Finifter 
(1970) also found no zero-order relationship between the size of municipalities and 
political competence; however, the author concluded that there was a relationship once 
the level of education was taken into consideration. 
Other authors measured citizens’ inﬂuence on local politics through direct political 
participation. Using a “communal activity” index, Verba and Nie (1972) found a strong 
negative relationship between the size of municipalities and citizens’ inﬂuence. Their 
investigations supported the proposition that the larger the community the more 
complicated and impersonal it becomes, leading to a reduced level of participation. In 
contrast, citizens in small communities can see the results of their participation more 
quickly, and this serves as an incentive for more involvement. Dahl (1971) estimated 
that the ideal size of political units was between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.
The start of modern research on the relationship between the size and the viability of 
democratic polities was marked by Dahl and Tufte’s study entitled Size and Democracy, 
published in 1973. In this book, the authors drew attention to the fact that democratic 
theory had not evolved with historical reality and had thus become outdated. Their 
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solution was to update democratic theory by including the “neglected problem of politi-
cal units and their inter-relationship” (1973, 139). They came to the conclusion that it 
was impossible to determine one optimal size for political units. As a result, they sug-
gested a mixture of small and large units, claiming that citizens could participate more 
easily in the former, but the latter improved the eﬀectiveness of citizen participation. 
Nevertheless, the authors recognized that the problem of ineﬀectiveness in small units 
and that of alienation in large ones might persist.
Besides the problem of diminishing avenues for political participation, Le Roy found 
evidence that civil society organizations themselves could be perceived as agents of the 
state (1995, 314). In the author’s view, this could lead to alienation or a “crisis of conﬁ-
dence and trust that characterizes much of the West.” By contrast, in his research focusing 
on the importance of proximity and capacity to inﬂuence local politics, Larsen considers 
that even if citizens’ participation is higher in small municipalities, this does not imply 
greater interest or knowledge or more positive views on local democracy (2002, 330). 
These ﬁndings indicate that the absolute extent of citizen participation in itself is not 
suﬃcient to account for the nature of local democracy. Lastly, the complex nature of 
the relationship between municipality size and the performance of local democracy is 
evident in the work of Keating (1995, 117), who directs our attention to the inﬂuence 
of speciﬁc local factors. 
3. DATA SOURCES
The main data used in this study were generated by the Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative (LGI) and the Tocqueville Research Center (T–RC) within the 
Indicators of Local Democratic Governance Project (ILDGP). The ﬁrst phase of the project 
took place in 2001, when the Tocqueville Research Center conducted a four-country 
survey, known as the Local Government Survey (LGS). The survey consisted of face-to-
face interviews with chief administrative oﬃcials from Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and 
Romania. 
Within the framework of the same project, the LGI published a volume entitled 
State of Local Democracy in Central Europe, comprising the reports on local democracy 
for the four countries mentioned above (Soós and Tóka 2002). This volume provided 
the main source of data for our country case studies.
4. VARIABLES 
The main variables for the three countries under analysis are introduced and described 
below. They include: the size of municipality, citizens’ participation, citizens’ eﬀective-
ness in inﬂuencing local matters, and system responsiveness.
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4.1 Municipality Size
The literature distinguishes between population number and surface area as the two main 
measures for municipality size (Swianiewicz 2002, 3). Although both of these are valid 
conceptualizations, population number is used here as the measure for municipality size. 
Following Soós and Tóka, municipalities are initially grouped into eight categories 
based on their population number (2002, 414). The categories include municipalities 
with inhabitants from 0 to 999, 1,000 to 1,999, 2000 to 4,999, 5,000 to 9,999, 10,000 
to 49,999, 50,000 to 99,999, 100,000 to 999,999, and ﬁnally, municipalities with a 
population over 1,000,000. To provide a clear overview and to allow comparability 
among our country cases, the eight categories are later merged into three: small mu-
nicipalities (0–4,999 inhabitants), medium-size (5,000–49,999 inhabitants) and large 
(over 50,000 inhabitants).
Table 4.1 illustrates the situation in the three countries in our study. In Hungary 
54.81% of all municipalities have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, in Romania only 
1.7%, and in Poland none. In the case of municipalities with a population of between 
1,000 and 4,999 inhabitants, 69.88% of Romanian, 23.0% of Polish, and 36.59% of 
Table 4.1
Municipalities by Population Size and Number of Inhabitants 
Hungary 1997 Poland 1996 Romania 1999
Number of 
municipalities
Total 
population 
category
Number of 
municipalities
Total 
population 
category
Number of 
municipalities
Total 
population 
category
Below 999 1,714 
(54.81%)
790,737 
(7.8%)
— — 52
(1.7%)
658,180 
(20.58%)
1,000 
–1,999
651 
(20.82%)
934,429 
(9.2%)
7
(0.3%)
12,234 
(0.0%)
388
(13.1%)
2,000 
–4,999
493 
(15.77%)
1,476,377 
(14.6%)
563
(22.7%)
2,235,165 
(5.8%)
1,674 
(56.78%)
5,581,663 
(24.76%)
5,000
–9,999
133
(4.25%)
931,912 
(9.2%)
1,078 
(43.4%)
7,656,636 
(19.8%)
607 
(20.59%)
3,981,735 
(17.66%)
10,000
–49,999
116
(3.71)
2.271,414 
(22.4%)
734
(29.5%)
13,722,206 
(35.5%)
180
(6.11%)
3,530,746 
(15.66%)
50,000 
–99,999
11
(0.35%)
709,971 
(7.0%)
56
(2.3%)
3,750,448 
(9.6%)
23
(0.78%)
1,778,327 
(7.89%)
100,000 
–999,999
8
(0.26%)
1,159,135 
(11.4%)
45
(1.8%)
11,262,652 
(29.1%)
23
(0.78%)
4,987,762 
(22.12%)
1,000,000
and over 
1
(0.03%)
1,861,383 
(18.4%)
— — 1
(0.03%)
2,027,512 
(8.99%)
Source: Data from Soós and Tóka 2002, 413–414.
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Hungarian municipalities fall into this category. This shows that, while over 90% of 
Hungarian and 71.58% of Romanian municipalities have below 5,000 inhabitants, in 
Poland only 23% of the municipalities belong to this group. On the other hand, 72.9% 
of Polish municipalities have between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, while for Romania 
the share is 26.7% and for Hungary it is only 7.96%. In all three countries the share 
of municipalities with a population above 50,000 inhabitants is very small (0.64% for 
Hungary, 4.1% for Poland, and 1.59% for Romania).
 Although the number of very large municipalities (over 50,000) is small in all three 
countries, their population still amounts to a signiﬁcant share of the total population. In 
Hungary, they account for almost 37% of the overall population of the country. In Poland 
and Romania, 36.6% and 39% of the population respectively lives in large municipalities. 
4.2 Citizen Participation
A direct measure of citizen participation is used in several analyses speciﬁc to the study 
of the relationship between municipality size and participation. Authors seeking to 
capture the elusive concept of citizen participation employ many diﬀerent measures 
including simple indicators such as voter turnout, and complex scales comprising a 
variety of diﬀerent direct and indirect forms of political participation. 
The LGS collected data on ﬁve diﬀerent forms of political participation (see table 
4.2), including: 
 • attendance at public demonstrations concerning local matters
 • collection of citizens’ signatures for petitions on various issues related to local 
politics
 • direct meetings between local oﬃcials and citizens or groups of citizens on local 
political matters
 • challenges to local government decisions in a court of law or at a higher admin-
istrative authority
 • proposal writing or written requests by civil society organizations on any public 
interest question.
The above table presents citizen participation rates for the diﬀerent types of political 
participation in the three countries under study as reported by chief administrative oﬃc-
ers (CAOs). From their responses we learn that the preferred forms of activity by citizens 
vary among the countries. In Hungary, civil society proposal writing and formulating 
written requests are the most preferred forms of citizen participation. The same is true 
for Poland, but the share of municipalities in which such action was undertaken is 15% 
higher than in Hungary. In Romania, civil society proposal writing holds second place 
at 14.5%, lower than in Hungary and Poland. 
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The second most common form of participation in Hungary and Poland—requests 
for meetings between local oﬃcials and citizens—presents even more accentuated diﬀer-
ences. In Hungary 24% of municipalities requested such meetings, compared to Poland 
with over 48%. In Romania this is the most preferred type of participation, yet it only 
occurred in about 20% of municipalities. 
The data show that attending public demonstrations and challenging local decisions 
in a court of a higher administrative authority are the least preferred forms of political 
participation in all three countries. 
The ﬁve forms of participation captured by the LGS data are the most common 
ones, but they exclude other potentially important types such as direct contact with 
local oﬃcials. This fact somehow weakens our own ﬁndings. Also, as the data come 
from CAOs and not directly from the citizens of the given municipalities, we can not 
adequately evaluate the levels of citizen participation. Citizens’ eﬀectiveness, however, 
is a diﬀerent matter and these data are worth considering for that purpose.
4.3 Citizens’ Effectiveness in Influencing Local Decision-making
Citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters is evaluated according to how much 
they are able to inﬂuence local decision-making. It is a composite measure, including 
the inﬂuence on local decision-making through local entrepreneurs, ﬁrms, and busi-
ness associations; civic associations, foundations, trade unions, and churches; the local 
branches of political parties; the print and electronic media; and direct citizen inﬂuence. 
The alpha reliability test for the scale of citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters 
is 0.7622 for Hungary, 0.7369 for Poland, and 0.7695 for Romania, with item-total 
correlations for all three countries presented in appendix I.
Although the measurement relies on the evaluations of chief administrative of-
ﬁcers from the selected municipalities, the data refer to the direct experiences of the 
Table 4.2
Municipalities’ Share in Type of Citizen Participation in Local Politics [%]
Country
Hungary Poland Romania
Public demonstrations 3.0 10.6 7.3
Petitions 12.6 26.5 12.5
Requests for meetings 24.2 48.3 20.3
Challenges to local government decisions 4.4 9.2 5.3
Civil society proposals 37.0 52.4 14.5
Source: LGS, 2001.
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respondents (as in the case of citizens’ participation). Therefore, they are substantively 
more reliable than in the case of CAOs reporting on citizens’ participation levels. Given 
the data constraints, however, we also include institutional variables that inﬂuence the 
structure of incentives to undertake political participation, i.e., the system’s capacity 
to respond. 
4.4 System Capacity to Respond
The capacity of the system to respond to citizens’ requests and to provide incentives for 
participation is measured by “expenditure rigidity.” The legal status of municipalities 
determines the responsibilities they are assigned to perform and therefore sets their level 
of autonomy in decisions on local matters. Expenditure rigidity is the percentage of 
own revenues in the total budget of the municipalities as reported by the local oﬃcials. 
Own revenues are those incomes of municipalities over which they have the authority 
to deﬁne both the pool and the amount of the payable taxes, fees or duties. Thus, all 
the revenues that are collected at the national level and redistributed to municipalities 
are excluded from this category. A reason for deciding to deﬁne own revenues in this 
way is that the shared tax systems in these countries are largely biased by the earmarked 
character of the transfers of the municipality revenue shares. 
Similarly, national transfers are largely normative and earmarked. Although they 
inﬂuence the income situation of municipalities, they do not contribute to an increase 
in their ﬁscal independence. Instead, in adopting a strongly redistributive system in each 
country, the intent was to guarantee the minimum provision of basic public services 
in all municipalities. 
Although legally there is no hierarchy among municipalities based on their size, and 
in theory all municipalities perform similar functions, there is still a certain diﬀerentiation 
based on the peculiarities of diﬀerent municipalities and their level of ﬁscal independ-
ence. For instance, in Hungary and Romania there are municipalities with county 
rights, which perform the functions of the County Council within their jurisdiction. 
The diﬀerence between the two countries lies in the fact that, while in Hungary local 
governments have the opportunity to decide which noncompulsory responsibilities to 
assume, the Romanian local governments do not have this choice. 
Another important distinction among municipalities is their urban or rural char-
acter. In the Romanian system, rural municipalities have only limited sources of own 
revenues compared to urban municipalities. This is due to the fact that a large share 
of the population in rural municipalities is active in various occupations related to 
agriculture. Under the current shared taxation system, a certain percentage of all in-
come taxes collected in their jurisdictions is redistributed to local governments. This 
amounted to 35% in 2000 and 36.5% in 2001. But since agricultural income is not 
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taxable, the amounts collected by rural municipalities as a share of local income are 
rather small. Various central government and county council equalization transfers are 
meant to compensate for this lack of funds. Nevertheless, these often come in the form 
of earmarked transfers, which determine both the scope of funds and the amount spent 
on speciﬁc budget lines.
An important consequence of this is to reduce the policy space available for mu-
nicipalities and the ability of citizens to inﬂuence decisions; thus, we can theorize that 
the higher the expenditure rigidity of municipalities, the less eﬀective citizens are in 
inﬂuencing local matters. On the other hand, from the ﬁndings of the research it seems 
that the relationship between municipality size and revenue rigidity is substantial or 
very strong for each country.
5. COUNTRY CASES
This section identiﬁes the relationship between the population size of municipalities 
and the level of citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing policymaking for each of the three 
countries. In each case, the scores on citizens’ eﬀectiveness, participation and the level 
of expenditure rigidity for each municipality size will be discussed.
5.1 Hungary
In the case of Hungary the correlation coeﬃcient between municipality size (log) and 
citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters is 0.355 and it is signiﬁcant at the 
0.01 level (see ﬁgure 4.1). This indicates a moderately strong direct relationship between 
municipality size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters. The correlation 
and signiﬁcance results are reported below. 
As expected from the ﬁndings of the earlier literature, the low score of R square 
indicates that municipality size is not the best predictor of citizens’ eﬀectiveness in in-
ﬂuencing local matters. Although municipality size is not a strong predictor (it explains 
only 12% of the total variation in citizens’ eﬀectiveness), the low signiﬁcance level implies 
that R square can not be attributed to sampling error. In this sense, the ﬁndings agree 
with the general ﬁndings of the earlier literature. 
Table 4.3 shows that citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters varies with 
the size of municipality in Hungary. According to the ﬁndings, only 15.1% of those 
interviewed consider that citizens have a slightly, fairly, or very big inﬂuence on local 
decision-making. By contrast, 67.1% of respondents believe that citizens’ eﬀectiveness 
in inﬂuencing local decision-making is very, fairly, or slightly small. This seems to sug-
gest that citizens’ ability to inﬂuence local decision-making is generally very limited in 
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all Hungarian municipalities. Still, we can track slight diﬀerences in the level of citizen 
eﬀectiveness among municipalities of diﬀerent sizes. From among 67.1% of respondents 
who consider citizen eﬀectiveness as being limited, a vast majority (77.6%) belongs to 
municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. This response was selected by only 
52.5% of those from municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, and 44.4% 
of those from municipalities above 50,000 inhabitants. This suggests that citizen ef-
fectiveness is generally low in Hungary, especially in small municipalities.
Figure 4.1
Hungary: Model Summary, ANOVA, and Coeﬃcients
Model summaryb
Model R R square Adjusted R square Standard error of the estimate
1 0.355a 0.126 0.123 1.1056
a. Predictors: (constant), log pop size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness to inﬂuence local matters.
ANOVAb
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
1 Regression 59.082 1 59.082 48.334 0.000a
Residual 409.498 335 1.222
Total 468.580 336
a. Predictors: (constant), log pop size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters.
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized 
coefficients
t Significance
Model B Standard error Beta
1 (Constant) 0.590 0.312 1.890 0.060
Log pop size 0.261 0.038 0.355 6.952 0.000
a. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters.
These data conﬁrm our statistical expectations: the smaller the municipality, the less 
eﬀective citizens are in inﬂuencing local decision-making. However, this occurs in an 
environment in which citizens are found to have very little inﬂuence in municipalities 
of any size at all. 
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Table 4.3
Citizen Eﬀectiveness in Inﬂuencing Local Decision-making in Hungary 
(by Size of Municipality) 
Municipality size Total
Citizens’ effectiveness 0–4,999 5,000 
–49,999
over 
50,000
Small influence Count 156.0 62.0 8.0 226.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 69.0 27.4 3.5 100.0
 % within municipality size 77.6 52.5 44.4 67.1
 % of total 46.3 18.4 2.4 67.1
Neither small nor big 
influence
Count 22.0 32.0 6.0 60.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 36.7 53.3 10.0 100.0
 % within municipality size 10.9 27.1 33.3 17.8
 % of total 6.5 9.5 1.8 17.8
Big influence Count 23.0 24.0 4.0 51.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 45.1 47.1 7.8 100.0
 % within municipality size 11.4 20.3 22.2 15.1
 % of total 6.8 7.1 1.2 15.1
Total Count 201.0 118.0 18.0 337.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 59.6 35.0 5.3 100.0
 % within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 % of total 59.6 35.0 5.3 100.0
Note: N=337.
Source: LGS 2001.
Table 4.4
Share of Municipalities in which Citizen Participation Occurred 
at Least Once (Hungary) [%]
Municipality size
0–4,999 5,000–49,999 over 50,000
Public demonstrations 2.3 7.3 40.9
Petitions 10.5 35.0 72.7
Requests for meetings 22.2 51.8 72.7
Challenges to decisions 3.9 13.1 27.3
Civil society proposals 33.7 82.5 90.9
Note: N=646.
Source: LGS 2001.
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The data in table 4.4 show that although all types of participation take place in 
municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants, citizens are the least active here. In other words, 
depending on the type of participation considered, in municipalities with fewer  than 
5,000 inhabitants, participation was undertaken only in 2.3% to 33.7% of the cases. 
The most frequent type of citizen participation was civil society proposal writing, fol-
lowed by requests for meetings between local oﬃcials and citizens. 
In municipalities with between 5,000 and 49,000 inhabitants, the share in which 
participation was undertaken is higher for all forms than in municipalities with below 
5,000 inhabitants. Civil society proposal writing was the most frequent form of par-
ticipation, and was employed at least once in over 82% of the cases.
The largest share of municipalities in which all forms of participation were under-
taken at least once is those with over 50,000 inhabitants. Civil society proposal writing 
and written requests occurred at least once in over 90% of the cases. The second most 
common form of participation was requests for meetings between local oﬃcials and 
citizens, and the third was the writing of petitions, undertaken in over 62% of mu-
nicipalities. 
The data seem to suggest that, although some type of citizen participation was 
undertaken in only 49% of all Hungarian municipalities, the larger the municipality 
the more intense the participation. Still, we need to keep in mind that there are only 
a limited number of really large municipalities. Furthermore, we cannot disregard the 
level of eﬀectiveness of participation.
In Hungary, citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters is constrained by 
the fact that the goal and scope of government transfers determine most decisions on 
local matters. The degree of legal autonomy of municipalities in Hungary is deﬁned 
in the Local Government Act and in sectoral laws. In accordance with the law, all 
municipalities have to carry out certain mandatory functions and they may provide 
further services on an optional basis. Interestingly enough, municipalities tend to carry 
out as many optional functions as they can, since this involves more central transfers. 
As shown by Soós and Kálmán (Soós et al. 2002, 25), central transfers still constitute 
the largest source of local government revenues, although their share has been reduced 
from 64% to 51%–53%. 
A rather large imbalance can be observed in the capacity of municipalities to raise 
local revenues, since this capacity depends on the level of economic development in 
each municipality. To equalize the existing imbalance, the central government calculates 
central transfers for operations, taking into consideration the business tax collected by 
the municipalities. Although local governments in Hungary have autonomy in deciding 
on their operational spending, this autonomy is constrained to a certain degree by the 
increasing share of earmarked grants for speciﬁc purposes (Fekete et al. 2002, 41).
According to the responses in the LGS, in 63.3% of Hungarian municipalities, over 
50% of overall revenues originate from diﬀerent types of government transfer. In 24.3% 
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of cases the transfers constitute from 30% to 50% of total revenues, and only in 12.4% 
do they account for less than 30% of overall revenues (see table 4.5). 
In terms of municipality size, we note that the smaller a municipality, the more it 
tends to depend on government transfers. This is indicated by the fact that 93.4% of 
the municipalities that have over 50% of their budget revenues coming in the form 
of government transfers belong to the group of municipalities with fewer than 5,000 
inhabitants, accounting for 65.2% of all Hungarian municipalities with a population 
below 5,000 inhabitants.
In the case of municipalities with between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, 46.6% 
have over 50% of their revenues originating from the government, which represents 
6.1% of all municipalities with such high rigidity. The budget of 31.3% of medium-size 
municipalities comprises from 30% to 50% of government transfers, and 22.2% have 
less than 30% of their revenues coming from government transfers.
Among large municipalities (over 50,000 inhabitants), only one-third depend on 
government transfers to an extent larger than 50% of their total revenues. The majority 
Table 4.5
Revenue Rigidity by Municipality Size in Hungary
Municipality size Total
Own revenue 
of municipalities
0–4,999 5,000– 
49,999
Over 
50,000
Below 30% Count 176.0 23.0 1.0 200.0
 % within own revenue of municipalities 88.0 11.5 0.5 100.0
 % within municipality size 37.4 17.7 4.8 32.2
 % of total 28.3 3.7 0.2 32.2
Between 
30% and 50%
Count 130.0 37.0 6.0 173.0
 % within own revenue of municipalities 75.1 21.4 3.5 100.0
 % within municipality size 27.6 28.5 28.6 27.8
 % of Total 20.9 5.9 1.0 27.8
Over 50% Count 165.0 70.0 14.0 249.0
 % within own revenue of municipality 66.3 28.1 5.6 100.0
 % within municipality size 35.0 53.8 66.7 40.0
 % of total 26.5 11.3 2.3 40.0
Total Count 471.0 130.0 21.0 622.0
 % within own revenue of municipality 75.7 20.9 3.4 100.0
 % within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 % of total 75.7 20.9 3.4 100.0
Note: N=622.
Source: LGS 2001.
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of these municipalities (51.5%) rely on government transfers to a smaller degree, central 
transfers constituting between 30% and 50% of their total revenues. Only 15.2% of large 
municipalities have less than 30% of their revenues collected from government transfers. 
As expected, the data show that the smaller a municipality in population size the 
more rigid its revenues tend to be. However, this happens in the context of a system in 
which transfers are signiﬁcant in municipalities of all sizes.
5.2 Poland
The correlation coeﬃcient between municipality size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness is weaker 
in Poland (0.26 and signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level) than in Hungary. Although this level 
of relationship indicates only a moderately direct relationship between municipality 
size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters, it is positive and cannot be 
attributed to sampling error. 
Figure 4.2
Poland: Model Summary, ANOVA, and Coeﬃcients
Model summaryb
Model R R square Adjusted R square Standard error of the estimate
1 0.260a 0.067 0.066 1.0926
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness to inﬂuence local matters.
ANOVAb
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
1 Regression 47.147 1 47.147 39.494 0.000a
Residual 651.803 546 1.194
Total 698.950 547
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters.
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized 
coefficients
t Significance
Model B Standard error Beta
1 (Constant) 0.533 0.423 1.260 0.208
Log pop size 0.277 0.044 0.260 6.284 0.000
a. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters.
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As with the case of Hungary, the score of R square is low, which indicates that 
municipality size is not the best predictor of citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local 
matters for Poland either. Still, municipality size explains 8% of the total variation. 
Table 4.6 shows that 50.9% of all respondents consider citizens’ eﬀectiveness in 
inﬂuencing local decision-making to be very, fairly, or slightly low. Of these, 21.5% are 
from municipalities with a population below 5,000, 72.4% from municipalities with a 
population between 5,000 and 49,999, and 6.1% from municipalities with over 50,000 
inhabitants. Only 20.5% of the respondents say that citizens have a big inﬂuence on 
local decision-making. 
The distribution according to size of municipality is 16.6% when there are fewer 
than 5,000 inhabitants, 71.0% with 5,000 to 49,999, and 12.4% with a population 
over 50,000. About one-fourth (28.6%) of the respondents claim that citizen eﬀective-
ness is neither low nor high. Of these, 13.4% are from municipalities with below 5,000 
inhabitants, 68.2% from municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, 
and 18.5% from municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants. 
Table 4.6
Citizen Eﬀectiveness in Inﬂuencing Local Decision-making in Poland
(by Size of Municipality) 
Municipality size Total
Citizens’ effectiveness 0–4,999 5,000 
–49,999
Over 
50,000
Small influence Count 60.0 202.0 17.0 279.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 21.5 72.4 6.1 100.0
 % within municipality size 65.9 51.9 25.0 50.9
 % of total 10.9 36.9 3.1 50.9
Neither small nor big 
influence
Count 21.0 107.0 29.0 157.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 13.4 68.2 18.5 100.0
 % within municipality size 23.1 27.5 42.6 28.6
 % of total 3.8 19.5 5.3 28.6
Big influence Count 10.0 80.0 22.0 112.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 8.9 71.4 19.6 100.0
 % within municipality size 11.0 20.6 32.4 20.4
 % of total 1.8 14.6 4.0 20.4
Total Count 91.0 389.0 68.0 548.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 16.6 71.0 12.4 100.0
 % within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 % of total 16.6 71.0 12.4 100.0
Note: N=548.
Source: LGS 2001.
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These data seem to indicate that, although citizen eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing 
local decision-making is generally low, in 32.4% of the municipalities with over 50,000 
inhabitants the inﬂuence is found to be large. Yet diﬀerences appear not only among 
municipalities of diﬀerent sizes, but also among municipalities with similar size. This 
suggests that in addition to size there are some other variables with a systematic eﬀect 
on citizens’ level of inﬂuence on decision-making in municipalities.
In addition to having the highest average municipality size, Poland also has the 
largest share of municipalities in which citizen participation was reported to have oc-
curred at least once during the year 2000. According to table 4.7, the most preferred 
forms of citizen participation were civil society proposals and meetings between local 
oﬃcials and citizens. This general trend remains valid for municipalities of all sizes. The 
data show that the larger a municipality, the more opportunities it provides for civil 
society proposals and written requests. For instance, the share of municipalities with a 
population below 5,000 inhabitants, where civil society proposals were introduced at 
least once in the year 2000, amounts to 49.0%. Compared to this, in municipalities 
with a population between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, civil society proposals were 
introduced at least once in 55.0% of the cases, while in large municipalities this share 
reached 62.7%. In the case of the second most preferred form of participation, i.e., 
requests for meetings between local oﬃcials and citizens, the trend is similar.
Although public demonstrations were reported in fewer than 10% of small and 15% 
of medium-size municipalities, there was at least one public demonstration in almost 
41.2% of large municipalities. A large increase can also be observed in the case of petition 
writing and challenging local government decisions at court or a higher authority.
The independence of local authorities in executing public tasks assigned to them 
is guaranteed by the Constitution. Municipalities need to execute public tasks of local 
importance. In accordance with the Local Government Act, the tasks consist of those 
aimed at satisfying the collective needs of the community as well as commissioned tasks. 
Both categories include mandatory and optional public tasks. 
Table 4.7
Share of Municipalities in Which Citizen Participation Occurred 
at Least Once (Poland) [%]
Municipality size
0–4,999 5,000–49,999 Over 50,000
Public demonstrations 9.1 14.7 41.1
Petitions 24.5 29.0 43.1
Requests for meetings 50.0 50.1 69.0
Challenges to decisions 34.5 40.4 60.4
Civil society proposals 49.0 55.0 62.7
Note: N=570.
Source: LGS 2001.
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Municipalities have autonomy in deciding over the method of implementation, 
provided that their decision is in compliance with the law. To implement commissioned 
projects, municipalities are provided with earmarked grants from the state. According to 
Aldona Okraszewska and Jacek Kwiatkowski (Soós et al. 2002, 197), in 2000 the share 
of earmarked grants for Polish municipalities was 13.7% of the total income. This share 
is considerably lower than that of the own income of municipalities (52.5%). As a result, 
we can say that the share of own income in the case of Polish municipalities is relatively 
high compared to Hungarian ones. However, this varies with the size of municipalities. 
According to the responses in the LGS (table 4.8), the budget of 60.31% of munici-
palities came from a given form of government grants. Municipalities with a population 
below 5,000 inhabitants represent 23.6% of the total municipalities with over 50% of 
revenues coming from government transfers. The budgets of 11.6% of small munici-
palities derived from 30% to 50% of revenues from central transfers, and only 13.5% 
of municipalities claimed to have budget dependence below 30%. 
Table 4.8
Revenue Rigidity by Municipality Size in Poland
Municipality size Total
Own revenue 
of municipalities
0 –4,999 5,000– 
49,999
Over 
50,000
Below 30% Count 32.0 73.0 7.0 112.0
 % within own revenue of municipalities 28.6 65.2 6.3 100.0
 % within municipality size 32.7 18.3 10.4 19.9
 % of total 5.7 12.9 1.2 19.9
Between 
30% and 50%
Count 42.0 133.0 29.0 204.0
 % within own revenue of municipalities 20.6 65.2 14.2 100.0
 % within municipality size 42.9 33.3 43.3 36.2
 % of Total 7.4 23.6 5.1 36.2
Over 50% Count 24.0 193.0 31.0 248.0
 % within own revenue of municipality 9.7 77.8 12.5 100.0
 % within municipality size 24.5 48.4 46.3 44.0
 % of total 4.3 34.2 5.5 44.0
Total Count 98.0 399.0 67.0 564.0
 % within own revenue of municipality 17.4 70.7 11.9 100.0
 % within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 % of total 17.4 70.7 11.9 100.0
Note: N=564.
Source: LGS 2001.
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In the case of municipalities with a population of between 5,000 and 49,999 in-
habitants, 55.8% reported their dependence on government transfers to be over 50%, 
which represents 72.9% of all municipalities with such high dependence. A dependence 
rate between 30% and 50% was reported by 23.2% of municipalities with a popula-
tion between 5,000 and 49,999 inhabitants, which accounts for 82.3% of all sizes of 
municipalities with this dependence rate. 
Large municipalities (above 50,000 inhabitants) also show considerable dependence, 
as 53.5% of these municipalities reported that more than 50% of their budgets came 
from government transfers. Of the large municipalities 25.6% have between 30% and 
50% of their budget originating from government transfers, and 20.9% have less than 
30% from transfers. 
Based on the above, we can conclude that in the case of Poland municipality size 
does have an eﬀect on the level of citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters. But 
the direct relationship is very weak and is attributable to a large extent to the speciﬁc 
features of local policy resulting from the economies of scale that local administrative 
units confront. Concerning revenue rigidity, the data show no strong relationship be-
tween municipality size and rigidity level.
5.3 Romania
The Romanian data show a correlation between municipality size and citizens’ eﬀective-
ness of .285 and this is also signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. This indicates a moderately strong, 
direct relationship between municipality size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing 
local matters. The correlation and signiﬁcance results are reported below. 
In the case of Romania, too, the low score of R square indicates that municipality 
size is not a strong predictor, and just as in the case of Poland, it explains only about 
8% of the total variation in citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters. 
In Romania (see table 4.9) 67.1% of all respondents consider that citizens have 
only very little, small or slightly small inﬂuence on local decision-making. Of these 
respondents, 41.6% are from municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabitants, 
23.6% from municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, and 2.0% 
from municipalities with a population over 50,000.
Only 14.2% of all respondents consider that citizens have a big inﬂuence over lo-
cal decision-making, of which only 4.4% come from municipalities with fewer than 
5,000 inhabitants, 7.3% from municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, 
and 2.4% from municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants. As regards the “neither 
small nor large inﬂuence” response, which constitutes 14.2% of the total, 4.4% fall in 
the category of municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, 7.3% in the 5,000 to 
49,999 category, and 2.9% in the over 49,999 category. 
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Figure 4.3
Romania: Model Summary, ANOVA, and Coeﬃcients
Model summaryb
Model R R square Adjusted R square Standard error of the estimate
1 0.285a 0.081 0.079 1.2763
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness to inﬂuence local matters.
ANOVAb
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
1 Regression 64.669 1 64.669 39.699 0.000a
Residual 729.784 448 1.629
Total 794.453 449
a. Predictors: (constant), log population size.
b. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters.
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized 
coefficients
t Significance
Model B Standard error Beta
1 (Constant) –0.267 0.469 –0.569 0.569
Log pop size 0.227 0.054 0.285 6.301 0.000
a. Dependent variable: citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters.
These results show that citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local decision-making is 
limited in municipalities of all sizes. Nevertheless, there is a clear diﬀerentiation among 
municipalities of diﬀerent sizes. According to the answers of the chief administrative 
oﬃcers, in the case of 76.0% of municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabit-
ants, citizens have only a small inﬂuence over local decision-making. In 60.9% of the 
municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, citizens’ eﬀectiveness is considered 
to be small. Where the population is over 50,000, the share of citizens with a small 
inﬂuence over local matters is only 30.0%.
Participation in municipalities with a population below 5,000 is rather small. The 
most frequent form of participation, i.e., requests for meetings between local oﬃcials 
and citizens, was reported to have occurred in fewer than 18% of municipalities. Among 
the other forms of participation only petition writing and civil society proposals reached 
over 10%. Public demonstrations were reported in 6.8% of the municipalities and chal-
lenges to government decisions in only 3.4%. 
In municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 49,999, the share of those 
in which some form of citizen participation occurred increases compared to the score 
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Table 4.9
Citizen Eﬀectiveness in Inﬂuencing Local Decision-making in Romania
(by Size of Municipality) 
Municipality size Total
Citizens’ effectiveness 0–4,999 5,000 
–49,999
Over 
50,000
Small influence Count 187.0 106.0 9.0 302.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 61.9 35.1 3,0 100.0
 % within municipality size 76.0 60.9 30.0 67,1
 % of total 41.6 23.6 2,0 67,1
Neither small 
nor big influence
Count 39.0 35.0 10.0 84.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 46.4 41,7 11,9 100.0
 % within municipality size 15.9 7,8 33,3 18,7
 % of total 8.7 19.5 2,2 18,7
Big influence Count 20.0 33.0 11.0 64.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 31,3 51,6 17,2 100.0
 % within municipality size 8,1 19,0 36,7 14,2
 % of total 4,4 7,3 2,4 14,2
Total Count 246.0 174.0 30.0 450.0
 % within citizens’ effectiveness 54,7 38,7 6,7 100.0
 % within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 % of total 54,7 38,70 6,7 100.0
Note: N=450.
Source: LGS 2001.
for small municipalities. In this category the most frequent form of participation was, 
again, requests for meetings between local oﬃcials and citizens, occurring in 30% of 
municipalities. Petition writing and civil society proposal writing were reported to 
have happened at least once in the year 2000 in 14.0% and 26.0% of municipalities, 
respectively. Measures taken to challenge local government decisions in court or at a 
higher authority more than doubled in terms of the number of municipalities in which 
they occurred, thus reaching a share of 9.0%.
The largest share of municipalities in which citizens’ participation occurred at least 
once is that of units with a population over 50,000 inhabitants. The increase in the 
share of municipalities in which civil society proposal writing was used is substantial 
compared to smaller-size municipalities. The same is the case for formal requests for 
meetings between local oﬃcials and citizens, which occurred in more than twice as many 
large municipalities as in middle-size ones. All other forms of political participation were 
reported to have occurred at least once in around 25% of large municipalities.
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The decentralization of local governments in Romania is established by the Local 
Public Administration Act. However, ﬁnancial decentralization and autonomy still re-
main limited. Municipalities are assigned certain mandatory tasks in all ﬁelds of public 
action by the central government and ministries. The autonomy to implement these is to 
some extent constrained by quantitative and/or qualitative regulations. The mandatory 
tasks imply that certain compulsory expenditures are imposed on municipalities. Some of 
these expenditures need to be covered from equalization grants and earmarked revenues 
provided by the state, which constrain municipalities’ ﬁscal autonomy. What is consid-
ered to be a similarly important problem lies in the fact that additional funding is not 
always ensured when new compulsory expenditures are imposed on municipalities.
From the responses of local oﬃcials we learn that in Romania 46.6% of all mu-
nicipalities obtain over 50% of their revenues from government transfers, with 13.2% 
receiving from 30% to 50%, and 40.2% receiving less than 30% from transfers.
If we contrast this data to the three categories of municipality size, we ﬁnd that 
municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants make up 82.5% of all municipalities 
with more than 50% of their revenues coming from government transfers, a share which 
accounts for 53.8% of all small municipalities (table 4.11). The share of medium-size 
municipalities with over 50% dependence rate on government transfers is 29.1%, and 
that of large municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants is even less, amounting to 
20.8%. Of these, 66.7% have government transfers amounting to less than 30%, while for 
middle-size municipalities the share is 51.3% and for small municipalities it is 35.6%. 
The  above table shows that in the case of Romania there is a relationship between 
the population size of municipalities and the level of citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing 
local matters. Peculiar to the Romanian case is the relationship between municipality 
size and revenue rigidity, as there is a mismatch between the most dense municipality 
size cluster and the lowest level of transfer dependence. 
Table 4.10
Share of Municipalities in Which Citizen Participation Occurred 
at Least Once (Romania) [%]
Municipality size
0–4,999 5,000–49,999 Over 50,000
Public demonstrations 6.8 8.5 23.5
Petitions 11.5 14.0 26.5
Requests for meetings 17.6 30.0 30.6
Challenges to decisions 3.4 9.0 32.4
Civil society proposals 11.5 26.0 76.5
Note: N=557.
Source: LGS 2001.
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Table 4.11
Revenue Rigidity by Municipality Size in Romania
Municipality size Total
Own revenue 
of municipalities
0 –4,999 5,000– 
49,999
over 
50,000
Below 30% Count 94.0 26.0 1.0 121.0
 % within own revenue of municipalities 77.7 21.5 0.8 100.0
 % within municipality size 29.4 13.2 2.9 22.0
 % of total 17.1 4.7 0.2 22.0
Between 
30% and 50%
Count 76.0 30.0 6.0 112.0
 % within own revenue of municipalities 37.9 26.8 5.4 100.0
 % within municipality size 23.8 15.2 17.6 20.3
 % of Total 13.8 5.4 1.1 20.3
Over 50% Count 150.0 141.0 27.0 318.0
 % within own revenue of municipality 47.2 44.3 8.5 100.0
 % within municipality size 46.9 71.6 79.4 57.7
 % of total 27.2 25.6 4.9 57.5
Total Count 320.0 197.0 34.0 551.0
 % within own revenue of municipality 58.1 35.8 6.2 100.0
 % within municipality size 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 % of total 58.1 35.8 6.2 100.0
Note: N=551.
Source: LGS 2001.
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Having discussed how the variables perform in each of the three countries separately, 
we turn now to a comparative analysis of the ﬁndings. This is relevant to highlighting 
the diﬀerences and similarities among the cases. 
6.1 Citizen Effectiveness
According to the responses of the CAOs, the share of citizens with only a small inﬂuence 
on local decision-making is three times larger than the share having a big inﬂuence in 
all three countries under study (table 4.12). In Hungary, 67.1% have a small inﬂuence, 
similar to Romania, and 50.9% in Poland. The category of respondents with neither a 
small nor a big inﬂuence represents 28.6% in Poland, 18.7% in Romania, and 17.8% in 
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Hungary. Those having a big inﬂuence on local decision-making in Hungary represent 
15.1%, in Poland 20.9%, and in Romania 14.2%. 
In terms of municipality size, citizen eﬀectiveness in Hungary is low in over 77.6% 
of the municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. This rate is 65.9% in Poland 
and 76.0% in Romania. High citizen eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local decision-making 
was registered in only 11.4% of Hungarian municipalities, 11.0% of Polish, and 8.1% of 
Romanian. The level of citizens’ eﬀectiveness is almost the same in all three countries.
For municipalities with a population of 5,000 to 49,999, the share with citizens 
having a small inﬂuence is 52.5% in Hungary, 51.9% in Poland, and 60.9% in Roma-
nia. The results for the “big inﬂuence” category are again almost identical in all three 
countries (20.3% in Hungary, 20.6% in Poland, and 19.0% in Romania).
In large municipalities, the share of low citizen eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local 
matters is 44.4% in Hungary, 25.0% in Poland, and 30.0% in Romania. Nevertheless, 
the diﬀerences among those with high citizen eﬀectiveness are substantial. Compared to 
19.6% of large Hungarian municipalities in which respondents considered that citizens 
had a big inﬂuence, the rate in Poland was 32.4% and in Romania 36.7%. 
In Romania the main diﬀerences in terms of citizen eﬀectiveness are between 
municipalities with a population below 5,000 and above 50,000. The largest variance 
was registered among municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. In contrast, in 
Poland we have a similarly large variance both among municipalities of below 5,000 
inhabitants and those with between 5,000 to 49,999 inhabitants. 
From the above we can conclude that the levels of citizen eﬀectiveness in the three 
countries under study show great similarities. While in Hungary and Romania the 
scores are almost identical, Poland, as expected, has a slightly higher level of citizen 
eﬀectiveness. This is in line with Dahl’s claim that the smaller a municipality the more 
trivial or ineﬀective participation becomes. As we noted in section 4.1, Hungary and 
Romania have very small municipalities on average, while Poland’s average municipality 
size is almost double. 
Table 4.12
Citizen Eﬀectiveness in Inﬂuencing Local Decision-making 
in All Three Countries [%]
Hungary
N=337
Poland
N=548
Romania
N=450
Small influence 67.1 50.9 67.1
Neither small nor big 17.8 28.6 18.7
Big influence 15.1 20.9 14.2
Source: LGS 2001.
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6.2 Expenditure Rigidity
The transfer systems in the three countries under study are somewhat diﬀerent, but 
earmarked transfers represent an important share of all transfers in each country. In 
terms of expenditure rigidity, we have seen that government transfers are an important 
source of revenue for municipalities in all three countries. In table 4.13, the level of 
expenditure rigidity for all three countries is compared. 
According to the data, there is a strong similarity between the Hungarian and Polish 
cases. For instance, in around 40% of all municipalities in both countries government 
transfers constituted over 50% of the total revenues of municipalities. In contrast, in 
Romania the share of municipalities with similarly high levels of government transfers 
was 57.7%. In the case of only about 20% of Romanian municipalities, the share of 
government transfers was between 30% and 50%, or below 30%. Compared to this, 
there was a 30% to 50% share of transfers in 27.8% of Hungarian municipalities and 
36.2% of Polish municipalities, while in 32.2% of Hungarian municipalities and 19.9% 
of Polish municipalities the share of government transfers was below 30%.
In the case of Hungarian and Polish municipalities, over 50% of transfer dependence 
is lower than in the case of Romanian municipalities. Also, the signiﬁcant gap in the 
level of economic development between the ﬁrst two countries and Romania, combined 
with the bureaucratic tradition in these countries, further emphasizes this diﬀerence. 
In Romania, for instance, there are even regulations specifying the number of persons 
a municipality can employ. Another important issue is the diﬀerences in expenditure 
rigidity, which need to be taken into consideration when dealing with the accounting 
standards in each country. Furthermore, the number of extremely small municipalities 
is large in Hungary and Romania (see table 4.1), and these communities are not self-
sustainable in ﬁscal terms when it comes to supporting ﬁxed costs such as local schools, 
public institutions and road maintenance. 
When comparing the expenditure rigidity of municipalities of diﬀerent sizes in 
the three countries, we ﬁnd that in the small municipalities with fewer than 5,000 
Table 4.13
Ratio of Share of Government Transfers to the Total Number of Municipalities
Hungary Poland Romania
Below 30% 32.2 19.9 22.0
Between 30 and 50% 27.8 36.2 20.3
Over 50% 40.0 44.0 57.7
Total 100.0 100.0% 100.0
Source: LGS 2001.
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inhabitants there is an important variance among countries (see table 1.14). In Poland 
only 24.5% of small municipalities have over 50% of their revenues originating from 
government transfers, while in Hungary this share is 35% and in Romania 46.9%. 
The lowest level of rigidity is found in Hungary, where in 37.4% of municipalities the 
transfers are below 30%. In Poland, of all municipalities with under 5,000 inhabitants, 
the largest share has budgets in which 30% to 50% of revenues comes from transfers. 
These results are reﬂected again in the overall municipality population size structure 
in Hungary and Poland. Thus, for both countries the lowest level of revenue rigidity 
corresponds to the category with the largest number of municipalities. This is not true 
for the case of Romania. 
Table 4.15 presents the share of government transfers within the total budget rev-
enues of municipalities with a population of 5,000–49,999. The pattern is similar to that 
of small municipalities with the exception of Hungary. Romania has the largest rate of 
municipalities with over 50% dependence on transfers (71.6%), while in Hungary the 
rate is 53.8% and in Poland 48.4%. For all three countries the share of municipalities 
with over 50% of their total revenues coming from government transfers is around 20% 
more compared to small municipalities.
In the case of large municipalities (more than 50,000 inhabitants), however, the 
previous trend changes. In Poland, the share of large municipalities with over 50% of 
Table 4.14
Share of Government Transfers to Small Municipalities 
Municipalities with 0–4,999 inhabitants
Hungary Poland Romania
Below 30% 37.4 32.7 29.4
Between 30% and 50% 27.6 42.9 23.8
Over 50% 35.0 24.5 46.9
Source: LGS 2001.
Table 4.15
Share of Government Transfers to Medium-size Municipalities 
Municipalities with 5,000–49,999 inhabitants
Hungary Poland Romania
Below 30% 17.7 18.3 13.2
Between 30% and 50% 28.5 33.3 15.2
Over 50% 53.8 48.4 71.6
Source: LGS 2001.
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Table 4.16
Share of Government Transfers to Large Municipalities 
Municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants
Hungary Poland Romania
Below 30% 4.8 10.4 2.9
Between 30 and 50% 28.6 43.3 17.6
Over 50% 66.7 46.3 79.4
Source: LGS 2001.
their revenues coming from government transfers remains as high as 46.3%. In Hungary 
and Romania, there is an increase in the share compared to middle-size municipalities 
(see table 4.16). 
We may conclude from the above that expenditure rigidity varies according to 
the size of municipalities in all three countries. Generally speaking, all municipalities 
regardless of population size are characterized by high expenditure rigidity. But a dif-
ference in the pattern is apparent in Romania, on the one hand, compared to Hungary 
and Poland on the other. 
Since expenditure rigidity has been used to measure the system capacity of munici-
palities, the ﬁndings suggest that municipalities in general have a low level of system 
capacity to respond to their communities’ expectations and needs. Nevertheless, dif-
ferences in rigidity rates among countries and municipalities do exist, as a reﬂection 
of local characteristics such as the level of development and the structure of economic 
activity. 
6.3 Citizen Participation
Having seen how political participation varies according to the size of municipality in 
the individual countries, we now look at the variance in diﬀerent types of participation 
as related to municipality size for all three countries. 
In the category of municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, participation 
is by far the highest in Poland (table 4.17). In terms of requests for meetings between 
local oﬃcials and citizens, 50% of small municipalities in Poland, 22.2% of in Hungary, 
and 17.6% Romania registered this form of participation. The results are similar for civil 
society proposals. In Poland, the rate of municipalities with at least one written proposal 
introduced by a civil society organization is more than four times larger than the rate 
in Romania. This is partly explained by the small number of civil society organizations 
in Romanian municipalities of this size.
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The third most common type of participation in municipalities with a population 
below 5,000 is petition writing. Again, this activity was undertaken twice as many times 
in Polish municipalities as in Hungarian and Romanian ones. The two least preferred 
types of participation, public demonstrations and challenging local government deci-
sions, also show the highest rate in Polish municipalities.
According to the ﬁndings presented in table 4.18, participation rates in medium-size 
municipalities (population of 5,000–49,999) become more balanced between Hungary 
and Poland. Requesting meetings with local oﬃcials and making civil society proposals 
remain the two most frequent types of political participation. Oﬃcials from over 82% 
of Hungarian municipalities reported at least one case in which a civil society proposal 
was submitted. Given that some form of participation was registered in only about 
51% of all Hungarian municipalities, the medium-size municipalities seem to have a 
considerably active civil society. 
Romania shows the lowest rates of participation, except in the cases of challeng-
ing local government decisions in court or at a higher authority and holding public 
demonstrations.
In large municipalities (with over 50,000 inhabitants), the rate of political par-
ticipation increases. Hungary has the highest levels of all forms of participation except 
challenging local government decisions, where Romania surpasses it. Civil society pro-
posals and requests for meetings remain the two preferred forms of citizen participation. 
The frequency of occurrence of civil society proposals is as high as 90% in Hungary, 
76.5% in Romania, and 62.7% in Poland (see table 4.19). 
The frequency of the other types of citizen participation also increased signiﬁcantly 
in large municipalities compared to small and medium-size ones. Participation rates in 
large municipalities in Romania show a considerable growth, in most cases reaching 
the levels of those in Hungary and Poland.
In conclusion, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the three countries in terms 
of frequency of citizen participation based on the size of municipalities. However, the 
Table 4.17
Citizen Participation in Local Politics by Type (Small Municipalities)
Type of political participation Municipalities with 0–4,999 inhabitants
Hungary Poland Romania
Public demonstrations 2.3 9.0 6.8
Petitions 10.5 24.5 11.5
Requests for meetings 22.2 50.0 17.6
Challenges to local government decisions 3.9 34.5 3.4
Civil society proposals 33.7 49.0 11.5
Source: LGS 2001.
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rank ordering of the diﬀerent types of participation remains constant across diﬀerent 
sized municipalities and countries. The results seem to suggest that, although political 
participation is rather limited, the larger the municipality the higher the citizen partici-
pation rates. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the main data source comes from 
chief administrative oﬃcials, and we should be cautious about drawing conclusions 
regarding citizens’ participation on this basis.
7. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The general ﬁndings from our calculations based on LGS data indicate that although 
the citizen eﬀectiveness rate as a whole is rather low in all three countries, there is a 
systematic relationship between municipality size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing 
local matters. The correlation tests for the three countries indicate that there is a weak 
Table 4.18
Citizen Participation in Local Politics by Type (Medium-size Municipalities)
Type of political participation Municipalities with 5,000–49,999 inhabitants
Hungary Poland Romania
Public demonstrations 7.3 14.7 8.5
Petitions 35.0 29.0 14.0
Requests for meetings 51.8 50.1 30.0
Challenges to local government decisions 13.1 40.4 9.0
Civil society proposals 82.5 55.0 26.0
Source: LGS 2001.
Table 4.19
Citizen Participation in Local Politics by Type (Large Municipalities)
Type of political participation Municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants
Hungary Poland Romania
Public demonstrations 40.9 41.1 23.5
Petitions 72.7 43.1 26.5
Requests for meetings 72.7 69.0 30.6
Challenges to local government decisions 27.3 60.4 32.4
Civil society proposals 90.9 62.7 76.5
Source: LGS 2001.
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but positive relation at a .01 signiﬁcance level between municipality size and citizens’ 
eﬀectiveness. Seen in this light, the municipality structure of the three countries in 
terms of population does seem to have an impact on the quality of local democracy in 
general. 
The strongest relationship was found in Hungary, with a correlation coeﬃcient 
of 0.262, and the weakest in Poland, with a coeﬃcient of 0.172. Romania stands in 
between the two with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.182. 
Although the correlation between municipality size and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in 
inﬂuencing local matters is weak and the explanatory power of the model is very limited, 
the low signiﬁcance level implies that r2 can not be attributed to sampling error. The 
model explains only 12% in Hungary, 8% in Poland, and 8% in Romania of the total 
variation in citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing local matters. These ﬁndings subscribe 
to the general ﬁndings of the earlier literature, i.e., that there is a weak but statistically 
signiﬁcant and positive correlation between citizens’ eﬀectiveness in inﬂuencing lo-
cal matters and municipality size, once citizens decide to participate. This occurs in a 
context in which the overall capacity of citizens to inﬂuence local matters is very low 
in municipalities of all sizes and in all three countries.
More surprising is the very low participation level in local political matters as re-
ported by chief administrative oﬃcials. In absolute terms, occurrences of all ﬁve types of 
participation included in the LGS are extremely limited. Interestingly enough, the two 
countries with the largest diﬀerences in terms of municipality size structure, Hungary 
and Poland, present the greatest similarities in terms of political participation rates. The 
biggest variation was in expenditure rigidity, where—although a strong national trend 
was found—no clear cross-country trend could be identiﬁed. 
The state of local democracy in the three countries seems to be rather weak in 
terms of system capacity to respond. A common ﬁnding for all three countries is that 
municipalities are highly dependent on central government transfers, and therefore there 
is not much incentive for citizens to participate. This also reduces the level of citizen 
eﬀectiveness. The general trend found for the three country cases is that the smaller 
the municipality, the higher its expenditure rigidity. Larger municipalities are more 
likely to have higher rates both of citizen participation and citizens’ eﬀectiveness in 
inﬂuencing local matters. As the hypothesis suggested, participation becomes minimal 
only in very large units, and the three countries under study do not have many very 
large units. 
In conclusion, it seems that the inﬂuence of citizens over local matters is very 
limited, because of the extremely low system capacity to respond to local needs and 
concerns. If this is the case, the improvement of the quality of local democracy will 
require enhancing the system’s capacity to respond to the requests of citizens. This in 
turn might produce an environment in which citizens’ participation could be more 
eﬀective and consistent.  
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The success of such an eﬀort also depends on the structure of the municipal system 
in these countries. By reducing the share of extremely small municipalities, in which 
the citizens’ eﬀectiveness is the lowest, we would also improve the opportunity to have 
a more vibrant and dynamic community life. Nevertheless, the implementation of any 
reform to reduce the number of administrative units could prove diﬃcult to achieve.  
NOTE
1 “Subjective political competence” was the main measure used to evaluate residents’ perceptions about 
their ability to inﬂuence local politics. 
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APPENDIX I
Reliability of the Citizen Effectiveness Scale
1. Hungary
R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S—S C A L E   (A L P H A)
Mean Standard deviation Cases
 1. DECIS08A 3.0593 1.6662 337.0
 2. DECIS08C 2.8012 1.5846 337.0
 3. DECIS08D 2.4154 1.8771 337.0
 4. DECIS08E 2.0208 1.4360 337.0
 5. DECIS08F 3.3086 1.6528 337.0
 Statistics for Scale Mean Variance Standard deviation  N of variables
13.6053 34.8646 5.9046 5
 
Item-total statistics
Scale mean 
if item deleted
Scale variance 
if item deleted
Corrected item
total correlation
Alpha 
if item deleted
DECIS08A 10.5460 23.4451 0.5357 0,7175
DECIS08C 10.8042 22.9080 0.6227 0,6876
DECIS08D 11.1899 22.8805 0.4712 0,7459
DECIS08E 11.5846 24.3031 0.6003 0,7001
DECIS08F 10.2967 24.6617 0.4551 0.7455
Reliability coefficients
N of cases N of items Alpha
337 5 0.7622
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2. Poland
R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S—S C A L E   (A L P H A)
Mean Standard deviation Cases
 1. DECIS08A 3.2099 1.5888 548.0
 2. DECIS08C 3.2974 1.5264 548.0
 3. DECIS08D 2.6241 1.8620 548.0
 4. DECIS08E 2.4781 1.5492 548.0
 5. DECIS08F 4.2755 1.5460 548.0
 Statistics for scale Mean Variance Standard deviation  N of variables
15.8850 31.9447 5.6520 5
 
Item-total statistics
Scale mean 
if item deleted
Scale variance 
if item deleted
Corrected item
total correlation
Alpha 
if item deleted
DECIS08A 12.6752 20.5707 0.6140 0.6471
DECIS08C 12.5876 20.8717 0.6269 0.6446
DECIS08D 13.2609 21.1146 0.4303 0.7243
DECIS08E 13.4069 21.2838 0.5779 0.6623
DECIS08F 11.6095 25.1050 0.2872 0.7639
Reliability coefficients
N of cases N of items Alpha
548 5 0.7369
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3. Romania
R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S—S C A L E   (A L P H A)
Mean Standard deviation Cases
1. DECIS08A 2.3933 1.7349 450.0
2. DECIS08C 2.3733 1.8016 450.0
3. DECIS08D 2.5333 1.9787 450.0
4. DECIS08E 2.1800 1.6755 450.0
5. DECIS08F 3.8489 2.0065 450.0
 Statistics for scale Mean Variance Standard deviation N of variables
13.3289 44.2346 6.6509 5
 
Item-total statistics
Scale mean 
if item deleted
Scale variance 
if item deleted
Corrected item
total correlation
Alpha 
if item deleted
DECIS08A 10.9356 30.5014 0.5596 0.7216
DECIS08A 10.9356 30.5014 0.5596 0.7216
DECIS08D 10.7956 29.2677 0.5162 0.7371
DECIS08E 11.1489 31.8642 0.5056 0.7393
DECIS08F   9.4800 29.4038 0.4965 0.7448
Reliability coefficients
N of cases N of items Alpha
450 5 0.7695
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APPENDIX II
Variable Description with Codes
Code Description
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
VOTE Voter turnout in last municipal elections, prior to 2001
CONTACT Direct contact with politicians and municipal officers
BROPA Broad organizational participation
Local collective action
ACTIO01a Number of public demonstrations
ACTIO02a Collection of citizens’ signatures
ACTIO02b Number of actions against the actions of local government
ACTIO03a Local civil society organization requests for meetings with local government on local 
policy issues
ACTIO04a Challenges to local government decisions by civil society organizations in a court of 
law or higher administrative authority
ACTIO05a Actions organized by political parties
ACTIO05b Actions organized by civil society organizations
ACTIO05c Actions organized by individual citizens
Local civil society
CIVIL01a Civil society organizations’ participation in decision-making
CIVIL01b Civil society organizations’ initiatives
CIVIL03 Local budget supported by civil society organizations
CIVIL04 Local government and civil society organizations’ contacts
CIVIL05 Civil society organization leaders that are municipal council office-holders
CIVIL06 Municipal council office-holders that are civil society organization leaders 
CIVIL07 Number of civil society organizations in the municipality
CIVIL08 Number of civil society organizations active in other municipalities
CIVIL09 Number of ethnic/racial minority civil society organizations active in the municipality
SYSTEM RESPONSIVENESS
DECIS06a Opportunity for citizen participation in local decision-making
DECIS06b Public hearings
DECIS06c Draft budget public
DECIS06d Proposed budget discussed with journalists
DECIS07e Negotiations with people affected by a policy decision
DECIS08a Influence by local entrepreneurs, firms‚ and business associations 
DECIS08c Influence by civil associations
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DECIS08d Influence by political parties
DECIS08e Influence by media
DECIS08f Influence by residents
INFO03 Public hearings and forums
INFO04 Local referendum
INFO05 Who initiated the referendum
INFO06 Municipal web site
INFO07 Municipality offering electronic information
POLCY01n Communication to citizens and media about activities of the municipal government
POLCY01p Citizens’ requests about national policies 
POLICY AUTONOMY & ARTICULATION
POLCY01a Council work schedule
POLCY01b Economic development plan
POLCY01c Local government investment plan
POLCY01d Public sanitation and environmental protection
POLCY01e Public education program
POLCY01f Sports program
POLCY01g Cultural program
POLCY01h Plan for financial supervision of local government
POLCY01i Reporting policies of chief administrative officials
POLCY01j Public safety and crime prevention
POLCY01k Health protection
POLCY01l Housing program
POLCY01m Mass transportation
POLCY01o Urban image
POLCY01q Public procurement regulation
FISCAL AUTONOMY
BUDGE05a Share of own revenue from total budget (BUDGE02–BUDGE05)
EXPENDITURE RIGIDITY
BUDGE04 Municipal debt to total expenditure
BUDGE03 Total expenditure
CONTROL VARIABLES
SIZE Size of municipality—number of legal residents with voting rights in local elections
AVESIZE Average size of municipality—number of legal residents with voting rights in local 
elections
BUDGE11 Project execution difficulty
SOCIO01 Number of settlements forming a municipality
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SOCIO03 Unemployment
SOCIO04a Social tensions due to income inequality
SOCIO04b Social tensions due to religious differences
SOCIO04c Social tensions due to political views
SOCIO04e Social tensions due to race/ethnicity
SOCIO04f Social tensions among parts of the municipality
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ABSTRACT
The following analysis explores the relationship between local representatives and 
citizens in Poland‚ Estonia, and Bulgaria examined from the point of view of the local 
representatives. We consider two main approaches: a citizen-oriented one emphasiz-
ing enhanced collaboration and consultation, and a rather classical, system-oriented 
approach entailing less input from citizens in government and more emphasis on rela-
tions in the inner administrative system. The two diﬀerent approaches result from the 
degree of openness that each region has acquired in its representation system since the 
fall of communism, and from the speed at which changes in roles and loyalties at the 
local level occurred. Our theoretical framework incorporates several approaches based 
on social capital, value orientations and context, and socialization inﬂuences. We ﬁrst 
review the conceptual issues involved and then use these concepts to assess the nature 
of the relationship between local representatives and citizens. The data for our analysis 
of the variables used to measure the concepts comes from the ILDGP project’s Local 
Representative Survey which focused on the activities, values, opinions‚ and demography 
of local councilors. The main ﬁndings of the research reveal a propensity of the local 
representatives towards a participatory approach in their relationship with citizens—an 
approach based on collaboration, consultation‚ and openness to citizens’ input in their 
activity as public representatives. We conclude from the analysis that social capital is 
not suﬃcient to explain the approach taken by local representatives to their relation-
ship with citizens, and that the input of variables like socialization, context‚ and value 
orientation contribute signiﬁcantly to an understanding of this issue.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The post-communist changes in Central and Eastern Europe have generated vigorous 
debates about why the various countries in the region have evolved diﬀerently. The ﬁrst 
temptation was to test western models and explanations, while adapting them to speciﬁc 
local conditions. At the same time, the idea of social capital‚ as elaborated in Putnam’s 
Making Democracy Work‚ was capturing interest as a promising concept. More recently, 
evaluations of the usefulness of this concept have ranged from overemphasizing it to 
considering it inadequate for the situation in Central and Eastern Europe (Mihaylova 
2003). Despite some unfulﬁlled expectations, the idea of social capital has proved to 
be useful in analyzing the emergence and evolution of civil society in Central and 
Eastern Europe. A higher degree of social capital is considered to be conducive to 
good governance, which in turn enhances certain components of social capital such as 
generalized trust (Uslaner 2003).1 We have thus considered it important to assess the 
level of social capital of local representatives and the positive inﬂuence that it may have 
on their relationship with citizens. 
This report looks at the style adopted by elected representatives at the local level in 
their relationship with citizens. Our framework distinguishes between two main styles 
or approaches: a citizen-oriented one with enhanced collaboration and consultation 
at the local level, and a rather classical system-oriented approach that involves less 
input from citizens and more dynamic relations at the inner administrative level. 
The development of a particular style is inﬂuenced by the degree of openness in the 
representation system acquired after the fall of the communism and the speed with which 
changes in the representatives’ roles and loyalties at the local level occurred. Neither 
of the two approaches, of course, is to be found in a pure form. In some situations a 
very citizen-oriented local representative may be compelled by circumstances to act in 
a system-oriented manner, while system-oriented local representatives might sometimes 
give the ﬂoor to citizens. 
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We expect that a collaborative and consultative approach towards citizens will be 
found among local representatives with higher levels of social capital who have been 
exposed to political socialization before holding the present public oﬃce, are stimulated 
by the local context  and are predisposed toward postmaterialist values. The hypothesis 
will be tested using data provided by the LRS survey2 of the ILDGP project, which 
focuses on the activities, values, opinions‚ and demographic characteristics of local 
councilors. The data comes from a randomly selected pool of municipalities whose local 
representatives have been asked to take part in the survey, from which the ﬁnal sample 
is self-selected and includes those local representatives who completed and mailed back 
the questionnaires on a voluntary basis. 
We begin with a brief exploration of approaches to local representation and 
the accountability of elected local representatives, and then investigate the speciﬁc 
administrative systems of the analyzed countries. After describing the distribution of 
local representatives according to their demographic characteristics, we explore the 
theoretical concepts underpinning our framework and their application within the 
analyzed units. Finally, we test successive models using a logistic regression method in 
order to investigate the combination of characteristics that citizen- and system-oriented 
local representatives rely on in their relationship with citizens.
2. LOCAL REPRESENTATION: CONTEXT AND APPROACHES
Theorists stress the importance of leadership style in the processes and performance of 
administrative systems, and we believe it is also a relevant factor in explaining the dynam-
ics of the relationship between local representatives and citizens. Thus, we address this 
issue of leadership style from the perspective of our interest in the diﬀerent approaches 
to local representation. We ﬁnd accountability—deﬁned as the extent to which people 
feel their behavior is going to be observed and evaluated by others, and that meaning-
ful rewards and punishments are contingent upon these evaluations (Chemers 1993, 
117)—to be an important component of local representatives’ conduct as local leaders. 
Besides the factors strongly related to leader accountability such as laws and regulations, 
speciﬁc evaluation systems‚ and mechanisms of social control, the individual orientations 
of local representatives in their relations with citizens are also relevant to their conduct 
as local leaders. Wherever provisions for citizen participation are assigned by law within 
the local decision-making process, local representatives have speciﬁc tools to develop a 
collaborative approach. Moreover, they are aware that electors have both the right and 
the mechanisms to regularly evaluate their performance. Based on the extent to which 
local representatives have met the electors’ initial expectations, there is always a chance 
that they will lose electoral support. Whether the electors actually do reevaluate their local 
leaders needs to be investigated further, as the focus of this paper is on the conduct of local 
representatives and its determinants, not on the citizens’ social and electoral behavior. 
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What are the incentives for elected local leaders to take a citizen-oriented approach 
to governance? Rather than looking at individual qualities and classical explanations 
based on demographic characteristics, this report explores the impact of factors such 
as social capital (assessed through levels of trust, networks‚ and participation), value 
orientation, context inﬂuences‚ and socialization. We have used these factors in exam-
ining the actual practices of the local administrations in order to ﬁnd the combination 
of factors that better predicts the likelihood of local representatives upholding either a 
citizen- or a system-oriented approach while acting as elected local leaders in Bulgaria, 
Poland‚ and Estonia. 
Our study is focused on the local representatives and the approach they choose to 
take in their relationship with citizens at the local level, but this should not be interpreted 
as disregarding the perspective of the citizens. The rationale for taking this approach 
is based on previous ﬁndings (Verba, Schlozman‚ and Brady 1995, 390) that from the 
wide range of people having the potential to get involved in social and political life, 
those who are already mobilized (active in civil society) will be more likely to take ad-
vantage of opportunities to participate. In the light of such ﬁndings, the eﬀorts of local 
representatives to stimulate and encourage citizen participation could prove to be very 
important to the success of local democracy in Southeastern Europe. Besides acting as 
an incentive for extended civic engagement, an approach of local representatives that 
encourages citizen participation will enhance or even supplement the legally provided 
mechanisms of consultation between local representatives and citizens. Another principle 
underlying our choice of focus is that local representatives are researched as common 
citizens. Their activities, values, opinions‚ and demographic characteristics are linked 
with the approach they take towards their relationship with citizens in the same way 
that research on the activities, values, opinions‚ and demography of regular citizens links 
such ﬁndings to their approach towards the political system. 
Societal changes that have occurred in the context of the latest economic develop-
ments have in turn brought changes at the individual level and have shaped citizens’ 
relationship with the political system. As Inglehart has noted, “In the long run, indus-
trialized societies of both East and West must cope with long-term changes that are 
making their publics less amenable to doing as they are told and more adept at telling 
their governments what to do” (1999, 251). This approach, along with the extended 
possibilities of civic participation that emerged after the fall of the communism, justiﬁes 
the inclusion in our explanatory model of a value orientation dimension‚ in addition to 
the trust and participation components of social capital. The value dimension in this 
paper consists of analyzing orientations to individual freedom, including the right to 
have a word in the decision-making process as opposed to an overemphasis on the role 
of the state in decision-making. Values in this case are not interpreted to mean personal 
qualities (such as trust, reliability‚ or openness).
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The discussion in western countries of postmaterialist and postmodern values is 
applicable to the present research to a certain extent. A limitation, of course, is the 
diﬀerence in the emergence and extent of such social changes in the analyzed region 
compared to the advanced industrialized democracies. Also, research into the eﬀects 
and inﬂuences of this value orientation has not yet been carried out in the countries 
analyzed here. Nevertheless, we have chosen to consider this dimension because of the 
existing postmaterialist orientations among the surveyed local representatives that could 
have an inﬂuence on their approach. It is of interest that some local representatives be-
lieve maintaining order in the country to be more important than giving people more 
say in government decision-making, or that some see solving local problems as more 
important than achieving national goals. Such orientations could impact signiﬁcantly 
on the approach local representatives choose to take in their relationship with citizens, 
as the analyzed data will show.
Other dimensions included in our model are the socialization of local representa-
tives and contextual inﬂuences. The literature on socialization ranges in subject matter 
from the transfer of ideological orientations from parents to children (Westholm, Niemi 
1992), to the impact of socio-economic status during childhood on an individual’s value 
orientations as an adult (Inglehart 1990; Conway 1991). In investigating the approach 
local representatives take towards their relationship with citizens, we use “political sociali-
zation” to refer to experiences such as the family tradition of holding public oﬃce and 
also to having a personal history of being reelected to public oﬃce in the years following 
the fall of  communism (where the available data sets cover the relevant years).
The relationship between local representatives and citizens is also shaped by con-
textual inﬂuences reﬂected in the extent of community participation and how much 
pressure it exerts on local government. Recent studies consider the contextual factor 
to be very important for expanding social capital in communities. Sandu (2003) has 
suggested that in Central and Eastern Europe, context should be understood as refer-
ring not only to the region or country, but also to the type of community. The present 
research takes into consideration contextual inﬂuences as they were perceived by the 
local representatives included in the surveys, as an indicator of how much they felt that 
the social context compelled them to take an open and collaborative approach towards 
their constituency. 
2.1 Local Administrative Systems 
Following the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, several 
challenges had to be faced simultaneously by the countries in the region. In addition 
to the creation of a minimal legal framework for the new regime, decisions had to be 
made on how best to address the population’s immediate social, political‚ and civil needs 
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(Przeworski 1995, 36). Several common features have marked the pathway undertaken 
by each country throughout the region. Institutional incapacity and economic diﬃcul-
ties are just two of the common challenges faced by the transitional countries. Each 
country has also had to address speciﬁc problems related to the particular nature of the 
previous regime.
In keeping with the methodological approach of analyzing dissimilar systems in an 
attempt to ﬁnd similar elements, we have selected the countries of Estonia, Poland‚ and 
Bulgaria for our study. The three countries have diﬀerent local government systems that 
will be analyzed further in this section, but their evolution following the regime change 
has several similarities that are also taken into account. Besides oﬀering a comparative 
analysis of the local government systems and of the legal framework for local govern-
ment in each country, this section will also provide some insights into the evolution of 
political rights and civil liberties, based on the Freedom House ratings and on the latest 
Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program. 
The local government systems in the three countries are distinguished by the number 
of levels they possess: one level in Estonia, two in Bulgaria‚ and three in Poland. The 
Estonian3 political system was established in the 1992 Constitution, which stated that 
local issues should be managed and resolved by local authorities without involvement 
from the central government.  Public administration is authorized to act only on a legal 
basis, but it is argued that Estonia’s public law and administration neglect organizational 
democracy and participation. There are increasing regional imbalances and gaps between 
the living standards of the rural and urban areas, providing evidence that the Estonian 
central authorities are not fully able to fulﬁll their tasks. Local authorities often lack 
opportunities to eﬀectively represent the interests of their constituents, even though 
the single-level system of local government was introduced to bring the authorities as 
close to the people as possible and to guarantee the democratic involvement of citizens 
within society (Haav 2000, 11).   
The local government system has one level with two types of units: towns (linn) and 
rural municipalities (vald). There also exists a higher unit—the county (maakond)—
which is part of the central government. The executive bodies of local government in 
Estonia, all elected for three-year terms, are the council, elected by the citizens, and the 
mayor, elected by the council, or the head of a rural municipality also elected by the 
council. As established by the Constitution, local authorities manage and independently 
resolve all local issues. Lately, eﬀorts have been made to reduce and consolidate the overall 
number of local authorities. Since most Estonian municipalities have between 1,000 
and 3,000 residents, amalgamating them into a number of larger local governments 
would improve each authority’s administrative and ﬁnancial capacities. 
Local representatives themselves have opposed such reform proposals due to certain 
immediate negative consequences at the local level (Made 2001). Considering that 
in most areas the municipal and state agencies are the biggest employers, one of the 
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arguments is that unemployment will grow when the local bureaucracy no longer provides 
jobs in the local government system. Besides this, the relationship with the population 
would suﬀer because of the increased distance between the local center and the periphery. 
Rural inhabitants would be penalized by having to use poor transportation systems to 
travel longer distances to the new administrative center. Even if larger administrative 
units could organize the redistribution of resources from richer to poorer units, the richer 
municipalities have regarded this as an argument against the reforms. The proposed 
governmental reform plan was to eliminate up to two-thirds of the administrative units, 
but the results of the 2001 presidential elections have caused a postponement of the 
announced reforms because the rural politicians’ candidate won the elections.
The local government system in Bulgaria4 has two levels: municipalities (obshtini) 
and regions (oblasts). The municipalities comprise mayoralties or settlements, and their 
decision-making authority is highly restricted. The executive branch is the mayor, 
elected by the settlements for a four-year term. Regional governors appointed by the 
Council of Ministers govern the regions, while local government units have very little 
decision-making authority. Along with the fact that the governors are appointed, this 
lack of power at the local level is likely to inﬂuence the kind of relationship that local 
representatives can develop with the citizens in their constituency. Most of the changes 
in local administration took eﬀect under the 1991 Constitution, which established a 
decentralized power structure and ensures the possibility of local referendums to be 
held on the basis of universal, equal‚ and direct suﬀrage by secret ballot (Article 10), 
and also under the Law on Local Self-Government and Public Administration. The 
latest changes occurred with the Law on Administration of 1998 and the Law on Civil 
Service of 1999. Even if there are regulations concerning the time frames in which state 
administration (local or central) should respond to citizens’ requests, in practice there 
still are problems with meeting the legal provisions. Besides the positive changes that 
the two laws have brought, there are some provisions that impinge on bureaucratic 
procedures. One of these concerns the duties of civil servants, which are deﬁned in 
terms of norms and regulations that are to be respected, including the need to respect 
the hierarchy (Georgiev 1999).
The local government system in Poland5 is the most elaborate of the three countries. 
The one-level system established by the Municipal Act in 1990 was changed in 1999 
to a three-level local government system. The levels are: municipalities (gminas), which 
have a directly-elected municipal council that in turn elects both the municipal board 
and the mayor; a county level  (powiat), which has a similar structure with a directly 
elected council for a four-year term that elects both the county board and the head of 
the county; and the highest local government level, the voivodship, which includes 
representatives of the central government and is represented by the regional councils 
elected by the citizens and the regional board elected by the council. 
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Although the administrative reform in Poland increased the distance between the 
authorities and the general population, there has been no opposition or fear that negative 
impacts would follow the reform. Article 170 of the Constitution states the following: 
“Members of a self-governing community may decide, by means of a referendum, matters 
concerning their community, including the dismissal of an organ of local self-government 
established by direct election.” This clause clearly describes the power citizens have in 
dealing with local governments, by specifying that they may decide by referendum to 
dismiss the locally elected self-government. Local government reform in Poland is seen 
as one of the few unquestionable successes of the Polish transition. According to the 
amended Constitution (1992), local self-rule is the basic organizational form of public 
life in the community (Howard 1999, 683).
Some common features of the local government systems in the three countries 
include the variable number of council members according to the size of locality, and 
the existence of the councils as representative bodies of local government units, although 
the term for which they are elected is shorter in Estonia (three years) compared to 
Poland and Bulgaria (four years). For a comparative overview of the three administrative 
systems see appendix 1. 
The three countries have evolved in similar ways, as is pointed out by the Freedom 
House6 ratings of political rights and civil liberties, shown in table 5.1 below. The 
Freedom House country ratings range from 1 to 7. Countries rated from 1 to 2.5 are 
considered free, from 2.5 to 5.5 partly free‚ and from 5.5 to 7 not free. The evolution 
Table 5.1 
 Freedom House Country Ratings (1991 to 2002)
Year7 Estonia Poland Bulgaria
1991–92 2.3 F* 2.2 F 2.3 F
1992–93 3.3 PF** 2.2 F 2.3 F
1993–94 3.2 F 2.2 F 2.2 F
1994–95 3.2 F 2.2 F 2.2 F
1995–96 2.2 F 1.2 F 2.2 F
1996–97 1.2 F 1.2 F 2.3 F
1997–98 1.2 F 1.2 F 2.3 F
1998–99 1.2 F 1.2 F 2.3 F
1999–00 1.2 F 1.2 F 2.3 F
2000–01 1.2 F 1.2 F 2.3 F
2001–02 1.2 F 1.2 F 1.3 F
Note: * F: free;  ** PF: partly free.
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org.
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toward political freedom of each of the three countries has been quite constant for the 
last ten years. We should underline the rapid progress in Estonia, where only ﬁve years 
were required to attain the level of Poland as far as Freedom House ratings are concerned, 
while Bulgaria has stagnated for ten years before coming close to being rated at 1.3 on 
the seven-item scale. 
 The Human Development Index used by the United Nations Development Pro-
gram also supports the hierarchy established among the three countries according to 
their post-regime evolution. Poland is in 35th place, Estonia  41st‚ and Bulgaria  57th. We 
chose to use this index because it is widely used to classify countries for multinational 
analysis, being a measure that encompasses more than just the level of economic income. 
The Human Development Index8 combines levels of literacy, education, health‚ and 
income, and is used as a “standard model of societal modernization” (Norris 2002). 
Both our analysis of local government systems in the three countries and the ratings 
provided by the Freedom House and Human Development Index lead us to conclude 
that Poland is the country with the most clearly positive evolution, followed by Estonia 
and Bulgaria. These diﬀerences also show up in our analysis of the type of relationship 
that local government representatives develop with the citizens in their constituencies 
in the three countries, discussed below. 
2.2 Characteristics of the Local Representatives
In this section we provide a short description and comparative analysis of the main char-
acteristics of the local representatives in the analyzed countries, based mainly on their 
demographic proﬁle. The analysis was conducted using data generated by the ILDGP 
project’s Local Representative Survey (LRS), which inquired into the activities, values, 
opinions‚ and demographic characteristics of local councilors in Poland, Bulgaria‚ and 
Estonia. Table 5.2 shows the results of the survey of the local representatives from the 
point of view of gender, education‚ and age distribution. 
The above table mainly shows similar characteristics among the local representatives 
included in the survey, with slight diﬀerences in the Estonian case. There is a signiﬁcant 
percentage of male local representatives in the three countries, with a slightly higher 
percentage of female representatives in Estonia (31.8%). From the educational point 
of view we should emphasize the more balanced distribution of local representatives 
in Poland in all three categories, as compared to the balance in only two categories for 
Estonia (secondary and higher education), while the Bulgarian case stands out with 
17% not having completed their secondary education as opposed to 78.8% having 
attended higher education, of which 60% are over 45 years old. The provisions of the 
Civil Service Act of 1999, stipulating that higher education is mandatory for appoint-
ment to a managerial function, explains this high percentage of more highly educated 
local representatives in Bulgaria.  
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Poland has a greater percentage of younger local representatives, with  7.1% under 
30 years old, while Estonia and Bulgaria have only 3.2% and 0.2% in this category. The 
most balanced age distribution for the other two categories, between 31 and 45 years 
and over 45 years, is the Estonian case with almost equal percentages, while Bulgaria 
and Poland have a higher percentage of local representatives in the last age category. 
Another important dimension for capturing a complete description of the local 
representatives in the three countries is their political orientation, which is indicated 
by two items: their membership in a political party and their self-positioning on the 
left-right scale of political beliefs (see table 5.3 below). The country in which the highest 
percentage of local representatives are members of political parties is Bulgaria (86.1%), 
as compared to only 35.8% in Poland, while Estonia shows a balance between 52% 
members and 48% non-members of political parties. The Estonian local representatives 
display another diﬀerence in being more right-oriented than their Bulgarian and Polish 
colleagues. We have to acknowledge again the very balanced distribution of local rep-
resentatives in Poland, with 31.2% oriented towards the left and center-left positions, 
34.1% to the center and 34.6% to the right and center-right. 
The position of the surveyed local representatives within their local administrations 
is presented in table 5.4. There are four main categories for this classiﬁcation: mayor, 
member of a local committee, chair of a local committee, manager of a municipal 
ﬁrm, and “other,” which includes positions such as vice-mayor, member of the county 
government, or member of parliament. 
The total ﬁgures show that some representatives in all three countries hold positions 
in more than one category. Most overlapping is due to committee chairs also being 
members of the committee, and managers of the municipal ﬁrms and vice-mayors 
Table 5.2
Demographic Characteristics of Local Representatives 
in Poland, Bulgaria‚ and Estonia (2002)
Variable Poland [%] Bulgaria [%] Estonia [%]
Gender Male 78.8 78.5 68.2
Female 21.2 21.5 31.8
Education Completed 8/9 years 15.0 17.1 1.5
Secondary 28.2 4.1 43.1
Higher 56.8 78.8 55.4
Age Under 30 years 7.1 0.2 3.2
Between 31–45 years 38.3 39.6 48.8
Over 45 years 54.6 60.2 48.0
Source: Local Representative Survey of  ILGDP, 2002.
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also being members of the local committee. Because of the small percentage of mayors 
included in the survey (fewer than 10% for each of the three countries), this category 
will be further analyzed together with the local councilors and committee members. 
This approach ﬁts the authors’ primary intention to analyze the combination of features 
that enhance a citizen-oriented relationship style in local representatives as individuals, 
and not to approach the investigation from the point of view of incentives for such 
attitudes being oﬀered by the position within the system. 
Table 5.3
Political Views and Memberships of Local Representatives 
in Poland, Bulgaria, and Estonia (2002)
Variable                           Country
Categories 
Poland [%] Bulgaria [%] Estonia [%]
Party membership member 35.8 86.1 52.0
non-member 64.2 13.9 48.0
Self-positioning on 
the scale of left-right 
political views
Le
ft 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
R
ig
ht 7 10.1 19.2 6.7
6 10.3 12.8 20.1
5 14.2 10.4 25.5
4 34.1 19.6 30.8
3 11.5 11.1 11.7
2 10.7 9.9 3.2
1 9.0 17.1 2.0
Source: Local Representative Survey of ILGDP, 2002.
Table 5.4
 Position of Surveyed Local Representatives 
in the Local Administrative System (2002)
                                   Country
Position  
Estonia [%] Bulgaria [%] Poland [%]
Member of committee 55.2 65.4 56.4
Chair of committee 38.7 26.7 34.0
Manager of municipality firm 5.0 2.2 0.7
Mayor 8.6 9.9 5.0
Other 8.3 8.4 20.7
Total 115.8 112.6 116.8
Source: Local Representatives Survey of ILGDP, 2002.
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3. EXPLANATORY APPROACHES
The theoretical framework of the following analysis is based on three main approaches: 
social capital, value orientations, and context and socialization inﬂuences. In each ap-
proach we will focus ﬁrst on the conceptual issues, and then assess their usefulness in 
terms of the results of the data analysis which encompasses the variables used as measures 
of the concepts. 
3.1 Social Capital 
The concept of “social capital” became a fashionable explanation for economic eﬃciency 
and good governance when Robert Putnam elaborated it in Making Democracy Work 
(1993) and in Bowling Alone (2000). Putnam deﬁnes social capital as “connections 
among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them.” He argues that social capital has signiﬁcant political consequences. 
Norris (2003, 3) describes a two-step model of how civil society directly promotes social 
capital and how, in turn, social capital (the social networks and cultural norms that 
arise from civic society) is believed to facilitate political participation and good govern-
ance. Both Coleman (1988) and Putnam agree that like other forms of capital, social 
capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not 
be attainable in its absence. 
The key element of social capital is trust, which lays the basis for cooperation among 
people who are diﬀerent (Uslaner 2002). Trust is viewed on two levels: generalized or 
interpersonal trust, meaning trusting other people, and institutional trust, meaning 
trusting institutions in a comprehensive manner. Trust in institutions builds on both 
institutional and human performance as far as the role and tasks of the institutions 
are concerned. Research shows that trust is an important ingredient in situations of 
cooperation. Communities characterized by an increased level of trust are more easily 
mobilized, as they are often motivated towards goals that refer to the common good 
(Badescu, 2001). Putnam also acknowledges the importance of trust, calling it the “cor-
nerstone of a cooperative spirit” (1993). Following from these notions of trust among 
people and trust of people in institutions, local representatives possessing a higher level 
of interpersonal trust would be more prone to consult and collaborate with citizens as 
far as public matters are concerned. Consequently, a high level of trust among local 
representatives would foster cooperation between them and their constituents. We argue 
that local representatives who have a higher level of social capital possess the prerequisite 
for a consultative and collaborative relationship with citizens. 
Mark Warren (1999b) holds that a political system is more democratic the more 
equally its institutions enhance individual self-rule and the more equally it underwrites 
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individual chances to inﬂuence collective judgments and decisions. He notes that 
democracy implies some processes of communication, ﬁrst at the level of individuals 
and second as a collectivity. Social capital has tremendous relational power, and is believed 
to facilitate political participation and encourage good governance. Consequently, it 
may be seen as a resource for fostering collaboration among citizens and government 
representatives at both local and central levels. In Giddens’ (1996) opinion governments 
depend on a complex, conﬁdence-based relationship between political leaders and the 
people. Thus, citizen participation in policymaking and decision-making processes 
represents a necessary feature of stable democracies while social capital is a resource for 
political activism (Badescu 2001, 81). Measuring the level of institutional trust of local 
representatives will help to complete the picture of the prerequisites they possess for 
consultation and collaboration with citizens. 
Another important component of social capital is the social networks that can be 
measured by aﬃliation with associational groups and social movements. Besides trust, 
information, and other factors associated with social capital, social networks may favor 
participation, depending on the type of action they involve (Badescu 2001). Conse-
quently, generalized trust is a resource for actions that endorse collective goals, and 
creates a positive context that enhances direct communication between citizens and 
local representatives. Moreover, a horizontal relationship between citizens and local 
representatives will be promoted in a context characterized by civic engagement, seen by 
Putnam as one of the components of social capital: the more horizontal these relations, 
the higher the level of social interaction, communication, and trust (1995). Such rela-
tions represent the basis for further partnerships and citizen involvement in designing 
policies. The presence of social capital encourages openness on the part of both parties 
and recognition of the advantages of cooperation. 
The development of the networking dimension of social capital has also nourished 
the emergence of what has been labeled as the dark side of social capital. This refers to 
the informal networks that support activities with a negative social impact, such as illegal 
labor migration, traﬃcking networks, or maﬁa-type structures. The surveys our data is 
taken from do not touch upon this side of the networking dimension of social capital, 
consisting only of measures of local representatives’ engagement in various types of or-
ganizations. Following the accountability measures presented in appendix IV it can be 
easily acknowledged that local representatives in the three analyzed countries expect to 
be asked to justify their position on local public issues more often by their family and 
work colleagues. Even if such evidence could be interpreted as a negative type of social 
capital networking on account of the known, highly praised family and work loyalty 
in the maﬁa-type structures, there is no rationale and no justiﬁable data as to further 
dwell upon such an interpretation. 
The data-based assessment of the social capital dimension follows three strands: the 
level of generalized trust among the surveyed local representatives, their level of institu-
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tional trust, and their engagement in social life through channels of citizen participation 
other than their position in the local government (assessed though engagement in civic 
and political organizations). Several items in the survey measuring the level of trust 
among local representatives are presented in table 5.5 below.
In Estonia most of the local representatives believe that most people can be trusted 
(64.3%), while the percentage in Poland is somewhat  lower at 44.7%, and in Bulgaria 
lower yet at 30.9%. The situation appears similar in the case of the second measure, with 
the Bulgarian ﬁgures showing the strongest response (64.5%) from those believing that 
most people would try to take advantage of them, compared to 5.1% for Estonia. The 
ﬁrst item, assessing the perceived level of generalized trust among people in the locality, 
shows a very high concentration around the central measure, while the extremes (low 
or high level of trust) are weakly represented, especially in the Estonian case. Among 
the three countries Estonia has the highest level of generalized trust, followed by Poland 
and then Bulgaria.
The second assessment of social capital among local representatives, which measures 
their level of institutional trust as declared in the survey,  reveals very interesting patterns 
(see appendix II). The most trusted of the democratic institutions is the presidency, 
with the highest percentages for each of the countries: 49.2% in Estonia, 38.7% in 
Poland, and 40.2% in Bulgaria. The central government is greatly distrusted in both 
Poland and Bulgaria, while in Estonia the media joins the political parties as far as lo-
cal representatives’ distrust is concerned. The least trusted institutions are the political 
parties (distrusted by 30.1% in Estonia and 53.4% in Poland), followed by parliament 
(40.8% in Poland and 37.3% in Bulgaria). It is surprising that political parties are so 
distrusted by local representatives in the three countries, considering that in Bulgaria 
Table 5.5
Level of Generalized Trust among Local Representatives 
in Estonia, Poland, and Bulgaria (2002)
Questions Estonia [%] Poland [%] Bulgaria [%]
Low
level of
trust
High
level of
trust
Low
level of
trust
High
level of
trust
Low
level of
trust
High
level of
trust
How much do people trust each 
other in your city?
6.0* 3.9 16.2 3.6 26.3 3.7
Can most people be trusted 
or do you need to be very careful?
32.0 64.3 52.8 44.7 67.8 30.9
Would most people take advantage 
of you or would they try to be fair?
5.1 28.5 57.3 40.6 64.5 34.5
Note: * Discrepancies from a 100% total are accounted for by non-answers and the medium value. 
Source: Local Representative Survey of ILGDP, 2002.
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a signiﬁcant 86.1% of the local representatives are party members and the parties they 
belong to have nominated 82.5% of them in the elections. The ﬁgures for Estonia  are 
lower but still surprising, considering that 51.1% of the local representatives are party 
members and the parties nominated 41.6% of them in the elections. The situation is 
diﬀerent in Poland, where just 34.9% of local representatives are party members and 
only 35.7% were nominated by their party for the elections. The other 64.3% were 
nominated by other organizational structures.  
The third dimension used to assess the level of social capital among local repre-
sentatives is their engagement in participatory acts, analyzed from the perspective of 
engagement in two types of organizations: civic and political. The ﬁrst type of involve-
ment—holding a position of trust in a civic organization—applies to 40.8% of local 
representatives in Poland, 24.9% in Estonia, and only 19.0% in Bulgaria. Another aspect 
is the number of organizations in which they are involved. This ranges from none at 
all to eight (in the case of one representative in Bulgaria). In Poland and Estonia the 
highest number of memberships was six, but most local representatives are engaged 
in only one organization, similar to the situation in all the analyzed countries. There 
was also a very high number of non-respondents—up to 60% in Estonia and 76% in 
Bulgaria. The situation in Poland is very diﬀerent, with the highest percentage of local 
representatives involved in civic organizations (89.7% are members in one or two or-
ganizations). Membership in political organizations (parties) reveals a highly politicized 
situation in Bulgaria where 86.% of the local representatives surveyed belong to a political 
party, as opposed to only 34.9% in Poland and 51.1% in Estonia. Of all the forms of 
political engagement, collecting signatures is the most common practice identiﬁed by 
representatives in the three countries, with 31.3% in Estonia, 47.1% in Bulgaria, and 
51.1% in Poland. On the other hand, there is little engagement in protest politics by 
local representatives in any of the countries; the highest level is in Bulgaria, with  up to 
12% participating in such activities. 
3.2 Value Orientations 
For a long time the explanatory power of economic factors as predictors of civic en-
gagement has been considered essential, especially as far as voting is concerned. But the 
predictive value of economic indicators in the postmodern era is no longer what it used 
to be (McAllister 1999, 201). In western industrialized democracies in particular, the 
impact of political culture and historical context on citizen participation in government 
has caused reconsideration of the factors involved. The consequences of unprecedented 
economic development have entailed not only societal evolution, but also a reshaping 
of how individual citizens see their relationship to the political system: “In the long 
run, industrialized societies of both East and West must cope with long-term changes 
223
L O C A L  R E P R E S E N T A T I O N
that are making their publics less amenable to doing as they are told and more adept at 
telling their governments what to do” (Inglehart 1999, 251). The same idea is reinforced 
in recent studies showing that “the politics of choice appears to be replacing the politics 
of loyalties” (Norris 2002, 1). 
The extent to which this applies to Central and Eastern European countries has not 
yet been assessed. Despite the enormous changes of the last ﬁfteen years, there is still 
a long way to go until this region reaches the unprecedented level of economic devel-
opment that was seen in the West, and from which postmodern theories concerning 
civic engagement and democracy have emerged. Still, Central and Eastern European 
countries have caught up rapidly in terms of  some of the underlying factors that eventu-
ally led to what Inglehart calls the silent revolution (Inglehart 1977). The increasing level 
of education, mass access to political information, and the diminishing eﬀectiveness 
of gender barriers (at least formally, if not entirely in practice) in Central and Eastern 
Europe are some of the factors that can be expected to play a similar role in the evolution 
of political behavior. Due to the prolonged lack of individual rights under the former 
communist regimes, the emphasis now placed on such rights encourages adherence to 
postmodern or postmaterialist values, even if the motivation has been diﬀerent than 
in the West.  
Such changes are encompassed in a broader mechanism of social change known 
as the social mobilization process, analyzed by Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984), 
Inglehart (1990), and also Dalton (1998). Social mobilization occurred as a conse-
quence of sweeping societal changes in the modern industrialized societies of the 
West, and partially in Central and Eastern Europe after the regime changes. A marked 
feature of this process in western societies has been the emergence of a highly political 
and sophisticated citizenry that deﬁnes politics in terms of their own interests (Dalton 
1998, 28) and has acquired the necessary levels of education, information, political skills, 
and resources to be self-suﬃcient in politics and to engage in direct actions challenging 
their governments. In the West, a more open, participatory, and individual-centered 
form of democracy evolved in response to the social changes occurring along with 
unprecedented economic development and material suﬃciency. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, however, citizens were either presented with a more open, participatory, and 
individual-centered democracy following the fall of communism in the region, or they 
had to challenge their governments to provide such opportunities for active citizenship 
in an open, participatory democracy. 
One distinctive aspect of the social changes discussed above is a shift in 
western value preferences from physical security and economic well-being to non-
material needs such as self-expression and individual fulﬁllment. This “silent revolution” 
is reﬂective of  the postmodern political attitude, which “allows a much wider range 
for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual subjective well being” (Inglehart 
1997, 238). 
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More speciﬁcally, this new orientation expresses a shift toward postmaterialism, 
which strongly de-emphasizes the previously lauded qualities of economic eﬃciency, 
bureaucratic authority, and scientiﬁc rationality upon which modern societies were built, 
and instead values individual autonomy, increased self-expression, and the acceptance 
of diversity. Postmaterialist values have major behavioral and attitudinal consequences 
for the way individuals relate to the political system and participate in social life. Citizens 
with postmaterialist values are more likely to be actively engaged in social life and more 
open to using unconventional and challenging modes of civic participation, including 
protest actions.
The value orientations of local representatives in the analyzed countries were 
assessed through two means. The ﬁrst involved having the representatives prioritize the 
following goals to be achieved in the country in the coming years:
 • Maintaining order in the country
 • Giving people more say in important government decisions
 • Fighting rising prices
 • Protecting freedom of speech.
Of these four items, maintaining order in the country proved to be the most highly 
valued goal in each country: 54.5% considered it the highest priority in Bulgaria, 57.3% 
in Estonia, and 62.2 % in Poland. The second priority, giving people more say in im-
portant government decisions, is also similar for the three countries. Fighting rising 
prices and protecting freedom of speech share the last place in the order of priorities, 
as shown in table 5.6.
The second item used to assess the value orientations of local representatives in 
the analyzed countries is their agreement or disagreement with certain statements that 
express contrasting orientations (traditional or postmodern) towards a variety of topics 
(see table 5.7).
For each of the two contrasting items in table 5.7, the one on the left puts a more 
traditional emphasis on increased state/government responsibility for providing goods 
and for equality of income or rights, while the one on the right reﬂects a more indi-
vidual-oriented approach which is closer to the postmodern and postmaterialist value 
orientations, without being exclusive or exhaustive. 
The local representatives in the three countries adhere to similar value orientations 
from the point of view of praising competition, private ownership, and the advantages 
of widespread public participation. The Estonian local representatives showed slight 
diﬀerences from the others in their favoring of income equality, additional rights for 
minorities, and the primacy of solving local problems over achieving national goals. A 
potential explanation for this may be the fact that Estonia, unlike Bulgaria and Poland, 
was part of the former Soviet Union and experienced both the status of minority and 
the primacy of the federation’s goals over local problems. Another diﬀerence worth 
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Table 5.6
Ranking of Strategic Goals by Local Representatives 
in Bulgaria, Poland, and Estonia [%] (2002)
Bulgaria
1 most important 2 3 4 least important
Maintain order 54.5 27.2 13.4 2.2
Give people more say 31.2 29.2 24.4 11.9
Fight inflation 4.6 19.4 28.2 43.8
Protect freedom of speech 9.1 20.5 29.7 36.6
Poland
Maintain order 62.2 19.5 11.5 4.6
Give people more say 23.2 27.0 32.3 15.3
Fight inflation 14.1 29.8 22.4 30.7
Protect freedom of speech 8.6 21.7 26.6 40.1
Estonia
Maintain order 57.3 23.7 11.5 2.6
Give people more say 21.3 27.0 37.3 9.0
Fight inflation 8.6 28.2 23.7 34.1
Protect freedom of speech 7.8 16.1 22.0 48.3
Source: Local Representative Survey 2002.
Table 5.7
Value Orientations of Local Representatives in Bulgaria, Poland, and Estonia [%] (2002)
Bulgaria Poland Estonia Traditional vs. postmodern 
value orientations
Bulgaria Poland Estonia
Percent agreeing with the 
first value preference 
Percent agreeing with the 
second value preference
20.2 17.6 31.7 income equality vs. income disparity 53.5 70.1 46.9
21.6 25.6 28.1 public ownership vs. private ownership 62.0 42.0 44.8
34.0 44.6 45.5 government vs. individual responsibility 
to provide goods
45.3 27.0 35.7
9.7 10.2 14.2 negative vs. positive outcomes of competition 81.9 75.7 73.9
48.2 37.6 19.1 achieving national goals vs. solving local problems 19.5 28.5 45.5
18.0 31.8 17.5 negative impact vs. positive outcomes 
of widespread public participation
62.9 46.6 62.4
64.9 63.8 45.7 equal rights vs. additional rights for minorities 28.4 22.7 35.4
67.5 42.0 47.0 limitation of freedom of speech vs. political 
extremists’ right to hold public meetings 
18.5 36.1 34.4
Note: Discrepancies from a 100% total are accounted for by non-answers and the medium value.
Source: The Local Representative Survey of ILDGP, 2002.
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noting is the individual-centered orientations of Bulgarian local representatives as far as 
the responsibility for providing goods is concerned, with 45.5% of local representatives 
believing that such responsibility belongs to the individual rather than to the government, 
as compared with the 27% of Polish and 35.7% of Estonian local representatives. 
3.3 Context Influences and Socialization
Political socialization is deﬁned as “the processes by which individuals learn the political 
norms, values and behavior patterns of the nations, groups or subgroups to which they 
belong. These characteristics can be thought of as each group’s political culture. Political 
socialization means the enduring attitudes and ways of behaving that characterize a group 
over an extended period of time” (Lipset 1995). Some scholars (Patton 2001) place 
the agents of socialization in two categories: ﬁrst the home, which plays a major role 
in shaping one’s world outlook from birth, with peer group pressure and contact with 
friends also having an eﬀect on one’s behavior and attitude, and second, the institutions 
other than family (school, social clubs, places of work, mass media) that have an impact 
on individuals’ behavior, values, knowledge, and actions. Social clubs and places of 
work are often selected as a result of certain stimuli from one’s educational experience. 
Yet, these factors are insuﬃcient to explain by themselves the diﬀerences in national 
levels of political activism. It is also important to take account of the broader context 
set by societal modernization, institutional design, and mobilizing agencies (Norris 
2003).
Discussion of the factors inﬂuencing the approach local representatives take to-
wards their relationship with citizens must necessarily include contextual inﬂuences. 
Of the external contextual factors that are relevant for our purposes we selected certain 
socialization inﬂuences, at the same time acknowledging that socialization means much 
more than what this paper investigates. Despite such limitations, we believe important 
insights for the purposes of this research can be gained by considering the inﬂuences 
exerted by several variables ﬁtting the broader patterns of context and socialization. 
Socialization inﬂuences can be seen in local representatives in such things as the fam-
ily tradition of assuming public oﬃce, or in the personal experience of holding public 
oﬃce before the present mandate. Contextual inﬂuences are measured by assessing 
the pressure for accountability that comes from several groups within the society, and 
the perceived inﬂuence on the decision-making process of several social actors, both 
individuals and groups. 
The family tradition of assuming public oﬃce is strongest in Poland and Bulgaria, 
with a shifting position between engagement in political parties (45.8% in Bulgaria 
and 23.3 % in Poland) and engagement in nongovernmental organizations (29.8% in 
Bulgaria and 42.7% in Poland). Estonia is very weakly represented from this point of 
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view, with only 9.2% of the representatives’ parents engaged in political parties and 
6.6% involved in nongovernmental organizations. 
Prior experience in holding public oﬃce during recent years is very well represented, 
with the majority of the local representatives included in the survey being reelected for 
at least one term in each of the three countries. As many as 10% in Poland and 16% in 
Estonia have been reelected more than three times, as is shown in table 5.8.
The context inﬂuences are measured by an item dealing with the inﬂuence of several 
persons and groups on the decision-making of the local government. The components 
can be divided into two distinct categories: inﬂuences from other institutions or repre-
sentatives (including civil servants, the chief administrative oﬃcer, the mayor, central 
government, and local branches of political parties), and direct or indirect inﬂuences 
from citizens (including church, interested citizens, media, civic organizations, unions, 
and local businesses). The ﬁgures are presented in appendix III. 
It is quite noticeable in all three countries that the highest inﬂuence is exerted by the 
ﬁrst category of factors, including other institutions and the direct hierarchical superiors 
of the local representatives, while the second group has a visibly lower inﬂuence on the 
decision-making process as perceived by the local representatives. The most inﬂuential 
category in all the countries is the mayor with almost 70% perceiving a high inﬂuence, 
while the inﬂuence of civic organizations and interested citizens is somewhere around 
50%, higher in Bulgaria and Poland than in Estonia. Church representatives along with 
unions and local business representatives share the lowest inﬂuence on local decision-
making in all the analyzed countries. 
The persons or groups to whom local representatives expect to be held accountable 
show a pattern of strong family networks. Most frequently, local representatives expect 
that they will be held accountable by family, work colleagues, and the political party. On 
the other hand, they have very little expectation of being held accountable by media, 
nongovernmental organizations, or the business community. The ﬁgures are similar 
for the three countries. In Estonia the ﬁgures are somewhat lower with regard to the 
Table 5.8
 Experience of Local Representatives in Holding Public Oﬃce
Reelected Bulgaria [%] Poland [%] Estonia [%]
One time 53.9 39.5 34.6
Two times 23.6 28.3 24.3
Three times 15.5 18.1 21.0
More than 3 times 2.0 10.7 16.0
Missing 5.0 3.3 3.8
Source: Local Representative Survey of ILDGP, 2002.
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frequency of accountability requirements, but not with regard to the groups to whom 
local representatives feel accountable (for more detailed ﬁgures see appendix IV). 
4. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
The initial hypothesis asserts that the approach local representatives take towards their 
relationship with citizens is determined not only by the social capital of local repre-
sentatives, but also by other variables which we expected would include their value 
orientations, socialization, and contextual inﬂuences. The dependent variable that we 
aimed to explain is the approach local representatives take towards their relationship 
with citizens, as deﬁned by two categories: the classical system-oriented approach, with 
decision-making based on hierarchical and classical bureaucratic procedures of the 
administrative systems; and the participatory, citizen-oriented approach, based on con-
sultation, collaboration, and partnerships and aimed at opening the decision-making 
process to input from citizens. 
We used successive logistic regression models to compare the probability that local 
representatives with certain characteristics would uphold the citizen-oriented approach 
with the probability that they would uphold a system-oriented approach.  The depend-
ent variable was computed by recoding a set of items from the questionnaire (see tables 
5.9 and 5.10) measuring the actions of the local representatives and their approach to 
their relationship with the citizens, using a high ranking for those options appropriate 
for a collaborative and consultative approach (i.e., organizing consultative forums before 
decision-making) and a low ranking for the more classical approach to decision-making 
(without input from citizens). The ﬁnal distribution has been obtained by assigning 
a “citizen-oriented” description to local representatives when more than half of their 
choices ranked at the high end of the scale, and a “system-oriented” description to those 
who chose more than half at the low end. 
Table 5.10 presents the ﬁnal frequency distribution of the dependent variable (the 
approach taken by the local representatives towards their relationship with citizens) 
after recoding. 
The categories of the dependent variable are balanced only in Poland, while in 
Estonia and Bulgaria there is a clear trend towards the participatory approach, with a 
surprising 90.3% favoring this approach in Estonia. 
The hypothesis was tested using an initial explanatory model that includes de-
mographic characteristics and measures of civic engagement and generalized and 
institutional trust. All of these are part of the broader explanatory variable—the local 
representatives’ level of social capital. The alternative models include the other proposed 
variables (socialization, context inﬂuences, accountability, and value orientations), with 
the evolution of the indicators being compared successively, one by one. First we analyze 
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Table 5.9
 Items Considered for the Final Distribution of the Dependent Variable
Items included in the final value of the dependent variable:
Have you held a citizen forum as a local councilor in the course of the past year?
Roughly how many hours in an average week do you usually devote to your activities as a councilor?
When making decisions, to what degree do you feel it is important to give special consideration to the 
following groups of people?*
 Citizens who voted for you
 All inhabitants of the municipality
 The party or group to which you belong
 Central government authorities
How influential does the opinion of the following people seem on the formation of your own opinion 
on local government issues?*
 Civil servants in the local administration
 Representatives of your party or the organization that nominated you at the elections
 Local business persons
 Representatives of civic organizations
 Local religious leaders
 Journalists
 Local residents you meet
A local representative can learn about the views of citizens in different ways. How important do the 
following sources of information seem for you as mayor or councilor in your municipality?
 Personal contacts with individual citizens
 Letters from citizens
 Representatives of civic organizations
 Your own party branch
 The municipal administration
Note: * The answers were indicated on a scale from 1 (very little importance) to 7 (very great impor-
tance).
Table 5.10
 Frequency Distribution of the Dependent Variable [%]
Poland Estonia Bulgaria
System-oriented approach 41.4 9.7 33.6
Citizen-oriented approach 58.6 90.3 66.4
Source: Local Representative Survey 2002.
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the changes for each of the three countries, and then we conclude with a comparative 
analysis for the three countries.
The indicators for Estonia are presented in table 5.11. The ﬁrst model shows a 
positive inﬂuence of both generalized and institutional trust and civic engagement. 
Age and gender do not have signiﬁcant values, but education positively inﬂuences the 
chances that a local representative with the described features will prefer a participa-
tory approach towards his or her relationship with citizens. The successive inclusion in 
the following models of new variables has slightly decreased the indicators in the ﬁrst 
model, which mainly remained statistically signiﬁcant. The inﬂuence of education and 
civic engagement measures has been aﬀected by the inclusion of the additional explana-
tory variables, and shows no statistical signiﬁcance in the ﬁnal model. The explanatory 
power of the model has been slightly strengthened by the context, accountability and 
value orientations measures, as indicators show (see table 5.11). 
The initial model for Bulgaria shows a particular signiﬁcance of age and education, 
starting from the ﬁrst model and remaining statistically signiﬁcant throughout. Other 
measures with a positive inﬂuence are civic engagement and institutional trust, which 
prove to be more stable in inﬂuence than generalized trust. The newly included variables 
have signiﬁcant positive inﬂuences in the model, slightly strengthening its explanatory 
power (see table 5.12).
The situation in Poland is slightly diﬀerent with fewer statistically signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients. The inﬂuence of age, gender, and education is not signiﬁcant, and age indicators 
are very close to 1. Institutional trust and civic engagement have positive inﬂuences, 
being signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst two models and reaching closer to 1 in the models includ-
ing context, accountability, and value orientations measures, which all have positive 
inﬂuences and signiﬁcant values.
A comparative analysis of the explanatory models for the three countries shows 
some particularities that may explain the frequency distribution of the dependent vari-
able as presented in table 5.10. The case of Estonia, with 90.3% of local representatives 
included in the survey leaning towards a participatory approach, may be explained by 
the signiﬁcant values of both generalized and institutional trust. These values retained 
their signiﬁcance in the models that included additional explanatory variables, which 
was not the case for the civic engagement measures. Previous studies have also under-
scored that it is social trust rather than associational activism that strongly correlates 
with levels of human and democratic development (Norris 2002).  
The unexpected 90% propensity of Estonian local representatives towards a par-
ticipatory approach in their relationship with citizens can be explained by the patterns 
of the administrative system and the embedded local government relationships which 
have been established over time and show resistance towards attempts at reform. The 
analyzed variables do not fully explain the high percentage of people-oriented local 
representatives, but if we add the impact of the administrative system we ﬁnd that such 
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Table 5.11
Logistic Regression Coeﬃcients for Estonia
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0.99 0.74 1.20* 1.17** 1.04** 1.16** — — — — 0.09
0.99 0.77 1.19* 1.16** 1.04** 1.15** 1.06* — — — 0.09
0.99 0.78 1.15* 1.11* 1.03** 1.10* 1.05 1.02** — — 0.11
0.99 0.83 1.14 1.12* 1.03** 1.05 1.03 1.02** 1.10** — 0.15
0.99 0.86 1.13 1.11* 1.03** 1.06 1.03 1.02** 1.10** 1.08* 0.16
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.5.
Source: Local Representative Survey, 2002. 
Table 5.12
 Logistic Regression Coeﬃcients for Bulgaria and Poland
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0.97** 0.91 1.50** 1.06 1.02** 1.12* — — — — 0.07
0.97** 0.91 1.46** 1.05 1.02** 1.11* 1.12** — — — 0.08
0.97** 0.94 1.44** 1.01 1.01 1.08 1.15** 1.03** — — 0.13
0.97** 0.95 1.41** 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.13** 1.02** 1.06** — 0.15
0.97** 0.93 1.40** 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.12** 1.02** 1.06** 1.06* 0.16
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D
0.99 0.92 1.12 1.02 1.01* 1.14** — — — — 0.02
0.99 0.92 1.12 1.02 1.01* 1.13** 1.03 — — — 0.02
0.99 0.89 1.12 1.01 1.00 1.10* 1.02 1.03** — — 0.08
1.00 1.01 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.03** 1.06** — 0.11
1.00 1.01 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.03** 1.06** 1.00 0.11
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.5.
Source: Local Representative Survey, 2002.
232
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
an overwhelming ﬁgure is accounted for not only by the people within the administra-
tion, but also by the system itself, due to the small size of administrative units that have 
favored a close relationship between local government and citizens for a long time. The 
opposition of local governments to reform initiatives aimed at decreasing the number 
of administrative units and consequently increasing the distance between the people 
and the local government also accounts for this high percentage of people-oriented 
local representatives.
The case of Bulgaria is diﬀerent from the other two because of the signiﬁcant and 
constant negative inﬂuence of age and the positive inﬂuence of education measures, 
which in the other cases are not signiﬁcant and very close to neutral values. The dis-
tribution of local representatives in Bulgaria by age has shown that 60% of them are 
over 45 years old. Bulgaria has the smallest number of young local representatives, with 
only 0.2%. The constant and powerful inﬂuence of education is also explained by the 
frequency distribution of the variable. The pattern of Bulgarian local representatives’ 
education is very diﬀerent from the other two countries, having almost no middle cat-
egory values and an overwhelming 78.8% with higher education, of which over 60% are 
in the last age category, thus strengthening the constant impact of the two variables in 
the model. This is due to the mandatory higher education requirement for appointment 
to a managerial position, stipulated in the Bulgarian Civil Service Act. The signiﬁcant 
and higher coeﬃcients for socialization should also to be mentioned, as this strengthens 
previous conclusions from section 3.3 showing the impact of the family tradition of 
associational membership. 
In the case of Poland, the highest percentages for the calculated coeﬃcients models 
show no statistical signiﬁcance; thus, the models seem to have rather limited explanatory 
power. The inﬂuence of civic engagement seems to be more signiﬁcant and constant 
when compared to this item in the other two cases, but the overall explanation provided 
by the models does not seem to be very appropriate for this case, which had the most 
balanced frequency distribution of the dependent variable. A potential explanation may 
be found in the balanced frequency distribution of local representatives in Poland on 
most of the variables considered. From the age distribution point of view, Poland has 
the highest representation of  local representatives under 30 years of age among the three 
countries. Education is also very well balanced, with a slightly higher percentage of local 
representatives having higher education, while the left-right self-positioning shows an 
almost perfectly equal situation, around 30% in each of computed categories. 
The only variable with an impact on the regression analysis results is the only one 
on which Polish local representatives do not show a balanced frequency distribution: 
the civic engagement variable. This is the point where Poland is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent 
from the other two countries. Over 80% of local representatives in Poland are engaged 
in civic organizations and 64.9% of them have been nominated in the elections by 
an organization and not by a political party. Compared to the 60% missing answers 
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in Bulgaria and 76.5% missing answers in Estonia on this item and to the balanced 
frequency distributions on other variables, this situation explains why civic engage-
ment is the only signiﬁcant variable for Poland. Besides the distribution for the local 
representatives themselves, Poland has a high percentage of parental engagement in civic 
organizations, which is the case for neither Estonia nor Bulgaria.
5. CONCLUSION
The present report aimed to investigate the factors inﬂuencing the approach that local 
representatives take towards their relationship with citizens, focusing the explanation not 
only on social capital but also trying to identify other variables with considerable inﬂu-
ence in each of the three countries—Estonia, Poland, and Bulgaria. Besides considering 
the classical approach of social capital (assessed through level of trust, networks, and 
participation) the research aimed at beginning a discussion about how variables such 
as value orientations, socialization, and context inﬂuences might aﬀect the relationship 
between local representatives and citizens. 
The main ﬁndings of the research show that there is a propensity from the local 
representatives in the analyzed countries towards a participatory approach in relating to 
citizens, based on collaboration and consultation with the latter and openness towards 
input from the citizens in their activity as public representatives. The three cases show 
various diﬀerences in the determinants that have an impact on the relationship between 
the representatives and their constituents, even if the dependent variable shows the 
prevalence of the same approach from the local representatives’ side, varying in percent-
age. The Estonian case shows an unexpected 90.3% of local representatives approaching 
the citizens in their constituency horizontally; at the other end, the Polish representa-
tives showed a highly balanced distribution. The explanatory models have focused on 
investigating the supplementary explanations provided by such variables as socialization, 
context inﬂuences (including accountability issues), and value orientations, which have 
been added one by one to the logistic regression-based models, considering at the same 
time the speciﬁcities of the administrative systems from the three countries that helped 
explain the signiﬁcance of the variables included in the explanatory models. 
The overall conclusion drawn from the analysis is that social capital by itself is not 
suﬃcient to explain the approach local representatives have towards their relationship 
with citizens, and the input of variables like socialization, context inﬂuences, and value 
orientations signiﬁcantly contribute to such explanatory attempts. Leadership style is also 
relevant for the dynamics of the processes and performance of administrative systems, 
inﬂuencing the relationship between local representatives and citizens. The combination 
of factors that stimulate local representatives to act as citizen-oriented decision-makers 
is far from being identiﬁed with certainty and exhaustively by this study. However, the 
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study has succeeded in conﬁrming the initial hypothesis for the cases of Estonia and 
Bulgaria, while the case of Poland needs further investigation to ﬁnd an appropriate set 
of explanatory variables. Another important conclusion of our analysis is that when con-
sidering the explanatory power of social capital, the various components (namely trust, 
networks, and participation) should be distinguished. In addition, diﬀerences should be 
examined among the various dimensions of each component. The tested models have 
shown that institutional trust and generalized trust have diﬀerent explanatory impacts, 
supporting the scholars who assert the need to separately approach the two concepts as 
they are of diﬀerent origins. 
Consideration of the systemic features of local administrations in the three countries 
has proved to be a valuable aspect of the research. The present study is far from shedding 
full light on the combination of factors that inﬂuence the approach local representa-
tives choose to take towards their relationship with the citizens in the three analyzed 
countries. This complex issue has to be further investigated, alternative models tested, 
and appropriate sets of explanatory variables sought, in order to constantly enrich the 
underlying theoretical principles of the relationships under study. An approach that 
would deﬁnitely add much to the understanding of the broader relationship between 
local representatives and citizens would be one that looked at the citizens’ own approach 
towards the relationship. This would complete the investigation that we undertook in 
the present report. 
NOTES
1 Extract from the discussions at the conference Social Capital in the Balkans: The Missing Link? organized 
by the Blue Bird Social Inclusion Group and the Center for Policy Studies, January 21st—February 
1st 2003 at Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
2 For more information on the samples and data collection methods please refer to Tocqueville Research 
Center’s web site: http://www.t-rc.org. 
3 The information is taken from the Local Government International Bureau web site: 
 http://www.lgib.gov.uk/enlargement/estonia.htm.
4 The information is taken from the Local Government International Bureau web site: 
 http://www.lgib.gov.uk/enlargement/bulgaria.htm.
5 The information is taken from the Local Government International Bureau web site: 
 http://www.lgib.gov.uk/enlargement/poland.htm.
6 The Freedom House country ratings are based on evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in 
each country, attempting to judge by a single standard. The indicators do not rate governments per se, 
but the rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. The surveys are not based solely on the political 
conditions of a given country, but on the eﬀects such conditions have on freedom. The ratings are 
based on a broad range of international sources of information, including domestic and foreign news 
reports, NGO publications, think tank and academic analysis, and individual professional contacts. 
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For more information on the criteria and methodology used to determine country ratings, please refer 
to http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm. 
7 The Freedom House ratings are shown starting only from1991 because this is the ﬁrst year when 
Estonia has been considered as an independent country in the surveys.
8 For more information on the methodology of calculating the index, please refer to http://www.undp.org/
hdr. 
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Political Parties in Local Governance: 
Do Delegates Represent 
Local or National Interests?
Filip Franek
ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the role of political parties in local governments in Bulgaria, 
Estonia, and Hungary, and asks whether political party members tend to behave more 
like “delegates” within their local governments, and independent candidates more as 
“trustees.” In Estonia and Hungary these characterizations appear to have merit, while 
in Bulgaria the data indicate a tendency that would support such a claim. The main 
research question addresses the connection between this concept of delegates and trus-
tees and the councilors’ own declared views on whether they represent local or national 
interests. The data from the “Indicators Project” show that local politicians who declare a 
preference for solving local problems rather than pursuing national goals vote according 
to their own opinions more often. We consider these individuals to be trustees. At the 
same time, there was not a signiﬁcant relationship between political party membership 
and local/national goals representation. The chapter also makes some observations about 
the diﬀerences among the three countries, including a higher number of independent 
councilors in Hungary, a greater inﬂuence of the central government on local issues in 
Bulgaria, and a higher level of public participation in Hungary.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with local politicians, local political parties, and their function within 
local governments in three countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary. The research is 
intended to contribute to the study of political parties in local government, particularly 
the role they play in determining whether local representatives pursue local or national 
interests. We will examine whether it is helpful to use the concept of delegate versus 
trustee in this particular context. Delegates are generally deﬁned as politicians who 
follow the opinions of the groups they represent. They try to ﬁnd out what their voters 
want and then act accordingly. Trustees, on the other hand, act and vote on the basis 
of their own view of what is best for their municipality or county as well as the nation 
(Burns, Peltason, and Cronin 1989).
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Estonia were chosen for the study as particular representatives 
of three geographical units within Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary as one of the 
Visegrad countries, Bulgaria representing the South-East of Europe, and Estonia as one 
of the Baltic states. Although there are some basic diﬀerences in the local governance 
of these countries, their general development is rather similar. The main diﬀerences 
include a higher number of independent councilors in Hungary, a greater inﬂuence of 
the central government on local issues in Bulgaria, and a higher level of public partici-
pation in Hungary. Comparing these countries can be particularly valuable because of 
the diﬀerences in their political cultures, the role of central government in local issues, 
and the role of political parties in local government. These diﬀerences are elaborated 
more speciﬁcally in section 3.  
What the three countries have in common, of course, is their pre-1989 experience 
of Soviet-type local governments characterized by a system of local councils that were 
actually executive units of the central administration. Professional party organizations 
directed every level of public administration; the party committees directed the local 
246
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
councils, decisions were made centrally, and ﬁnances were distributed in the same way. 
Everything was organized hierarchically. After 1989, the post-communist states decided 
to follow the path of decentralization, which required a centrally imposed legal and 
political framework for the process of rendering local government independent from the 
state hierarchy. In countries like Hungary and Poland, there was pressure from below 
to promote the emerging local government, while other countries (e.g., Bulgaria) saw 
a national policy to implement a local self-government system without actual demand 
from the regions (Elander and Gustafsson 1991). 
A political party is deﬁned here as a group organized to support certain policies 
on matters of public interest. The aim of a political party is to elect oﬃcials who will 
try to carry out the party’s policies. Public interest issues informing the parties’ policies 
may range from peace, war, and taxes, to how people should earn a living or pragmatic 
questions such as whether or not to build a new bridge in the village.
In this chapter we will ﬁrst examine if it is possible to identify political party mem-
bers as delegates and independent candidates as trustees. The data will indicate that 
this works only for Estonia and Hungary. As the concepts of trustee and delegate are 
measured on the basis of whether the councilors prefer to vote according to their own 
views or on the basis of the opinion of their “group of special consideration,” the links 
between these variables will be examined as well. The second research question attempts 
to determine the distinct markers of the local politicians who can be characterized as 
delegates and trustees. We propose that in the case of trustees, a personal history of civic 
engagement and embeddedness in the municipality will be found. Delegates, on the 
other hand, are expected to be less involved in civic projects and less embedded in the 
municipality. The third question addresses the relation between the concept of delegate 
and trustee and the councilors’ declared representation of local versus national interests. 
Here we seek to identify the characteristics of the councilors who declare a preference 
for local rather than national interests. Can diﬀerences among them be explained on 
the basis of the distinction between delegate and trustee?
At the most general level, we adopt Chandler’s (1998) diﬀerentiation between elite 
and pluralistic theories for the purposes of our study. We will ask whether delegates can 
be described as typical councilors from the perspective of elite theories, which claim 
that the community is ruled by a group of inﬂuential party leaders, local businessmen, 
or civil servants. In the light of elite theory, the expectation is that councilors will nor-
mally vote in accordance with the position of the political party or other group that gave 
them the opportunity to become council members. In an analogous way we consider 
whether trustees, in their eﬀorts to ﬁnd out what is best for the community, might 
reﬂect the norms and assumptions of pluralistic theories. A categorical diﬀerentiation 
would clearly be rather simplistic, which is why such a link has only an indicative value. 
Moreover, the results of the research in all three countries indicate that the majority 
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of the councilors belong to neither of the two groups, as they decide how to vote on 
the basis of the particular situation. The concept is nevertheless given rather extensive 
attention due to the expected correlation between the representation of national versus 
local interests and the concept of delegates and trustees. It is expected that in at least 
one country delegates will declare a preference for the national interest while trustees 
will express preference for local interests.  
  As stated earlier, within the operational terms of the “Indicators Project” delegates 
are councilors who vote according to the opinions of their group of special consideration 
rather than according to their own views. Trustees, on the other hand, vote according 
to their own views.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Normative Standpoints
Some authors (Newton, Dunleavy, and Stoker) suggest that political parties have a 
tendency to separate the actual local issues from their local election campaign, which 
leads to a lack of accountability at the local level. Political parties present their national 
programs and local candidates are supported by national politicians, but local policies 
are often left out of the spotlight. The success of a political party at the local level is then 
determined by the position of the party at the national level. Such situations promote 
the phenomenon of local politicians as delegates, as they ﬁnd themselves in a position 
where the only thing that matters for their political success is their loyalty to the party 
secretariat. Later we will suggest, together with Kuroda and Wiatr (1974), that inde-
pendent candidates are more concerned about local issues. However, as Stoker (1991) 
would add, that does not necessarily make them more eﬃcient or more beneﬁcial for 
the community. Independent candidates’ concern for local issues can be understood 
as their primary motive in entering politics. Such candidates are not attracted by the 
possibility of furthering their political careers but by the opportunity to solve the issues 
they are concerned about. 
Be that as it may, the purposes of this chapter are essentially descriptive, not nor-
mative; that is, we do not intend to propose normative criticism of the role of political 
parties in local governance. The theoretical debates about this issue, however, necessarily 
include some important normative standpoints, such as the debate between protagonists 
of localism and their critics. For this reason the following section will present some of 
these normative highlights. 
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2.2 Local Decision-makers
Wiatr (1974, 261) highlights four contextual spheres which inﬂuence local government 
decision making:
 • The structural characteristics of the political system (to what extent the local 
government is autonomous)
 • Socio-economic conditions
 • Characteristics of the local leadership (the decision-makers themselves)
 • The extent and type of public participation in decision-making.
The third sphere—the characteristics of local leaders, especially in the context of 
their party membership or non-membership—is the one most relevant to the analysis 
in this chapter. The ﬁrst issue to be addressed is the motivation of local agents for their 
involvement in local politics. Our initial assumption is that some candidates get in-
volved in local politics because of their concern with local issues, while others see local 
politics as a good start for their future political career. Their concern is to get political 
experience and recognition that will help them get involved in national politics. An 
intuitive example of the reasonableness of this expectation is the fact that successful 
ex-mayors of big cities are usually unbeatable candidates in majority vote elections (e.g., 
Czech Senate elections). It would be tempting to assume that the ﬁrst group is mostly 
represented by independent candidates and the second one by political party members, 
but this is not necessarily the case. Also, it is important to stress that this distinction 
does not imply that either independent or political party agents will be better or more 
eﬃcient actors in local politics. 
The second question concerns how local leaders actually make their decisions. 
Chandler (1998, 251) proposes two ways of answering this question. The ﬁrst is in 
line with elite theory and asserts that local government bodies are controlled by small 
groups of political party chairs who are closely connected with local business circles 
and/or important civil servants. The second is based on pluralistic theories and claims 
that the elite persons who seem to make the ﬁnal authoritative decisions are forced—if 
they want to maintain their power—to acknowledge the requests of the larger groups 
that express the majority opinion in their respective communities. At the end of the 
day, the voters will judge them in elections on the basis of their perceived contribution 
to the welfare of the county.  
Chandler’s interpretation of elite and pluralistic theories at the level of local gov-
ernment is based on his observation that the construction of local politics in Europe 
is—even in the smallest communities—inﬂuenced by political parties. In discussing some 
European countries, he concludes that their local councils are not ruled by independent 
local councilors but by  certain political majorities. On the other hand, Kuroda (1974) 
presents a more “localist” approach and proposes a participatory model where the idea 
of local government springs from the explicit desire of the people to manage their local 
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aﬀairs. Kuroda claims that “citizens and residents of a community are interested in build-
ing self-governing bodies in the hope of improving the quality of their lives” (1974, 117). 
In illustrating this kind of interest, Kuroda mentions such diverse goals as the attraction 
of new industries or the conservation of the natural beauty of the community.
Both Kuroda’s participatory model and Chandler’s pluralistic theory stress the im-
portance of public participation in local decision-making.  They assume that people can 
actually make a diﬀerence and have a solid way of inﬂuencing local politics; they also 
suppose that citizens are interested in doing so. This research, however, is not intent on 
exploring the relations between civic participation and decision-making in detail. Instead 
it will look at the possible inﬂuence that previous, civic involvement of the councilors 
can have on their decision-making.
2.3 Criticism of Political Parties in Local Government
Stoker’s book, The Politics of Local Government (1991), based on an analysis of local 
government in the UK, opposes Kuroda’s localist ideas. Stoker sees local government as 
a focus for the broader conﬂicts between political parties, as well as an arena for political 
competition between business groups, trade unions, community action groups, ethnic 
minorities, etc. He describes the politicization of locally elected local governments 
through their opposition to the administration, as a consequence of growing party control 
over local authorities. “It is now almost universal practice for councilors of the same 
political party on an authority to organize themselves into a political group which meets 
to pre-determine the line to be taken on matters coming before the council,” contends 
Stoker (1991, 39). He goes on to stress the importance of values like group discipline, 
cohesion, and solidarity, which in his view are central to political party members. This can 
be supported by the observation that 92% of the Conservative and 99% of the Labour 
groups, when in power, vote together. Moreover, the argument goes, the organization 
of local authorities is based on party lines and, crucially, such politicization also entails 
the management and the strengthening of the parties and party organizations within the 
local government. This view, based on the situation in the UK, might be supported by 
the experience in several Central European countries where, in spite of a great number 
of independent councilors, most counties are controlled by coalitions composed of the 
same parties that cooperate at the national level. 
This tendency is particularly interesting against the background of what Malikova 
(1995) describes as the “unclear political orientation of campaigns at the town and vil-
lage or county level.” She claims that attempts to explain local politics in Central and 
Eastern Europe by a left-right diﬀerentiation lead only to confusion. “In the municipal 
elections the orientation prevailed more toward the solution of the real problems of towns 
and villages. Candidates tried hard to convince voters of their professional competency,” 
250
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
concludes Malikova (1995, 17). The question of why local alliances, which are primarily 
concerned with solving local issues, follow the same pattern of party cooperation as the 
party secretariats on the national level thus remains open.
As pointed out earlier, Chandler discusses the same phenomenon (local councils 
being controlled by party majorities), but he presents it in a rather localist light while 
describing pluralist theories: citizens can pressure their representatives by threatening 
not to elect them again. Chandler and Malikova both presuppose that local elections 
are decided on the basis of local political performance, local campaigns, and local issues. 
Stoker, on the other hand, claims that local elections are determined by national issues. 
Newton’s research (in Stoker, 1991, 52) on local elections in Birmingham between 1945 
and 1965 shows that local factors have a relatively insigniﬁcant impact on local election 
results. Stoker concludes by saying that a determined localist could argue that national 
party allegiances are structured in part by the performance of the parties at the local 
level; however, he implies that such consideration can be neglected. 
The broadly accepted journalistic approach seems to follow Stoker’s rather than 
Chandler’s conception. Recent local elections in Spain were interpreted as a victory 
of Prime Minister Aznar because his party managed to keep power in most counties. 
The implication is that the people in Andalusia, for example, were actually voting for 
Aznar and not for the local representatives that they thought were most ﬁt to deal with 
Andalusia’s aﬀairs. Similar stories are often heard throughout Europe and seem to sup-
port Stoker’s conclusions. 
Magnusson and Sancton (1983) list some further arguments against the involve-
ment of political parties at the local level, which have a long history and include the 
following:
 • Most local issues are “administrative” rather than “political” in character;
 • There is no point in having local issues entangled with acrimonious political 
party debates that have no inherent connection to them;
 • The presence of parties would result in favoritism in the awarding of contracts 
and the provision of services.
2.4 Supporting Arguments for Political Parties 
 in Local Government
Apart from the above criticisms of the dark side of political parties in local government, 
Stoker (1991, 49) argues (quoting the “Widdicombe Report”) that party politics in local 
government are both inevitable and desirable because they oﬀer the organizational basis 
through which citizens can achieve self-government and the services they want without 
direct participation. Political parties, according to him, also enable straightforward ac-
countability. Magnusson and Sancton (1983) add the further argument that political 
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parties bring a certain continuity to local politics, stimulate interest in it, and provide 
a good training ground for party activists.
Goldsmith and Rose (2000) claim that, especially in larger constituencies, there 
is not much diﬀerence between local and national politicians. The authors argue that 
both are in search of power and prestige. This claim can be taken as an extension of the 
point made by Magnusson and Sancton, that political parties bring continuity to local 
politics as well as people who are interested in furthering their political careers.
Another proponent of having classical political parties involved at the local level 
is Martin Saiz (1999). He claims that local political parties should be understood as 
“Janus-faced,” or double-faced, in that they are components  of national  organizations, 
on the one hand,  and speciﬁc  actors in  community politics, on the other. This claim 
would also be supported by Coulson (1995), who focuses on the establishment of local 
democracy in Eastern Europe. According to Coulson, the development of local agents 
is a minimum condition for the emergence of local autonomy, and the natural groups 
of such agents are local governments or the regional branches of political parties. Chap-
man and Malikova (1995) strengthen this view by saying that at least on the local level 
voters are more interested in personalities than in parties. Writing about Slovakia in the 
mid-nineties, they argue that “unstable groups have formed around personalities rather 
than on the basis of platforms or socio-economic cleavages” (1995, 65).  
  This theoretical section has addressed the role of political parties in local govern-
ance and attempted to examine its critics as well as its defenders. Critics of political 
parties in local government argue that political parties shift the attention far from local 
issues and cause local elections to be decided on the basis of the national policies of 
their respective parties; that they “politicize” local administrative issues; and that their 
involvement may result in favoritism when it comes to contracts and provision of 
services. The defenders argue that political parties provide the necessary organizational 
framework of self-government; they allow for straightforward accountability as well 
as continuity in local politics; and they also create opportunities for the develop-
ment of local politicians. The main link between the criticism of political parties in local 
government and Chandler’s elite theories would be the danger of favoritism, while the 
clearest link between the defense of  political parties and Chandler’s theory of pluralism 
is the accountability argument. 
As this research will focus on identifying delegates and trustees among the coun-
cilors, we propose that it is possible to link these concepts (delegate and trustee) to the 
theories (elite theories and pluralistic theories). Delegates can be seen as councilors 
presented in the elite theories. They give more consideration to their party or other 
group of special consideration, they have to be constantly accountable to the party 
or other group of special consideration, and they tend to vote in accordance with the 
positions of those parties or groups. Trustees are more in line with pluralistic theories. 
They see themselves as the people’s representatives, who have a mandate to follow their 
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own opinion on what is the best for the constituency. That is why they tend to be more 
independent from the party. 
2.5 What Goes on Inside Local Governments?
Political parties are, however, not the sole agents of local governance. In attempting to 
understand the real functioning of local governments, Stoker stresses the importance 
of examining the internal politics of local authorities. He tries to inquire “what goes on 
inside towns, boroughs, and county halls...” (1991, 89). As a way of getting at this ques-
tion he presents the following six models of how local governments might operate:
 1. The “joint elite” of senior oﬃcers and councilors. What happens according to this 
model is that the party chairs make the group accept decisions made by them-
selves and leading civil servants. However, Stoker claims that in Britain, lately, 
the opposite is more common: the political group instructs the civil oﬃcers 
what to do. This model was probably in some sense applicable in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the early ‘90s, when the newly elected representatives relied 
on the experience of the pre-1989 oﬃcials. 
 2. The ruling party group and party caucuses. This model is particularly important 
when the party is set on implementing its manifesto. The inner structure of 
decision-making within a political group can vary from the domination of an 
inner circle of senior members perhaps inﬂuenced by various interest groups, 
to giving the right to vote to all local party members, even to those who are 
not councilors. The main point is that the decision of the party is binding for 
all the councilors nominated by the respective party.
 3. Councilors as ward representatives. This category seems to represent an ideal type 
of the councilor-as-trustee. The councilors enhance local loyalties; they may have 
a history of activism in the community or at least in some single-issue cases; 
they have good contact with the voters and know how to handle local issues; 
moreover, they reintroduce an area dimension into policymaking. Stoker claims 
that, given some favorable circumstances, the ward councilors can be eﬀective 
in pursuing their goals.  However, he admits that the ward representatives are 
usually not involved in the policymaking process and thus cannot inﬂuence 
the major decisions aﬀecting their wards. It can be argued that potential eﬀorts 
of majority party councilors to represent the interests of their wards end up 
unfulﬁlled because of the pressure to follow the party line. At the same time, 
the demands of minority party councilors can easily be neglected.
 4. Interdepartmental conﬂicts. This model studies the intraorganizational politics of 
local authorities and is interested, for example, in the issue of professionalization 
of local government services.
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 5. Intradepartmental relations. The real inﬂuence in local government in this model 
is not based on a formal authority or hierarchy but rather on ideas, innovation, 
and solutions. That is why even junior oﬃcials can be actual motors of policy-
making.
 6. Interparty deals. Not many counties are ruled by only one party. The same kind of 
deal-making that takes place at the national level of politics can be found here. 
As this research is concerned with the inﬂuence of political parties on local govern-
ment and not on the role of civil servants or other agents, it will examine two scenarios 
based on this typology. The ﬁrst one proposes that all political party members and 
those who were nominated by a political party can be identiﬁed as delegates. From this 
perspective only independent candidates can be identiﬁed as trustees. This assumption 
is based on Stoker’s second model (the ruling party group and party caucuses). In this 
model it is the political party that formulates the policy, and when it makes its decision 
the party requires everyone to vote in accordance with it. 
The second scenario considers the situation of a ward representative who is at the 
same time a member of a political party and a political group within the municipal 
council. In this case it is possible to be a political party member and to perceive oneself 
as a trustee who is aware of the interests of the constituents in the ward and makes inde-
pendent decisions in their interest. This ward representative, it can be claimed, would be 
more embedded in the municipality and would have a history of civic engagement.
2.6 Tensions between Local and National Governments
Malikova (1995) claims that, on the most general level, a fundamental diﬀerence between 
local and central politics is the nature of the power that is available to local and national 
politicians. She argues that to attain political authority local elites are not required to 
have the same political capabilities as professional politicians who work in central gov-
ernment. “The speciﬁc professional ability of local politicians must include in-depth 
knowledge of local problems and the ability to work out local policies that will attract 
citizens to cooperative decision making about public aﬀairs” (1995, 7–8). The power 
of local elites is characterized by the uniqueness of local problems. Local authorities 
are confronted with the citizens’ immediate problems and they have the advantage of 
having personal inﬂuence on the formation of local public opinion. Local representa-
tives thus have a natural tendency towards independence in dealing with local issues. 
However, critics of localism point to the illusory nature of the claim that local power is 
independent from the center. They assert that local political power is always subordinate 
to the central government. That is why they consider the calls for local autonomy and 
independence to be based on political illusion. 
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Elander and Gustafsson (1991) as well as Vajdova (1995) argue that tensions be-
tween central and local government were present in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
early 1990s because of the legacy of the Soviet model of local government. As was said 
earlier, the Soviet model was based on party control of local councils which were not 
self-governing bodies but executive units of state administration. The tension between 
central and local government was in some cases related to the pressure from below to 
promote the emerging local self-government system on the one side and the national 
policy of implementing national democracy and a market-oriented economy on the 
other. In other countries, however, self-government was implemented as part of the 
national policy without any popular demand for such an arrangement. 
The period of transition was characterized by political decisions aimed at the 
establishment “of a renewed governance function of municipalities” (Malikova, 1995). 
The law established autonomous local units as legal bodies with independent budgets, 
property and sources of income. However, as Elander and Gustafsson (1991) point 
out, in some countries there is still a struggle between the center and the local govern-
ment due to the latter’s ﬁnancial dependence on the center, caused by the fact that the 
multidimensionality of local budgets (in which the center is not the only determinant) 
is not yet fully operating. Sopoci (1995) oﬀers a speciﬁc example of this general strug-
gle between central and local government during the transition period in Slovakia. He 
describes the formation of the Association of Towns and Villages of Slovakia (ZMOS) 
and a later clash between them and the center. “In fact, the representatives of the state 
and the deputies of Slovak towns and communities turned out to be bearers of polar-
opposite interests and proponents of diametrically diﬀering conceptions of how to build 
public administration in Slovakia—one of them highly center-oriented, and the other 
committed to decentralization and the devolution of power” (1995, 27). With this 
example in mind, it can be expected that local politicians, both delegates and trustees, 
will prefer to represent local rather than national interests. 
These tensions seem to have become a thing of the past, and the “national world 
of local government” (Rhodes 1991, 9) is now operating in most Central and Eastern 
European countries. According to this concept local government represents an institu-
tionalization of local interests and constitutes an arena for negotiations with the central 
state, while from the perspective of the central state it plays an integrative role in the 
sense of involving citizens. 
3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BULGARIA, ESTONIA, AND HUNGARY
This research is not concerned with the general state of local governance in Central and 
Eastern Europe, but focuses on the role of political parties in local government. Moreover, 
it addresses a very speciﬁc issue related to their role—do they tend to turn their members 
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into party trustees? As our analysis is based on data from the three selected countries, it 
can be expected that the results will diﬀer among the countries. The aim of this section is 
to point out some important structural diﬀerences in the roles of the political parties in 
those countries that might explain the diﬀerent results. Some studies (Baldersheim 1996, 
Bennett 1997) claim that political parties in local governance in Central and Eastern 
Europe are crystallized and clearly diﬀerentiated, since they relatively consistently and 
eﬀectively represent the interests of distinct groups of citizens. We can assume that due 
to the territorial as well as historical speciﬁcities of Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary, their 
political parties and also political cultures will function according to diﬀerent patterns. 
For this reason the research will not focus on diﬀerences between individual parties but 
will instead attempt to ﬁnd general tendencies within the countries.
Bennett (1997) presents an interesting historical argument according to which some 
diﬀerences among the post-communist countries can be explained on the basis of their pre-
1989 situation. He claims that countries with more liberal Communist Party regimes (such 
as Hungary) had already developed an increased level of local autonomy in the 1980s, unlike 
countries with a more conservative Communist Party rule (such as Bulgaria or the Czech 
Republic). This would mean that Hungary has a longer tradition of decentralization and local 
governance. At the same time, the new political parties were introduced only after 1989, so 
it is hard to argue that Hungary has a longer history of free public engagement. 
Some authors (Kandeva 2001, Ieda 2000) characterize the Bulgarian local govern-
ment as highly politicized. The central government plays a rather important role in local 
politics in that country because of the role of national parties and of governors who 
are appointed by the Council of Ministers. The local election system combines pro-
portional and majority systems—proportional for councilors and majority for mayors. 
As mentioned earlier, the national parties are dominant in local governments and they 
tend to form the same coalitions that operate at the national level. According to Ieda 
(2000), in the 1999 elections and in the previous one the coalitions were the United 
Democratic Forces and the Democratic Left.
Ieda (2000) also claims that in Hungary, unlike in Bulgaria, the national political par-
ties have little inﬂuence in the local politics of the villages because most of the councilors 
are independent of political parties. He states that up to 82.9% of local council members 
in Hungarian villages were independent in the early 1990s. This can be supported by 
the ﬁndings of Soós and Kálmán (2002), which show  that the role of political parties 
in Hungary depends on the size of the municipality. Soós and Kálmán argue that local 
party branches are more active in cities, while their organization in smaller communities 
is weak. “Parties in smaller municipalities tend to be brand names and frameworks for 
electoral campaigns rather than forums for political debate and interest aggregation” 
(Soós and Kálmán 2002). The autonomy of the local political party branches depends 
more on the organizational history of each party than on their political program and 
orientation. According to Horváth (2000), in Hungary there is a tradition of public 
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participation in the decision-making process. Direct methods include local referendum, 
public initiative, and public hearing. Citizens may also participate in local decision-
making through membership in committees of the representative bodies. 
Local political party branches play an important role in choosing the candidates 
in Estonia, and the candidates must comply with the political program of the party. 
Minorities also play an important role, especially in the cities. Horváth (2000) claims 
that although the Local Self-government Foundation Act states that forms of direct 
democracy can include meetings and referendums, these arrangements have not been 
extensively used. Moreover, on the few occasions when they were used in issues related 
to territorial division, only a very small number of citizens took part in them. 
In the three countries, the political culture and the legislation concerning local gov-
ernance are generally quite similar. But there are three areas of diﬀerences related to the 
role of political parties in local governance. First, the number of independent candidates 
seems to be high in Hungary and low in Bulgaria, with Estonia falling in the middle in 
this respect. Second, it appears that the central government has a greater inﬂuence in 
Bulgaria than in the remaining two countries. Third, the level of public participation 
in Hungary is probably higher than in both Estonia and Bulgaria. 
4. METHODOLOGY
The analysis section will focus on the relationship between the concept of delegates and 
trustees on the one hand and the declared preference for national versus local interests 
on the other. We also examine whether party members can be identiﬁed as delegates 
and independent councilors as trustees. The descriptive statistics already show that there 
are major diﬀerences in key variables among the countries under study. These include 
party membership of the councilors (274, MEMBPART), frequency of explaining their 
position to their fellow party members (162, ACCPARTY), relevance ascribed to various 
groups of special consideration (169, RPRPARTY), embeddedness in the municipal-
ity (293, TIMEMUNI), and ascribed preference of local versus national interests (98, 
LOCALISM). These basic diﬀerences among the three countries will be interpreted on 
the basis of the relevant literature mentioned in the theoretical section. Following these 
descriptions, the analysis will focus on answering three main research questions:
 1. Is it possible to identify councilors who are political party members and/or who 
were nominated by a political party as delegates and independent candidates as 
trustees?
 2. What are the distinct markers of those local politicians who are characterized 
as trustees or delegates?
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 3. Are the councilors who declare their preference for national rather than local 
interests political party members? Is it possible to explain a preference for national 
over local interests on the basis of the concept of delegates and trustees? 
Question 1
The “Indicators Project” identiﬁes delegates as councilors who vote in accordance with 
the position of their groups of special consideration. Trustees, on the other hand, vote 
according to their own opinion (175, TRUSTEE). This research question examines 
whether it is possible to identify councilors who are political party members (274, 
MEMBPART), and/or who were nominated by a political party (206,207, NOMPARTI) 
as delegates. Apart from correlations between these variables, multivariate analysis will 
be involved and the following variables will be given special attention:
 • Special consideration: citizens (166, RPRVOTER)
 • Special consideration: municipal area (168, RPRAREA)
 • Special consideration: party (169, RPRPARTY)
 • Special consideration: certain occupational groups (170, RPROCCGR)
 • Special consideration: all inhabitants (168, RPRALL)
 • Special consideration: ethnic groups (171, RPRETH)
 • Special consideration: central government (172, RPRGOV)
 • Frequency of explanation: party members (162, ACCPARTY)
 • Frequency of explanation: own constituency (165, ACCCONST)
 • Vote with majority (281, MAJMIN)
Question 2
This research question undertakes to explain “what causes a trustee to be a trustee” and 
“what causes a delegate to be a delegate.” This part of the research proposes that trustees 
will have a veriﬁable history of civic engagement (measured on the basis of declared 
organization or participation in demonstrations and petitions) and of embeddedness in 
the municipality. The delegates, on the other hand, are expected to be less involved in 
civic projects and less embedded in the municipality. At this stage we will also examine 
whether NGO membership or nomination by an NGO to public oﬃce have an inﬂu-
ence on how the councilor votes. 
Question 3
This primarily examines the relation between political party membership (274, MEM-
BPART) and position on the scale measuring the ascribed priority of national versus 
local goals (98, LOCALISM). The latter variable will also be tested with the concept of 
delegate/trustee (175, TRUSTEE). The analyses will also examine interfering variables 
and the relevance of the following variables:
 • Central government as a group of special consideration (172, RPRGOV)
 • The level of trust in the central government (138, PTRGOV)
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4.1 Working Hypotheses
Question 1
H1: Political partly members (274, MEMBPART) will vote as delegates (175, TRUS-
TEE) while independent candidates will behave as trustees.
This hypothesis proposes that political party members and those who were nomi-
nated by a political party can be identiﬁed as delegates. From this perspective, only 
independent candidates can be identiﬁed as trustees. This assumption is based on Stoker’s 
second model (the ruling party group and party caucuses). It is the political party that 
formulates the policy, and when it makes its decision the party requires everyone to 
vote in accordance with it.
Question 2
H2: Trustees (175, TRUSTEE) and independent candidates (274, MEMBPART) have a 
proven history of civic engagement, measured on the basis of the following variables:
 • They are more likely to have a membership in an NGO (244, NGOMEMB)
 • They will more often participate in demonstrations (283, ACTDEMO)
 • They will more often sign petitions (284, ACTPETI)
 • They will more often organize these (285, ACTORGA)
This hypothesis is based on Stoker’s model of ward representatives, characterized 
as councilors who are aware of the interests of their wards and make independent deci-
sions in their interests.
Question 3
H3: Trustees (175, TRUSTEE) and independent candidates (274, MEMBPART) will 
ascribe priority to solving local problems (98, LOCALISM).
This hypothesis is based on the earlier discussion of Malikova’s text in section 2.3 
on tensions between local and national governments.
5. ANALYSIS 
5.1 Political Parties and Descriptive Statistics
The data show an important diﬀerence in the frequency of councilors holding a political 
party membership among the three countries in our study. There is also a major diﬀer-
ence in the number of councilors who were nominated by a political party in the last 
elections, which leads us to consider that the role of political parties in local governance 
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may be fundamentally diﬀerent in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hungary. The country results 
are as follows:
 • In Bulgaria 86.1% (802) of the respondents were party members, while only 
13.9% (129) did not have a party membership. At the same time, 94.8% (907) 
of the respondents were nominated by a political party in the last local elections 
(either by a party in which the councilor had a membership or another one). 
 • In Estonia 52% (502) of the respondents were party members and 48% (464) 
non-members. Those nominated by a political party (either a party in which 
the councilor had a membership or another one) comprised 68.2% (670).
 • In Hungary only 34.7% (320) of the respondents were party members and 
65.3% (601) non-members. Those nominated by a political party (either a party 
in which the councilor had a membership or another one) comprised 45.5% 
(447).
These descriptive ﬁndings support Ieda’s (2000) claim that unlike in Bulgaria, na-
tional political parties have little inﬂuence on local politics in Hungarian villages since 
most of the councilors are independent of political parties.
Table 6.1 presents the means of two relevant answers to the question: “How fre-
quently are you requested by the following people to explain your position on a local 
public issue?” A higher number indicates higher frequency. Only in Bulgaria are party 
members more often required to explain their position to the party members than to 
the constituency. The diﬀerence in this value particularly is rather high, particularly 
between Bulgaria and Hungary.
Table 6.1
 Frequency of Requests to Explain Position (Means)
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary
Party members 3.12 2.54 2.36
Own constituency 2.76 2.67 2.98
Table 6.2
Groups of Special Consideration (Means)
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary
All inhabitants 6.07 5.86 6.10
Voters 5.73 5.17 6.15
Party 4.75 4.41 4.26
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Table 6.2 shows the means of declared special consideration given by councilors 
to diﬀerent groups of people. It is interesting to note that the political party has in 
general a much lower value than all inhabitants of the municipality as well as voters. 
The value is lowest in Hungary and highest in Bulgaria. It is also worth noticing that 
voters are seen as a more important group of special consideration than all inhabitants 
only in Hungary.
For the purpose of identifying delegates and trustees, the respondents were asked 
the following question: “Sometimes there may be a conﬂict between what you yourself 
believe is a correct decision for your municipality and the opinion among groups of 
people for whom you have special consideration. In such instances, do you usually fol-
low your own opinion or the opinion of the groups of people?” The question measured 
their declared independence, as they had to say if they usually follow their own opinion, 
the opinion of the groups of people, or if it diﬀers depending on the situation. The 
results are as follows:
 • In Bulgaria 23.3% of respondents answered that they vote according to their 
own opinion, 13.3% follow the opinion of the groups of people, and for 63.4% 
it depends on the situation.
 • In Estonia 17.6% said they vote according to their own opinion, 9.1% usually 
follow the opinion of the groups of people, and 73.3% claim that it depends 
on the situation. 
 • In Hungary 18.2% declared that vote according to their own opinion, 10.4% 
follow the opinion of the groups of people, and 71.4% said that it depends on 
the situation.
These data indicate that a higher number of councilors claims to follow their own 
opinion in Bulgaria than in the two other countries, but also a higher number claims 
to follow the opinion of the groups of people. Respondents in Hungary and Estonia 
tend to decide on the basis of a particular situation more often. The data also show 
remarkably similar percentages between Hungary and Estonia.
When it comes to the issue of embeddedness in the municipality, the lower mean 
value shows a longer period of time that the respondents lived in the locality. The means 
are 1.31 for Bulgaria, 1.17 for Estonia, and 1.44 for Hungary. This would lead to the 
conclusion that councilors in Hungary live for a shorter time in their municipality than 
in the other two countries, but the data generally indicate very high levels of embed-
dedness. This means that most of the councilors live either their entire lives or for a very 
long period of time in the municipalities they represent.
Another important variable (LOCALISM) measures the declared position on a 
seven-point scale between the following statements: “Achieving national goals must 
always take priority over solving local problems” versus “Solving local problems must 
always take priority over achieving national goals.” The cumulative percentages indicat-
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ing preference of national goals to local problems show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence among 
the respective countries. In Bulgaria 48.2% of respondents declare national goals to be 
the priority, compared to 19.1% in Estonia and 13.3% in Hungary. These data strongly 
resonate with the theoretical claim by Kandeva (2001) and Ieda (2000) that there is 
a higher inﬂuence of the central government in Bulgaria than in the remaining two 
countries. It seems that in Bulgaria there is not only stronger inﬂuence of the central 
government on the local one but the local representatives also acknowledge the priority 
of the national goals. 
5.2 Can Political Party Members Be Identified as Delegates?
This section will present the answer to the ﬁrst working hypothesis separately for each 
country. After this overview we will learn if it is possible to identify political party mem-
bers as delegates and independent candidates as trustees on the basis of the available 
data. Cramer’s V is usually used as the correlation coeﬃcient between an ordinal and 
a nominal variable, while Pearson’s coeﬃcient is used between two ordinal variables. 
Asresid (adjusted residual) is indicated in cases where it is higher than 1.5 and there 
is not a high enough correlation or the correlation is not signiﬁcant. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the signiﬁcance of the correlation is 99%.
Bulgaria
Political party members in Bulgaria give special consideration to their party as they are 
more often asked by their party to give explanations, but it cannot be said that they vote 
according to the opinion of the party or other groups of people rather that according 
to their own view. It is not possible to identify political party members as delegates. 
At the same time, it is not possible to identify independent candidates as trustees. This 
situation can be partly explained by the fact that almost all councilors in Bulgaria were 
nominated to their function by a political party. More detailed analysis shows that:
 • Members of political parties in Bulgaria are more often asked to explain their 
position to fellow party members (Cramer’s V=0.451). In the case of those who 
were nominated by the party as members, Cramer’s V=0.396. In the case of 
those who were nominated by another party, Cramer’s V=0.326.
 • Members of political parties in Bulgaria list their political party as a more im-
portant group of special consideration (Cramer’s V=0.285). In the case of those 
who were nominated by a party as members Cramer’s V=0.282. In the case of 
those who were nominated by another party Cramer’s V=0.205. 
 • Members of political parties in Bulgaria more often do not follow the opinions 
of groups of special consideration. There is not a signiﬁcant correlation, but the 
asresid=1.5. (In the case of those who were nominated by a party as members 
other party, asresid=2.4.)
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Table 6.3 shows a medium correlation between giving special consideration to party 
and to voters, central government, occupational groups, ethnic groups, and frequency 
of explanation to party members. A smaller correlation was found between special 
consideration to party and voting with the majority. Interestingly enough, there is no 
signiﬁcant correlation between special consideration given to the party and special 
consideration given to all inhabitants. When it comes to special consideration to all 
inhabitants, there is only small correlation with voting with the majority and a very 
small correlation with frequency of explanation to own constituency. There is also very 
small negative correlation with special consideration to municipal area. 
When studying the relation between delegates/trustees and groups of special 
consideration, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation in the case of political party (Cramer’s 
V=0.125, signiﬁcance 93%), occupational group (Cramer’s V=0.127, signiﬁcance 
93%), and central government (Cramer’s V=0.136, signiﬁcance 98%). 
From this we can conclude that politicians who give more special consideration 
to party, central government, and occupational groups vote as delegates. They are also 
Table 6.3
Bulgaria (Pearson Correlation)
 Special consideration: 
voters of respondent
Special consideration: 
all inhabitants
Special consideration: 
party
Special consideration: voters 1.000 0.072(*) 0.349(**)
Special consideration:
municipal area
0.285(**) –0.088(**) 0.211(**)
Special consideration:
all inhabitants
0.072(*) 1.000 –0.021
Special consideration: party 0.349(**) –0.021 1.000
Special consideration: 
certain occupational groups
0.208(**) –0.078(*) 0.335(**)
Special consideration: 
ethnic groups
0.131(**) 0.001 0.333(**)
Special consideration:
central government
0.133(**) 0.055 0.350(**)
Vote with majority 0.040 0.101(**) 0.149(**)
Frequency of explanation: 
party members
0.060 0.035 0.246(**)
Frequency of explanation: 
own constituency
–0.001 0.076(*) –0.004
Note: *  Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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more often expected to explain their position to party members. In comparison with 
the data from other countries it will be shown that this group of councilors in Bulgaria 
is not as linked with their municipal area.
Estonia
The results show that political party members in Estonia are more often asked to explain 
their position to party members and they give more special consideration to the party. 
Also, they vote according to the opinion of the party rather than following their own 
opinion. They can be identiﬁed as delegates. It is also possible to identify the independ-
ent candidates as trustees.
More detailed analysis shows that:
 • Members of political parties in Estonia vote less often according to their own 
opinion (delegates) Asresid=–1.9
 • Members of political parties in Estonia are more often asked to explain their 
position to fellow party members (Cramer’s V=0.364). In the case of those who 
were nominated by a party as members, Cramer’s V=0.340, while if they were 
nominated by another party, Cramer’s V=0.170.
Table 6.4
Estonia (Pearson Correlation)
 
Special consideration: 
voters of respondent
Special consideration: 
all inhabitants
Special consideration: 
party
Special consideration: voters 1.000 0.012 0.340(**)
Special consideration: 
municipal area
0.346(**) –0.046 0.216(**)
Special consideration: 
all inhabitants
0.012 1.000 0.002
Special consideration: party 0.340(**) 0.002 1.000
Special consideration: 
certain occupational groups
0.239(**) –0.109(**) 0.400(**)
Special consideration:
ethnic groups
0.231(**) –0.031 0.341(**)
Special consideration: 
central government
0.221(**) 0.001 0.425(**)
Frequency of explanation: 
party members
0.136(**) 0.072(*) 0.256(**)
Frequency of explanation: 
own constituency
0.071(*) 0.119(**) –0.038
Vote with majority 0.058 –0.042 0.095(*)
Note: *  Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
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 • Members of political parties in Estonia list their political party as a more im-
portant group of special consideration (Cramer’s V=0.236).
Table 6.4 demonstrates a rather strong correlation between special consideration to 
party and special consideration to central government and occupational groups. It also 
shows a medium correlation between special consideration to party and consideration to 
ethnic groups, voters, and municipal area as well as frequency of explaining their position 
to party members. In the case of special consideration to all inhabitants there is a small 
correlation with the frequency of explaining their position to their own constituency 
and a small negative correlation with special consideration to occupational groups.
Table 6.4 indicates that politicians who give more special consideration to their party 
also give more consideration to the central government and to occupational groups. 
They also give more consideration to the ethnic groups, voters, and municipal areas. 
Also, they are more often expected to explain their position to party members. Coun-
cilors who give more special consideration to all inhabitants are more often expected 
to explain their position to their constituency and they give less special consideration 
to occupational groups. The comparison with the other countries shows that there is 
a stronger link between councilors who give special consideration to their party and 
to central government as well as occupational groups. However, there is no signiﬁcant 
correlation of these variables with the delegate/trustee dichotomy.
Hungary
The results show that political party members in Hungary are more often expected to 
explain their position to the party (particularly if they were nominated by the party as 
members), and they give special consideration to the party as well as to their voters, 
but they give less consideration to all the inhabitants of the municipality. Political party 
members also tend to vote more often according to the opinion of the party or another 
group of people rather than according to their own opinion. They can be identiﬁed as 
delegates. We can also say that the independent candidates tend to give more special 
consideration to all inhabitants and vote more often according to their own opinion. 
They can be identiﬁed as trustees. 
More detailed analysis shows that:
 • Members of political parties in Hungary are more often asked to explain their 
position to fellow party members (Cramer’s V=0.632). In the case of those who 
were nominated by their political party as members, Cramer’s V=0.705, while 
if they were nominated by another party, Cramer’s V=0.243.
 • Members of political parties in Hungary list their political party as a more im-
portant group of special consideration (Cramer’s V=0.46). In the case of those 
who were nominated by a party as members, Cramer’s V=0.501, while if they 
were nominated by another party, Cramer’s V=0.191.
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 • Members of political parties in Hungary list all inhabitants of the municipality 
as a less important group of special consideration (Cramer’s V=0.231). In the 
case of those who were nominated by a party as members, Cramer’s V=0.255. 
 • Members of political parties in Hungary more often follow the opinion of their 
groups of  special consideration (Cramer’s V=0.108; signiﬁcance of 95%).
 • Political party members give more consideration to the voters. Asresid of party 
members giving very little consideration to the voters is –2.2, while it is 2.2 
for the non-members. This result is rather surprising, but it can be argued that 
the political party members have a closer connection with their voters because 
they view them as supporters of the party. 
 • Councilors who were nominated by an NGO as its members tend to vote 
according to the opinion of their group of special consideration. The respec-
tive asresid=2.6. This can be explained by the fact that as representatives of an 
NGO they are expected to be its delegates. It is also possible that some politi-
cal groups have the status of an NGO but at the same time play the role of a 
political party.
Table 6.5 shows that, unlike in the previous two cases, special consideration to voters 
does not have the strongest correlation with special consideration to party, but it does 
correlate with special consideration to municipal area. However, there is not a correla-
tion with “special consideration to all inhabitants.” The variable “special consideration 
to party” strongly correlates with the frequency of explanation to party members. There 
is also a medium correlation between special consideration to party and special consid-
eration to occupational groups, municipal area, and voters. A smaller correlation was 
found between special consideration to party and special consideration to central govern-
ment, minority self-government, and regional government. There is a negative correla-
tion between special consideration to party and special consideration to all inhabitants. 
The variable “special consideration to all inhabitants” has little correlation with “special 
consideration to ethnic groups,” central government, regional government, and minority 
self-government. However, there are similar levels of correlation between those variables 
and special consideration to party. There is also a small negative correlation between spe-
cial consideration to all inhabitants and frequency of explanation to party members. 
Table 6.5 shows that politicians who give more special consideration to the party 
also give more consideration to occupational groups, to municipal areas, and to their 
voters. They also give more consideration to the central government and minority self-
government. On the other hand, they give less consideration to all inhabitants. The 
comparison with the other countries shows that the councilors who give more special 
consideration to the party in Hungary are more concerned about the municipal area 
and the occupational groups. Those who give more consideration to all inhabitants are 
less often asked to explain their position to party members.
266
F A C E S  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y
Table 6.5
Hungary (Pearson Correlation)
 Special consideration: 
voters of respondent
Special consideration: 
all inhabitants
Special consideration: 
party
Special consideration: 
voters of respondent
1.000 0.020 0.284(**)
Special consideration: 
municipal area
0.483(**) –0.042 0.381(**)
Special consideration: 
all inhabitants
0.020 1.000 –0.136(**)
Special consideration: party 0.284(**) –0.136(**) 1.000
Special consideration: 
certain occupational groups
0.200(**) –0.001 0.384(**)
Special consideration: 
ethnic groups
0.191(**) 0.153(**) 0.272(**)
Special consideration: 
central government
0.141(**) 0.151(**) 0.224(**)
Special consideration: 
regional or county government
0.096(**) 0.209(**) 0.157(**)
Special consideration: 
Minority self-government 
(HU only)
0.091(*) 0.169(**) 0.205(**)
Frequency of explanation: 
party members
0.147(**) –0.189(**) 0.636(**)
Frequency of explanation: 
own constituency
0.120(**) 0.040 0.098(*)
Vote with majority 0.018 0.038 –0.079(*)
Note: *  Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. 
5.3 Who Are the Delegates and Who Are the Trustees?
Bulgaria
Hypothesis H2 (that trustees and independent candidates have a proven history of 
civic engagement) cannot be accepted in the case of Bulgaria. There was only a small 
correlation supporting the claim that delegates less often participate in demonstrations 
(Cramer’s V=0.108, signiﬁcance: 95%). 
Estonia
In the case of Estonia, it can be said that independent candidates have a proven history 
of civic engagement. However, there is a signiﬁcant correlation in only two out of four 
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indicators. The other two indicators show a certain tendency (asresid) which supports 
the hypothesis. At the same time, it cannot be said that trustees have a proven history 
of civic engagement. Nor can it be said that either independent candidates or trustees 
are more embedded in the municipality. 
More detailed analysis shows that: 
 • Independent candidates in Estonia will more likely have a membership in an 
NGO (see table 6.6). The correlation is rather small (Cramer’s V=0.163).
 • Independent candidates in Estonia sign petitions more often. The correlation 
is rather small  (Cramer’s V=0.140).
 • Independent candidates in Estonia more often participate in demonstrations. 
Asresid=1.3; there is no signiﬁcant correlation.
 • Independent candidates in Estonia more often organize these. Asresid=1.5; there 
is no signiﬁcant correlation.  
Hungary
The Hungarian results are very surprising as they indicate that political party members 
as well as those who give more special consideration to party are more involved in civic 
activities. At the same time, party members are less embedded in the municipality than 
independent candidates. No correlation was found between trustees and the indicators 
of civic engagement or embeddedness in the municipality.
How is it possible that political party members are more publicly engaged while 
independent councilors are more embedded in their municipalities? Perhaps this can 
be explained by the fact that most of the political party members as well as those who 
give more special consideration to parties live in larger cities where they have more op-
portunities for civic engagement. This may also explain why independent candidates are 
more embedded in their municipalities. The correlation between size of municipality 
and party membership is very high (Cramer’s V=0.690).
More detailed analysis shows that: 
Table 6.6
Party and NGO Membership in Estonia
Party membership
 
Position in civic organization
No Yes Total
Party member
 
Count 282.0 99.0 381.0
Adjusted residual 4.4 –4.4  
Non-member
 
Count 203.0 143.0 346.0
Adjusted residual –4.4 4.4
Total Count 485.0 242.0 727.0
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 • Independent candidates in Hungary are not more likely to have a membership 
in an NGO. In fact, table 6.7 shows that the contrary is true. The members 
of political parties are more often members of NGOs in Hungary (Cramer’s 
V= 0.147).
 • Independent candidates in Hungary do not more often participate in dem-
onstrations. Table 6.8 shows that the correlation is the reverse: political party 
members more often participate in demonstrations (Cramer’s V=0.357).
 • Councilors who give less special consideration to the party in Hungary do not 
participate more often in demonstrations. On the contrary, the councilors who 
give more special consideration to the party more often participate in demon-
strations (Cramer’s V=0.240).
 • Independent candidates in Hungary do not sign petitions more often. Petitions 
are more often signed by party members (Cramer’s V=0.334).
 • Councilors who give less special consideration to the party in Hungary do not 
sign petitions more often. Councilors who give more special consideration to 
the party will more often sign petitions (Cramer’s V=0.269). 
Table 6.7
Party and NGO Membership in Hungary
Party membership
 
Position in civic organization
Non-member Member Total
Party member
 
Count 109.0 180.0 289.0
Adjusted residual –4.2 4.2  
Non-member
 
Count 274.0 243.0 517.0
Adjusted residual 4.2 –4.2
Total Count 383.0 423.0 806.0
Table 6.8
Party Membership and Participation in Demonstrations in Hungary
Party membership
 
Participation in demonstration in previous year
Not marked Marked Total
Party member
 
Count 224.0 96.0 320.0
Adjusted residual –10.8 10.8  
Non-member
 
Count 774.0 27.0 601.0
Adjusted residual 10.8 –10.8
Total Count 798.0 123.0 921.0
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Table 6.9
Party Membership and Embeddedness in the Municipality in Hungary
Party membership
 
Embeddedness in mMunicipality
All life Long time Short time Never Total
Party member
 
Count 164.0 133.0 8.0 8.0 313.0
Adjusted residual –3.9 3.6 –0.7 3.0  
Non-member
 
Count 388.0 181.0 20.0 2.0 591.0
Adjusted residual 9.9 –3.6 0.7 –3.0
Total Count 552.0 314.0 28.0 10.0 904.0
 • Independent candidates in Hungary do not organize petitions more often. Party 
members will more often organize these (Cramer’s V=0.282).
 • Councilors who give less special consideration to the party in Hungary do not 
organize petitions more often. Councilors who give more special consideration 
to the party will more often organize these (Cramer’s V=0.195).
 • Independent candidates in Hungary are more embedded in the municipality. 
This is demonstrated well in table 6.9 (Cramer’s V=0.162).
 • Councilors who were nominated by an NGO as its members tend to vote ac-
cording to the opinion of their group of special consideration. The respective 
asresid=2.6. This can be explained by the fact that as representatives of an NGO 
they are expected to be its delegates. It is also possible that some political groups 
have the status of an NGO but at the same time play the role of a political 
party.
5.4 Local versus National Interests
In this section we examine the relation between councilors’ preference for local versus 
national interests, on the one side, and the trustee/delegate dichotomy as well as their 
status as political party member or independent candidate, on the other side. At the 
same time, attention is paid to the variables “central government as a group of special 
consideration” and “level of trust in the central government” as supporting indicators 
of the local versus national orientation.
Bulgaria
We can say that councilors who declare a preference for solving local problems rather 
than advancing national goals in Bulgaria are trustees. They give less special considera-
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tion to the party and they do not aspire to a future political career. On the other hand, 
there is no correlation between political party membership and any of the indicators 
of local/national interests. However, when party membership is used as a controlling 
variable, there is a signiﬁcant correlation between delegate/trustee and national/local 
goals only in the case of party members (Cramer’s V=0.161).
More detailed analysis shows that:
 • Bulgarian data only show a correlation between variables “trust to central gov-
ernment” and “central government as a group of special consideration” (Pearson 
correlation=0.272). “Ascribed priority to achieving national goals” versus “solving 
local problems” did not correlate with these. 
 • The councilors who ascribe priority to solving local problems over national 
goals in Bulgaria tend to vote more often according to their own view (trustees). 
(Cramer’s V=0.146).
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Bulgaria 
(delegates) will less often vote according to their own view (Cramer’s V=0.136).
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Bulgaria 
will more often give special consideration to the party (Somers’ D=0.281).
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Bulgaria 
tend to aspire to a political career on the national level.  The respective asresids 
=1.6 versus –2.0.
Estonia
Councilors who declare a preference for solving local problems rather than national 
goals in Estonia can be considered trustees, as they give less special consideration to the 
party and they do not aspire to a future political career on the national level. On the 
other hand, there is no correlation between political party membership and any of the 
indicators of local/national interests.
 • The Estonian data only show a correlation between the variables “trust in cen-
tral government” and “central government as a group of special consideration” 
(Pearson correlation=0.182). Ascribing priority to achieving national goals versus 
solving local problems did not correlate with these.
 • The councilors who ascribe priority to solving local problems over advancing 
national goals in Estonia tend to vote more often according to their own view 
(trustees). Asresid=2.4
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Estonia 
will more often give special consideration to the party (Somers’ D=0.331).
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Estonia 
will less often vote according to their own view (delegates). Asresid=3.1.
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 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Estonia 
tend to aspire to a political career on the national level (the respective 
asresids=2.8).
Hungary
Councilors who declare their preference for solving local problems rather than national 
goals in Hungary can be considered trustees, as they give less special consideration to the 
party, do not aspire to a future political career on the national level, and do not have a 
professional political background. On the other hand, there is no correlation between 
political party membership and any of the indicators of local/national interests. However, 
when party membership is used as a controlling variable, there is a signiﬁcant correla-
tion between delegate/trustee and national/local goals only in the case of independent 
candidates (Cramer’s V=0.157, signiﬁcance 95%).
Hungarian data show a correlation between the variables “trust in central govern-
ment” and “central government as a group of special consideration” and “ascribe priority to 
local/national goals.” Table 6.10 demonstrates the data, using Pearson Correlations.
 • The councilors who ascribe priority to solving local problems over advancing 
national goals in Hungary  tend to vote more often according to their own view 
(trustees). Cramer’s V=0.133.
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Hun-
gary will less often vote according to their own view (delegates). The respective 
asresid=2.8.
 • The councilors who give special consideration to central government in Hungary 
will more often give special consideration to the party (Somers’ D=0.235).
 • The councilors who ascribe priority to solving local problems over advancing 
national goals in Hungary do not tend to aspire to a political career on the 
national level (the respective asresids=2.0).
 • The councilors who ascribe priority to solving local problems over advancing 
national goals in Hungary do not tend to have professional political training 
(the respective asresids=–2.1).
Table 6.10
Representation of Local vs. National Interests in Hungary 
National or 
local goals
Trust 
central government
Special consideration 
for party
National or local goals 1.000 –0.77 (sig. 95%) –0.122
Trust central government –0.770 (sig. 95%) 1.000 0.202
Special consideration for party –0.122 0.202 1.000
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have attempted to examine the role of political parties in three Central 
and Eastern European countries and to propose a possible theoretical generalization of 
the results. The primary objective was to identify delegates and trustees among local 
politicians. The ﬁrst step of the ﬁrst research question focused on testing whether it is 
possible to identify political party members as trustees and independent candidates as 
delegates. The second research question tried to answer the question: “What are the 
distinct indicators of local politicians who can be characterized as delegates or trustees?” 
The third research question searched for links between the concept of delegates and 
trustees and their declared representation of national versus local interests.
In our earlier theoretical discussion the task was to ﬁnd a deﬁnition suitable for 
identifying delegates and trustees. Delegates, we said, can be seen as councilors who 
give more consideration to their political party than to their constituents, who tend to 
vote in accordance with the position of the party, and have to be constantly account-
able to it. Trustees see themselves as  representatives of the people and tend to be more 
independent of the political party, voting on the basis of their own opinion of what is 
the best for the community. 
Section 3 of this chapter highlighted relevant diﬀerences in the local governments 
of the three countries. Namely, a higher number of independent councilors in Hungary, 
a greater inﬂuence of the central government on local issues in Bulgaria, and a higher 
level of public participation in Hungary. These claims were based on pertinent literature 
and are, in fact, supported by the data of the “Indicator Project.” The description of the 
data shows that almost 95% of the Bulgarian councilors were nominated to their posi-
tion by a political party,  68% in Estonia, and only 46% in Hungary. The description 
also shows that only the councilors in Bulgaria are more often required to explain their 
position to their party than to their constituency. 
The most relevant contribution of the research is that it reveals a correlation between 
the concept of delegates and trustees, on the one hand, and councilors’ declaration that 
they represent national or local interests, on the other. The correlation was present in 
the case of all three countries. We found that councilors who declared a preference for 
solving local problems rather than pursuing national goals voted more often accord-
ing to their own opinion (trustees), gave less special consideration to the party, had no 
aspiration for a future political career on the national level, and in the case of Hungary, 
did not have professional political training. At the same time, there was no correlation 
between preference for national versus local goals and political party membership. This 
result suggests that the dividing line between councilors who are more oriented to local 
or national goals is more related to the concept of delegates or trustees rather than to 
party membership. The data for Bulgaria and Hungary show that party membership 
has an inﬂuence on the relation between the other variables; this link should be studied 
in more detail in the future.
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The research also found a correlation between political party membership and the 
concept of delegates in Hungary and Estonia. The Bulgarian data did not sustain this 
link, probably because almost all councilors in Bulgaria were nominated to their func-
tion by a political party. At the same time, there was link in Bulgaria between being a 
delegate and giving special consideration to the party, occupational group, and central 
government. This is a tendency that supports the working hypothesis.
In our eﬀort to identify what characterizes delegates and trustees in terms of civic 
engagement, embeddedness in the municipality, professional political training, and 
plans for the future, no signiﬁcant links appeared. However, the data do indicate that 
independent candidates in Estonia are more involved in civic activities. In Hungary, 
surprisingly, the political party members are more engaged in civic activities. This can 
be explained by the fact that most Hungarian political party members live in larger 
constituencies, which oﬀer them more opportunities for civic engagement. 
The theoretical contribution of the research can be discerned at three levels. First, it 
has conﬁrmed  the empirical observations about each country-case that were reviewed 
in the relevant literature. Second, a link between the concept of delegates and trustees 
and the focus on councilors’ representation of national or local issues was demonstrated. 
Finally, the research has contributed to verifying the validity of these deﬁnitions in the 
particular comparison of the three Central and Eastern European countries in our study. 
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Institutional Balance in Local Government: 
Council, Mayor, and City Manager 
in Local Policymaking1 
Georg Sootla, Kristina Grau
ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an analysis of variations in the horizontal institutional conﬁgura-
tion of local governance in Hungary, Estonia and Latvia. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the 
variation in the distribution of authority between institutions and in the decision-making 
behaviour of the local councils. 
According to our results, Latvia clearly follows the committee model of local 
governance, which puts policymaking authority in the hands of the council and its 
commissions, and which is conducive to the establishment of close contacts with civil 
society. In Estonia, the institutional conﬁguration of local authorities is rather close to 
the cabinet model of local governance, in which policymaking authority is distributed 
between the majority coalition and a strong political executive. This conﬁguration leaves 
little room for initiatives from individual politicians in policy formation or in contact 
with citizens. Hungary belongs to the mayoral model of local governance, in which the 
council’s signiﬁcant authority is balanced by the rather separate administrative author-
ity of a local manager (the notary). The division of policymaking authority between 
them depends largely on whether the directly elected mayor commands a majority in 
the council. In the case of majority support, the distribution of policymaking authority 
becomes similar to the committee system.
The main source of variation was the extent to which politics is institutionalized 
in the three countries. The cabinet model in Estonia was characterized by extremely 
intensive partisan aﬃliations and the formation of factions and coalitions. In Hungary, 
the institutionalization of politics has been almost nonexistent in smaller and medium-
sized communities. The speciﬁcs of the electoral system were also a determining factor in 
this. The committee system, characterized by a very weak executive core, favors regular 
review of costs and the eﬃciency of administration and service delivery, whereas the 
relatively independent administration in Hungary is rather resistant to the review of 
administrative costs.
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1. CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
More than ten years have passed since the major reform of local government in Hungary, 
Estonia, and Latvia. These reforms were focused on the democratization of local gov-
ernance after ﬁfty years’ experience of a “totally administered” society. The magic word 
“decentralization” sums up all the reform rhetoric and practice of that time (Horváth 
2000, Kimbell 1999). Research on local government in CEE countries in the 1990s 
similarly focussed on intergovernmental relations: on the analysis of devices that would 
guarantee autonomy from interventions by central authorities, and of self-government 
at the local level. 
Moreover, this focus on theorizing about local government ﬁts with the European 
academic tradition of recent decades. Models of local government in this tradition 
primarily describe diﬀerent ways of balancing central and local relations, starting with 
Leemans’ seminal book (1970). This is mainly because a broad interpretation of the 
concept of local government has been accepted in the European (institutional) tradi-
tion. Since then various models have been suggested by diﬀerent scholars. Along with 
the fused, split, and dual systems proposed by Leemans, there has been a variety of 
other interpretations emphasizing diﬀerent dimensions of intergovernmental relations. 
Kjellberg (1993) and his followers focused on the analysis of autonomous versus integra-
tive trends in central local relations (Amna, Montin 2000). Wright (1995) developed 
a typology in which the agency model was the speciﬁcally identiﬁed outcome of Brit-
ish local government reforms under the Thatcher government. Recently, John (2001) 
reasserted the legacy of Page and Goldsmith’s North-South typology (Page, Goldsmith 
1987) which combines three basic variables—functions, discretion, and access—in 
analyzing intergovernmental dynamics.
Hence, the analysis of local government reforms and its outcomes has a rather favo-
rable theoretical context. Nevertheless, there does not appear to have been much progress 
in analyzing local government institutional developments from the standpoint of the 
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central-local balance that Leemans and Smith (1993), in particular, have considered the 
cornerstone of local governance and democracy. To some extent the theoretical weakness 
in the analysis of intergovernmental relations was caused by the speciﬁc interpretation 
of the principle of subsidiarity, either from a libertarian perspective (Vanberg 1997) or 
from a rhetorical perspective that serves certain political interests (Sanglot, Blichner 
1996).
But the main reason was rather trivial. The majority of the analysis completed by 
western scholars merely reviewed the emerging democratic institutions of governance 
and did not aim for a more profound analysis. Presumably, this was mainly because of 
language barriers. For a long period the majority of domestic analysts did not have suf-
ﬁcient academic capacity and remained rather descriptive, or they saw their main task as 
commenting on legal texts. More successful was the analysis of the concrete dimensions 
of local government, e.g., local ﬁnances (especially Hőgye 2002).
The Indicators of Local Democracy Project—on which our data analysis will 
rely—was one of the ﬁrst attempts at a quantitative comparative analysis of local gov-
ernance carried out at the Toqueville Research Center (Soós et al. 2002). However, 
here too we could not see a calculated strategy of testing certain theoretical models or 
hypotheses: the need for ﬁrst-hand factual data about the state of local democracy was 
still very urgent.
Another, narrower approach to “models” of local government originates in the US 
Model City Charter (Frederickson 2001, Svara 2001). Representatives of this tradition 
also analyze balance as a core mechanism in the institutionalization of democracy. But 
they focus on the horizontal balance of core local government institutions: council, 
mayor, and city manager. This analysis discusses the practical strengths and weaknesses 
of various conﬁgurations of interaction among those actors and institutions in diverse 
local government landscapes in the US (Hansell 2000). But some other authors have 
developed a rather sophisticated theoretical analysis of these diverse situations (Svara 
1990, Mouritzen, Svara 2002) as well as profound international comparisons (Mouritzen, 
Svara 2002). European and especially CEE analysts have largely dropped this dimension 
of theoretical modelling from their focus. In Europe, the analysis of local government 
regimes has attracted more attention (John 2002). We are deeply convinced that this 
is one of main reasons why key problems of local development—citizens’ involvement, 
democratic control, and corruption—have not received enough serious theoretical and 
practical attention in CEE countries. Why not?
The majority of new democracies in CEE chose the autonomous model of local 
government. By1993 Kjellberg and his colleagues (Kjellberg 1993, Kjelleberg et al. 
1994, Sootla 1995, Kjellberg et al. 1996) had already warned that a conﬁguration of 
split hierarchies that had developed in many CEE countries (Estonia, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and temporarily in Latvia) would create considerable problems not 
only in balancing central-local relations but also in the internal dynamics of governance. 
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An implicit controversy between democratic values and the capacity of local authori-
ties appropriate to this model soon started to hinder the development of channels of 
responsiveness for meeting citizens’ needs and the establishment of enough eﬀective 
mechanisms of democratic control at the local level (see also Bennett 1996).
Autonomous models of local government are founded on wide local democracy and 
democratic representation (Kjellberg 1993). Autonomy provides much freedom to act 
with discretion at the local level, but there is no eﬀective mechanism of external control 
over autonomous actors, i.e., local government institutions. If external mechanisms of 
control (administrative intervention) emerge, the logic of autonomous local government 
will be considerably distorted. Without internal devices of democratic control—party 
competition, transparency, feedback, and input from the citizenry—the local authority 
may develop into an oligarchy that can be brought under control only through strict 
centralization. For this reason, horizontal checks and balances between LG institutions 
and actors are the cornerstone of smooth democratic governance in the framework of 
autonomous models. Hence, we ﬁnd ourselves taking a more narrow approach to the 
theory of local government models, since this will  serve the immediate needs of local 
governments in CEE countries. 
The main aim and purpose of this study is to analyze the institutional checks and 
balances in diverse legal and cultural institutional environments. We assume that institu-
tional actors have diﬀerent roles in diverse models and, therefore, that the policymaking 
process and style varies in Latvia, Hungary, and Estonia.
In the conclusion of his analysis of the Model Charter, Frederickson (2001) ob-
serves that “the formal legal description of a given city as either council-manager or 
mayor-council is less accurate than the particular structural variation that the citizens 
of a given community have chosen to adopt in order to make their government reﬂect 
their preferences and values.” He also cites Adrian  (1998), who has suggested that “the 
distinction between cities on the basis of their legal platforms is less and less meaning-
ful.” Let us take these remarks as a tentative general hypothesis and research strategy, 
since such purely theoretical models cannot easily be veriﬁed through empirical analysis. 
Also, in the course of institutionalization—understood in the context of normative 
institutionalism (Powell, Dimaggio 1991)—of democratic mechanisms and values such 
as representation and participation, legal deﬁnitions would lose their constitutive impact. 
The actual shape of democratic institutions reﬂects the dynamic attitudes, capacities, 
and actions of local actors.
Hence, we deﬁne our research strategy. After describing the empirical research and 
methods used, we provide a brief analysis of possible formal models developed in Hun-
gary, Estonia, and Latvia. Then we analyze how the main local government institutions 
are balanced within various dimensions. In the ﬁnal section we make suggestions for 
further analysis.
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2. THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE 
 AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN HUNGARY, ESTONIA, AND LATVIA 
We would like to concretize somewhat the typology oﬀered by American authors and to 
distinguish between the council, mayor, and manager forms, in which diﬀerent models 
of organization of the executive serve as the basis for comparison. This is important 
because the council-manager (mayoral) conﬁguration can entail three rather diﬀerent 
ways of organizing the key actors in the policymaking process: committee, cabinet, 
and mayor.
2.1 The Committee Model 
A textbook version of the committee system is apparent in the UK (Smith 1993, Stoker 
1991). In this system emphasis is on collegial policymaking at council committees and on 
the avoidance of the concentration of meaningful power in any single actor. In addition, 
committees exert considerable power in supervising the implementation of council deci-
sions by independent agencies. Councilors in this kind of local government have a very 
intensive and extensive workload (Rao 1999). It is intensive because the decision-making 
process is entirely deliberative and must be recorded in writing, and extensive because 
many routine tasks and also policy advice (preparation of drafts for decision) that are 
often delegated to the executive, are done in this case by council and its committees. 
Also, to steer LG agencies and organizations, boards are established where councilors 
participate as actors. The main idea in this model is to ensure as much representation 
or input as possible from the community via its representatives and as much control as 
possible over the policymaking process by those representatives. This model does not 
promote strong leadership as is expected in the US. Rather, the mayor’s role is at best 
primus inter alia, but more frequently that of representative and mediator.  The mayor’s 
oﬃce itself has only a small separate administration, as administrative tasks are delegated 
to the independent agencies. The mayor’s oﬃce serves mainly to manage certain support-
ing functions, e.g., personnel management or purely bureaucratic-technical functions 
such as handling documentation. The city manager is a weak ﬁgure because his role is 
merely to steer the work of agencies.
We expect that the committee model reduces the role of partisan representation, 
because working in committees and side-by-side with professional staﬀ advisers would 
gradually socialize councilors to take a more professional approach to their work. In 
this framework, an adversarial situation that is normal when party competition forms 
the basis of the policymaking process could not emerge.
Latvia has clearly modelled its organization on this kind of political-administrative 
split (Vanags, Vilka 2001, Vilka et al. 2002). This is obvious even at the level of termi-
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nology, where the word “mayor” is not used in legislation, but “chairperson” instead. In 
the Latvian Local Government Act, the representative body is called the “territorial local 
government council,” which indicates identiﬁcation of government and council.
According to the Local Government Act the most powerful actor in the Latvian 
local community is the council, which has extensive competence up to and including 
the nomination of judges (Section 21). Legislative initiatives can be brought forward 
by councilors, committees, or the chairperson and by the initiator of an extraordinary 
meeting. In other words, the head of the administration does not have the right to 
make proposals for decision at council (Section 33). The failure to reach quorum is 
such a serious event in Latvian local life that Cabinet must be informed if this occurs. 
There is no separate executive oﬃce in Latvia at the municipal level. The mayor’s oﬃce 
is also a unit of council, because in communities with fewer than 5,000 habitants the 
chairperson also occupies the post of chief executive oﬃcer.
Council committees have the right to “monitor the work of the local government 
institutions and undertakings,” which is usually the role of the executive (see also Rao 
1991). In Latvia, the heads of public organizations who become councilors cannot 
be members of committees that monitor the work of their own organization (Section 
58). This indicates that such committees have signiﬁcant power of scrutiny and direct 
supervision, besides their role as dominant policymaker. Latvian councils can also form 
boards of directors, commissions, or working groups for “the performance of speciﬁc 
functions or for administration of the administrative territory” (Section 61). This is a 
much diﬀerent mandate than the mandate of supervisory boards that are largely used 
in democratic local communities.
According to Latvian law the executive director is appointed to steer the work 
of LG independent agencies and organizations. The scope of the director’s powers is 
deﬁned in the provisions of the law (Section 69). Executive directors can only propose 
the candidate of the head of organizations of the local administration, who is appointed 
by council. (For instance, in Estonia this is exclusively within the authority of the head 
of the local executive, not council.)The executive director has a small administrative 
oﬃce, but this structural unit is not prescribed by law. As only 8% of local government 
units have a population above 5,000 (Vilks 2002), these two institutions in Latvia are 
mostly merged into one.
Speciﬁc to the Latvian conﬁguration of LG are the unusually extensive rights of 
intervention by central government and even ministers who can, for instance, call 
extraordinary sessions and initiate legislation at the local council. This is radically diﬀer-
ent from UK practice (Smith 1993). In the Latvian case the need for direct intervention 
would be caused by the need for a fast solution to (possible) conﬂicts between central 
government and local communities, particularly where the Russian-speaking popula-
tion forms the majority.         
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2.2 The Mayoral Model 
The model of the mayor as chief executive has many variations in real life, depending 
on whether the mayor is assisted by a career oﬃcial (city manager) and whether the 
mayor is appointed by council or directly elected. When the mayor is appointed by 
council and does not have the support of a majority of council, the model approaches 
the committee model. The similarity is especially strong if the local government does not 
have a city manager or the role of the latter is very weak. The mayor’s role in this case 
would be reduced to chairing council meetings and supervising independent executive 
agencies and organizations (see also Hansell 1999, 2000).
At the other end of the continuum, the mayor is directly elected and has the full 
support of council as the leader of the majority party. The mayor is assisted by the city 
manager who is completely dependent on the mayor’s mercy, because council does not 
have independent policymaking powers to balance the mayor-manager tandem. That 
is, the mayor as the formal chief administrator has complete control over the council in 
developing local policy. The only variables that could hinder the authority of this mayor 
are a weak party and coalition discipline at council. This model is already close to the 
mayor-council model that is usually applied in fused (not autonomous or dual) systems 
of local governance. But in our case Hungary has some traits of the fused system.
In our opinion, Hungary belongs to this classical council-manager, mayoral system. 
Council has the power and capacity to be involved in policymaking at the preparatory 
stages and can play a substantive role in the supervision and steering of local ﬁnances and 
property. A directly elected mayor is ﬁrst of all the head of council, and then the head 
of the mayor’s oﬃce. Both the mayor’s oﬃce and its manager (notary) emanate—ac-
cording to law—from the will of council. All other powers of LG institutional actors are 
delegated by council. Obviously, the direct election of mayors after the 1994 revisions 
to the LG Act was intended to balance somewhat those powers and to avoid the over-
politicization of administration. A similar model was used in Estonia and was abolished 
for the same reasons (Sootla 1995.)
However, the above description of the status of council reﬂects the formal, legal 
deﬁnition. In reality, the mayor’s oﬃce is a rather important and separate part of the 
administrative machinery because it is managed by an independent notary. This makes 
the mayor and notary important autonomous actors in preparing policy decisions. 
Council cannot directly steer the departments of the mayor’s oﬃce, but can ask the 
mayor to intervene if council members suspect that the oﬃce or its departments are not 
responsive enough to council’s policy positions. The manager would actually play a very 
important if not central role vis-à-vis the mayor, especially in the case of cohabitation.2 
Firstly, council only approves the results of an open competition that is the basis for 
selection of the manager. This makes it rather diﬃcult to ﬁre the manager. The man-
ager is formally the employer of civil servants who are employed at council. Last but 
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not least, the city manager is responsible for the implementation of state tasks assigned 
to the local authorities. Thus, city managers are also representatives of the state at the 
local level. This shows the presence of elements of a fused local government system in 
Hungary. All this would make the city manager rather powerful in balancing council’s 
policy agenda and especially in supervising the administration and independent agencies 
that are formally the responsibilities of council. 
A recent study of local budgeting demonstrated how the cohabitation period creates 
a council where committees play an exclusively dominant role in relation to the mayor 
and the mayor’s oﬃce. On the other hand, in the absence of cohabitation the notary plays 
a much more important role in the preparation of the budget (Hőgye et al. 2002).
2.3 The Cabinet Model
The cabinet model delegates extensive policymaking authority to the politically ap-
pointed and controlled mayor, who is usually the leader of a major political party and 
coalition. The mayor appoints a collegial executive body that is similar to ministerial 
(as in France or Belgium) or government cabinets, depending on where the members of 
cabinet come from. Council has mainly a legislative role and acts as principle representa-
tive of the community as the owner of public property. All transactions involving the 
community’s assets, removable property, and ﬁnancial obligations must be decided only 
by the council. Besides policymaking, cabinet has full discretion in making decisions 
concerning administrative aﬀairs. The main policy proposals come from cabinet. In 
the framework of the cabinet model, the institutions of local governance—council and 
government—can be eﬀective and responsive to community needs only if their activi-
ties rely on a balanced spectrum of parties. The parties exert political control over the 
executive and at the same time ensure the passage of the mayor’s proposals in council. 
But the active role of the mayor and cabinet in preparing policy does not necessarily 
mean that council’s committees are marginal in the policy process. Besides assisting 
council in its legislative role, council committees play a signiﬁcant role in supervising 
the administration, especially concerning their costs and eﬃciency. 
Thus, Estonia has developed a classical cabinet model with a balance between the 
representative and executive sides. Presumably, the various modiﬁcations of the cabinet 
system are caused by the diﬀerent interrelations between government and administra-
tion. One strategy is to delegate as many functions as possible to independent or private 
actors (management perspective). In this case, the cabinet is more policy oriented and 
less prone to taking on managerial functions. The other strategy, adopted in Nordic 
countries, is to involve local civil society actors in managing  the rather integrated and 
complex local government (governance perspective) through collegial bodies. Estonia 
has chosen the ﬁrst scenario. For instance, in 2002 only 5.64% of all local government 
revenues came from economic activities.
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In Estonia mayors as well as members of the cabinet must not come from council. 
They can be community leaders, businessmen, and even key civil servants who are not 
elected as members of council but are proposed by the coalition and appointed by the 
council. This is not permitted in Latvia and in Hungary. On the one hand, a powerful 
mayor should not have a direct mandate from citizens but only the support of majority 
coalition members. This can increase the undemocratic impact of interest groups and 
corporatist networks. On the other hand, the appointment of the mayor and especially 
members of cabinet not from the council enables the strengthening of  the professional 
dimension of the executive and avoids its overpoliticization. 
The council has a relatively limited competence, although—as in all countries—only 
the council has a direct mandate of governance from citizens. The scope of its actual 
competence in Estonia is similar to the obligatory competence of the council in Hungary. 
That is, the Estonian council’s actual competence is restricted to a minimum, i.e., as 
legislator and representative of owners’ (community property) rights. The cabinet man-
ages and shapes local policy, which the council then debates and approves or does not 
approve. Thus, council acts in the policy process primarily as a supplementary political 
check (or control) and legitimizer of decisions elaborated by the government. Even in 
the appointment of cabinet, the council could approve or disapprove the mayor’s choice. 
All other appointments are at the discretion of the mayor. 
Our analysis of budgeting practices revealed quite extensive cooperation and a clear 
division of roles between government and council. The main actor in the budgeting 
process was of course the government. But government, which is interested in the smooth 
adoption of its budget, involved key actors from council in the budget preparation 
process, including the establishment of expenditure “ceilings” and the  harmonization 
of details. Cooperation between governing institutions and civil society is also visible 
in other areas. Chairs of other committees and especially members of commissions (the 
latter must not be members of council) are often leaders of civil society or of a public 
organization in the same area that is strictly prohibited in Latvia.   
  However, council members have the power to exert political control over the mayor 
and cabinet. Hence, partisan politics is crucial for balancing those two institutions in 
this form of governance. In 1997–98 the commission for public administration  reform 
suggested introducing the position of city manager. But in the cabinet system this is 
not necessary because of the strong balance between the roles of mayor and council. 
Party factions could be separate and powerful actors in multiparty governments, which 
would make the council more independent vis-à-vis the mayor.
We turn now from the description of the models, legal provisions, and actual practices 
of local governance in the three countries, to the data that informs our study.
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3. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
The data was created within the framework of the “Indicators of Local Democracy” 
project that was developed and coordinated by the Toqueville Research Center in 
Budapest. Surveys were carried out in Hungary and Latvia in the spring of 2001 and 
in Estonia in the fall of 2002 and early winter 2003. There were two diﬀerent surveys. 
One was the Local Government Survey (LGS) which polled top oﬃcials from local 
administrations in an eﬀort to identify, through more or less neutral respondents, the 
main parameters of the functioning of local government and local democracy. The other 
was the Local Representatives Survey (LRS) in which the work of council and values 
of local council members were expressed. As the project was carefully managed and 
coordinated from the Toqueville Research Center, the research was almost identical in 
all seven countries that participated. Here we describe the research process and methods 
that were employed in Estonia.
The sampling for the local councilors’ survey was established according to population 
size. If a municipality was sampled, all the local councilors of that municipality were 
included in the study. The sample included 120 municipalities out of 241 (n=1,878), 
and the survey was conducted by mail. The response rate in Estonia was 56.5%. In 
Hungary the sample included 3,192 respondents, with a response rate of 29%. This 
survey was not done in Latvia.
For the chief administrative oﬃcers’ survey, at least two top oﬃcials were selected 
from each of the 241 municipalities (that is, the number of LG units) in the sampling 
frame. In Hungary and Latvia the survey was conducted by interview and in Estonia 
by mail. The LGS questionnaires were sent to the respondents by post and returned in 
the same way to the research group. In Hungary the sample was 704 persons and 646 
were polled. In Latvia the sample was 280 and 241 were polled. In Estonia the survey 
included 355 persons. The response rate overall was 76.4%. Table 7.1 shows the sent 
and returned questionnaires as they were distributed across the regions.
The standard format of the LRS and LGS questionnaires was used with minor ad-
aptations for the speciﬁcs of the Estonian LG system. Some changes were made because 
of the extremely small size of Estonia and Estonian municipalities, but these minor 
amendments do not harm the comparability of the data. The Estonian version of the 
questionnaire has been translated back into English and checked for correctness at the 
T–RC. The LRS  questionnaire contains 68 items and the LGS one 95.
The survey data are analyzed against a number of background variables, the most 
common of which is the size of municipality.
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3.1 Data Analysis and Discussion
 
In this section we will ﬁrst identify the institutional actors’ impact on local government 
decisions. This indicator demonstrates the actual role of various institutions in the poli-
cymaking process as well as the general horizontal balance of power at the local level. 
Second, we analyze variables that inﬂuence the balance between council and mayor, 
identifying also the variables that are most likely to cause imbalance. Third, we examine 
the major actors in the decision-making process and hence the decision-making styles 
under diﬀerent regimes of governance. Finally we turn to council-administration rela-
tions and the supervisory role of council.
3.1.1 The Distribution of Power between Institutional Actors
In diﬀerent models the distribution of actual power and inﬂuence might be consider-
able. In both surveys we asked respondents: 
“Generally speaking, how much is the inﬂuence of the following persons and bodies on 
the decisions of your local government? Please evaluate their inﬂuence using a seven-point 
scale, where 1 means a relatively a smaller inﬂuence and 7 a very big inﬂuence.”
The results are presented in table 7.2.
We can see in table 7.2 that the general horizontal balance of power at the local 
level is diﬀerent among the three countries. In Latvia all local institutional actors have 
quite a strong impact on decisions, but council and committees are most powerful. The 
mayor as head of cabinet and the chair of council are clearly the most inﬂuential actors 
in Estonia. It is interesting that Estonian top oﬃcials and councilors agree on who the 
most powerful actors are, while this is not the case in Hungary.3 Hungarian top oﬃcials 
Table 7.1
Distribution of Sent and Received Survey Samples by Region in Estonia
Regions Included counties Survey samples
LRS sent LRS returned LGS sent LGS returned
Western Estonia Hiiu, Saare, Lääne, Pärnu 307 128 66 51
North-east Estonia Lääne-viru, Ida-Viru 378 190 41 54
Northern Estonia Harju, Rapla, Järva, Tallinn 528 278 102 65
Central Estonia Jőgeva, Viljandi, Tartu 282 234 106 66
Southern Estonia Valga, Vőru, Pőlva 244 153 40 36
Total 1,739 983 355 272
Source: Estonian LRS 2002, LGS 2002.
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consider the administration in the mayor’s oﬃce (city manager) to be the most inﬂuential 
actor, but councilors do not think it has very strong impact on the decisions of LG. 
Instead, they think the mayor is the leader in inﬂuencing LG policymaking. 
The other general indicator shows the diﬀerence in impact between the most power-
ful and least powerful actors. In countries with a smaller diﬀerence (Latvia with a mean 
of 1.56) there would be more institutional balance in comparison with Estonia where 
this diﬀerence is as much as 2.43. In Estonia, the imbalance between the various actors 
is obvious: local decision makers regard business as more inﬂuential than themselves!
One more general indicator is the diﬀerence in the overall average strength of the 
actors (i.e., their power resources). In Latvia the overall mean of the power resources 
of all institutionalized actors was 5.75, whereas in Estonia the mean power resource of 
councilors was 4.55 and of top oﬃcials 4.74, which was even less than the result for the 
“most interested citizens” in Latvia. Here we could hypothesize about the reasons for 
the diﬀerence in the overall estimation of power resources.  On the one hand, it might 
be the result of purely psychological diﬀerences in the acceptance of power distance in 
diﬀerent cultures. Power distance is a widely used concept of Hofstede (1994), which 
describes diﬀerences in the acceptance of the feasibility and legitimacy of unequal dis-
tribution of power among people. It is expected that diﬀerences in the acceptance of 
power distance also inﬂuences the assessment of the actual scope of power resources 
that superiors or institutions command. In cultures that tolerate a large power distance, 
Table 7.2
The Impact of Diﬀerent Institutional Actors on LG Decisions According 
to Top Oﬃcials and Councilors (Means*)
Latvia              Hungary Estonia
Top officials Top officials Councilors Top officials Councilors
Mayor/ chairperson 5.43 5.37 5.82 5.67 5.41
Head of council — — — 5.37 5.10
Council 6.74 5.31 — — —
Councilors 5.33 5.30 4.42 3.24 3.65
Committees 6.09 5.51 4.86 4.93 4.72
Mayors’ office 
(administration)
5.18 5.90 3.67 4.01 3.87
Most interested citizens 4.91 3.65 3.28 3.39 3.51
National government 3.80 4.03 4.72 2.86 4.23
Business 3.69 3.57 3.42 3.41 3.98
Note: * mean on 7 point scale: 1—no inﬂuence at all, 7—very big inﬂuence.
Source: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LRS, LSG 2001, Estonian LRS 2002, LGS 2003.
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the power resource of superiors/institutions seems much larger for subordinates than 
the scope of power that superiors or institutions actually command. Legitimate powers 
acquire supplementary weight here. (The impact of acceptance of large/small power 
distance on the assessment of power resources of institutions by people must be care-
fully studied.) The other reason could be the diﬀerence in actual power resources that 
authorities in various countries can command. Power resources can be interpreted in 
that case as the amount of monetary resources (budget) one can command and the 
number of services the local government directly provides. 
In Latvia and Estonia the weightings for the main actors in terms of power were 
as expected. In the Latvian committee system the council and its committees play a 
decisive role, whereas in Estonia power is held by a strong mayor as head of the cabinet 
and/or such authority is concentrated in the hands of single actors (the mayor and head 
of council), which the committee system intentionally tries to avoid.
Top oﬃcials’ and councilors’ diﬀerent opinions may be the result of their consider-
ably distinct ﬁelds of action. A directly elected mayor is ﬁrst of all head of council and, 
according to the results of the study, frequently has complete control over the council. 
Local council is primarily a forum for political discussion that would be considered by 
councilors as the most important dimension of policymaking. (As table 7.3 shows, 
councilors tend to think that they have much less power than the mayor does.) The 
main responsibility of the notary and his/ her subordinates, besides elaborating policy 
proposals, is the implementation of state tasks assigned to the state and local authorities. 
For the oﬃcials, these dimensions of policymaking are presumably the highest source 
of authority at the local level. 
What is more surprising is that the direct election of mayors in Hungary has not 
resulted in a considerable higher overall power potential for that position compared to 
the council chair in other countries. The power resources should be higher when the 
Table 7.3
Impact of Committees on LG Decisions by Size of Community (Means*)
Latvia Hungary Estonia
> 1000 4.65 3.17 4.62
1,000–1,999 5.51 4.71 4.72
2,000–4,999 5.83 5.92 5.11
5,000–9,999 6.24 5.96 5.37
10,000 < 6.34 5.73 4.72
Total 6.07 5.51 4.92
Note: * means on 7 point scale: 1—no inﬂuence at all, 7—very big inﬂuence.
Sources: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LRS, LGS 2001, Estonian LRS 2002, LGS 2003.
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mayor commands a majority in council and considerably lower when such support is 
absent (Horváth 2000).
The size of community is not as strong an independent variable for diﬀerences in 
the balance of power and power resources as is usually expected. An exception is the 
commissions, whose power is considerably strengthened with increase in size, especially 
in Latvia and Hungary. 
Some less important observations can also be made. The increase in the inﬂuence of 
the position of mayor with the increase in size of municipality was surprisingly moder-
ate in Latvia and Hungary. In Estonia, too, where the mayor is the chief executive, the 
mayor’s inﬂuence hardly increased at all. In Latvia and Estonia the role of councilors 
decreased as the size of community increased, whereas in Hungary we observe the 
reverse trend.   
Speciﬁc aspects of the institutional power balance are also indicated in the consider-
able role attributed to “most interested citizens” in Latvia, which is comparable to the 
power resources of the mayor’s oﬃce. This is not surprising in the committee system 
with its principle of representation and management boards in which citizens can be 
involved, since this would tighten the contact between authorities and citizens. In Esto-
nia, citizens can be members of council commissions (unlike in Latvia) and participate 
at council meetings, but their impact is considerably lower. 
The other diﬀerence between the countries concerns the extent of autonomy. In 
Hungary and Latvia the inﬂuence of central government on LG decisions was much 
higher than in Estonia. Earlier, we discussed the controversy concerning the Latvian 
autonomous system where central authorities and even individuals (ministers) can easily 
intervene in the aﬀairs of local authorities. In Hungary the source of this kind of inﬂuence 
is diﬀerent. The local government notary (manager) is, among other roles, a representa-
tive of the central government at the local level charged with implementing tasks of the 
central government in the community. This makes Hungarian local government similar 
to the continental model, although the (moderate) authority of directly elected mayors 
is evidence of a diﬀerence from the continental tradition (Smith 1993).
3.1.2 Cooperation between Council and Mayor
Although the mayors in these three countries play somewhat diﬀerent roles, the issue 
of cooperation between mayor and council indicates further diﬀerences in local govern-
ance systems. We did not ﬁnd overall diﬀerences among the countries in this respect 
(table 7.4). 
What can we conclude from this? Can we say that there is no adversarial policymak-
ing in local government in these countries? Here the variable of municipal size started 
to play a rather important role. In Latvia the level of cooperation was not inﬂuenced 
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by size, but in Hungary and Estonia the overall level of cooperation increased with the 
increase in size. This trend was almost even in municipalities of all sizes. In Estonia the 
problem of cooperation seems to be most urgent in the smallest communities.
The other variable—the politicization of the mayor—is even more interesting and 
had the strongest impact. Also, this correlation is very signiﬁcant in enabling us to ap-
proach the core ﬁnding of our study.
In Hungary and especially in Latvia (table 7.5), support for the mayor decreases if 
the mayor is a member of any party. In Estonia we see the reverse trend—mayors who are 
party members tend to have better relations with the council compared to non-partisan 
mayors. The variations among countries in this respect become even more pronounced 
when party membership is analyzed (table 7.6).
The extent of partisan aﬃliation is radically diﬀerent in Estonia, even in the case 
of the smallest communities. In Latvia the comparable level of partisan aﬃliation is 
found in communities with 5,000 or more inhabitants (6% of all municipalities) and 
in Hungary in those with 10,000 or more (4.4%). This means that council-mayor rela-
tions in the majority of Hungarian and Latvian communities rely on rather diﬀerent 
Table 7.4
Cooperation between Council and Mayor in Latvia, Hungary, and Estonia [%]
Latvia Hungary Estonia
Majority supports the mayor 51.8 48.7 50.0
Depends on the issue 47.7 50.2 49.6
Mayor is rarely supported 0.5 1.1 0.4
Sources: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001 and the Estonian LGS 2003.
Table 7.5
 Eﬀect of Party Membership of Mayor on Level of Cooperation 
between Council and Mayor [%]
Latvia Hungary Estonia
Party 
member
Non-
member
Party 
member
Non-
member
Party 
member
Non- 
member
Majority supports 
the mayor
34.9 71.2 44.2 52.1 51.8 41.7
Depends on 
the issue
64.3 28.8 55.4 46.8 47.7 58.3
Mayor is rarely 
supported
0.8 0.0 0.4 50.6 0.5 0.0
Source: Latvian LSG 2001, Hungarian LSG 2001, Estonian LSG 2003.
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Table 7.6
Frequency of Political Party Membership of Mayors [%]
Latvia Hungary Estonia
Yes No Yes No Yes No
> 1,000 7.7 92.3 8.2 91.8 60.7 39.3
1,000–1,999 5.8 74.2 11.7 88.3 82.9 17.1
2,000–4,999 36.7 63.3 11.5 88.5 78.6 21.4
5,000–9,999 66,7 33,3 31,7 68,3 97,1 2,9
10,000 < 64.4 35.6 64.5 35.5 88.2 11.8
Total 53.1 46.9 44.4 55.6 81.3 18.7
Sources:  Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001 and Estonian LGS 2003.
principles than in Estonia. We should reemphasize here that the mayor in Estonia is the 
head of the executive and comes not from council but from the community. In Latvia 
and Hungary the mayor must be elected as the member of council and should therefore 
have some clear political aﬃliation.  Hence we would expect to have two diﬀerent types 
of decision-making process in the local councils: deliberative-councilor-centered and 
factional-coalition-centered. 
3.1.3 The Role and Forms of Politicization in Policymaking
Latvia and Estonia represent two divergent conﬁgurations within actual policymaking 
institutions. In Latvia policymaking and implementation occur in committee. The city 
manager, as noted earlier, does not have the right to make proposals for decision at 
council in Latvia. In Estonia policymaking and implementation are the responsibility 
of the mayor as head of cabinet. Commissions and factions within council mostly play 
the role of political supervision and promotion of coalition interests.
Coalitions and factions are less developed in Hungary and most developed in Es-
tonia (table 7.7). 
In Estonia only about a quarter of the councils in smaller communities do not have 
factions, whereas this is the highest level of factionalization of councils in Hungary and 
Latvia. In Hungary factions are found only in the largest communities. The extent of 
factionalization of councils is far higher in Latvia than in Hungary. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of forming an organized opposition or coalition is minimal in almost all local 
councils in Hungary and in more than 50% of councils in Latvia (ﬁgure 7.1).
Are the extent of institutionalization of factions and the presence of an opposition 
reliable enough as indicators to predict the intensiveness of partisan politics in the 
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council? Parties might exist, but because of the strong role of council in general and 
the committees in particular, there are few incentives for councilors to be organized as 
factions.    
In our survey, a formal agreement to establish coalitions was reported in only a few 
local councils in Hungary, except in the largest municipalities (at 27%) which includes 
only 4.3% of all LG units. In Latvia coalition agreements are a bit more popular, but 
still do not exceed 6% or 7% in the smaller and 20% in the largest communities. In 
Estonia coalition politics is much more developed and signiﬁcant even in the smallest 
communities.
If  parties do not ﬁnd it feasible to organize into formal coalitions, another indica-
tor of the number of informal coalitions and voting practices could be how strong the 
organized/partisan decision-making at councils is.
As demonstrated in ﬁgure 7.2, in Latvian municipalities (except in those with a 
population above 10,000) the proportion of reported formal and informal coalitions 
Table 7.7
Number of Factions per Council [%]
0 1 2 3 and more
LATVIA
> 1,000 57.1 14.3 21.4 7.1
1,000–1,999 64.5 9.7 19.4 6.5
2,000–4,999 54.8 9.7 22.6 12.9
5,000–9,999 55.6 11.1 16.7 16.7
10,000 < 27.7 0.0 38.5 33.8
HUNGARY
> 1,000 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1,000–1,999 98.3 0.0 1.7 0.0
2,000–4,999 93.8 2.1 4.2 0.0
5,000–9,999 96.6 1.7 1,7 0.0
10,000 < 24.7 1.1 14.2 60.1
ESTONIA
> 1,000 28.0 8.0 40.0 24.0
1,000–1,999 27.0 10.0 46.0 17.0
2,000–4,999 17.5 6.2 44.3 32.0
5,000–9,999 8.6 8.6 37.1 45.7
10,000 < 0.0 0.0 21.1 79.0
Sources:  Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001, Estonian LGS 2003.
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Table 7.8
Public Agreement about the Establishment of a Majority Coalition [%]
Latvia Hungary Estonia
Yes No Yes No Yes No
> 1,000 7.7 92.3 0.0 100.0 14.8 85.2
1,000–1,999 6.5 93.5 1.7 98.3 20.8 79.2
2,000–4,999 10.0 90.0 0.0 100.0 24.7 75.3
5,000–9,999 11.1 88.9 3.4 96.6 69.7 30.3
10,000 < 18.9 81.1 27.8 72.2 68.8 31.3
Total 15.0 81.0 16.8 83.2 30.5 69.5
Source: Latvian LSG 2001, Hungarian LSG 2001, Estonian LSG 2003.
Figure 7.1
Proportion of Local Councils with and without Factions [%]
Sources: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001, Estonian LGS 2003.
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No Faction Faction
does not exceed 30%. In Hungary the role of informal coalitions is also insigniﬁcant, 
but their importance gradually increases when the population of the community reaches 
5,000 or higher. 
This partly conﬁrms our tentative hypothesis that the excessive role of commissions 
can diminish the role of political party values and increase the role of professional  values 
and committee identity.
The next indicator of decision-making style is voting behaviour. The only comparable 
data we can use for this is the frequency of unanimous decisions.
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Table 7.9
Frequency of Unanimous Decisions (Mean on 10-Point Scale)
Latvia Hungary Estonia
> 1,000 7.86 8.10 5.41
1,000–1,999 7.90 7.77 6.24
2,000–4,999 7.64 7.30 5.61
5,000–9,999 7.62 6.51 4.75
10,000 < 7.84 4.33 4.00
Total 7.81 5.61 5.92
Sources: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001, Estonian LGS 2003.
Figure 7.2
Proportion of Local Councils with Formal or Informal Coalition Agreements [%]
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This data is almost completely in accord with our previous observations. In Hungary, 
where coalitions have the weakest role, we ﬁnd the largest proportion of unanimous 
decisions. This decreases with the increase in size of community and is at comparatively 
the same level as in Estonia’s largest communities. Latvia’s results show an evenly high 
level of unanimous decisions. Presumably, coalition politics does not make much sense 
in committee-centered councils. But that does not mean there are not intense debates 
in Latvian councils. On the contrary, this was reported as the strongest variable in 
inﬂuencing decisions.
Sources: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001, Estonian LGS 2003.
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Unfortunately, data from Hungary and Latvia were not reliable enough to enable 
us to identify voting behaviour from the standpoint of conﬂicts and debates. This is 
because the questions were related only to communities where coalitions actually ex-
isted, and in Hungary and Latvia the proportion of such communities was rather low. 
Therefore, we have evidence only from Estonia where coalition and opposition politics 
is the essential device in decision-making.
It is true that there are fewer politically sensitive issues at the local level than at the 
national level. The Estonian data provide some idea of what proportion of issues would 
be sensitive to party politics. In about half of the cases, the coalition has not retained 
unity. Even more frequently, councilors who are not members of a coalition supported 
the coalition when voting at council. That is, the dichotomy between deliberative and 
coalitional politics and the corresponding diﬀerence between committee-based and 
coalition-based decisions are not so strict in the local policymaking process.
3.1.4 The Role of Council in Steering Administration
The last aspect of our analysis is the balance between council and administration. What 
devices are typically used to steer the bureaucracy? We would expect that in the com-
mittee type of local government direct scrutiny and intervention would be preferred, 
whereas in the cabinet type political methods of control would be used as a more reli-
able device.
In our survey the indicator for such controls was the intensity of council’s review of 
costs and of the eﬃciency of administration. The question asked was the following:
Table 7.10
Voting Behavior in Estonian Councils by Size of Local Community (Mean*)
Voting behaviour Size of local community by population
> 1,000 1,000-1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000–9,999 10,000 < Total
Frequency of 
majority coalition 
voting together
4.79 4.42 5.87 6.61 4.68 5.23
Frequency of majority
coalition prevailing 
against all others
3.34 3.32 4.23 5.03 2.00 3.76
Frequency of 
unanimous decisions
5.41 6.24 5.61 4.75 4.00 5.92
Note: * mean on a 10-point scale.
Source: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001, Estonian LGS 2003.
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“Over and above hearing the usual and mandatory reports, did the council review 
any of the following  at any time in the last year?”
Three targets of scrutiny were diﬀerentiated: administrative costs, costs of local gov-
ernment services, and institutional costs. The results are shown in table 7.11 below.
We ﬁnd considerable evidence of intensive activity in Latvian councils in checking 
administrative and service costs. This is not at all surprising because in Latvia the power 
balance between representatives and the executive is strongly inclined towards council. 
We do not see a meaningful diﬀerence with respect to checking LG institutional costs, 
which is the most intensively used channel of supervision in Estonia and especially in 
Hungary. In Estonia the realization of council’s interest in analyzing administrative 
costs is considerably more intensive than in Hungary, mainly because the politically 
appointed mayor plays a key role in executive and the administration does not have 
the ability to resist. This activity is signiﬁcantly more intensive in Estonia, and council 
is more active in the smallest communities where relations between council and mayor 
are less favorable than in larger councils.
Hungary demonstrated signiﬁcantly less intensity in reviewing administrative costs. 
Presumably this is because it is the mayor’s oﬃce which has to be reviewed, and the 
mayor hardly supports frequent attempts of council to call the mayor to account. At 
the same time, council was as active in Hungary as in Estonia in reviewing services and 
institutional administrative costs, because this is a task of the mayor’s oﬃce and therefore 
there is little resistance to such attempts to control.
Responses to this question demonstrated one very paradoxical result that may indi-
cate possible sources of corruption. In general, institutions’ power resources, especially 
the power of a commission—which is the main initiator of reviews—was positively 
correlated with the frequency of review of costs. But in Latvia it is vice versa—the over-
all intensity of reviews decreased in the largest communities (the numbers in brackets 
indicate the intensity of reviews in Latvia, with the largest councils excluded). More 
detailed analysis revealed that in the largest communities where there was no review of 
costs, and especially of administrative costs, the power resource of the key actors was 
Table 7.11
Intensity of Review of Costs of Administration by Councils during Last Year [%]
Indicator Latvia Hungary Estonia
Review of administrative costs 87.1 (94.84) 47.7 64.6
Review of institutional costs 70.6 (79.8) 66.9 71.1
Review of services costs 84.7 (88.5) 54.1 52.8
Source: Latvian LGS 2001, Hungarian LGS 2001, Estonian LGS 2003.
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higher than that of the key actors in communities which did carry out the review. Hence, 
in some communities where there is extensive concentration of power in the hands of 
council and its institutions, the power resource could also be used to hinder the control 
of administration. We observed a similar statistical trend in Estonia, but in the smallest 
communities in which the decision-making style was signiﬁcantly more deliberative than 
in larger communities where factions and coalition-based decision-making prevails. 
4. CONCLUSION
It is a rather risky enterprise to seek quantitative evidence for the existence of diﬀerent 
theoretical models of local government in diﬀerent countries. Even if the main variable 
accounting for diﬀerences among the countries is the legal frameworks, we ﬁnd that on 
concrete issues there is also considerable variation among local governments within one 
country, which indicates that rather diﬀerent patterns of actual behaviour and attitudes 
do exist in the same legal framework.  
We observed clear diﬀerences between Estonia and Latvia in institutional conﬁgu-
rations, the distribution of authority and patterns of behaviour, which have obviously 
developed in rather diﬀerent legal contexts in those two countries. In Estonia the strong 
role of the executive and in Latvia the strong role of council is emphasized. That is, 
consistent committee and cabinet systems produce internally more homogeneous local 
governance in comparison with the council-mayor system. In Hungary, such diﬀerences 
are caused not only by political variables but also by diﬀerences in the legal context at 
elections in both smaller and large communities. However, such diﬀerent perceptions of 
the roles of institutional actors in local governance by oﬃcials and councilors in Hun-
gary indicated the dispersion of policymaking authority between the main institutions. 
Whether this ﬂexibility of institutional and role conﬁgurations can contribute to the 
eﬀectiveness of local democracy is a research question for further analysis.
NOTES
1 This chapter is the revised version of a paper presented at the 8th IRSPM Symposium, Budapest, March 
30–April 2, 2004. The article was written in the framework of the project.
2  This concept—derived from French government practice—means that a directly elected mayor cannot 
command a majority at the council which is elected separately and according to other rules.
2 Local Representative Study was not done in Latvia and so we can not compare Latvian top oﬃcials’ 
and councilors’ opinions.
3 Indicator of frequency in largest communities.
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What is local democracy?
Is it a social or political issue 
raised by concerned citizens 
at a local government council 
meeting? 
Is it the number of male versus 
the number of female 
representatives in a municipality?
Is it a protest or petition, 
politics or policymaking?
Local democracy is all these things, 
yet local democracy and the 
transformation of local democracy has 
been obscured by the larger political 
transformations taking place 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Faces of Local Democracy is the result of an ongoing 
project promoted by LGI and the Tocqueville Research Center 
to monitor the progress of democracy building 
on the local level. 
In evaluating democratic performance, the papers 
collected in this volume are designed for researchers 
and organizations whose mission is to study, 
monitor, and enhance democratic governance. 
